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ABSTRACT 
This work is an attempt to study the turbulent and dark period 
of late 18th century Persia. We begin with the death in 
1193 A.H./1179 A.D. of the Vakil, Karim Khan Zand, after near-
ly twenty years of rule. Immediately thereafter the conflicts 
and contradictions inherent in a semi-feudal monarchy came to 
the surface, giving rise to the most violent and chaotic anar-
chy. The Vakil's own tribe, the Zands, failed to grasp their 
only chance of survival which was to remain unified against 
their rivals. Instead, one after another Zand prince usurped 
supreme power and killed his own kinsmen. In this process the 
country was destroyed and eventually witnessed the final down-
fall of the Zands in 1209/1794. 
From the death of the Vakil, the Zand 's most formidable rival, 
.Ag.a Mohammad Khan Qajar, was consolidating his power in the 
northern provinces of the kingdom. By careful planning and pat-
ience, he contributed to the weakening and eventual tqtal 
annihilation of ·the Zand dynasty. 
In this thesis we also attempt to clarify the underlying curr-
ents behind these events. The dynamics of the society and soc-
ial and economic forces are studied in detail. This period of 
history is of particular importance as it marks the end of a 
semi-feudal regime based on tribal military support. Before the 
advent of the 19th century, which witnessed the sedentarization 
of nomadic tribes and the formation of a regular and disci-
plined army under the Qaj ars. 
In this study of an important, but little known, period of tran-
sition, particular emphasis is laid on socio-economic aspects 
such as trade, religious life and the structure of late 18th 
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INTRODUCTION 
By the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th centuries, 
Safavid rule was drawing to its close and the invasion of the 
Afghans accelerated the process. Magmud Qalza' i ( Qalj a' i) of 
a Sunni tribe of Qandehar, rebelled in 1134/1721, after his 
tribe had been subject to a long and agonising harassment. He 
marched on Kerman and Yazd and, having captured these 
places, advanced towards Esfahan. He besieged the ~afavid cap-
ital for a few months and eventually captured it. He estab-
lished a short-lived dynasty in Persia, during which period 
the ~afavid crown prince, Tahmasb, made many attempts to top-
ple it. 1 Afghan rule could not, however, withstand the military 
genius of Nader and it collapsed in 1143/1730. 
The impact of Afghan rule on Persia was devastating; many 
cities and towns were destroyed and others suffered massacres, 
famine and the epidemics which followed. Nader overthrew the 
Afghans and freed the Persian empire from the hands of two 
great powers, Ottoman Turkey to the west, and Russia to the 
north. In his spectacular victories in India, he brought back 
riches which were spent only on military expeditions or else de-
posited in his stronghold in Khorasan. He wished to establish 
an empire vaster than that of Timur or the Safavids, but in . 
his ambition he ruined the country and denuded it of its resour-
ces. 2 He changed his capital to Mashad, which was strategic-
ally more important for his northern expansions. 
Nader attempted to undermine the remainder of the ~afavid her-
itage by making it a condition of his acceptance of the throne 
of Persia, that he was authorised to substitute the Sunni faith 
1. See Lockhart, The Fall of the Safavi. Dynasty, Ca1bridge 1958. 
2. For further discussion see Lockhart, Nader Shah, London, 1938. 
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for Twelver Shi <i.sm. This met with resentment on the part of 
the clergy and the general public, but the notables ·present at 
the ceremony of coronation did not dare to oppose him. 1 Thus, 
he established himself in power and by confiscation of the 
Ouqaf, further aggravated the discontent of the cOlama. 
Nader' s military achievements did not bring back the unity of 
the Safavid era. Indeed, he was faced with numerous rebellions 
which erupted in different parts of the empire. These were 
crushed with fierceness and brutality. 2 All classes of the inhab-
itants were in constant dread of his harsh measures. Agricult-
ure was greatly hampered by his ruthless conscription of the 
peasants to the army; the peasants left their villages and took 
refuge in the mountains to escape his extortions. The merchants 
were in straitened circumstances because of his impositions and 
the government officials viewed him with terror. The tribes suf-
fered great hardships due to his policy of transplanting them 
to his newly acquired territories. From 1730 onwards, he trans-
planted many tribes, mostly to Khorasan to form a barrier ag-
ainst the inroads of the Ozbaks and Turkman,S. Tribal economy, 
which was based on animal breeding, was much reduced as a 
result of inclement cold and an unsuitable environment. 
The cities and towns were left as ruinous wastes, as a result 
of the movement of large armies through them. In short, 
Nader' s rule was a reign of terror for every group of the in-
habitants. His army was divided into two hostile camps, that 
of the traditional Qezelbash, consisting of the Turkish tribes, 
such as Qajars and Afshars, and. the other of the Sunni Ozbaks 
and Afghans. 3 
This division resulted in his assassination in 1160/1747. Had 
1. See Hanway, Jonas, An historical account of the British trade over the C_a:;p}._a_n 
Sea, 2 vols., Dublin, 1754. 
2. Arunova, M.R. & Ashrafian, K.Z., Doulat-e-Naderi, tr. Hamid _A 1 in, Tahr·an, 1356 • . 
3. Hanway, op. cit. 
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he been more inclined to establish his rule through a more rat-
c__.,.._.J..J~_,_:, 
ional and mild administration, his government could have Aim-
Qrove_sl the evils of the Afghan invasions. He took measures to 
fight the corruption which had existed in the country over a 
l<?ng period. He introduced discipline into the army and punish-
ed deserters. 1 He attempted to weaken the position of thecOlama 
in order to discourage excessive Shi c a fervour and, by forbid-
ding the public from abusing the first three khalifs made an 
effort to reconcile the Shic a and Sunni sects. These measures 
had no long lasting effect, however, and his death left the 
country an easy prey to a number of freebooters to divide his 
empire and inflict more calamities on the country. 
The north east of the empire was won by an Afghan soldier, 
Ahmad Khan, who established a dynasty in what is now known 
as modern Afghanistan. In the Afsharid Capital, Mashad, after 
many coups and counter coups, the feeble grandson of Nader, 
Shahrokh was a mere puppet, whil~ his military chiefs held the 
rea~ power. In the central plateau the vacuum was filled by 
a few chiefs, such as cAli Ma-rdan Khan Bakhtiari, Fath cAli . 
Khan Afshar, Azad Khan Afghan, Karim Khan Zand and Mo~am-
mad Has an Khan Qaj ar. These chiefs, in their ruthless strug-. 
gle for power, destroyed what had survived the ravages of the 
Afghans and the oppressions of Nader Shah. They were all des-
troyed by each other, until Karim Khan emerged as the ultimate 
victor. 
Karim Khan was the chief of an obscure Lor/Lak tribe. He 
started his career in the army of Nader shah, but did not 
achieve distinction as a military chief. After the death of 
Nader ( 1160)' he joined Nader's nephew, Ebrahim Khan, and 
fought in his army for a while and was apparently given the 
title of Khan by Ebrahim. Soon afterwards, he set himself up 
b 
1. See Tajrohat al-Ahrar va Tasliat al-Ahrar, 2 vols, Ta~riz, 1349-50. 
" 
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as an independent contestant for supreme power. 1 In his strug-
gle for power he had three formidable rivals whom he managed 
to banish from the arena by tact and resilience. Indeed, on 
many occasions, Karim Khan was reduced to nothing, his army 
dispersed, his treasures were lost and even his kinsmen desert-
ed him and his harim fell into the hands of his enemy. But on 
every occasion he re-emerged with greater spirit and zeal. 
After he had secured his position in the central and southern 
provinces, he attempted ·to subdue the northern parts. This pro-
cess took him seven years to achieve. When he eventually con-
quered the largest parts of the empire, he made no further at-
tempt to extend his domain. He treated Afsharid rule in Khora-
san with respect and kept his good relations with Shahrokh 
throughout his reign. 2 His last effort to capture Basra, appar-
ently by the provocative conduct of the Pasha of Bagdad to-
wards his subjects was a big mistake. He lost the best part of 
his army and regretted it until he died. 
Karim Khan's successes over his rivals owed much to his good 
sense and prudence and to a greater extent to the mistake: of 
his rivals. In many instances he could have been totally anni-
hilated but his foes failed to finish him off. Many accidents, 
which are generally termed good fortune, assisted him in his 
pursuit of power. 
He ruled for nearly twenty years, for fourteen of which he stay-
ed in Shiraz, his favourite city. 3 He took great pains to settle 
the affairs of state. He appointed governors and kalantars to 
manage the administration in the various provinces and made 
them answerable to himself. Every year they had to present 
themselves at court in order to settle their accounts... He pun-
1. See Mojmal al-Tavarikh, Tehran, 1344. 
2. See Golshan-e-Morad, Abol Hasan Ghafari, Ms. 
3. For further discussion see Ruzna1eh Mirza Mohammad· Kalantar, Tehran, 1325. 
4. Asef Mohammad Hashem, Rostam al-Tavarikh, Tehran, 1348. 
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ished dishonesty and rewarded loyalty and honesty. He was 
mild and humane and avoided violence if there were other alter-
natives. 
His death was universally regretted. His successors, with their 
rash and senseless conduct, ruined what he had built up with 
so much effort. 
In his reign, trade and agriculture flourished and despite his 
illiteracy and total ignorance of arts and literature, he encour-
aged artists and rewarded men of literary ability. He was per-
haps amongst one of the very few sovereigns, whose rule is re-
membered with admiration and esteem by the people. 
This thesis is a history of the successors of Karim Khan, cover-
ing a period of sixteen years (1193-1209) from the death of the 
vakil to the final fall of the Zand house; and of the political 
and social impacts of that period. Although a number of works 
have been written on this period of history, 1 there are many 
interesting areas unexplored. I have attempted, as far as I 
have been able, to uncover these dark aspects. I have tried 
to demonstrate the importance of the social factors involved in 
determining the political climate. By investigating the conflict-
ing interests of the urban and tribal elements in the society, 
I have tried to explain the impetus behind the political events. 
Persian society at that time, rather like today, was a complex 
composition of diverse groups with different and conflicting in-
terests and each strove to further its own cause. Thus the soc-
iety was plagued with internal strife and for several decades 
the tribes increased their sphere of power and influence which 
over-shadowed the urban elite. The urban population in their 
struggle to gain supremacy over the tribes, knowing at the 
1. Roshan Zamir, Die Zand dynastie, Hamburg, 1970. Khubnazar Has an, Janeshinan-e-
Karim Khan, Freiburg, 1974. 
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same time that they were no match for the tribes in battle, re-
sorted to subterfuge and conspiracy in order to reduce their 
power. 
In this attempt to assert themselves, the urban population 
abandoned their own differences in order to fight the common 
enemy; the reconciliation, however, was temporary and with 
out long lasting effects. 
I have attempted to study the undercurrents, which in econom-
ic, religious and cultural life of the society as a whole con-
tributed to the emergence of a new order: namely, the long and 
relatively peaceful reign of the Qajars, which marked the end 
of the supremacy of the tribes in the political arena. The Qaj-
ars, themselves of tribal background and aware of the power 
of the tribes in creating unrest and disorder, tried their best 
- - - c -to reduce their power. Aqa Mo~ammad Khan and Fat~ Ali Shah 
the first two monarchs of the Qajar dynasty, transplanted the 
tribes whose power they could not contain. Many of the tribal 
leaders were either killed or imprisoned and kept as hostages 
at the court. Almost all the attempts carried out to contest the 
Qajar sovereigns came from their own tribe and that clearly 
shows that the power of other tribes was broken. The Qajars, 
by attempting to establish a regular army brought the tribal 
warriors under their direct control. Furthermore, they created 
an elaborate and powerful bureaucracy, which was in direct 
control of the administration, of military and civic affairs; 




NOTES ON THE SOURCES 
General Introduction 
The period under study in this thesis ( 1193-1209/1779-1796) is 
often reckoned to be a dark era, in which only anarchy and 
civil war prevailed. 1 This interregnum, which followed the fall 
of the ~afavids and the invasion of the· Afghans, and lasted 
until the long reign of the Qaj ar dynasty' is' however' a 
period of great importance which has been very little studied 
by modern scholars. More recently, the career of Karim Khan 
Zand has been analysed in detail by Perry, 2 but only in his 
epilogue has he time to deal very briefly with the successors 
of the vakil. This neglect by scholars is regrettable, since the 
period under discussion is one of great importance, as it is a 
transitional era which brought about great changes in the soc-
ial structure of Persian society. Indeed the 12th Century A. H./ 
18th Century A. D. can be regarded as the last phase of the 
supremacy of the tribes over the sedentary classes of society. 
The neglect is not due to a lack of first-hand sources, as 
there are a great many histories written during or a little 
later than this period. The ignorance of the period stems far 
more from the fact that not many modern scholars have devoted 
any time to the study of this subject. 3 
1. C.f. the brief treatment accorded to this period in P. Avery, Modern Iran (London, 
1965), p.23. 
2. Perry, John: Karim Khan Zand (Chicago, 1979). 
3. The modern studies on Zand history a~e as follows: 
I. Radjabi, Parvis: Iran unter Karim Han (1752-1779) (Gottingen, 1970). 
II. Roschanzamir, Mehdi: Die Zand Dynastie (Hamburg, 1970). 
III. Khubnazar, Hasan: Janeshinan-e-Karim Khan-e-Zand (Friburg, 1974). 
IV. Nava'i, Abdolhosain: Karim Khan va zaman-e-u (Tehran, 135-
V. Hedayati, Hadi: Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh (Tehran, 1335/1955). 
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At all events, the main purpose in this thesis will be, wherev-
er possible, to study the social history of the time, rather 
than the account of wars and coups. This makes the task for 
the scholar even more difficult than it might already appear. 
Persian history books have a tradition of omitting events in 
which the masses are involved. In reality, the histories are 
merely the accounts of one or more monarchs. They record not 
even the events which occur in their patron's private life, but 
it is his court life which is communicated to us. 
The social history is made even more inaccessible by the status 
of the writers of the histories themselves. The historian of the 
12th Century/18th Century A.D. is a member of the elite; he is 
either a dignitary or a close relation of a notable. The author 
of Ruznameh, Mirza Mo~ammad Kalantar, falls into the first cat-
egory 1 - Ghaffari, Golestaneh and Kuhmarre 'i, are of the sec-
ond category. 2 What really enabled them, and in some ways 
encouraged them, to write history books was not their love of 
history writing, but the fact that they were educated and had 
gained the necessary qualities of a Mirza. They also had 
access to the government chanceries and, by being involved in 
political events, were eyewitnesses to those episodes which 
they relate. It is, however, unusual for an individual, who 
has not the chance of gaining information on the battles and 
other events, to attempt to write a history. Thus, even when 
an ordinary soldier in the army of Nader Shah writes his mem-
oires, he relates those episodes in which he personally partici-
pated. This source is an exception to the rule, in that the 
writer is a commoner and has no connection with the local/ 
provincial notables. 
1. Mirza Mohammad was the kalantar of Fars during the reign of Karim Khan. He enjoyed 
great power' and influence and added to the family inheritance by purchasing many 
villages, wholly or in part. 
2. Golestaneh was the nephew of Mohammad Taqi Golestaneh, the rebellious governor 
of K ermanshah. He was besieged together with his uncle, in the citadel of K erman-
shah by the Vakil, and was delegated to negotiate peace with the latter. Thus, his 
account of the event is probably the most accurate of all sources. 
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These historians can be divided into two groups: the profess-
ional historian, such as Nami 1 , who was paid to write his hist-
ory for his patron; and secondly, the freelance amateur, such 
as Golestaneh, who clearly writes for his own amusement. But 
these two groups do not differ greatly from one another. The 
only material difference is that the latter writes for pleasure, 
with a view to presenting his work to a monarch 2 at some 
stage, whereas the former earns his livelihood. The freelance 
historian, however, is by no means impartial to a reigning mon-
arch and his opponents. His personal inclination induces him 
to side with one or the other. 3 At all events, one thing is 
certain: that the freelance historian did not compose his work 
to gain any monetary reward, and that makes him more reli-
able than the professional one, who writes history from the 
information provided for him by his patron, and presents it in 
a way pleasing to that patron. Thus, he never ventures to 
question the authenticity of his so-called "facts", and does not 
dare to criticise that of which he disapproves. Even a histor-
ian, who dares to pass judgement on the conduct of his patron, 
does so only in a subtle, ironical manner, rather than by dir-
ect means... Before we proceed to an assessment of individual 
sources and their value for the study of the history of the 
time, it may be useful to give a brief account of the style of 
writing in the 12th Century /18th Century. The literary style of 
1. Nami was appointed by the order of Ja c far Khan, to compose a history of the Zand 
dynasty. He attended the court and the material was provided for him by the minister, 
Mirza Mohammad Hosein. 
2. Golestaneh finished his work in India (and wished to present it to the Indian 
king). 
3. The author of Tarikh-e-Zandiy~h, sides with the Qajars all the way through his 
work and, only at the end, does he quote an ode, which shows that he is not greatly 
pleased with the barbarities committed by Aqa Mohammad Khan on his opponents: 
The cupbearer of the world fills many of these cups 
empties the full and fills the empty cup. 
4. Golshan-e-Morad on 1any occasions criticises the Zands and their mistakes. He 
ironically remarks that cAli Morad Khan was more happy about the arrival of his new 
bride, the daughter of He day at Khan, than he was with the victory of his son in 
Hazandaran. 
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the period is for the most part unattractive and full of unnec-
essary simile and flattery. 1 
The sources of this period can be divided into two broad divis-
ions: 
1. Primary sources 
2. Secondary sources 
The primary sources can be further divided into Persian histor-
ies written in the Zand or early Qajar period, together with 
the contemporary accounts composed by European travellers. 
Special reference should be made here to the History of Persia 
written by Sir John Malcolm in 1808, which is, therefore, to be 
classified as a primary source. A very valuable collection of 
primary documents is to be found in the India Office Record 
and Library. 
I. Persian Primary Sources: 
Giti Goshay, Mirza Mohammad Sadeq-e-Musavi Nami, et al. 12, . . 
edited by Sa cid Nafisi, Tehran, 1317/19. 
Giti Goshay is the main source on the history of the Zand dyn-
asty. Although it is written by three different authors and 
some omissions are apparent, but it is the only detailed and 
complete history of the Zands and was written by three Monshis 
at the court of the Zand rulers during the period of our study. 
The authors' lives and careers have been given in Perry's 
1. It was only with Aqa Mohammad Khan Qajar that the fashion was altered. This ruler 
prevented his historians from composing their works in the prevailing style of writ-
ing. Ma 1aser Soltaniyeh is a good example of these history books. The author clearly 
tries to use pure Persian words, rather than c Arabic and Turk ish substitutes; 
his composition is even pleasing in many aspects. Apart from these, only a few of 
the historical works of the period are written in a simple manner, and this may well 
be attributed to the author 1s lack of knowledge of the arts of the Mirzas. Mirza 
Hohammad Kalantar follows a totally different pattern from the average monshis of 
the time. He frankly states that he did not study the sciences and the arts as well 
as he could have done. Op. cit., p.]. 
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book. 1 It would seem rather unnecessary to repeat what he has 
already written. There are, however, some points that have to 
be clarified here. ~adeq Musavi actually started his work as 
early as the reign of Karim Khan and he was not only the 
court poet, as Perry maintains, but also the historian of the 
Vakils. Rieu believes that the account given by the author of 
Fava•ed al-Safavieh is authentic, where he writes that Nami was . 
severely rebuked by c Ali Morad Khan (A. H. 1196-99) for the 
noble origin he had mendaciously assigned in his Tarikhi Zand-
iyyeh to the Zand family, and was compelled to drink the 
water, in which his own copy of that history had been 
washed. 2 It appears that the displeasure of cAli Morad Khan 
was due to the harsh and uncomplimentary account, which the 
author gives on cAli Morad Khan's character and conduct, 
rather than what Rieu believes to be the case. 
Hedayati assumes that he composed his history in the reign of 
J a c far Khan~ This is, however, dubious. It would appear likely 
from . the minute details provided in this source on the life and 
reign of Karim Khan, that it was written during his lifetime. 
The work contains accounts not mentioned in any other source. 
The patron of Nami was the noble vazir, Mirza Mohammad 
Hos ein Farahani, who communicated to him much of the inform-
ation that the work contains. Maftun, who spent much of his 
youth in Shiraz as a hostage in the court, asserts that Nami 
was actually the chronicler of the Vakils.,. His office may well 
have enabled him to gather the information for his composition. 
His style is typical of his time. It is elaborate to such a 
degree that the reader has to go through a few pages before 
discovering anything of substance and importance. For in-
1. Perry, John: Karim Khan Zand {Chicago, 1979), pp.303-304. 
2. There was the rough draft in existance, on the basis of which the author continued 
his composition. 
3. Golshan-e~Morad, p.274. 
4. Maftun, Ab dol Razzaq: Negarestan-e-Dara, ( Tabri z, 1342), p. 271. 
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stance, the reader has to read passage after passage in praise 
of spring and its description. It is, however, rewarding to 
find that his account is detailed and consistent in respect to 
historical events. Nami can, on occasion, be strongly biased 
in his support of the Zands, so much so that he is inclined to 
falsify the evidence and omit certain incriminating facts. 1 
Nami died in 1204/1789, apparently at an advanced age. His 
work was carried on by one of his disciples, who was charged 
with the task by the vazir, Mirza Mohammad Hosein. It app-
ears that Nami stopped his work in 1200/1785, as c Abd al-
Karim b. cAli Reza Sharif resumed the narrative from that date 
onwards. The work was not completed by the second author, 
since he fell into the hands of the Qajar chief, Aqa Mohammad 
Khan, as he . himself asserts. 2 The last part of the work was 
composed by another disciple of Nami' s, Mohammad Reza Shir-
• c • -
azi. He brings the events up to the death of Lot£ Ali Khan, 
and with a degree of satisfaction, relates the dire fate of Ijaji 
Ebrahim and his accomplices. Both of the Zails are broadly 
speaking in the same literary style as the main work, but 
less florid and elaborate. In fact, the last part is written in 
a much simpler style altogether. 
The only published edition of the book, which was edited and 
amended by Sa c id Nafisi3 , is full of spelling mistakes and 
1: For example, Gi ti GoshaJ omit! an event, which ~e ~eems highly e1barr~ssing :or 
h1s patron, namely, that Ja far Khan 1 s brother, F arz Ah, defected from h1s serv1ce 
and joined his mortal enemy, the Qajars; Nami makes no reference to the event at 
all. Again, in a riot which broke out in the city of Esfahan, when Jacfar Khan was 
leaving it in great haste and confusion, Gi ti Gosh ay calls the rioters 11Arazel va 
Oubash" (rogues and scoundrels). In another source, we learn that the rioter; were 
the artisans and shopkeepers, together with the i_ufis. Nami, however, mentions that 
the private guards of the late king, cAli Morad Khan, had a part in it. 
2. G.G., p.372. 
3. Ibid., Introduction, p.v. 
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confusing phrases. It appears that the editor had access to one 
erroneous and deficient copy, written by a number of ignorant 
copyists. Nevertheless, the published edition has been used in 
this thesis. The editor has added indices of names and places 
which facilitates the study of the book. 
Golshan-e-Morad: Abol ~as an Ghaffari, 1210. Ms. British Lib-
rary, Or3592. 
This manuscript was completed in 1210 by different copyists. 
The author wished to present it to his patron, Mirza Mohammad 
c Ali Khan Shirazi, while he was in Kashan. Although the style 
of writing is not congenial, but it is well executed and neat. 
It appears the author himself supervised the copyists, thus it 
is accurate and without mistakes. It has been used in this 
thesis ; the copy in Malek Library has also been consulted. 
For the biography of the author, we refer the reader to Perry 
again. 1 It is worth noticing here that Abol Hasan Ghaffari 
stopped writing for a while, when he was in his native town, 
Kashan, as he himself indicates. After the death of his father, 
he was summoned to Kashan to attend to his family affairs; 
thus he was unable to continue his task. It was only when 
Mirza Mohammad c Ali Khan Shirazi o:aji Ebrahim 's brother) 
came to the town in the company of Mohammad Khan, the Gover-. 
nor of Qum and Kashan, that the author was encouraged and 
urged to finish his composition. 2 It is, however, curious that 
there would appear to be no mention of Mohammad c Ali Khan 
being in Kashan at any time. He was in. Tehran, when he and 
his family were seized and blinded, or put to death. 3 There is 
no doubt that Mohammad c Ali Khan Shirazi is the person, under . 
whose protection Golshan-e-Morad was completed. The author 
1. Perry, J: Karim Khan Zand 
2. G.M., p.250. 
3. Ma 1aser Soltanieh, p.74. 
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asserts that Mohammad c Ali Khan is a young man of great abil-
ity and is well informed of all the political events, and had 
even been an eyewitness to many of them. 1 
The author deserves praise for the intelligent remarks he makes 
on various subjects. For instance, he comments on the poor 
quality of the ammunition used by the Zand army against that 
used by the cAr ab tribes resident in Khorasan, when the town 
of Yazd was besieged and the latter came to its aid. He also 
remarks on the change of attitude which the tribal warriors of 
c -Ja far Khan had adopted on the same occasion. He states that 
the tribes, who would never turn their back to the battlefield, 
were now acting contrary to their previous usage; like that of 
Gorgin Milad, they fled the battlefield. 2 
His style of composition is very similar to that of Nami, but 
c - -less flattery is bestowed on his patron, Ali M orad Khan. In-
deed, he is a true diplomat; he omits to mention the rebellion 
c -staged by Ja far Khan and goes as far as stating that the 
latter shed tears at the death of c Ali Morad Khan, his half bro-
ther. 3 The author is evidently aware of the fact that, should 
he fall into the hands of the Qajars, his fate would be a sad 
one; thus, he refrains from abusing Aqa Mohammad Khan and, 
wherever that chief is mentioned, he bestows due respect 
upon him. The observations made by the author are mixed with 
irony; for instance, he mockingly observes that c Ali Morad 
Khan was more thrilled at the arrival of his new bride, than 
at the victory of his son in Mazandaran against the Qajars... The 
work has not been published and there are a number of manu-
scripts in various libraries. The manuscript preserved in the 
Malek Library appears to be the original copy. The B. L. copy 
1. G.M., p.459. Rieu Catalogue, Suppl ., p.45. 
2. Ibid., p.418. 
3. G.M., p.413. 
4. Ibid., p.405. 
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was reproduced from it in 1887 for a foreign visitor, and pres-
ented to the Museum later. 1 
Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh: Ebn cAbdal-Karim c Ali Reza Shirazi, 1215 AH/ 
1800 A.D., ed. by E. Beer, Leiden, 1888. 
A modern historian has confused Ebn c Abdal Karim cAli Reza 
with the author of the second part of Giti Goshay cAbdal-Karim 
Ebn cAli Reza, i.e. Hedayati. 2 The confusion stems from two 
causes: first is the similarity of the names ; indeed the only 
difference in the two is the order of Ebn, which could easily 
be a mistake on the part of the copyist, or a cover up adopted 
by the author for fear of the Qajars. Secondly, the contents of 
the two books are so similar that one might assume that the 
works are written by one and the same person, or else, that 
one has copied the other. 
At all events, there is no information available as to the life 
and profession of the author of Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh. In his intro-
duction to the published edition, Beer suggests that he was a 
tribal city dweller; this may be deduced from the sympathy 
which he shows to the tribes, and from the fact that he tries 
to prove that the tribes were loyal to Lo!fc Ali Khan. 3 Whatever 
his origin may have been, the author is definitely a scribe, 
although his command of the Persian language does not imply 
that he was a learned Monshi. Yet he knows enough of the arts 
of Mirzas. His composition is clumsy and unattractive, but as 
Beer asserts, he tried to write in a simple manner and, in this 
respect, he is standing on the threshold of a new wave of 
modernism in Persian literary style ... 
1 • .!!_ i e ~ _ ~ !!!~ i ~! , S u p p 1. p • 4 5 • 
2. Hedayati, Hadi: Tarikh-e-Zand~h, Vol.I, p.46. 
3. T.Z., Introduction, pp.l-24. 
4. Ibid., pp.87,100. 
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In his work, Ebn CAbdal-Karim decidedly takes the side of the 
Qajars and does not miss an opportunity to express his dis-
approval of the Zand family. There are, however, curious in-
stances where he betrays his partiality for the cause of 
Lotf c Ali Khan, when he bitterly reprimands those who deserted 
the latter and accuses those, who captured him, of ingratit-
ude. 1 Thus, one is apt to think that Ebn cAbdal-Karim shared 
the same admiration for Lotf c Ali Khan, as his worst enemies. 
There is a mystery about the work that no modern historian 
has been able to solve. He does not mention a patron, nor does 
he give the source of his information, whereas it appears to 
be strangely accurate. Beer seems to be right in his assumpt-
ion that the work was not composed for reward, nor was it be-
cause the author wanted to please a patron. 2 His motives, there-
fore, in writing the book with its obvious partiality to the 
house of the Qajars remain unclear. Incidentally, Waring refers 
to a history written by the Mirza to Mohammad Khan, the son 
of Zaki Khan, as his source for the brief history, which he 
wrote, of the Zand reign. 3 It appears possible that he used 
Tarikh-e-Zandb'~h as his source, since there are many instances 
where the two works are identical... If ·this assumption proves 
to be true, then the reason for the obscurity of the author 
might be clarified. That is to say, Mohammad Khan Zand was 
one of the few Zand nobles, who fled and retired to India. He 
subsequently returned to Persia and staged a rebellion against 
c -
Fat~ Ali Shah, but was defeated and fled again. This could 
clearly mean that the fear entertained by the author was be-
cause his old master was alive, and his associates were regard-
ed with suspicion and apprehension by the Qajars. 
1. T. z. ' p ~ 100 
2. Ibid., Introd., pp.1-24. 
3. Waring, Edward Scott: A Tour to Sheeraz by the route of Kazesoon & Feerozabad 
(London, 1808), p.259. 
4. Ibid., p.263. 
- 11 -
The published edition of this work contains an introduction 
with notes and an index of geographical names, which add to 
the value of the history. This edition has been used in this 
thesis. 
Mojmal al-Tavarikh: c Abol Hasan b. Mohammad Amin Golestaneh, . . 
1198-1199. Edited by Modarres Razavi, Tehran, Ebn Sina, 1344. 
This work does not hold much importance for the period under 
study here. The author was a resident of Morshed Abad in 
India, when Karim Khan established himself in power, and he 
gathered his information by letters he received from Persia, or 
else through personal interviews with the travellers arriving 
in India from his native country. Thus, he has made gross mis-
takes in his accounts of the political events; for instance, he 
relates that Sadeq Khan fled to Rasht and asked assistance 
from Hedayat Khan, when his troops deserted him to join their 
families in Shiraz. 1 If it was not for the corrections that 
Kuhmarre 'i added to the original work, Mojaml al-Tavarikh 
would be worthless for the period ( 1193-1209), which we are con-
cerned with in our study. 
At all events, the work has great importance for the study of 
the early Zand era and the power struggle between Karim Khan 
and his rivals. The author gives the most accurate account of 
the siege of Kermanshah by Karim Khan, and its fall, as he 
was an eyewitness to the event. His uncle, Mirza Mohammad 
Taqi Golestaneh, was a zealous opponent of the Vakil; he, 
eventually, in his ambition for power lost his life at the hands 
of the Kurds. 2 
The author of the work was taken a hostage by the Zands, but 
managed to escape. He acted as a negotiator with the Vakil on 
1. M. T. , p. 343. 
2. Ibid., p.313. 
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behalf of his uncle, in order to conclude a peace treaty be-
tween the warring parties. He, however, forsook his native 
country after the death of his uncle. He first proceeded to the 
c 
holy shrines in Ottoman Eraq, where he discovered that his 
other uncle and his brother were living a comfortable life in 
India. He, therefore, left the Ottoman territories for India. 1 He 
arrived at Bengal in 1169 A. H./1755 with two of his younger 
brothers. He found his uncle, Mir Mo~ammad Es~aq, in a poor 
state of health, and he died within six months. 2 The author 
stayed in India for the rest of his life. He was so incensed by 
the boastful and indifferent manners of the Indians, that he 
resolved to ignore them and isolate himself. His brother per-
suaded him to employ his time in composing a history of the 
events that he had experienced. The present book is the result 
of his endeavours. 3 There is a ~ to the work, written by 
Zain-al~Abedin Kuhmarre 'i, who was the son of the governor of 
Kuhmarre' . The zail contains some first hand information which 
.:.:::.__ 
is not mentioned in other sources. For instance, the account of 
a meeting in the house of J:Iaji Ebrahim, and attended by the 
notables of Fars, held to discuss a formula agreeable to all 
present on the accession of Lotfc Ali Khan. This has not be re-
ferred to by any other source, as it was convened in secret; 
but the author was present. The only other source is Fasa 'i, 
whose grandfather was also present at the meeting, and he men-
tions it in his Farsnameh.,. 
The Zail to Mojmal al-Tavarikh is brief and inadequate in its -
accounts, as it only deals with the events up to the year 12035/ 
1788, where the author stops his composition due to some un-
known reason. For a detailed biography of both authors, the 
1. M. T., p.3. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p.5. 
4. Fasa 1i, ~asan: Fars Nameh, part 2, p.30. 
5. Op. Cit., p.354. 
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reader is referred to Perry. 1 
The printed edition of the book contains a valuable introduct-
ion with notes and appendices, index of names, etc., which 
provides additional information to the reader. The editor also 
gives a detailed account on the political events subsequent to 
the fall of the Sa fa vids. 
Rostam al Tavarikh: Mohammad Hash em Asef, 1193-1247, edited 
by M. Moshiri, Tehran, Amir Kabir, 1348/1970. 
This work has not been given the credit it deserves, as it is 
the only source which provides us with socio-economic data on 
late 18th Century Iran. After its publication, it gradually be-
came known to scholars and even distinguished modern schol-
ars, such as Lambton, give much credence to it, 2 although, in 
respect to historical accuracy, it is not by any means impress-
ive. Facts are mixed with fantasies and one does not know 
what to believe. The fanciful anecdotes, however, can be treat-
ed as popular tales, which the ordinary people revelled in, as 
they were mostly about the ruling classes. It appears that the 
author's motive 
to the reigning 
in writing this composition was to present it 
c -monarch, Fatl} Ali Shah, and make some mon-
ey. 3 This financial remuneration was never obtained; the auth-
or finished his work in 1247 and presented it to the heir 
apparent, c Abbas Mirza, and his brothers... But there is no 
mention of a monetary award. 
1. Perry, op. cit., p.305. 
2. Lambton, in her recent article: "The tribal resurgence and the decline of bureau-
cracy in 18th century Persia", bases her arguments wholly, if not totally, on Rost-
am's account. Neff, T. and Owen, R., Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History, 
London, 1977, pp.lOS-129. 
3. R. T., p.63-6. 
4. Ibid., pp.52-53. 
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The author does not give any information about his personal 
life and profession. According to his own account, he appears 
to be a Jack of all trades. He claims a respectable descent for 
himself, and relates that he was a school prefect and treated 
his unfortunate schoolmates with . much brutality. He also men-
tions that he attended the same school as the sons of the Zand 
nobles and other dignitaries, which indicates that he came from 
an affluent family. He, however, asserts that he had connection 
with the lutis as well. 1 
The author, who assumes the title of Rostam al ~okama and 
claims that he was honoured by the title of ~am~am al-Dolleh 
by Fath cAli Shah, attempts to write poetry, but the quality of . 
of his poems is poor and cannot be given merit. His literary 
style is vulgar and unsophisticated, but he claims that he 
aimed at simplicity, so that everyone may understand. 2 It can, 
however, be attributed to his lack of knowledge of literature. 
As mentioned before, Rostam al-Tavarikh is the only source 
which contains information on the life and traditions of the gen-
eral public. The author gives us the prices of foodstuffs and 
other articles of necessity, which, first of all, shows the stand-
ard of living at that period of time, and the products of the 
country. It also gives the names of the public women in Shir-
az, the names of the famous Lutis, Pahlavans. Thus, much of 
the information, relevant to the socio-economic conditions in 
this thesis, is based on Rostam al-Tavarikh. 
Ruznameh-e-Mirza Mohammad Kalantar: 1200/1785. Edited by A. 
Eqbal, Tehran, Yadgar, 1325/1907. 
Mirza Mohammad, like most of his contemporary amateur histor-
ians, composed his works as a pastime, or, rather, to forget 
1. R. T., p.56. 
2. Ibid., p.48. 
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his unhappy time spent in the camp of the Qajar chief, Aqa 
Mohammad Khan. 1 He produces an account mostly related to the 
city of Shiraz after the fall of the ~afavids. He gives a gener-
al picture of the anarchy and the oppression, which the king-
dom suffered before and during the reign of Nader Shah. 2 His 
account is based on his personal experience and it may be gen-
erally trusted as the authentic version of the events. 
His family was one of the most renowned and respectable famil-
ies of Shiraz. His uncle became the Kalanter and ~ai:eb Ekhtiar 
of the province of Fars, as well as the Motevali of the shrine 
of Shah Cheraq in the reign of Nader Shah. 3 His ancestors were 
all distinguished men of learning and rank. That is why he 
was so arrogant and resented most of his superiors, such as 
the Vazirs. He became the Kalantar of Fars when Karim Khan 
established himself in Shiraz, and remained so for the whole 
reign of the Vakil. He was constantly at odds with the three 
ministers who served the Zand rulers successively. All these 
men, .Mirza J a c far, Mirza Rabic and Mirza Mohammad Hose in, 
- c . 
were originally from Eraq-e-:A.jam, and Mirza Mo~ammad, being 
a local zealot, criticised and abused them with fury. His numer-
ous quarrels with the functionaries of lower rank, also shows 
that he did not get along with many people... He had a bitter 
tongue and a more bitter pen, and invariably criticised every-
one. He, however, admits that the Vakil had many virtues, 
with a few shortcomings. His judgements on people were purely 
personal and motivated by self-interest. He was proved wrong 
in his choice between the Qaj ars and the Zand ruler, J a c far 
Khan, whom he calls a jackass. He bitterly regrets joining the 
camp of Aq a Mohammad Khan; he tried very hard to gain his . 
freedom to return to Shiraz, 5 but to no avail. He died in 
1. R.M.M., p.(l). 
2. Ibid., pp.S-29. 
3. Ibid., p.23. 
4. Ibid., pp.(l)-100. 
5. Ibid., p.93. 
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Tehran alone and unhappy. 
His style of writing is very simple yet confusing, as he uses 
colloquial expressions and slang, particularly common to the 
province of Fars; he is also brief in his accounts. His work 
was published as a special edition to the Journal, Yadgar. The 
c - -editor, Abbas Eqbal, has added valuable explanatory notes 
and indices. In the introduction, there are notes to clarify the 
obscure expressions. 
Zendegani-e-l!azin: Mohammad cAli 
by F.C. Belfour, London, 1830. 
Hazin . Lahiji, 1155/1742, tr . 
Hazin was a poet, scholar and a great traveller. 1 He visited 
many of the provinces and towns after the ravages of the 
Afghan invasion. He gives a description of the life and miser-
ies that the general populace experienced. Although he only 
covers the period immediately after the fall of the ~afavids, 
his account of the character and habit of the city dwellers, 
their courage and zeal in defending their honour and homes, 
is unique. His work is very important for the study of Afghan 
Persia. Hazin was born into a devout family in 1103/1692, in 
the city of Esfahan.2 His family originated in Gilan, where they 
had a family inheritance. Hazin' s father repaired to Esfahan 
and lived there until his death. Shaikhc Ali was educated with 
utmost care and under the most prominent contemporary schol-
ars. He 
well as 
attained eminence in 
arts. He commenced 
all departments of sciences as 
his autobiography in the year 
1155/1742, and wrote his memoires until he left Persia for 
India, where he led the dullest life in the dullest place. 3 We 
have no information as to the latter part of his life; he died 
at the advanced age of 88, in the year 1193/1779. 
1. z.~., p.v. 
2. Ibid., English edition, p.v. 
3. Ibid., p.ix. 
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His work is a mixture of biography, geography and history. In 
his travels he provides the reader with a description of a 
place, its prominent men of learning and rank, together with 
the history of it. He gives an account of the events after he 
left Persia, but only as a residue to his memoirs. Apparently 
he harboured great animosity towards Nader Shah, and that 
was partly the reason why he fled from his native country. 
Nader Shah, however, went to India on his military expedition. 
The author changed his abode from Lahore, where his brother 
lived, just before Nader arrived. 
Ijazin was an industrious man; he wrote many treatises and dis-
courses. He also wrote poetry, which ranked him among the 
best poets of his time. He appears to have been widely known 
in Persia, as wherever he travelled, the populace approached 
him and entreated him to stay. He associated with people of 
higher status, the same as he did with ordinary people. He 
had personal acquaintance with Shah ~ahmasb, the last real 
king of the Safavid house; this may well be the cause of his 
hatred for Nader. 
His work has been translated into English with much elegance 
of style; Belfour translated the poetry of ~azin, with that of 
other poets quoted in Hazin' s work, with great beauty and 
sweetness of expression. 1 The English edition is completed with 
explanatory notes on the content of the work. 
- - c -Ma 'aser-e-Soltaniyeh: Abdol Razzaq b. Najaf Qoli Donboli, Maftun. . . 
Tehran, Ebn Sina, 1351. 
This work is the first Qaj ar history, written by the court hist-
orian of that dynasty. Maftun was the son of the chief of the 
Donboli tribe. He was kept in Shiraz as a hostage during the 
reign of Karim Khan. 2 After the fall of the Zands, he entered 
1. z.~., p.(l)-308. 




service of the Qajars and became the private secretary to 
c - -
heir apparent, Abbas Mirza, until he died at Tabriz in 
1242 1 /1826. While in Shiraz, he spent his time in the pursuit 
of learning and scholarship. He gained knowledge of all as-
pects of arts and sciences. He was an industrious writer, as 
well as a prominent poet, and left many works behind in prose 
and poetry. 
He commences his history of the Qajars with the account of the 
invasion of the Afghans and the contribution of Fath c Ali Khan 
Qaj ar in repelling their army. He further relates the life and 
achievements of Mohammad Hasan Khan, the son of Fath cAli 
Khan. He brings his work up to the reign of Fath cAli Shah. 
He finished his composition one year before he died in 1241 2 I 
1825. Although he spent much of his youth in the court of the 
Zands, and that experience must have enabled him to gather 
first-hand information about that dynasty, he does not contrib-
ute any original account of the power struggle between the 
Zands . and the Qajars. He does, however, relate interesting 
anecdotes about the Vakil in his other works, such as Tajrobat 
al-Ahrar va Tasliyat al-Abrar, which contains valuable inform-
ation on the private life of Karim Khan. The fact that he does 
not elaborate on the Zand history in his official assignment, 
was not due to his hostility towards the Zands; indeed he as-
serts that he found the Vakil a sea of generosity. 3 It may be 
attributed to the fact that he was in the service of the Qajars 
and did not wish to antagonise them. 
Ma' aser-e-Soltaniyeh was first published in 1241/1825, that is, 
• 
in the same year as its completion. A copy of it was presented 
to Sir Harford ]ones by Fath c Ali Shah, and the former trans-. 
lated it into English and published it in 1815 ... The translation 
1. Majmacal Fasaha, Vol.6, p.l007/Tarikh-Khoy, p.538. 
2. Tazkerreh Delgosha. 
3. Tasliat al-Ahrar va Tajorabat al-Abrar, Vol.I, p.l26. 




of the work is known as The Dynasty of the Kajars. The recent 
lithograph edition of the work, published in 135 1 has been 
used in this thesis. It is written in a relatively simple style, 
but it is still verbose and florid. 
A~san al-Tavarikh or Tarikh-e-Mohammadi, by Mohammad Taqi 
Saru'i, 1201-1211. Ms. Malek Library, no.3957. 
This work is commonly known by its second name. The author 
was ordered by Aqa Mo~ammad Khan to write a history of his 
family. Saru 'i commenced his composition in 1201 (it is also re-
corded as 1205 1 ) and completed it in 1211, the same year as 
Aqa Mohammad Khan was murdered. There are several copies of 
this work in Persia and abroad. The copy in the Malek Library 
is in beautiful Nasta c liq with a leather cover. It has 183 fol-
ios of a large size. It belonged to the private library of 
Prince Baha' al-Douleh and was acquired for the Malek Library 
in 1272/1855, which indicates that it must have been written 
prior to that time. This copy was used in this thesis,. but the 
copy preserved in the British Library has also been consulted. 
The content of the work is very similar to all the Qajar histor-
ies. The main goal of the author is to prove the right of the 
Qajars to the throne of Persia, which was usurped by the 
Afshars and the Zands. It is the first source which actually 
abuses the family of the Zands in the most outrageous terms. 
The style of composition is elaborate and full of flattery and 
unnecessary metaphors. The reader is lost in its complex verbos-
ity. For instance, the author writes eleven pages in praise of 
his patron, using the most unattractive similes in his descrip-
tion. 
Zinat al-Tavarikh: Mirza Mohammad Razi Tabrizi, 1218-1226. 
British Library Ms . Add.23.514.23.515 & 23.528. 
This source is a general history of the East, especially Persia. 
1. Tarikh-e-Mohammam, Ms. no.3957, Malek Library. Tehran. 
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The author, Mirza Razi, the son of Mohammad Shafi c Tabrizi, . 
held the office of M ostoufi al-mamalek of A~arbayj an and was 
a favourite of Fath cAli Shah. In 1218/1803, he was ordered by 
his master to compile a general history, which would cover the 
reign of Fat~ c Ali Shah. He was assisted in his massive work 
by several other scholars, such as c Abd al-Karim cAli Reza 
Shahavari, the author of the second Zail to Giti Goshay. Rieu 
believes that he was aided by Mirza Ebrahim Eshtehardi too. 1 
Tarikh-Khoy asserts that Maftun Donboli was another person 
who compiled a part of that enormous work. 2 Apparently the 
section on the history of the prophets was written by Mirza 
Razi, while the history of the kings was committed to cAbd 
al-Karim, who finished it in the space of one year. 3 The auth-
or, Mirza Razi, was a poet and his Takhalos was Bandeh 
(slave); he wrote in an excellent hand and was a learned man 
in all departments of knowledge... Thus, he had acquired dis-
tinction as an administrator, as well as a literary man. 
This work was used by Sir John Malcolm, as he makes numerous 
references to it. It is divided into two major divisions, named 
Pirayeh, and is further subdivided into two Gunehs. The part 
relevant to the history of the Qajars begins with the life and 
adventures of Fath cAli Khan Qajar; then it comes down to his 
successors. The reign of FathcAli Shah is given inthe B.L.Msc • . 
in chronological order, that is, year by year. The last event 
recorded is the advance of the Turkish Army into the Persian 
territories and its subsequent retreat in the year 1221/18065 • 
The reign of Karim Khan and his successors is dealt with in 
a summary form' There are many copies of this work in Persia 
1. Rieu, Suppl. Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the B.L., p.27 
2. Aqasi, M. Tarikh-Khoy, Tabriz. Daneshkadeh Adabyat, 1350., p.538. 
3. Op. cit., Vol.!, p.135. 
c c 
4. Shushtari, Mir Abd al-La~if. Tohfat-al-Alam Ms • 
5. Rieu Catalogue, Vol.II, p.136. 
-
6. Zinat al-Tavarikh Ms ., Tehran, n.p. 
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and abroad. 
I I. Secondary Sources: 
These are mainly historical works written in the later part of 
the 13th Century and by the order of the Qaj ars. These works 
can be divided into two major categories: 
1. the general histories. 
2. Qajar histories, which can be further subdivided by local 
and national. 
These sources contain little original information, as all of them 
are copied from the primary sources of the Zand era. Occasion-
ally one finds fresh information in some of them; thus, they 
might be regarded as useful and complementary to the period 
under discussion. 
Rozat al.Safa: Reza Qoli Khan Hedayat, Tehran, 1270. 
This is a general history from the descent of Adam to earth 
and the account of the prophets and saints down to the reign 
of Na~~er al-:-Din Shah Qaj ar. The work was originally written 
by Mohammad Khavand Shah of Balkh, known as Mir Khwand, 
who executed the task of a general history by the order of the 
minister to the Timurids, Amir cAli Shir Nava 'i. He, however, 
did not finish his work and died in 903, where he left his 
history. His son, Khwand Mir, added one more volume to the 
existing six volumes and brought it down to his own time, 





Khan Hedayat, a distinguished scholar, after 
his mission 
dean of Dar-al-Funoun school. 
to Kharasm, was appointed the 
He was summoned by Na~e r- al-
Din Shah to his palace once, when the king communicated his 
1. R.S., Vols.6-7, n.p. 
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wish to commission the scholar with the task of completing that 
history up to his own reign. The Shah stated that he had been 
acquainted with Rozat al- Safa and that he had found three . 
faults in it. First, it was a large composition and it was diff-
icult for anyone to copy it; thus, it would not be as widely 
read as it ought to be. Secondly, the work had stopped in the 
tenth century and, although many histories had been written 
on the events subsequent to the rule of Timurids, there was no 
comprehensive source which would cover the span of 370 years 
which had elapsed. Thirdly, there was no index of the names 
and dates of the kings whose history was included in this 
work. It was extremely difficult for the reader to trace any of 
them. Our scholar was charged with the completion, publication 
and addition of indices to it. 1 Reza QOli Khan was not quite 
sure whether he would be able to do what he had been com-
manded to do. He reasoned that Mir Khwand had taken thirty 
years to compose his work and that had been under the aus-
pices of the distinguished minister, Amirc Ali Shir, whose patron-
age and bounty had enabled the author to execute his under-
taking in comfort and repose. Still, he had died at the age of 
sixty, presumably because of his enormous effort. Thus, he was 
still contemplating the idea of his great endeavour, when he 
was summoned by the Qajar Shah's minister, Mirza Aqa Khan 
Nouri, who entreated him not to hesitate to obey the command 
of his master, and he would be supported and provided with 
necessary funds for his upkeep. 
Reza QOli Khan set about gathering information for his work 
and added three more volumes to the original history. He stop-
ped his composition in the year 1274/1857, and presented it to 
the reigning monarch, who wished it to be published. 2 This 
edition is a lithograph of the original manuscript, written in 
a beautiful hand with much elegance and neatness. The origin-
1. R.S., Introduction, n.p. 
2. Ibid. 
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al volumes of the work were amended and a table of the names 
and dates of the monarchs was added to the first volume. 
Reza QOli Khan begins his contribution with the establishment 
of the Safavids. His next volume contains the fall of that dyn-
asty and the subsequent events. The history of the Afsharids, 
Zands and the first monarchs of the Qajar dynasty, is related 
in this volume. The last volume contains the reign of Moham-
mad Shah and Naser al-Din Shah. His style is florid and full 
of flattery. Although it is a secondary source for the Zand hist-
ory, it contains some fresh material on that era. For instance, 
the interview between Haji Ebrahim and Aqa Mohammad Khan is . 
unique and original in its content. 1 It cannot, however, be ver-
ified as to its authenticity. 
Nasekh al-Tavarikh: by Mohammad Taqi Sepehr, Tehran, 12 73. 
This monumental work was written by the court historian of 
Naser al-Din Shah. Sepehr compiled his work single-handed and 
in fourteen volumes. It begins with the mythological past and 
goes from the fall of Adam to the Qoranic stories and down to 
the reign of his patron. His work is the first of its kind, in 
that it contains information on the foreign monarchs, religious 
leaders, scientists and prominent artists of the world. The auth-
or, fearful that his death might prevent him from completing 
his history, tries to make it as concise and brief as possible. 
It has been published many times and, recently, the two vol-
umes on the Qajar dynasty have been reprinted as the history 
of the Qajars. 2 
The author claims that he witnessed the advent of the Qajar 
house and asserts that he has seen four of its monarchs. Thus, 
he makes a claim to having been an eyewitness to many of the 
historical events. 
1. Rieu, op. cit., .Vol.9, n.p. 
- c 
2. Nasekh al-Tavarikh, Qajarieh, Tehran, Elmieh, 1354. 
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Local & National Histories: 
F arsnameh-e-N aseri: by Mohammad Has an F as a I i' Tehran, 
Sana 1 i, 1340. 
Mirza ~as an was born into a distinguished family in 1237/1821. 
His uncle, Mirza ] ani, was a dignitary of the Zand era. He 
sided, however, with the Qajars and apparently was the master-
mind behind the plot against Lotf c Ali Khan. 1 Mirza ~as an grew 
up in Shiraz and spent his life in pursuit of learning and 
scholarship. He travelled to various places in order to further 
his knowledge. He was in charge of the family religious found-
ations and apparently lived by the revenues he obtained from 
his Ouqaf. 2 The death of a relation deprived him of part of 
that revenue; thus, he was involved in endless disputes with 
the usurpers of his rights. He managed, however, to recover 
his property not long before he died. 
Farsnameh consists of two parts: the historical section, which 
forms the major part of the work; and the second part, which 
is the geographical description of the province of Fars. He had 
a splendid knowledge of geography; he endeavoure·d to execute 
two maps of that province, which he presented to Zell al-. 
Sol!an, the son · of the reigning monarch, Naser al-Din Shah, 
and the governor of Fars. 3 During the governorship of Farhad 
- c -Mirza Mo tamed al-Douleh, Fasa 1 i produced another map of the 
province of Fars and presented it to the king with a petition 
about his lost property on the margin of the map. The petition 
was granted and Farhad Mirza did everything in his power to 
restore Mirza Has an 1 s losses. It was by the order of Farhad . 
Mirza that Fasa 1 i began his work ... His work was not completed 
1. G.G., p.374. 




until the year 1305/1887. Although the author wished to bring 
the historical events down to 1311/1893, for some unknown 
reason, he stopped it at 1300/1882. This may well have been 
due to the fact that, by the time he finished the first volume, 
he was seventy years of age and blind. It is not known when 
he died, but he was still alive when his work was published 
for the first time in 13141 /1896. 
The author had access to the wealth of official documents, as 
he had close connections with the dignitaries of the province 
and also had access to the works written prior to his time. 
The role played by his family in the last phases of the Zand 
rule, makes this work of some value to us, although he has 
very little original information, and in fact copies Ruznameh 
almost word for word on the history of the Zands. 2 
Events are given in yearly order, thus, they are brief and in-
sufficient, as the work covers a large span of history. The 
scope of Farsnameh is not by any means local and it tends to 
fit the province of Fars into the general picture of the Empire 
under the Qaj ar rule. This work is a mixture of history, geo-
graphy and biography and, in that sense, is typical of its 
kind. Hence, it is a good specimen of the knowledge and learn-
ing held by a 19th Century Persian scholar. 
Farsnameh was translated into English in part by Busse, and 
published in 1972. H. Busse only covers the historical section 
on the Qajars, under the title: History of Persia Under Qajar 
Rule (Columbia University Press, New York). 
Tarikh-e-Kerman: Ahmad cAli Khan Vaziri Kermani, 1291; ed. E. 
Bastani Parizi, Tehran, Ketabha-ye Iran, 1340/1961. 
This work is one of the very few histories written on the 
1. F.N., part 2, p.34. 
2. Ibid., pp.207-227. 
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province of Kerman. The author was the grandson of the famous 
18th Century merchant, Aqa cAli, who played a major role in 
the accession of the Qaj ars and the fall of the Zands. He was 
one of the major instigators of the resistance, which the city 
- c -
of Kerman showed to Lotf Ali Khan, in both attempts made by 
the latter to seize it. Xqa ~li, however, fled to the camp of 
the Qaj ars, when the city fell into the hands of the Zands. 1 
There is no information available, as to the author's date of 
birth. He was, however, educated in Kerman and showed no in-
terest in the affairs of state. Thus, he dedicated his life to 
scholarship and agricultural activity. 2 He travelled to the cap-
ital Tehran in 1294/1877 for medical treatment. He died there 
a few months later. His pension was allocated to his son, who 
finished his work. 
Ahmad cAli Khan began his work in 1291/1874 and managed to 
cover the historical events up to the year 1209, which coincides 
with the murder ot Lotf c Ali Khan and the official accession of 
Aqa Mohammad Khan to the throne. 3 He was still engaged in 
his composition in 1293/1876, but poor health and his trip prev-
ented him from completing his work ... 
His son, Aq a Khan managed to finish the work and presented 
it to the governor of Kerman, cAbd al-~osein Mirza Salar-e~ 
Lashgar. The work was thus named Tarikh-e-Salariyeh. Aqa 
Khan continued the task of his father and brought the events 
down to the rule of his patron, and even furthered it to the 
year 1317/1899. 5 
1. T.K., p.359. 
2. Ibid., Introduction, p.2. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p.3. 
5. Ibid. 
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Although A~mad cAli Khan held no official position, it appears 
that he had access to a large private library, which had manu-
scripts of the rarest books. He asserts that he had consulted 
upwards of a hundred books to establish some of his historical 
facts. The work is original in its section on the Zands and 
appears to be unique in many ways. For instance, on the occas-
ion of ~adeq Khan's flight to Kerman. 1 Ahmad c Ali Khan also 
gives a unique account of the discord and division between the 
dignitaries of Kerman, when the city was beseiged by LotfcAli 
Khan. It, thus, throws light on the darkest phases of the Zand 
rule. 
The work was published in 1340/1961 for the first time, with 
an instroduction and much additional information by the modern 
Kermani scholar, Bastani Parizi. The editor has added a val-
uable section on the sources for the study of the history of 
Kerman. Indices, photographs and an English introduction have 
added to the value of the book. 
Tarikh-e-Molk Ara: Mirza Reza Qoli, Malek Library no. 4161 
(1272) 
This chronicle was written by a scholar in the service of the 
Qajar prince, Morteza2 Qoli Mirza Molk Ara. There is no inform-
ation as to the life and career of the author. He was born in 
Mazandaran and apparently was murdered there, too. His body 
was recovered in a well. 3 He studied in Esfahan and became 
the private secretary to the Qajar prince, his patron, at whose 
request he composed his work. The author begins his work with 
the contest between the Afshars and the Qajars. Although he is 
naturally partial to the cause of the Qajars, his work is of 
importance as regards Zand history. 
1. T.K., p.334. 
2. His name is also given as Mohammad Qoli Mirza. 
3. Notes on the first page of the Manuscript in the Malek Library. 
- 28 -
The manus.cript in existence in the Malek Library is in a 
beautiful Nasta c liq hand with a leather cover. It entered a 
private collection in the year 1272/1855 A. D., which indicates 
that it must have been written prior to that date. The literary 
style is very much the same as other 19th Century history 
books. 
European and Other Sources: 
These may be divided into two major groups: history, travel 
accounts and memoirs; and records and documents. The history 
books are only a few, the most important being the History of 
Persia. 
History of Persia: John Malcolm, London, 1815. 
John Malcolm was born in Scotland in 1769. He entered the 
E. I .C. service at an early age and climbed the ladder in mili-
tary service quickly. He travelled to Iran three times and, on 
each occasion, stayed for a long period of time. His office as 
an envoy to the court of Persia and his military rank, played 
a major role in his acquiring influence and favour among one 
faction of the courtiers of the Qajar king, Fath cAli Shah. 1 His 
first mission was performed in 1800, just a few years after the 
fall of the Zands. On his second .mission in 1808, he was 
strongly challenged by his counterpart, Sir Harford ]ones, who 
had been sent as an envoy on the part of the English King, 
George hv~The arrival of Malcolm 's mission caused great con-
fusion ~apprehension in the Persian court, since the Gover-
nor-General of Bengal, Lord M into, had sent Malcolm on a hos-
tile errand and had threatened to seize the island of Khark. 3 
It was also reported that a prince of the Zand family was in 
1. Malcolm, J., Sketches of Persia, Vol.II, p.l52; Kaye, J.W., Correspondence of 
Major General Sir John Malcolm, Vol.!, pp.l33-4. 
2. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.!, pp.l27-9. 
James Morries to India. 3. I.O.R. Miscellaneous Papers, Box 1A.l809. Letters from 
~~---------------------------
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his suite and this only added to the frenzy. Thus, the govern-
or of Shiraz turned out of the city all the Lak and Lor tribes; 
the act met with strong protest on the part of Sir Harford 
]ones. 1 The incident is significant in that it indicates that the 
shadow of the Zands was still looming over the kingdom, or at 
least the province of Fars. 
Malcolm gathered his information while he was on his missions, 
although he claims that: 
"When I first had the opportunity of collecting the 
material which forms the basis of my present work, 
I neither enjoyed nor had any prospect of enjoying 
the necessary leisure for putting them into a form 
to meet the public eye. " 2 
He was drawing the full salary of an envoy, with an army of 
secretaries and aids to assist him in putting his work togeth-
er, plus a house for his residence. The Governor-General, Lord 
Minto, deemed the composition of a history of Persia useful and 
essential, since there was so little information available on the 
Persian Empire. 3 Malcolm, as he himself acknowledges in his 
introduction, had the good fortune of having a number of offic-
ers in his suite, who, out of zeal in their duties and personal 
regard for the author, provided him with first-hand information 
on the various provinces of Persia.,. He had also formed a 
close friendship with the dignitaries in the court of the Qajars 
and they in turn assisted him in his task. 5 
His work is in two volumes and divided into two sections. The 
first part covers the ancient history of Persia and its legend-
I.O.R. Box 1A.1809. Letter from James Morrier to Lord Minto. 
2. Kaye, Vol.II, pp.59-60. 
3. Ibid., p.60. 
4. H.P. Introduction, Vol.!, p.xiv. 
5. H.P., Vol.!, p.xiii. 
- 30 -
ary past. In that part, he has entirely relied on the Eastern 
sources; his aim was to write a history the way the Eastern 
people saw it. Furthermore, he reasons that the European and 
Greek sources are at the disposal of those interested in the sub-
ject. This section is of no importance to our study, since there 
are many sources written on the ancient history of Persia, so 
that Malcolm' s work has lost much of its value. The second 
part on the modern age, and especially the 18th and 19th Cen-
turies, has great importance for our study. It starts with the 
events preceding the fall of the Sa fa vids and comes down to 
c - --the reign of Fath Ali Shah Qajar. Much of the second volume . . 
is taken up with observations, which he· makes on the life and 
habits of the inhabitants of the Persian empire, as well as the 
monarch and his ministers. This part is of primary importance 
to our work. It provides much valuable and original material. 
On the period under study, he has very little original informat-
ion. Indeed, he has copied a manuscript, which, according to 
Rieu, was the Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh of Ebn cAbdal-Karim. 1 His 
account, as expected, is biased against the Zands and reflects, 
as true, ·the version given by the opponents of that house. How-
ever, he occasionally makes his own personal remarks on the 
political events. As the book was published in 1815, when Mal-
colm had returned to England, his work can be considered as 
a first-hand source for the period under discussion. 
One major drawback in Malcolm, is his hasty and rash judge-
ments on the character of individuals and people in general. 
He admits in his sketches of Persia, that he likes to make up 
his mind quickly about people. 2 This leads him to judge a 
whole nation with sweeping generalizaion. He accuses the Pers-
ian people of forgetting the shortcomings that to his mind Lotf 
1. Rieu, Catalogue, Vol.!, p.198. 
2. Sketches of Persia, London, 1827, Vol.! 167 • 
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c Ali Khan had, 1 but he does exactly the same himself when it 
comes to people he favours. He bestows inordinate praise on 
Haji Ebrahim, 
2 
who, by all other accounts, was an ambitious, 
dishonest and ungrateful man. His judgement on ljaji Ebrahim 
is strongly rejected by his countryman, Sir Harford ]ones. 3 Mal-
colm calls the Persian people dishonest and false, but there 
are evidences of his own false and dishonest conduct, which ) 
throws light on his character.. and discredits his rash judge-
ments. 
Dynasty of the kajars: Ma' aser Soltanieh, translated by Sir . 
Harford ]ones, with an introduction, London, 1833. 
The reason why this work is mentioned in this section, al-
though it is a Persian source, is that Sir Harford ]ones added 
1. H.P., Vol.II, p.201. 
2. Ibid., p.275. 
3. Mission t~ Persia, Vol.I, p.413. 
4. There is a report sent from Sir Harford Jones to Mr. Adair, the Ambassador to the 
Ottoman court, which contains an interview between Sir Harford Jones and c Abbas 
Mirza, the heir apparent to the throne of Persia. Mr. Morrier was present as Sir 
Harford 1s secretary. This would suffice to prove the point: 
11 His royal highness also desired Mr. Morrier to tell Mr. Adair, what 
general Malcolm had been doing. He said what sort of conduct is 
this? At the desire of the king 1 s, I sent one of my own people for 
the express purpose of bringing up the money, which the envoy gave 
an order for, which I so much wanted; to enable me to carry on the 
war against our enemies. Instead of money, what is this tobacco and 
sugar that General Halcolm is sending me up? A11 I to load •Y guns 
with tobacco and set fire to it, as if it were gunpowder; am I to 
fight the Russians by s11oking kallioons? Why, if I were to issue 
an order to all 11y people to do nothing else than smoke, there is 
enough tobacco to last them all for five years, and if I were to 
get together all the confectioners of Espahan to make sweetmeats 
of this sugar, there would be enough to feast us all for the same 
length of time. What iS all this? What does General Halcolm mean 
with his tobacco and sugar? All this he said in the pleasante st 
tone possible, but evidently in the greatest vexation in the dis-
appointment he had suffered, as if he felt for the mortification 
which the subject must give to Sir Harford Jones. Sir Harford Jones 
said 1 indeed I am much ashamed 1 • To this the Prince said if I was 
not persuaded of your attachment for me & that nothing of this could 
be attributed to you, I should include you in the blame, but I know 
it is no fault of yours." 
I.O.R., L/P&S/9 Box 18. 31st May, 1810. 
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an interesting introduction to the work, which is a primary 
source for our study. Ma' aser Soltanieh was written by c Abdal-
Razzaq Donboli Maftun, and presented to Sir Harford }ones on 
his departure from Persia by Fat~c Ali Shah. 1 The original work 
is the official history of the Qajars. It was later translated 
into English and published in England. The introduction, which 
the translator entitles "preliminary matters", contains the most 
valuable account on the last phases of the Zand and Qajar 
struggle. Its importance lies in the fact that Harford J ones 
played a part in the events and witnessed many of them. 
Sir Harford }ones had travelled twice to Persia during the 
reign of the Zands. His first trip in 1787 was during the rule 
c -
of J a far Khan; the second time, in 1791, he was invited to the 
c - -court of Lotf Ali Khan by his minister, Mirza Mohammad Hos-. 
e in. 2 He became the envoy to the court of the Qaj ars later. His 
acquaintance with the Zands was occasioned, while he was the 
joint factor of the E. I .C. in Basra. On both his trips to the 
Zand court, he was treated with much kindness and hospital-
ity. Ja cfar Khan gave him two audiences, in which Francklin 
was present and acted as his interpreter. 3 Lotfc Ali Khan re-
ceived him in the most amiable atmosphere and regarded him 
as a friend until the end of his days. Thus, he had access to 
the last king of the Zand house and conversed with him freely. 
His honesty and genuine conduct gained the favour of Lo!fcAli 
Khan, who placed so much trust in him, as to charge him with 
sale of his precious jewels... He also asked for his advice and 
assistance in time of crisis. Harford }ones, in his turn, is in-
fatuated by Lotf c Ali Khan. His manly beauty, invincible spirit . 
and gallant disposition, had fascinated the Englishman. He 
speaks of him as a hero, a man whose composure and courage 
1. D.K., p.(l) 
2. Ibid., p.ix. 
3. O.M.T. 77. 
4. D.K., p.cxxv. 
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did not allow him to lament or complain. 1 He has great regard 
and respect for Lotfc Ali Khan's friendship and trust . His affect-. 
ion for Lotf c Ali Khan thus leads him to ignore his shortcomings 
which are affirmed by his close associates and friends. 2 On the 
other hand, his hatred for ljaji Ebrahim, induces Harford ]ones 
to relate with a degree of pleasure the dire fate, which befell 
I:Iaji Ebrahim and his family. 3 Thus, he clearly is not devoid 
of partiality in his writing. 
Although brief in his account, ]ones covers the whole span of 
Persian history in his introduction. He begins with the legend-
ary history in a summary form, coming down to the reign of 
the ~afavids. He gives more detail on that epoch, but his per-
sonal experiences at the time of the Zand and Qajar power 
struggle is the most elaborate. He asserts that he lost his 
notes on the private interview with Lotf c Ali Khan in his last 
audience, and he relies completely on his memory when he 
attempts to write it down later... Indeed, his memory appears 
to be very sound. 
It would perhaps be useful here to give a brief account of Sir 
Harford ]ones's life. He was born in Wales in 1764 and entered 
the service of the E. I. C. when he was very young. He served 
in the Basra establishment for many years until he was pro-
moted to the rank of joint factor there. He resided for some 
years in India, where he learnt Persian, and he was able to 
improve his knowledge of the language later in Basra. 5 On his 
second trip to Persia, he was able to converse with Lo!fc Ali 
Khan without the aid of an intermediary. As he as~erts, he 
made the acquaintance of all classes of the Persian people, 
1. D.K., p.clxxxv. 
2. Ibid., p.cxlv. 
3. Ibid., p.cxci. 
4. Ibid., p.clxv. 
5. Mission to Persia, Vol.!, p.32. 
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from princes, ministers, merchants, down to agriculturalists. 1 
His mission as an envoy to the Qajar court lasted about four 
years from 1807 to 1811. He was instrumental in the conclusion 
of the treaty between Persia and Britain, where he served his 
country with zeal. He indicates in a private letter: 
"I prevented Persia from signing an armistice pact 
with Russia at a time when the effect of it would 
be detrimental to the Porte, our ally. I prevented 
Persia availing herself of the offers made to her 
both by Russia and the government at Bagdad to 
aggrandize her empire at the expence of Turkey 
& I negotiated the treaty of subsidy between Eng-
land and Persia at £8000 per annum less than it 
was thought afterwards necessary to give. " 2 
Although his actions were motivated by his love for his country 
and her interests, nevertheless he stood by his friend Lotfc Ali 
Khan and merits due praise for this . 
. 
Persian in recent years by John Gurney and Homa Nateq, with 
additional notes and explanations. 3 The translation is at times 
uncongenial. Sir Harford ]ones's translation of Ma' aser Soltan-
ieh is excellent, in that the reader finds it fluent and less ver-
bose than the original. 
Memoires and Travel Books: 
Observations made on a tour from Bengal to Persia in the year 
1786-1787: William Francklin. London, 1789. 
This work is the result of an eight month stay in Persia. In 
1786, Francklin obtained a furlough from the E.I.C. establish-
1.D.K.,p.ix. 
2. B~L. Add.41.768 Letters and Papers of Sir Harford Jones 1799-1820. 
- - c 
3. Akharin-Rozhaye Lo~f Ali Khan Zand, Tehran, Amir-Kabir, 1353. 
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ment in Bengal, in order to improve his knowledge of the Per-
sian language, as well as to gain information about the hist-
ory and culture of the Persian nation. 1 He boarded a ship 
bound for the Persian Gulf on the 27th February, 1786, and 
arrived in Shiraz on the 29th March of that year. 2 His stay, 
although brief, was a fruitful one. He stayed with the natives 
and adopted all their manners; by this means he enjoyed his 
trip and learnt a lot about the country. He, therefore, recom-
mends to all travellers to adopt the same approach. 3 His work 
is unique, in that he gives a detailed account of the customs 
and traditions of the country; for example, we have no account 
in existance of the mourning rituals during the month of 
Muharram in any of the contemporary sources. Nor is there a 
description anywhere else of the ceremony performed at the 
Qorban festival (c id). During his stay, Francklin, with much 
diligence and precision, observed the minutest aspects of life 
in Persia and, more specifically, in Shiraz. He also adds to 
his valuable observations a brief historical account of the per-
iod up to his departure from Persia... He was an eyewitness to 
many of the events he relates and, thus, his work is of prime 
importance to our study. 
While at Shiraz, Francklin made the acquaintance of Sir Har-
ford }ones, who had travelled to Shiraz for the benefit of his 
health. He accompanied Harford Jones as the interpreter be-
e - s tween Ja far Khan and the latter. Most of his historical ac-
counts are gathered from the military classes, who were still 
resident at Shiraz, and had served the Zands in many exped-
itions. 5 It is interesting to have the version given by these 
1. O.M.T., Introd., p.{I). 
2. Ibid., p.21. 
3. !bid., p.57. 
4. Ibid., pp.112-142. 
5. Ibid., p.77. 
6. Ibid., p.126. 
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people, since most other historic a 1 sources have been written 
by members of the bureaucracy, and are thus hostile to the 
tribal elements, who formed the main core of the Persian army. 
Unlike Malcolm and Jones, who travelled to Persia on an offic-
ial purpose and, hence, were entertained by the high ranking 
officials, Francklin was a solitary traveller and had to make 
do with whatever was at his disposal. Thus, he collected his 
information from the ordinary people and single-handed. Fur-
thermore, he did not have a host of officers and scholars to 
assist him in his work as Malcolm did. This makes his work 
all the more original, as it is the result of his direct contacts 
and without any intermediary. 1 
M
/ . emo1res historiques, politiques et geographiques de voyages 
de comte Ferrieres Sauveboeuf, faits en Turquie, Perse et en 
Arabie. Paris, 1790. 
This work was written between 1782-1789, when Count Sauve-
beouf travelled to Ottoman Turkey and Persia in the capacity 
of an ambassador. 2 He spent some months in Persia, at various 
places, including Tehran and Esfahan. His mission was primar-
ily to Constantinople. Thus, the greater part of the book is 
dedicated to the description of, and observations about, that 
Empire. He also provides a very interesting section on the pro-
vince of Georgia, which had become the centre of much contro-
versy at that time. 3 Catherine I I, the Empress of Russia, in 
her thirst for expansion, had annexed the Kuban area and 
Crimea to her territories. These areas were previously part of 
Ottoman Turkey. Furthermore, she had made friendly overtures 
to the Prince of Georgia, Heraclius, in order to persuade him 
to throw off his allegiance to the Persian court, and become a 
1. O.M.T., p.119. 
2. M.H.P.G., Vol.!, pp.ij-iij. 






protectorate of the Russian Empress. She had succeeded in her 
designs without much difficulty and, in 1783, a treaty was 
signed, according to which Georgia accepted the suzerainty of 
the Russian Empress, in exchange for military assistance. 1 The 
events had created great alarm in France. Louis XVI, the king 
of France, anxious to curtail the Russian expansions, appointed 
Sauveboeuf to the court of Turkey and Persia, to form a united 
front against the Russians. 2 The mission was, however, fruit-
less, since a short while after the arrival of the French 
envoy, cAli Morad Khan died and Sauveboeuf managed to leave 
Persia with great difficulty. 3 cAli Morad Khan, however, was so 
busy with his internal problems, that he had no time for such 
ambitious exploits. During his reign, he felt that it sufficed 
to send a robe of honour to Heraclius and, thus, to demand 
tribute from him. His effort was futile, since by then the 
treaty had been ratified and the Georgian prince had decided 
to accept Russian protection. cAli Morad Khan did not live long 
enough to pursue the Georgian question any further. 
Ferrieres' account on Persia is brief, yet he gathered informat-
ion on various aspects of life in Persia, such as religion, 
agriculture and women. His observations are original and use-
ful. Thus, his work is one of the major European sources on 
that era. It was published in Paris in two volumes in 1790. 
A tour to Sheeraz: Edward Scott Waring, London, 1804. 
Although this journey was undertaken in 1802, that is, a few 
years later than the period under study, yet it can neverthe-
less be considered as a primary source. The reason is that the 
city of Shiraz, which is the subject of the author's observat-
ions, had not greatly changed in its administration and social 
1. H.P., Vol.!, p.214. 
2. Ibid. Lang, The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, N.Y. 1957, p.184. 
3. M.H.P.G., Vol.!, p.78. 
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structure, although it had sustained ruthless ravages by the 
Qaj ars, after it fell into their hands. 1 Waring is an observant 
and diligent traveller and scholar. He provides much informat-
ion on the socio-economic features in the society of south Per-
sia, such as trade, revenues, arts and classes. Although he 
had connection with the elite, and even the ruling prince enter-
tained him frequently during his stay at Shiraz, yet he made 
intelligent observations on the lower classes of the citizenry, 
like the Lutis and the prostitutes . . 
Despite the assurances given by the author, that he has spared 
no pain to establish the accuracy of his information, and that 
he has advanced no statement upon doubtful or suspicious auth-
ority, his accounts are at times fanciful and incredible. 2 The 
historical section of his book contains a summary account of 
the events subsequent to the death of the Vakil until the mur-
der of Lotf c Ali Khan. He asserts that his sources were mainly 
two manuscripts: one of them was written by a native of Shiraz 
from the time of Karim Khan to the fall of the Zands. This 
source can easily be identified as Tarikh-Giti Goshay. The 
other source of his information was a manuscript written by an 
individual, who was personally involved in the political ev-
ents. Waring asserts that this man was the secretary (Mirza) 
to Mohammad Khan, the son of Zaki Khan. Rieu believes that 
Waring used the Tarikh-e-ZandiY.eh of Ebn cAbdal-Karim. 3 If this 
assumption proves to be true, the mystery of Ebn ~bdal-Karim 's 
profession and his motives for his composition can be clarified. 
W a ring asserts that he has tried to reconcile the opposing 
views of his sources, their being drastically opposed to one 
another. 
1. Waring, p.33. 
2. Ibid., p.263. 
3. Rieu, Catalogue of ••• , Vol.I, p.198. 
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Life and adventures of Joseph Amin (1726-1809). Edited by Amy 
A pear, Calcutta, 2nd. ed. , 1918. 
Joseph Am in was born in Hamadan of Armenian parents. His 
father, a merchant, left Persia during the reign of Nader Shah 
and settled in India. Joseph stayed in Persia with his grand-
father until he was eighteen; he then proceeded to India and 
joined his family. He resolved to go to Europe in order to educ-
ate himself; thus, despite his father's opposition, he boarded 
a ship in 1751 and arrived in England six months later. He 
was at first taken charge of by an Armenian merchant in Lon-
don, and lived comfortably until the latter turned Roman Cathol-
ic and, finding Joseph loyal to his faith, did everything in 
his power to harm him. Am in was left with no money and no 
friends; for some years he earned his living by undertaking 
menial employment. 1 
As he was on the verge of committing suicide his fortune rose, 
when he met a nobleman, who offered him assistance and pro-
tection. Joseph Amin was able to make the acquaintance of 
many exalted circles in London. He was even introduced to 
George IV, who took great interest in his adventures. With the 
help of his influential friends, he managed to resume his 
education in the academy of military sciences. He was obsessed 
with the idea of freeing his unfortunate countrymen, the Armen-
ians, from the grip of the cruel Muslim rulers. While in Brit-
ain, he offered his services to Heraclius, the king of Georgia, 
and, although he received no response, he did not give up his 
ideas. 2 He made two attempts to reach Georgia; the first was 
doomed to failure, as he had no-one to protect him against the 
jealousy of the Turks. On his second trip, however, he was re-
commended to two of the great ministers in the court of Russia, 
and they provided him with passports and money to proceed to 
1. L.A.J.A., Parts I-IV. 
2. Ibid., Parts V-XXVIII-XXXI. 
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Georgia. He had a great many adventures on the way and even-
tually reached Teflis, the capital of Georgia in 1763. He stayed 
with Heraclius for nearly two years and became the commander 
of his forces in the skirmishes between the Georgian army and 
the Lasgis. Am in's attempts to persuade Heraclius to raise an 
army and attack the Turkish territories adjacent to Georgia, 
failed to make any impression on the mind of the Georgian 
prince. He even had Am in arrested and kept him under house 
arrest for a month. Am in was eventually freed and was sent 
back to Russia. 1 En route he changed his course and proceeded 
towards Persia. He arrived in Esfahan in 1776, whenc Ali Morad 
Khan had made himself master of that city, he was drafted into 
the latter's army and a small corpse of Georgians were under 
his command. His duty was to guard the Khan's private quar-
ter. Am in was discharged of his services after a short while, 
apparently at the instigation of the Kalantar of Julpha, Meger-
di eh, who feared that Amin might take his place. Amin, how-
ever, stayed in Esfahan for a long time and married there. 
He left Persia in 1783 with his eldest son, for Calcutta. His 
wife and his three other children joined him later. 2 
Joseph Amin was a fanatical Christian and a zealous national-
ist. All his life, he tried in vain to encourage his fellow Arm-
enians to throw off the yoke of servitude to the Muslims. His 
endeavours, however, were fruitful in that Heraclius sought the 
protection of the Russians 
I I, who gradually annexed 
territories. Apparently, she 
and became a vassal to Catherine 
a great part of Armenia to her 
was greatly in favour of Amin' s 
designs and wished him to enter her service; it was at her ex-
press command that he was sent to Georgia. 3 
Amin wrote his biography in English himself; -and it was first 
1. L.A.J.A., part XI-XVI. 
2. Ibid., p.514. 
3. Ibid., part XII, pp.191-192. 
~f-~ 
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printed in London in 1792 and this was probably the copy used 
by Sir John Malcolm. His work is of great value to our study, 
as it contains much original information about the situation of 
the Armenians in Persia, during the reign of the Zands, and 
the state of Georgia at that time. His general observations 
about Persian politics are worthy of notice. The author died in 
Calcutta in 1809, and was buried there. This book was edited 
by one of his descendants with much additional information and 
footnotes. There is also a portrait of the author included in 
the 2nd editon. 
French Consular Correspondances: 
The French consular reports and documents relevant to Persia 
are preserved in the Archives National des Affaires Etrangeres, 
under the heading of La Perse, correspondance consulaires Bag-
dad et Bassorah. These are: 
1. Bagdad (1742-1791) 
Tome I: Affaires etrangeres, BI 175 
Tome II: " 





2. Bass orah ( 1743-1791) Affaires etrangeres 
BI 197 
Much of the information in these records is concerned with the 
political rivalry of the French and British in the Ottoman terr-
itories and the Persian Gulf. There are, however, occasional 
references to the 
only in respect 
general 
to the 
state of the Empire 
trade routes and the 
in Persia, but 
safety of the 
roads. I was not, however, able to consult these reports due 
to some financial difficulties, which prevented me from travell-
ing to France or obtaining the expensive microfilms of the rele-
vant records. 
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Russian Consular Reports and Despatches: 
The lucrative trade connections with the Empire of Persia and 
the semi-independent kingdoms across Caucasus, enabled the 
Russians to establish consular offices in Darband and Anzali. 
Their interests were not purely commercial, and they took every 
opportunity to acquire political power in those areas. Thus, 
they kept a close watch over the Persian territories and in-
formed their government of all the developments regarding the 
political situation in those areas. As a result, there is a great 
repository of secret despatches and reports kept in the Soviet 
Union Archives. Unfortunately, these have not been thoroughly 
investigated by scholars and only a few articles have been pub-
lished on the basis of these records. The bulk of these records 
are still kept in Leningrad, (Archiv Vneshney politiki Rossii 
- AVPR). 
Despite my numerous attempts to obtain copies of these records, 
I was not able to do so, hence I have used the materials avail-
able in the above-mentioned articles. 
India Office Record and Library: 
These valuable records have been thoroughly investigated and 
widely used in this thesis. At times the I. 0. R. records were 
the only source of information on the dark aspects of this per-
iod of history. For the description of the records see Perry. 1 
1. Perry, J., Karim Khan, pp.310-311. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SUCCESSORS OF KARIM KHAN 
Contrasted with the prosperous and tranquil reign of Karim 
Khan, the events which ensued on his death and led to the 
succession of Lotf c Ali Khan, the last Zand ruler, can be re-
garded as a series of confused and bloody upheavals. Consider-
ing the dearth of material and the inadequacy of the sources 
on the causes and effects of these upheavals, we should regard 
ourselves fortunate in having access to the accounts given by 
observant travellers, such as E. Scott Waring and W. Franck-
lin. From these sources we can deduce the driving forces and 
the political climate of the time, in the country in general and 
in the southern provinces in particular. W a ring, in his many 
valuable observations, tries to clarify the reasons behind all 
these events in a country where, as he rightly observes, "The 
throne is the inheritance of the sword". 1 
When, after a long illness which lasted nearly a year, the 
Vakil died on the morning of 13th Safar 1193/3rd March 1779, 
there emerged chaos and violence which he had foreseen, but 
had no power to prevent. Indeed, it is curious that he did not 
attempt to secure the throne for his only son who was of mat-
ure age. 2 There had already formed two factions in the court, 
each supporting one of his sons, Abol Fath (1169/1755-1201/ 
1786), and Mohammad cAli ( 1174/1760- ? ) • 3 The third son, Ebra-
him, was a mere child and had no pretension to the throne. 
Apparently, there was a fourth son by the name of Saleh Khan. 
1. T.S., p.268. 
2. G.M., p.220. 
3. Ibid. 
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In the year 1189/1775, a young man appeared in the court of 
the Vakil, claiming to be his son. Although a number of court-
iers were dubious about the truth of the assertion, but some 
others believed that he was a son of the Vakil. At .Jall events, 
Karim Khan accepted him and treated him as a son. Saleh Khan 
brought his mother and wife to the court. 1 
Karim Khan had no male offspring until he was well over the 
c 
age of fifty. His favourite child was Abd al-Rahim Khan 2 
(1173/1759 -1191/1777), who died very young, two years before 
his father. It was a serious blow to the Vakil and he was so 
grieved that he had no wish to continue living. 
This grief may well have been exacerbated by the fact that 
Abol Fath Khan, his eldest son, was a frivolous youth, whose 
habit of drinking and debauchery had often subjected him to 
severe punishment 
younger brother. 3 
born of a Jewish 
from his father and reprimands from his 
Mohammad cAli Khan, the second son, was 
mother, and that had made his position on 
the question of succession rather precarious ... Thus, neither of 
the Vakil's sons was . fit for the power, with which he was· to 
be invested. Despite the obvious shortcomings of Abol Fath 
Khan, many of the notables were prepared to support him as 
the only rightful heir to the throne, which his father had se-
cured him through good management and magnanimity. Apparent-
ly, Abol Fath Khan had allied himself with a few of the great 
Zand generals, like Nazar cAli Khan and Kalb cAli Khan. His 
major rival, his brother. Mohammad cAli Khan, was supported by 
his father-in-law, Zaki Kha~, and cAli Morad Khan, the latter's 
nephew. Before the news of the Vakil's death wasdisseminated 
through the capital, Shiraz, Abol Fath Khan sent one of his 
1. G.M., p.389. 
2. G.G., pp.231-232. 
3. G.M., p.220. 
4. Ibid., p.215. 
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confidential servants to inform 
ments. The news was, however, 
one of the ladies in the harim. 1 
his supporters of the develop-
leaked to the rival faction by 
Zaki Khan immediately sent word to some of the Zand nobles 
and the tribal chiefs to assemble at his house. He also summon-
c - -
ed his nephew, Ali Morad Khan, who sided with him in his 
support for Mo~ammad cAli Khan. As the Vakil had not yet died, 
while these events were taking place, Zaki Khan took the pre-
caution of admitting his nephew to his house by a secret en-
trance, in case Karim Khan survived the night and Zaki 
Khan's preparations became known to him. The purpose of the 
assembly was to discuss the best line of action in securing the 
succession of Mohammad cAli Khan to the throne. 2 Nazar cAli 
Khan, in the meantime, had sent a few of his adherents to the 
citadel, commonly known as the Ark, while he, himself, and 
his adherents, the sons of Shaikh cAli Khan, had established 
themselves in the latter's palace. 3 
Nazar cAli Khan was one of the most respected nobles of the 
Zand tribe, that is, a Rish Safid (white beard), whose ad-
vanced age and wisdom prevented him from rash conduct. He, 
thus, sent his son, Mohammad cAli, to his opponent, Zaki Khan, 
to persuade him to visit Nazar cAli Khan and consult him on the 
question of accession to the throne, before the Vakil's death 
became known to the general populace.,. Zaki Khan, dismissing 
the idea, invited all the Zand nobles to assemble in the royal 
seraglio, where the corpse of the Vakil lay, in order to arr-
ange for the funeral and interment of the Vakil, and then to 
proceed with the affairs of state. 5 
1. Presumably the mother of c Ali Morad Khan, who had married Sadeq Khan after the 
death of her first husband. G.M., p.215. 
2. Ibid., p.219. 
3. Ibid., p.216. 
4. Ibid., p.219. 
5. Ibid., p.216. 
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Nazar cAli Khan was well aware of the hostility, which existed 
between the sons of Shaikh cAli Khan, the Vakil 1 s late cousin, 
and Zaki Khan. He was also sensible of the averse sentiments 
with which Zaki Khan regarded him. Hence, he sent word again 
that there was no cause for Zaki Khan 1 s alarm, as there was 
no ill will towards him, and that it would be advisable to 
come to the house of Shaikh cAli Khan, where all the supporters 
of Abol Fath Khan were assembled. 1 His messenger returned dis-
appointed for the second time. Zaki Khan set off with his 
forces to the Ark with cAli Morad Khan in his party. On enter-
ing the guard house of the royal apartment, some of the elders 
of the tribes, such as Mafi, joined forces with Zaki Khan, 
while Na~ar cAli Khan proceeded to the Ark with only a few of 
his adherents. 2 He entered the citadel, shut the gates, and 
then proclaimed his intention to give battle to Zaki Khan. His 
conduct was not, however, approved by his supporters. They 
argued that their number, wealth and popular support exceeded 
that of Zaki Khan and there was no reason for their placing 
themselves in a position which would only benefit Zaki Khan 
and his supporters. 3 Indeed, their protestations were logical 
and well founded. While they were confined in the Ark, Zaki 
Khan was able to gain the support of the Vakil's private 
guards, who had come to enquire about their late master ... More-
over, Zaki Khan had opened the royal treasures and distrib-
uted money among the soldiery to win their support. Apparent-
ly, Zaki Khan had amassed great wealth, which he did not hes-
itate to make use of in his aspirations. 5 
Nazar cAli Khan had made a fatal mistake in leaving his person-
al guards, numbering about 2000 men, in the palace of Shaikh 
1. G.M., p.216. 
2. G.G., p.217/G.M., p.216. 
3. G. M., p.216. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid./ O.M. T., p.126. 
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c Ali Khan. The Vakil's citadel was besieged by order of 
Zaki Khan and a fight broke out between the two factions which 
lasted twenty four hours. 1 
On Wednesday, the 14th of ~afar 1193/4th of March, 1779, Karim 
- c -Khan's wife, and mother of Abdal Rahim Khan, the late son of 
the Vakil, arrived at the gates of the Ark. 2 She was admitted 
to the Ark, where she made representations to the effect that 
Zaki Khan wished to settle the matter in a peaceful manner, 
and she entreated the besieged Khans to assemble at the house 
of her late son, cAbdal Ra~im Khan, to negotiate with the oppos-
ing faction. 3 This was apparently a ploy devised by Zaki Khan 
to come to an agreement with his opponents, as he was not 
sure of the outcome of the events. 
Nazar cAli Khan accepted his terms and came out of the Ark. Ap-
parently, Zaki Khan had every intention of honouring his terms 
and was on his way to the meeting place agreed upon, when 
he was confronted by Esma cil Khan Qashqa' i, who had been a 
resident of the court for some years and had gained great in-
fluence in the court... He dissuaded Zaki Khan from attending 
the meeting, and argued that all the Khans opposed to him 
were of great military prowess and, should they wish to chal-
lenge him, they could do so with facility. Thus, it was advis-
able to send a representative to the meeting. Zaki Khan was 
only too willing to violate his promises, and decided to commiss-
ion one of the lesser Khans of the Zand tribe, Mohammad 
Hos ei.n Khan Hazareh, to attend the meeting. This act greatly 
~ffended Nazar cAli Khan, who was about to leave the house, 
but he was assailed by a body of troops sent by Zaki Khan. 
There was a fierce battle, which terminated with the murder of 
1. G.M., p.218. 
2. Ibid.;cAbdel Rahim Khan's wife was the daughter of NazarcAli Khan. 
3. G.M., p.217. 
4. Ibid., p.218. 
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N azar ~li Khan. 1 
It appears that some of the besieged Khans had refused to 
leave the Ark, due to their mistrust and apprehension of a man 
like Zaki Khan. 2 At all events, on hearing of the develop-
ments, they prepared for battle. On the 15th of ~afar, 1193/ 
5th March, 1779, another envoy arrived at the gates of the 
Ark, stating that the whole discord was settled now that Nazar 
c Ali Khan had been killed, and the Khans should not fear to 
step out of the Ark. 3 They were promised a truce in return for 
their peaceful surrender. The Khans, who had held their posit-
ion for three days without food and water, gave themselves up 
and on entering the house of Zaki Khan, were all slaughtered. 
Their heads were then presented to Zaki Khan ... 
There are contradictory accounts as to the number and the 
mode employed in their execution. One traveller asserts that 
they were torn to pieces by the Pahlevans of Zaki Khan. 5 This 
is a significant detail about one of the roles assigned to urban 
elements as opposed to tribal ones in this period. Unfortunate-
ly, there is no other evidence to substantiate this allegation. 
Again the number of Khans slain has been given as between 12-
23 in different sources. s During the course of these events, the 
corpse of the noble Vakil had been left in the royal seraglio 
O;arim) and it was only when Zaki Khan had annihilated all 
his opponents, that he set about interring the body of Karim 
Khan. 7 
1. G.M., p.218. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid.; T.Z., p.7. 
4. G.G., p.218; G.M., p.218. 
5. O.M.T., p.127. 
6. T.Z. gives the number slain as 12; G.G.: 15-16 slain; and G.M.: 23 slain. 
7. G.G., p.219; G.M., p.219. 
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It is essential at this point to study the causes of the dispute 
over the succession of the Vakil and also the elements involved 
in it. We have already stated that this dispute occurred mainly 
and primarily among the Zand nobles and particularly the mili-
tary chiefs. We have no evidence as to the participation in 
this dispute of the city notables in charge of the civil admin-
istration in the capital, Shiraz. The kalantar, Mirza Moham-. 
mad, who enjoyed great power and influence in political affairs 
during the lifetime of the Vakil, seems to have been inactive 
in the contest. Nor was Mirza ] a c far, the Vazir of the late 
monarch, involved in it. There is, however, mention of Mirza 
Ja cfar Khorasani, the minister to Na;ar cAli Khan, who together 
with his master took refuge in the Ark and was subsequently 
killed. 1 
As was to be expected, the tribal elements were actively in-
volved in the violence which ensued; the tribe of Mafi, for 
example, one of the original allies of Karim Khan, were instru-
mental in his gaining victory over his rivals. 2 At this stage 
they were acting as the fifth column, and were concerned only 
with their own gain, rather than the welfare of the state. They 
had received an immense sum of money from Zaki Khan to sup-
port his cause, 3 and were the murderers of the Zand nobles. 
The Qashqa'i tribe were also active in support of Zaki Khan. 
Esma c il Khan was actually playing the role of the latter's 
henchman... The conflict inherent in the semi-nomadic/urban mon-
archy found expression in the frays between the kalantar and 
the Qashqa' i chief, during the reign of Zaki Khan. 5 
1. G.M., p.219. 
2. This tribe was one of the Lak nomads residing in the province of Lorestan. Perry, 
Karim Khan, p. 279. 
3. R.M.M., p.72. 
4. G.M., p.219. 
5. Loc. cit., pp.69-70. 
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Zaki Khan's next step was to bury the Vakil. 1 Then he set 
a bout appropriating the property and the effects of the de-
ceased Khans. He gathered immense wealth and did not spare 
~adeq Khan's household, sending the <;2ashq a' i chief, Esma c il 
Khiin, to the latter's house and pillag'e1 it with brutality. 2 He / 
further summoned ~adeq Khan to the court, giving him a report 
of the Vakil's death at the same time. 3 It seems that, despite 
the execution of all the opposing faction, Zaki Khan still could 
not declare his son-in-law, Mohammad <Ali Khan, as the success-. 
or to the Vakil. As he elevated the eldest son to the throne, 
there is every reason to believe that there must have been re-
sistance to the younger prince's accession. It was only after 
a few days that he dared to declare his intention of forming 
a dual kingship. Thus, he made Mohammad cAli Khan the joint 
ruler ... 
During this period, Zaki Khan was the sole administrator in 
the capital. The two princes were rulers in name only. After 
a short while, Mohammad cAli Khan was cast aside and Abol 
Fath Khan became the king. But this did not last very long 
and again Mohammad cAli Khan was put on the throne. Event-
ually, both princes were set aside and Zaki Khan took matters 
into his own hands. 5 cAli Morad Khan, who had sided with his 
uncle Zaki Khan, 6 was now showing signs of disaffection. He 
knew that he could not place confidence in a man who had be-
trayed his kinsmen and the cause of his late half-brother, 
Karim Khan. 7 cAli Morad Khan was fearful of his safety and 
1. M. T. asserts that Karim Khan was buried before these events. Karim Khan was 
buried in a garden adjoining the Ark in a little house known as Kolah Farangi 
{Frankish Hat). 
2. G.M., p.219; G.G., p.219; R.M.M., p.71. 
3. Ibid. 
4. G.G., p.219. Ibid. R.M.M., p.69. 
5. Ibid. 
6. c Ali Morad 1 s mother was Zaki Khan 1 s sister and had married Sadeq Khan on the 
death of her first husband. 





life, thus he prevailed upon Abol Fath Khan to solicit Zaki 
Khan's permission to send cAli Morad Khan on a military ex-
pedition. Zaki Khan was reluctant at first to concede to this 
proposal, but he ~ventually agreed, apparently because of the 
successful exploits of Aqa Mohammad Khan in Mazandaran. cAli 
Morad was sent at the head of an army to quell the revolt, 
which had erupted in the city of Esfahan,. 1 and then proceed 
to Tehran to show the Zand flag there. 
Before we relate the events which occurred after the departure 
of cAli Morad Khan, we study the return of Sadeq Khan from . 
Basra and subsequent developments. Sadeq Khan, on learning 
of the death of his brother, the Vakil, evacuated the city of 
Basra in great haste and set off for Shiraz. On his way, 2 he 
was informed of the murder of the Zand nobles and the access-
ion of Abol Fath Khan to the throne. 3 He proceeded towards 
the city and halted outside the gates. Zaki Khan, fearful of 
Sadeq Khan's great military prowess, expressed his desire to 
c - -meet him. Ja far Khan, the eldest son of ~adeq, was sent to 
the city to investigate the intentions of the usurper, Zaki 
Khan, and inform his father. On his return, he affirmed what 
Sadeq Khan had anticipated, that is, if he entered the city, . 
he would meet with the same fate as his kinsmen... Sadeq Khan . 
determined to lay siege to the city, was preparing for the tac-
tical engagement, when his soldiers, who numbered 2,000 men, 5 
received letters sent out from Shiraz, warning them to leave 
their commander, Sadeq Khan, or else their families and wives . 
would be given over to the soldiers.' The letters had the 
1. G.G., p.222. T.Z., p.a. 
2. He learnt of the developments in Duraq. 
3. G.G., p.220. T.Z., p.a. 
4. Ibid. Sadeq Khan didn •t have more than 2,000 men with him., as we are informed 
by the E.i.c. Resident that he was expecting reinforcement, but it never arrived. 
I.O.R. G/29/17. Bushire, 26th May, 1779. 
5. I.O.R. G/29/22. Bushire, 26th May, 1779. 









desired effect and in a short while all the troops left the un-
fortunate chief, heading for home. 1 Sadeq Khan had to take . 
refuge in a place of safety, thus he fled towards the province 
of Kerman, where he had many friends and supporters. 2 Appar-
ently, there were only three hundred men with him; 3 they had 
no relations in Shiraz and had no fear of Zaki Khan 1 s atrocit-
ies. Mohammad Hos ein Khan Sistani was among Sadeq Khan 1 s . . 
devoted adherents, who remained with him and invited him to 
his principality ... An army was sent to pursue Sadeq Khan, at . 
the head of which was placed Mohammad Hosein Khan Zand; at 
the engagement which ensued, he was killed and the Shirazis 
were forced to retreat to the city. 5 Sadeq Khan arrived in Barn . 
safely, and garrisoned his few adherents, awaiting a better 
chance. 
Revolt in Esfahan: 
Fath cAli Khan Afshar, one of the warlords involved in the 
power struggle after the death of Nadir, was among the promin-
ent figures kept as hostage in Shiraz, during the reign of Kar-
im Khan. He, however, died in Shiraz and, as the illness of 
the Vakil worsened, he gave permission to Fat? cAli 1 s sons to 
proceed to Esfahan and take their families and households to 
.A~arbayjan, the original abode of that chief. 6 As his sons, 
J ahangir and Mohammad Rash id, reached Esfahan, the news of . 
Karim Khan 1 s death spread and the Afshar tribes, who had 
1. G.G., p.220. T.Z., p.9. M.T., p.343. I.O.R. G/29/27. Bussora. 26th May, 1779. 
2. G.G., p.221. Ibid. R.M.M., p.71. 
3. This chief was the governor of Bam and his fa111ily was to play a decisive role 
in the fate of the last Zand prince. 
4. T.Z., p.9. E.I.C. resident gives his men as 700. I.O.R. G/29/17.Bushire, 27th May,1779. 
5. G.G., p.221. T.Z., p.9. I.O.R. G/29/17. A force of 1400 sent out to pursue him 
and was defeated. 
6. G.G., p.222. G.M. asserts that cAli Morad Khan went to Esafahan, but did not 
interfere with the-;;;olt there. Op. cit., p.256. 
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been transferred ·to that city, persuaded the young chiefs to 
take the opportunity and attempt to capture the city of Esfah-
an. Some of the in ha bi tants of the city, who are called by the 
official historian Alvat va Arazel (the rabble) 1 , allied them-
selves to the rebels and they forced the governor, Haji Aqa 
Mohammad, to take refuge in the citadel of Tabrak, in the 
vicinity of Esfahan. The citadel was besieged by the rebels, 
and for about fifteen days the whole place was in a state of 
chaos and anarchy. 2 
The governor had 
revel t, and Zaki 
Bas~am Khan, to 
informed the government at Shiraz of the 
Khan appointed one of his ablest generals, 
quell the rebellion. On the arrival of the 
army, the revolt was crushed; nine of the major instigators 
were executed in the public square, Naqsh-e-Jahan. The Esfah-
ani allies of the Afshar chiefs were captured and imprisoned. 3 
This is an interesting instance of the citizens of Esfahan stag-
ing a rebellion against the central government. The elements 
/ 
involved are given as the declasses and lutis, but there is one 
significant feature in this event, that is, the official position 
of the leaders of the mob, who were Kakhodas and Babas in 
the city ... 
Aqa Mohammad Khan and Qajar tribal alliance: 
• 
Mohammad Has an Khan Qajar, a formidable chief, whose gallant 
• 
exploits in pursuit of power had been curtailed by his untime-
ly death, 5 was another rival of Karim Khan. His sons were 
taken to Shiraz and Qazvin and kept as hostages in the former 
1. G.G., p.222. 
2. Ibid. T.Z., p.7. 
3. ~· p.223. 
c 
4. Ibid. Babas appear to be equal to Rish-sefid. Tohfat-al-Alam asserts that the 
elders of Z urkhaneh were termed as Baba. 
5. He was killed by one of his own men in 1172/1758. 
• 
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city after his death. One of them, Hosein Qoli, was later ap-
pointed as the governor of the town of Damghan. He had ambit-
ious designs and, in pursuit of his claims to the throne, he 
rebelled. 1 However, he could not further his pretensions, as he 
was forced to live in exile in the province of Astarabad. From 
there, he revolted again and his troops were dispersed by an 
army sent from Shiraz. Hosein Qoli Khan then fled to Dasht-e-
Qebchaq among the Turkman tribes of that area. His third 
attempt to attain power in the province of Mazandaran ended 
~-
with his murder ~ the hands of the Turkmans. 2 During all 
these events, Aqa Mohammad Khan was in Shiraz. Although he 
was fearful of the implications of his brother's conduct, he 
was on all occasions treated with kindness and clemency. Appar-
ently he was granted permission to leave the city on hunting 
exped_itions, because he was despised for being a eunuch and 
was not regarded as being as important as his youngest bro-
thers. 3 On one occasion he had fled to the shrine of Shah-e-
Cheragh, but the Vakil sent for him, with a robe of honour ... 
When the ailing Zand ruler was on the verge of death, Aqa 
Mohammad Khan decided to gain his freedom. Thus he set out 
on a hunting expedition with a few of his closest associates on 
the night before the Vakil died. 5 He was informed of the event 
through his aunt, a lady in the royal ~Jarim. It appears that 
Aqa Mohammad Khan left Shiraz on the 12th Safar 1193/2nd 
• c 
March, 1779, with two of his younger brothers'.: ] a far Qoli and 
Mehdi Qoli Khan.' He set off for Mazandaran and, en route, 
he stopped for a short while in Esf"ahan and then proceeded 
to Tehran, where he recruited some of the Kurdish tribes 
1. G.G., p.170. 
2. Ibid. 
3. R. T., p.359. 
4. Fava 1 ed-al-~afavieh, Ms • B.L., pp.145-146. 
5. G.G., p.246. G.M., p. T.Z., p.6. 






of 1.000 rupees from a merchant in Mazandaran. 
He spent the first phase of his struggle for supremacy in con-
flict with his own brothers, and managed to assert himself by 
treachery and cunning over his rivals. 2 The first challenge 
from the Zands to his growing power in Mazandaran, came dur-
ing the short-lived rule of Zaki Khan, who sent his nephew, 
c Ali M orad Khan, to show the Zand flag in Tehran. But since 
c Ali Morad Khan had also entertained ambitious designs, he 
merely appointed Amir Guneh Khan Afshar to attack Amol; he 
was, however, defeated and fled to Qazvin. 3 
Aqa Mohammad Khan gradually united the different branches of . 
· the Qajar tribe and that set him on the road for his attempt 
to gain the throne, which, according to the Qajar chroniclers, 
was usurped from his house by the Afshars and the Zands. His 
efforts were, first and foremost, centered around the unificat-
ion of the tribes, with whose assistance he could achieve what 
his father had failed to effect. 
Sadeq Khan in Ker.man: 
• 
There is very little information in the contemporary sources on 
the fate of the able Zand chief, Sadeq Khan, after he left for 
Kerman. What one is able to glean from them is contradictory 
and inaccurate. The only source, which gives a detailed ac-
count on the matter is Tarikh-e-Ker.man, a work written much 
1. SarJi, M.T., T.M., Msc. Tehran. He killed one of his brothers and blinded another. 
2. Fava'ed-al-Safavieh, p.147. 
3. G.G., p.247. 
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later than the period under study. However, according to the 
above mentioned history, ~adeq Khan, after having found him-
self deserted 1 by his troops, fled to the province of Kerman. 
The governor, Se.yed Abol~asan Khan, and the principal not-
ables of the city, came out to meet him, with presents and pro-
- - c visions. Among the welcomers was Aqa Ali, a wealthy merchant, 
who owned immense riches and was to play a major role in the 
last episodes of Zand history. The Zand Khan was accommod-
ated in the house of this merchant, since there was no suitable 
abode for a royal guest. 2 His retinue were ·quartered in the 
Ark built by Na;ar cAli Khan, during his office as the governor 
of the place in the Vakil's rule. 
Apparently, the Khan had a great amount of cash, that is, six-
ty thousand Gold Tomans and Indian Rupees, which he distrib-
uted to the people of Kerman, to gain their support in pursuit 
of his cause. He managed to recruit about 1,000 contingents 
from the city and its dependencies. He conscripted troops from 
the neighbouring districts and, in a short while, gathered an 
army numbering 8,000 men. 3 The Khan proceeded from Gavashir 
towards Shiraz. On the way to Shiraz, he learnt of the murder 
of Zaki Khan, and hastily advanced towards Shiraz. 
Golshan-e-Morad, 
which he stayed, 
the only source which mentions the place in 
c - -asserts that he was at Qal e Aqa, a village 
in . the vicinity of the town of Rafsanjan... We have no inform-
ation as to who owned this village, but Waring asserts that 
Sadeq Khan was advised by his minister, Mirza Mo~ammad ~os­
ein, to repair to his property near Barn. 5 Tarikh-e-ZandiYeh 
also affirms that the Zand chief secured the Ark in Rafsanjan, 
1~ G.M., p. T.K., pp.342-343. I.O.R. G/29/17 Bussora, 26th May, 1779. 
2. T.K., p.335. 
3. Tahfat al~la• asserts that Sadeq Khan had gathered a great sum of money. 
4. J ographia·Ye-Kerman, p.169. 
5. T.S., p.263. 
!~: 
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while he was in the area. 
However, the activities of ~adeq Khan deserve special notice; 
as will be seen later, he was the main cause of friction and 
discord, which occurred between the young king, Abol Fath 
Khan, and Zaki Khan, and which eventually resulted in the 
former's abdication. Harford ]ones states that the Vakil had 
appointed his brother, Sadeq, as the guardian of his sons. 1 Al-. 
though none of the Persian sources endorse this allegation, it 
is quite clear that Abol Fath Khan was well disposed towards 
his uncle and wanted him to enter the capital when he re-
turned from Basra. 2 The E. I.C. resident asserts that Abol Fath 
and his brothers were confined for 24 hours while Sadeq Khan . 
was there. This widened the gap already in existence between 
the king and Zaki Khan. There were other causes for Abol 
Fath Khan's displeasure. He was simply tired of being king in 
name only, while Zaki Khan was ruling for him . 
Zaki Khan seems to have been extremely apprehensive of a 
powerful rival such as ~adeq Khan. The account given by 
Mirza Mohammad, the kalantar of Shiraz3 bears evidence to the 
fears of a usurper, whose power was more than usually based 
on terror and menace. This fear was well founded, since Sadeq . 
Khan did not lose time in gaining the support\ of cAli Morad Khan, 
a chief of rank and ability, to oppose his uncle, Zaki Khan, 
for the cause of the rightful heir, Abol Fath Khan. Sadeq Khan . 
wrote letters to cAli Morad soliciting his assistance to fight the 
usurper, Zaki Khan. Apparently, 
"the appeal which Saduck Khan rsic 7 after his 
flight from Shiraz made to Aly Moor ad r sic 7 who 
was then at Tehran gave him the pretext that he 
desired, he assembled the officers of his army and 
demanded from them if it was not disgraceful to 
support any longer a chief who treated the son 
1. D.K., p.cxiv. O.M.T.S., p.13. 
2. T.Z., p.9. 
3. R.M.M., p.70. 
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"and brother of Kureem Khan in the manner Zuckee 
Khan /Sic 7had done. " 1 
Having attained the approbation of the army with no great 
effort, cAli Morad Khan made himself the master of Esfahan and 
declared himself in favour of the young prince, Abol Fath 
Khan. 2 Enraged by the developments and aware of the serious-
ness of the threats, ·that is, having two formidable rivals, who 
had made themselves masters -of two traditionally Zand jurisdict-
ions, Zaki Khan decided to meet the challenge in person. 3 
As there was another major rebellion in the province of Kham-
seh and Hamadan, we will deal with that first and later relate 
the last phase of Zaki Khan's rule, which· terminated with his 
murder by the very tribal warriors who had been instrumental 
in his attjrocities committed towards the Zand nobles. 
The Revolt of Zolfaqar Khan: 
Zolfaqar Khan was a turbulent chief of the tribe of Afshar, 
resident in the area of Khamseh. He had rebelled several times 
during the reign of the Vakil. Each time he had been defeated 
but pardoned for his misconduct, due to the clemency of the 
Vakil... The situation was totally different now, that is, Karim 
Khan was no more, and the country had been thrown into a 
state of turmoil and unrest. Zolfaqar Khan took the opportunity 
of trying his luck once more and established himself in the 
town of Qazvin, not without great difficulty. The event again 
involved the citizens of that town defending their rights and 
principles. 
1. H.P., p.l58. T.Z., p.lO. G.G., p.224. 
2. Ibid. 
3. G.G., p.226. T.Z., p.lO. R.M.M., p.71. 





















usual the soldiers of Zolfaqar Khan, once they were settled 
the town, began many acts of outrage and excess towards 
citizens. Their excesses went as far as violating the hon-
of the town's womenfolk. Highly incensed by such excesses, 
citizens revolted against the newcomers. Many of the troops 
were slain, while Zolfaqar Khan was compelled to retire to the 
citadel. The Ark was besieged and barricades were erected in 
all the areas round the Safavid royal palace. The civil strife 
continued for some days until a certain Luti by the name of 
Mirza Qazvini, together with a few of his followers, penetrated 
into the palace through the water canal of the Ark. This man 
helped Zolfaqar Khan to seize the barricades of the citizens 
and overpower them. 1 This was achieved, the rioters were cap-
tured and their property was confiscated. 2 This instance is 
another example of the courage and zeal of the citizens in de-
fence of their rights against the tribal elements. It also in-
dicates the involvement of the Lutis in uprisings and gener-
al disorder. 
The province of Gilan was in chaos at this time, due to a gen-
eral uprising. The populace had ousted the semi-hereditary gov-
ernor, Hedayat Khan, and had compelled him t<:> send his family 
and effects away by sea, while he fled tocEraq-e~Aj am. 3 Incid-
ently, Hedayat Khan seems to have been aware of the tension 
and dissatisfaction of his subjects, as we are informed by the 
Russian emissary, who had visited the governor in his magnif-
icent palace at Rasht. 
"Hedayat Khan asked that Gilyan rsic 7 province be 
placed under th~ Russian protection. -Hedayat Khan 
had proposed this at his last meeting with Consul 
Bogolyubov. He had suggested that as soon as 
Karim Khan died Russia should send 3,000 men to 
Gilyan in addition to Hedayat Khan's 15,000 Heda-
yat Khan took upon himself the maintenance of the 
1. G. M., p.271. 
2. Ibid. : . 
3. G. G., p.230. 
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"Russian force and promised to pay Russia what he 
had been paying Kerim Khan, 200,000 Rubles each 
year and 2,000 batmans - 700 poods of raw silk. " 1 
The answer to the proposal from Petersburg was negative, due 
to the treaties of 1732 and 1735 and Russia's long friendship 
with Persia. 2 However, Hedayat Khan was captured by ~olfaqar 
Khan and sent to Khamseh. 3 The next we hear about him is in 
the battle which took place between cAli Morad Khan and the 
Afshar chief, Zolfaqar Khan... Zolfaqar Khan made himself mas-
ter of the province with great ease, by appointing some of the 
local chiefs in charge of the administration. His next step was 
to return to his stronghold of Khamseh, where he could repel 
the challenge of the Zand army, with 'Ali Morad Khan at its 
head. 
These actions covered several years. During this time the gov-
- c -ernment at Shiraz had changed hands and, now, Ali Morad 
Khan was acting as the commander of the army in cEraq on 
behalf of Abol Fath Khan. We will relate these events in a 
later section. 
We have mentioned that cAli Morad Khan openly rebelled against 
the rule of Zaki Khan. Apparently, his camp had attracted a 
great many warriors in Tehran. He then set off for Esfahan 
c 
and, on the way, he visited the shrine at Qum of Ma :umeh, 
the sister of the eighth Emam Mo~ammad Ebn Musa-al Reza. He 
vowed that he would fight until the rightful heir was rein-
stated. If he gained final victory over his rival he would 
present the shrine with a great sum of money to decorate and 
beautify it. 5 
1. L. V. Stroeva," Russian Sources on the History of Iran, 1750-1800 11 , Vestnik Lenin-
grad skogo universiteta, no.20, 1974. 
2. Ibid. 
3. G.G., p.223. 
4. G.M., p.276. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 4th Oct. 1779. 






During his stay at Qum, letters had arrived from the governor 
of Kashan, together with a few decrees (Tacliqe) addressing the 
chiefs in his army, informing them of the dismissal of cAli 
Morad as the commander of the Army in cEraq. They also con-
tained orders that the Am.irs should present themselves in the 
capital, Shiraz. Fortunately, these Ta cliqes had found their 
way into the hands of men partial to cAli Morad Khan, other-
wise they could have excited great alarm in the troops and 
may even have incited them to disperse. 1 On this occasion cAli 
Morad Khan, with much alertness and promptitude, rescued his 
army from being thrown into tumult and confusion. He purged 
the chiefs, whose fidelity was not altogether certain, seized 
these men on the way to Kashan, and delivered them to Kash-
an' s governor to be held in prison. 2 Among the purged officers 
was 'Abdol Rahim Khan Shirazi, the leader of the infantry3 and 
some of the tribal chiefs of Bajlan, Modanlu and Eslamu. cAbdol 
Rahim Khan rightly deserved the suspicion that cAli Morad Khan 
manifested towards him. He was ~aji Ebrahim' s brother, who 
was later to become the Kalantar of Shiraz. It was cAbdol Rahim 
Khan who had carried out the mutiny in the camp of Lotf cAli 
Khan at the kalantar' s instigation. 
However, 'Ali Morad Khan did not stay very long in Kashan and 
he set off for Esfahan, where he intended to make his power 
base. .. Zaki Khan had regretted his own -folly in sending such 
a potential rival out of his reach. ·He had contrived to elimin-
ate all his opponents. Apparently having to rely on the assist-
ance of his nephew, cAli Morad, who seems to have been his 
only ally in the ruthless struggle for supremacy over the Zand 
nobles' he had refrained from taking action against CAli Morad 
Khan. 
1. G.M., p.261. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. Apparently after his release he joined Sadeq Khan in Shiraz. 
4. G.G., p.224 Loc. cit. T.Z., p.lO. 
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Golshan-e-Morad asserts that it was during the time that cAli 
Morad Khan was in Tehran that he decided to oppose his uncle 
and "their friendship turned into hostility". 1 There is, how-
ever, reason to believe that, even while in Shiraz, cAli M orad 
Khan was entertaining resentment towards Zaki Khan. 2 At all 
events, Zaki Khan, determined to curtail the threat from cAli 
Morad, prepared to leave the capital to challenge him. He ord-
ered the citizens of Shiraz, of all ranks and descriptions, to 
leave the city within a few hours and gather in the shrine of 
Emam Zadeh Hamzeh· outside the gates, including the Colama. 
Only a few shopkeepers and artisans were to remain in the 
city. The picture given by the author of Giti Goshay of the 
horror and confusion which this order created, although terrify-
ing, can at times be amusing. 
"Some of the great men and dignitaries had failed 
to inform their families while they had no proper 
footware and could not procure horses and were on 
foot." 1 
Zaki Khan had been supervising the execution of his order, by 
sitting at one of the gates of Shiraz, to make sure that all the 
male inhabitants of any consequence would leave ... The inhabit-
ants, unaware of his scheme, had gathered outside the gates, 
only to be taken along towards Esfahan at short notice. Zaki 
Khan appointed his son, Akbar Khan, as the governor of the city 
in his absence and, taking along the unfortunate sons of the 
Vakil, 5 on the 20th Jomada I 1193/ 8th May, 1779, he marched 
in great haste to Esfahan. 
1. G.M., p. 259. 
2. G.G., p.222. 
3. Ibid., pp.225-226. G.M., p.262. T.S., p.267. T.Z., pp.10-11. 
4. G.G., p.225-6. G.M., p.262. 
5. Ibid. T.S., p.267. 
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On the way, he forbade his army to make any noise; that is, 
even the bells on the cattle had been removed. The Neqareh 
Khaneh had been forbidden to produce any sound, in case the 
enemy were alerted of the approaching troops. 
His troops stopped on the border of F ars 
small town of Yazdkhast (or Eiyzad Khast). 
and cEraq, in the 
It was here that 
Zaki Khan was killed. The events, which led to his death, are 
c - -as follows: His adversary Ali Morad Khan had looted a cara-
van, which was carrying treasures to the capital from Esfahan. 
The raid had taken place near Yazdkhast and Zaki Khan, infur-
iated by the act, vented his anger on the local population for 
having failed to prevent it, and demanded reimbursement of 
6000 Tomans, 1 the value of the stolen treasure, from them. 
The wretched populace pleaded innocence and asserted that they 
knew nothing of the matter. Their representations met with the 
wrath of the Khan, who ordered his soldiers to take eighteen 
of the principal men of the town and throw them from a win-
dow, which was overlooking a cliff. ( The window was shown to 
Malcolm in 1807 by the people). Apparently he had ordered 
them to be beaten before they were murdered.2 Not satisfied with 
what he had done, he sent a holy man, a seyed, to be pres-
ent. On entering the room, he accused the poor man of having 
appropriated· and concealed the sum of money in question. The 
seyed' s plea failed to create any impression on the mind of a 
man, whose wrath would only be appeased by acts of barbar-
ity. He further commanded his soldiers to throw the holy man 
from the window. He was dashed to pieces, while his wife and 
daughters were given away to the lust of the soldiery. 3 
The tribal warriors, however callous and hostile to the citi-
zens they may have been, beheld these actions with horror. 3 
1. H.P., Vol.II. Francklin states the amount as 3,000 Tomans; p.129. 
2. G.G., p.227. G.M., p.264. 
3. H.P., Vol.II, p.160. 
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They considered his last act a sacrilege and beyond what they 
could endure. They met secretly after the event and determined 
to kill Zaki Khan, vowing not to betray their cause. Apparent-
ly one of the conspirators had contrived to inform the Khan of 
the plot, probably out of fear or flattery. This treachery was 
discovered and the traitor was put to death by his assoc-
iates.1 However, at night, when the Khan had retired to his 
private tent, the elder of the tribe of Mafi, by the name of 
Khan 'Ali Khan, with a few others, approached his tent. Zaki 
Khan was alone in the tent with two girls, whom he had chosen 
to spend the night with. 2 He generally did not allow the 
guards to be around his tent, 3 and this made the task easier 
for the plotter~. They drew near to the tent, Zaki Khan noticed 
the noise, got up and tried to reach his tent of audience, .. 
where he could see light; but, before he could make a move, 
he was shot and the tent was thrown over his head by cutting 
the ropes. 5 He died on the 28th] amada: I I 1193/ 13th July, 1779. 
Thus ended the life of a man, whose one hundred days of rule 
was truly a disastrous nightmare. It appears that the excesses. 
of Zaki Khan in Yazdkhast were not the only cause for his mur-
der. As Golshan-e-Morad asserts, the Mafi tribal chiefs, who 
had been of great assistance to him after the death of the 
Vakil, were known for their bravery and dignity among the 
warriors. Zaki Khan had witnessed their bravery and capabil-
ities in times of trouble. This had created apprehension in his 
mind and he had secretly turned away from them, waiting for 
a suitable opportunity to do away with them. They, for their 
part, 
him 
had sensed his dangerous fears and were keen to finish 
off before he took the ini tia ti ve. 6 This assertion is 
1. G.M., p.256. To the number of seventy. 
2. Ibid. 
3. R.M.M., p.72. G.G., p.227. 
4. T.S., p.267. 
5. G.M., p.265. D.K., p.cxiv. 
6. G.M., p.264. G.G., p.227. 
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endorsed by the account given by the kalantar, Mirza Moham-
mad, who also states that the tribal warriors openly expressed 
their dissatisfaction with his conduct, despite the enormous 
amount of money which he had given them. 1 Giti Gosh ay des-
cribes the leader of the plot as a troublesome character, who 
feared for his safety. This work also asserts that Khan cAli 
Khan was allied with other tribes in this conspiracy. 2 There 
is an allegation, which involved Abol Fath Khan in the 
affair. 3 This is, however, doubted by some other authorities, 
who observe that this act is outwith his known character... 1 -
Immediately after the murder, the assassins rushed to the 
prince 1 s tent to inform him of the incident. All the troops then 
declared themselves in favour of Abol Fath Khan. On the follow-
ing morning, the king, with all the notables and a great num-
ber of troops, set off for Shiraz. Sadeq Khan was informed of 
the event and he, too, hastened towards the capital. 
To assess the impact of the short-lived rule of Zaki Khan, that 
is, a period of little more than three months, is a difficult 
task. Zaki Khan 1 s time and energy were largely taken up at 
home, that is to say, with his attempt to annihilate ruthlessly 
the nobles of the Zand family, who were a potential threat to 
his reign of terror. This policy, in effect, deprived the Zands 
of the militarily capable generals, such as Nazar cAli Khan, 
who had achieved many spectacular victories over the Zand' s 
opponents during the reign of the Vakil. Further, he had antag-
onised those tribal chiefs, on whose aid the rulers had to rely 
at the time of major unrest. For instance, it is significant that 
he was murdered by the Mafis, an indispensable element in 
the Zand army. 
1. R.M.M., p.72. 
2. G.G., p.227. 
3. T.S., p.267. 
4. H.P., Vol.II, p.161. 
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But we must give him some credit for his administration, al-
though it was only through inciting fear and terror, that he 
carried out his measures. However, his management was so 
vigorous that no-one dared to disobey him. 1 One historian in-
forms us that in his reign, the shopkeepers left their shops 
open and unattended, while reposing in 
and no-one would touch the goods or 
Mirza Mohammad, Kalantar of Shiraz, 
their homes at nights, 
approach the shops. 2 
asserts that Zaki Khan 
was the only person, who could take the administration in 
hand after the death of the Vakil. One may assume that rival-
ries and strife were already in existe.nce before the Vakil 
died. It is not, however, primarily by what the arrogant, 
bitter kalantar affirms, that one comes to this conclusion. We 
learn from an interview between the Russian consul and Heday-
a t Khan, the governor of Gilan, that 
"Karim Khan is no longer popular with anyone, los-
ing power over his army. With only 4000 men in 
his protection and a few strongholds. Tired with 
age he ha s remained in his fortress for three 
years, his guards disarming every one at the 
gates; Karim Khan prevented his Khans from revolt-
ing only because their wives and . relatives were 
in Shiraz and Kazvin as hostages. He collected 
much money and gold in tax, from his poor people, 
for his frivolous sons. "3 
These accounts were endorsed by the kalantar, who affirms that 
the manners the Vakil had adopted in the last year of his life 
were quite contrary to those he used to have. He would kill 
many people for a trifling offence; it was especially his avar-
ice, which had been the cause of much criticism. The kalantar 
further asserts that during his long illness, the provinces of 
c 
Fars and Eraq were in constant terror and anxiety. Four or 
five times, the news of his death reached the in ha bi tants, and 
1. G.M., p.261. 
2. M.T., p.345. 
3. Vestnik Leningradskogo ••• 1750-1800, AVPR, 1768, 77/7, 100, 6. 
j.:. 
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again it was denied from Shiraz. 1 The illness of the Vakil had 
caused a power vacuum and had created discontent and uncer-
tainty among the public, more so "in the .tribal . warriors who 
formed the army. As Golshan-e-Morad describes it: 
"Karim Khan despite his serious condition was in 
such dread of a revolt that he used to force him-
self to attend the usual public audiences, on one 
occasion as he was mounting his horse to go to his 
private apartment (harim) weakness betook him 
and he fell off his horse, he was carried into the 
palace by the order of his son Abol Fath Khan who 
was immediately called to attend his father. n 2 
This reminds one of the situation in the Safavid period, that is 
during the reign of Soltan Mohammad Safavi, the Qezelbash . 
Amirs, . discontented with the weakness of the Shah and the 
power and influence of Mahd -e-'Olya, his wife, rushed into the 
IJarim, slew her and many of her relations. They burst open 
the chests of treasures and plundered whatever they found.3 The 
Vakil was afraid of an uprising amoung his own relations. 
The court . had already polarized around his two sons, even the 
ladies in the I].arim were divided .in support of one against the 
other. 
The citizens of Shiraz were in greater dread of unrest, as 
indicated in the account given by Golshan-e-Morad. 
"In an occasion before the Vakil died his conditions 
had worsened to a degree that there was no hope 
for his surv1v1ng the attack of the disease. The 
citizens of Shiraz set out to barricade their houses 
and their streets in order to defend themselves." 
1. R.M.M., p.68 
2 • G.M., p.214. 
c - - c - -





It was only after his recovery was confirmed that the Shirazis 
started their normal life. 1 This event is indicative of the ten-
sion already felt by the city populace. As to what they really 
feared, we do not know, but it is highly likely that what -happened was a fraction of what would have happened had 
Zaki Khan not taken the lead. There are two possibilities: 
1) The supporters of different factions amongst the citizens took 
to battle in order to establish their power. 2) The soldiers, 
who were mainly tribal, attacked civilians, plundered the 
------------------~------------ ·-·- -·· 
houses and massacred the people. In either of the two cases, 
of which the latter seems the more likely, it would have in-
volved much more bloodshed. 
The kalantar, who seems to be totally resigned and even hos-
tile to the nobles of the Zand house, uses an expression which 
shows his disinclination to participate in any of the hostilit-
ies, that is: "let the head of the enemy be struck by the dag-
ger of the enemy". 2 It is quite evident that he does not 
support either of the two factions, despite the fact that he is 
faithful to the wishes of his late master, the Vakil. As he con-
stantly reprimands and curses Sadeq Khan, for having deprived . 
Abol Fath Khan of his rights, 3 it is surprising that he sees 
nothing wrong with Zaki Khan's brutality. It was probably of 
the real civil strife that he, as well as the citizens of Shiraz, 
were most apprehensive. Although Francklin strongly believes 
that Zaki Khan had not a single good quality to counterbal-
ance his vices, it seems that he prevented much more bloodshed 
during his rule, than he inflicted on the country. 
Reign of Abol Fath Khan: 
On the 29th Ja11.ada I 1193/ 15th June, 1779, that is, the day 
1. G.M., p.214. 
2. R.M.M., p.69. 




after the murder of Zaki Khan, the prince, Abol Fath Khan, 
with all the courtiers who had unwillingly accompanied Zaki 
Khan to Esfahan, advanced towards Shiraz. 1 Some of the not-
ables, including 
urged the prince 
Khan before he 
Haji Aqa Mo~ammad, the governor of Esfahan, 
to challenge the growing power of cAli Morad 
acquired greater influence and strength. But 
the prince was inclined to march to the capital as soon as he 
could to save the treasures and royal household. This was, in 
any case, a more advisable course of action, since he was not 
yet certain of the hostile sentiments of cAli Morad Khan. This 
policy proved sound since, immediately c - -after Ali Morad Khan 
learnt of Abol Fath Khan's accession to the throne, he declared 
himself in favour of the new sovereign and even sent great 
presents ( pishkesh). 2 cAli Morad Khan was reaffirmed in his 
charge as the commander of the forces in CEraq. The procession 
of the prince to the capital was indeed pompous and magnifi-
cent 
"as no king had ever been welcomed 
ner, upward of 100,000 peo_ple had 
greet him, a bout 50, 000 Tomans were 
festivity for the occasion. "3 
in this man-
come out to 
spent on the 
Coins were struck in Abol Fath Khan's name and, for the 
second time, he ascended the throne, only to be removed again 
within a short space of time. 
We have mentioned in the previous section, that the young 
prince was much inclined to drink and spend his time in the 
society of beautiful damsels... He apparently had no intention 
of changing his habits now that he had become a king. He 
started his rule with drinking from dawn to dusk. 5 His court-
1. G.G., p.228. R.M.M., p.72. O.M.T.S., p.132. T.S., p.269. 
2. O.M. T.S., p •. l31. T.S., p.269. 
3. R.M.M., p.73. 
4. G.G., p.230. Loc. cit. 
5. Ibid., p.232. R.M.M., p.73. T.Z., p.12. 
·.~ 
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iers, who were in debt to his father for much of their wealth 
and social prestige, tried their best to dissuade him from the vile 
habit, but to no avail. He promised many times to refrain from 
drinking, but on every occasion he broke his word . 1 ] oseph 
Amin asserts that he was drinking with his footmen and danc-
ing girls were in his court all day long. 2 ~adeq Khan, who 
had placed himself in court as the guardian to the king, also 
reprimanded him and even used harsh words to shake up the 
drunkard king. This was of no use. 3 
There are, however, contradictory accounts on this point. 
Francklin asserts that Sadeq Khan 
"upon hearing of his brother's decease he became 
ambitious of reigning alone and from that instant 
formed schemes for the destruction of his nephew.""' 
Francklin' s views are not shared by any of the contemporary 
historians. There is only an indication in the Ruznameh of the 
kalantar that, after the first few days, Sadeq Khan determined . 
to cast his nephew aside and take charge of affairs. 5 Although 
the Kalantar and the Zand chief, Sadeq, had a long history of . 
animosity, the kalantar is fair to the man and affirms that, 
at first, he had every intention of serving his frivolous neph-
ew. The kalantar even puts the blame on a few of the Zand 
nobles, Khoda Morad, Hushiar and Morad Khan, who influenced 
Sadeq Khan to set himself up as the sovereign. 6 Francklin fails 
to mention the drinking habit of the king and attributes his 
melancholy fate to his lenient disposition. 7 Although it is true 
1. R.M.M., p.73. 
2. L.A.J.A., p. 458. 
3. G.G., p.232. T.Z., p.12. T.S., p.269. 
4. O.M.T.S., p.131. 
5. R.M.M., pp.56-57. 
6. Ibid., p.73. 
7. O.M.T.S., p.132. 
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that Abol Fath Khan was an innocent, kind and immature 
youth, there is every reason to believe that his weak character' 
and mismanagement had reduced the people to the severest dis-
tress, 2 as he had totally forsaken the responsibilities and 
duties of a ruler and had paid no attention to the warnings 
of the nobles and courtiers, that he should take measures 
against his enemies in the court. 3 It appears, however, that 
he was not absolutely devoid of ambitions, as he had tried on 
s·everal occasions to interfere in political affairs, and this was 
stongly resented by his uncle ... 
One of the main causes of discord between him and ~adeq Khan 
was the fate of AkbarKhan, the son of Zaki Khan. This individual 
had been peacefully stripped of his charge as the Beglarbegi 
of Fars on the king's arrival at the capital. Abol Fath Khan . 
wished to kill or mutilate Akbar Khan, while Sadeq Khan pro-. ' 
tected him throughout. 5 Apparently Akbar Khan attended the 
court, as it was customary for the nobles to do, but on every 
c :... 
occasion, the mother of Ali Morad Khan, who later married 
Sadeq Khan, accompanied him in order to prevent his execution . 
or mutilation. 6 
There is no mention as to the cause of the king's wishing to 
kill the unfortunate Akbar Khan. It could, however, be attrib-
uted to the humiliations, which the king had suffered at the 
hands of Zaki Khan, and his wishing to take his revenge on 
the latter's son. However, Golshan-e-Morad asserts that Akbar 
Khan also had insulted the young prince. 7 The gap between 
1. T.S., p.269. 
2. Ibid. 
3. R.M.M., p.73. 
4. T. Z., p.12. 
5. T.S., p.269. 
6. G.M., p.267. 
7. Ibid., p.265. 
:'.1 




the king and his uncle widened, to the extent that Abol Fath 
Khan kept ~adeq under house arrest for some time, until he 
was persuaded to summon him and make peace with him. Azad 
Khan Afghan, another prominent hostage at the court of the 
Vakil, was to act as a mediator and attempt to bring Sadeq 
Khan back to the court. His mission failed since ~adeq Khan 
stated that, as long as the king was not willing to adopt his 
counsel and pay due respect to his old uncle, he was not pre-
pared to attend the court. 1 It appears that Azad Khan was not 
the only mediator. The kalantar also, together with a few of 
the notables (six people whose names are not given), tried to 
convince Sadeq Khan of the detrimental effect of his antagonism . 
towards his nephew. Sadeq Khan promised to heed their repres-. 
enta tions, but broke his promises. 
The tribal chiefs were, as usual, very active in the whole 
affair. The kalantar names Amir Gun eh Khan Afshar, the milit-
ary commander of the Vakil's army as the instigator of the dis-
affection of Sadeq Khan. 2 The tribes appear to have been tired 
of the division of power. They had, on many occasions, per-
suaded the king to give them leave to eliminate ~adeq Khan al-
together, but the king had refused them permission. 3 There is 
an interesting account related by Golshan-e-Morad in this con-
nection. The tribes had gathered at the great square (Maidan), 
demanding permission to deal with Sadeq Khan directly. The . 
king, knowing that they were only looking for trouble, had 
appeared at the balcony of the royal palace to communicate 
with them. The tribes, finding the king immune to their per-
suasions, abused him and it very nearly turned into a mutiny, 
when Mohammad Zaman Khan Zand Ishak Aqasi Bashi ushered 
the king inside and advised him to leave, in order to prevent 
any serious unrest... The tribes then assembled at the house of 
1. G.M., p.268. This is the last time we hear of him; he died shortly after. 
2. R.M.M., p.74. 
3. Ibid., pp.74-75. 
4. G.M., p.269. 
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Sadeq Khan and remained there. 1 . 
This account is substantiated by the kalantar, who affirms that 
after the tribes were disappointed with the king, they gathered 
round ~adeq Khan and, consequently, the king was deprived of 
his throne. The Kalantar also alleges that Sadeq Khan deceived 
his nephew by promising to give his daughter in marriage to 
him, and that was one of the reasons, why Abol Fath was not 
willing to harm his uncle. 2 This is not confirmed by any other 
source. Giti Goshay completely justifies ~adeq Khan 1 s conduct 
by stating that the king was under the influence of some of 
his entourage, who enticed him to kill his uncle. 3 Further, he 
asserts that the king was seized and put in confinement peace-
fully, ... whereas a European historian states that it was after a 
harsh row, that this event took place. 5 Waring, the source of 
this allegation, is apt to fantasise in his account, apart from 
the fact that he gathered his information at a much later 
period, that is, 1802, and he does not even quote his sources. 
However, on the 3rd Rabic II 1193/ 21st. April, 1779, Sadeq . 
Khan assumed the supreme power and his first step was to send 
his son, Ja cfar Khan, to Esfahan in the capacity of governor. 6 
The main goal was to recapture Esfahan from cAli Morad Khan 
who, during the whole period of Abol Fat~ Khan 1 s reign, was 
busy quelling the revolt by Zolfaqar Khan and subjugating the 
provinces in the west. It was in Kashan that cAli Morad Khan 
learnt of Abol Fath Khan 1 s fate. 7 He, subsequently, proclaimed 
himself a competitor for the throne. ~adeq Khan had tried, on 
1. G.M., p.269. R.M.M., p.73. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. G.G., p.232. 
4. T. Z., p.12. G.G., p.233. 
5. T.S., p.270. 
6. G.M., p.278. T.Z., p.13. 
7. G.G., p.277. 
.. 
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many occasions, to threaten his military chiefs by the usual 
methods, such as sending letters to the military chiefs to des-
ert their leader. 1 These measures did not have the desired 
effect, as 'Ali Morad Khan appeared to be fairly popular with 
his army, because of his bounty and liberality of manners. We 
are informed by various historians, that he gave bonuses to 
his soldiers and was always ready to forgive the mistakes com-
mitted by his chiefs, even if they were disastrous for his 
cause. 2 
It is extraordinary that Sadeq Khan did not attempt to purge 
the civil administrators, as he was well aware of their adverse 
sentiments towards him; Mirza Mohammad kalantar, who had 
done a great deal to prevent Sadeq Khan from assuming the 
reins of the kingdom, was confirmed in his charge, together 
with other notables. 3 He cast aside some of the tribal elements, 
who wished to interfere in state affairs, such as Hasan Khan 
Qashqa'i, the son of Esmac il Khan ... The kalantar remarks that 
the Zand tribal warriors, who had gathered around ~adeq 
Khan, eliminated all his opponents, 5 but he fails to mention 
who they were. 
As the rule of Sadeq Khan will be related in a separate chap-. 
ter, we here end this section with the account of the sad and 
melancholy end of Abol Fath Khan's rule. He ruled about two 
months and nine days. 6 It is not certain whether he was de-
prived of his eyesight, but, as Lotf cAli Khan states to Harford 
Jones, it appears that he suffered that cruel calamity. 7 His 
1. G.M., p.292. 
2. Ibid. R.T., p. 442. 
3. R.M.M., p.77. 
4. G. M., p.266. He had been killed by the order ofcAli Morad Khan, when he presented 
himself at the latter's court in Esfahan. 
5. R.M.M., p.75. T.Z., pp.12-13. 
6. Ibid., p.74~ 
7. D.K., p.clxvi-£lxvii. 
,j 
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reign was too brief and turbulent to have contained any major 
events. It was merely a contest between two parties for power. 
The competitors were not in any sense compatible. Sadeq Khan . 
was an experienced man in age and background, with supreme 
military talents and prowess against a young, inexperienced 
and, according to many of the sources, lenient, weak and unam-
bitious youth. 1 As observed by a European sympathiser, 
"he was of too mild a disposition for the turbulent 
time in which he lived, humane, just and gener-
ous, he was the delight of all who saw him and 
died universally regretted after lingering for the 
space of two years in a miserable prison overwhelm-
ed by grief and vexation. " 2 
Even if all these sympathetic qualities were true, his weakness 
and idleness were a great obstacle on his way to acquiring 
power. It was a losing battle for the unfortunate prince, as 
he was not fit for the power he was vested with. As for his 
death, we have no accurate information. Golshan~e-Morad gives 
the date of his death as 1201. 3 He appears to have been alive, 
when Shiraz was captured by cAli Morad Khan, and was later 
flogged by Seid Morad Khan, the governor of Shiraz, for hav-. 
ing concealed jewellery... This was in 1196, which makes the 
space of time that he lived, after he was dethroned, nearly 
four years. Therefore, Francklin appears to be wrong in his 
statement about his death. 
Golshan-e-Morad also asserts that he was seized and imprisoned 
on the 3rd. Rabic II, 1193/ Z1st. April, 1779, whereas Tarikh 
c -e-Zandiyeh places it on the 9th Sha ban/ 23rd August. This 
makes his rule two months and nine days, which is consistent 
with the assertion of the kalantar of Shiraz. 5 
1. G.G., p.232. R.M.M., p.74. 
2. O.M.T.S., p.132. 
3. G.M., p.220. 
4. R.M.M., p.74. 
5. Ibid. 
'·-· ,.
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Sadeq Khan, the new sovereign: 
Sadeq Khan, in his successful coup, arrived at the Ark with 
his sons and· troops. He was admitted by the guards into the 
citadel. At that point, Abol Fath Khan and his brothers unsus-. 
pectingly set off to the entrance to greet him, whereupon they 
were seized and put into confinement on the spot. 1 We have al-
ready mentioned that Sadeq Khan had sent his eldest son, 
1a c far Khan, to Esfahan to capture and bring it back under 
- c -the suzerainty of Shiraz. 1 a far Khan made his entry into the 
c - -city almost unopposed, since Ali Morad Khan was engaged in 
subjugating a revolt in the western provinces and his newly-
appointed governor, Baqer Khan, who had been promoted from 
the rank of Kadkhoda to the governorship of the Safavid cap-
ital, 2 did not offer a substantial resistance. 1 a c f~r Khan was 




are given for 1ac far Khan's hasty departure. 
c - - c 
states that, as Ali Morad Khan was 1a far 
Khan's half brother, he did not wish to enter into a hostile en-
gagement with him. Giti Goshay attributes his departure to the 
smallness of his army. It appears that the real cause was that 
Esfahan had no fortifications, in which 1 a c far Khan's army 
could take refuge if a siege should occur. Moreover, he was no 
match for 'Ali Morad Khan on an open field. 1 a c far Khan took 
the governor with him and left the city in such confusion, that 
many of his soldiers were left behind. 3 
'Ali Morad Khan returned to Esfahan. All the troops, who had 
been left behind by 1ac far Khan joined his forces, .. thus add-
1. G.M., p.269. G.G., p.233. T.Z., p.12. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 4th. Oct. 1779. 
2. Ibid. cAli Morad Khan had raised Baqer Khan Khoraskani from the rank of a Kakhoda 
to that of the governor of Esfahan. 
3. R.M.M., p.75. 
4. Ibid. 
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ing to his power. He is accused by some of the sources, of ha v-
ing extorted great sums of money from the inhabitants. The 
artisans and traders were the ones most pressed for contribut-
ion. 1 This was, however, not unusual. Any chief of pretensions 
levied a great sum of money on the inhabitants of a city or 
district, when he was preparing for a major military expedit-
ion. '11li Mor~d Khan then gathered a large force and sent one 
of his relations, Seid Morad Khan, at its head towards Fars. 2 . 
By this stage, ~adeq Khan had commissioned his son, cAli Naqi 
Khan, to attack Yazd, a city of great importance for the Zand 
house, due to its industry and properous business activities, 
which brought considerable revenue to the treasury. The gover-
nor of the city, Taqi Khan, had made his submission known to 
c Ali Morad Khan, by sending letters of acknowledgement and 
the usual present ( Pishkesh) 3 • Moreover, the governor of the 
province of Kerman, A bol Has an Khan, had for some time past 
refused to pay his tribute to Shiraz and had shown partiality 
to '11li M orad Khan's cause ... 
c Ali Naqi Khan managed with the assistance of Mohammad Hos-
ein Khan Sist ani, an old and devout supporter of his father, to 
subjugate the neighbourhood of Yazd, but the governor had re-
solved to resist the enemy. Taqi Khan Yazdi had requested 
assistance from cAli Morad Khan, who at first sent Reza Qoli 
Khan Qaj ar to Yazd, but for some unknown reason, 5 he recalled 
him to Esfahan and ordered Mohammad cAli Khan Boqayeri, 
another of his generals, to advance towards Yazd. This chief 
proceeded with the utmost speed to that quarter, and set about 
fortifying the town by whatever means he could. Mohammad cAli 
1. G.G., p.234. 
2. Ibid. 
3. G.M., p.293. 
4. G.M., pp.325 and 326. 






















Khan, on one occasion, had ventured to come out of the city 
and he severely defeated the vanguard forces of cAli Naqi Khan, 
which numbered 2000 men. He had gained a great amount of 
booty too. 1 This event had boosted the morale of the Yazdis 
who, in general, are un-warlike and timid. They were deter-
mined after this victory to defend their town with more resil-
• 2 1ence. 
It appears that 'Ali Naqi Khan had tried to reconcile the gover-
nor before he laid siege to the citadel. He had written a letter 
to him, in which he had entreated him to make peace with the 
government at Shiraz, but it had had no positive effect, since 
Taqi Khan had decided to side with cAli Morad Khan. Thus cAli 
Naqi Khan, having captured the old citadel of Yazd, 3 besieQed 
the governor in the new Ark. The siege lasted more than twen-
ty days. Eventually, : Mo~ammad ~osein Khan Sist ani suggested 
entering the citadel and negotiating with the besieged.. This 
was accepted and for a time the latter went to and fro, trying 
to make peace. This aroused suspicion in 'Ali Naqi Khan, who 
was not in a position to express his apprehension of a sell-
out, fearing to antagonize a powerful ally as well as a good 
friend. Therefore, he found it more expedient to leave the town 
and return to Shiraz ... 
Since he had tortured and beaten whoever he had the least 
suspicion of having any money, the unfortunate inhabitants of 
the old town were relieved when he left. It is asserted in some 
of the sources that he proceeded towards Kerman and was ad-
mitted into the citadel by Abol Hasan Khan, the governor. 5 
This is not, however, mentioned in most of the contemporary 
1. G.M., p.294. 
2. :bid., p.293. 
3. Ibid. Yazd had two citadels. 
4. Ibid., p.297. 
5. Ibid., p.298. E.I.C. resident believes that Akbar Khan captured it. G/29/21, 
Bushire, 28th June, 1781. 
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sources and many of the histories are completely silent on this 
score. Thus, cAli Naqi Khan came back to Shiraz. He was, how-
ever, then ordered to join his brother, Has an Khan, in his 
camp at a place known as Kushk-e-Zard (Qasr-e-Zard). It was 
there that an engagement between the forces· of Shiraz and cAli 
M orad Khan's occurred, in which Se id M orad fled from the battle-
field. As a result of his act, the whole of 'Ali Morad' s army 
lost its cohesion and his troops left the field in confusion. cAli 
Morad Khan, enraged by the defeat of his forces, decided to 
fight the foe in person. He moved out of Esfahan and encamped 
on its outskirts. It was at this time that his cEraqi riflemen 
deserted him, heading homeward. Mohammad Reza Khan, the 
chief of Farahani riflemen, having a grudge against cAli Morad 
left his service. The rest of his troops soon followed suit and, 
completely helpless, he was forced to take refuge in Hamadan, 
where he had appointed a governor, after having captured the 
town on his last expedition. 1 The reason given for this incid-
ent, according to Joseph Amin, was that they were greatly dis-
gusted by his conduct. He had been drinking constantly and, 
on one occasion, had stripped his clothes off and danced naked 
in the presence of his military chiefs. 2 
'Ali Naqi Khan advanced to Esfahan, while his brother returned 
- c . - -
to the capital, Shiraz. Apparently, Ali Morad Khan was in such 
haste that he made the journey from his camp at Qasr-e-Zard 
to Esfahan in 24 hours, while a usual trip would take at least 
three days .3 cAli Naqi Khan, a youth of great courage, had not 
the sense to follow his foe, while he was reduced to naught. 
Instead, he established himself in Esfahan, and appointed 
Mohammad Zaman Khan Bigdeli as Vakil to manage the adminis-
tration. He also reinstated the old governor, Haji Aq a Mo~am­
mad, in his charge as the governor... ~adeq Khan wrote a 
1. G.M., p.310. G.G., p.235. T.Z., p.15. 
2. L.A.J.A., p. 458. 
3. G.M., p.310. 
4. Ibid. 
: .. :: 
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letter to his son 
"to desire he would not lose a moment in improving 
the great advantage which fortune had given him 
but the idle youth intoxicated with his success 
thought of nothing but enjoying his victory. " 1 
According to Joseph Am in, during the forty days that cAli Naqi 
Khan stayed in Esfahan, he committed many more cruelties and 
excesses towards the inhabitants. His officers, drunk, searched 
the houses of the citizens for young girls and whoever fell into 
their hands was dishonoured. 2 cAli Morad Khan, in contrast to 
c Ali Naqi Khan, on entering Hamadan, endeavoured to gather 
forces in order to regain what he had lost. In the course of 
thirty to forty days, he gained the support of many tribal 
warriors and set off towards Esfahan. 3 cAli Naqi Khan, who had 
done nothing during his stay at Esfahan except indulge in 
drinking and debauchery, was alarmed at the news of his 
enemy's approach. It was too late to organize his men and, de-
feated in battle, he fled to Shir az ... 
Here we should mention the long-standing hostility on the part 
of cAli Morad Khan towards the ~ufi saints. The situation had 
come about when cAli Morad Khan was leaving Esfahan. At this 
point, apparently, some of the ] alali 5 Darvishes had marched 
c -
through the city, blowing their horns in rejoicing at Ali Morad 
Khan's grave prospects. This had enfuriated the chief to such 
an extent that, when some zealous Muslims notified him of the 
~ufis' great influence in the place, he did not hesitate to 
1. H.P., Vol.2, p.163. 
2. Op. cit., p. 
3. R.M.M., p.76. G.G., p.236. G.M., pp.311-12. I.O.R., G/29/17. Bussora, 5 Dec. 1780. 
4. Tara'eq, p.172. 
5. Tar a 1 eq believes that Jalal i Sufis were the adherents of Jalal-e-Bokhari and were 
basically a Shi ea order from India; but whether they were different from the Jalalis 
of Anatolia is not kn~wn. Op. cit., Vol.!!, p.525. 
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banish them from the city with much disrespect. cAli Morad 
Khan had shown partiality to the Sufis previously. He had . 
allocated a Tak i.yeh (cloister) named after Faiz cAli Shah to the 
latter and his disciples, and had even requested him to pre-
pare a charm for him, so that he might be victorious over his 
enemies. This request had been granted him and he had been 
on good terms with the ~ufis until the above mentioned incident 
occurred. 1 Apparently, on this occasion, a brother of Aqa Moh-
ammad Khan, who was imprisoned in Esfahan, had been freed 
and the Sufis, along with some others, had gathered round his . 
banner and had even declared him the king. This had enfur-
ia ted cAli Morad Khan to such a degree, that he changed his 
amiable attitude towards the Sufis and became their bitter 
enemy. 2 
Sadeq Khan and the tribes: 
Sadeq Khan had twice attempted to reduce to submission the 
turbulent tribes of Kohgiluyeh, but both expeditions had proved 
futile. On the first expedition, his son, Taqi Khan, had been 
sent to that area, but he had not effected a victory over these 
tribes. 3 On the second occasion, a few of the prominent Khans, 
like 'Ali Khan of the tribe of Qara chorlu, l}aydar Khan Bakh-
tiari and Cheragh Khan Faili, were sent to those parts to plun-
der the inhabitants, should they fail to comply with the 
demands of the government at Shiraz. The Kohgiluyeh tribes 
asked for assistance from cAli Morad Khan. He appointed Mo~am­
mad Khan, the son of the Vali of Lorestan, known as Faili, 
with the son of Khosro Khan, the Vali of Ardalan. A shamlu 
chief, Kaz~m Khan, was also commissioned to challenge the 
army of Shiraz. On the latter's arrival, all the tribes in the 
Shiraz army joined his camp and ~adeq Khan's army was corn-
1. Tara'eq, p.187. I.O.R. G/29/17. 1780. 
2. G.M., p. 





















pletely routed. 1 
These events appear to have taken place before the defeat of 
- - c -
another of Sadeq Khan's sons, Ali Naqi Khan, and this victory 
c -
greatly increased and heightened Ali Morad Khan's confidence. 
He had by this time established himself in possession of Kash-
an, Hamadan, Brujerd, Kohgiluyeh and Esfahan with many of 
Zand dependencies being tributary to him. 2 
At this stage we have to clarify the causes of Sadeq Khan's un-. 
popularity with the tribes and the general public. The majority 
of the sources agree that the conduct of his sons and the ex-
tortions and harsh treatment of his officials, had incited great 
alarm and disaffection in the people. 3 Giti Goshay asserts that 
the three sons, who were by a common woman from the district 
of Qir and Karzin, had apparently been much influenced by 
their uncle, a notorious Luti, whose profligate disposition was 
proverbial. Thus, his nephews had taken after him, as is gen-
erally believed in Persian folklore, Owlad-e-halal-be Khalush 
Miravad. The three sons of the monarch had each gathered a 
number of Lutis around themselves and had set about extorting 
money and riches from the poor inhabitants of Shiraz. Their 
conduct was so excessive, that even the Lak tribes had been 
disgusted with them and, secretly, had s{ded with cAli Morad 
Khan, joining his camp one by one ... 
Sadeq Khan appears to have had numerous offspring, amounting . 
to forty. 5 The eldest, Jac far Khan, was a mild and sensible 
youth, who was much beloved by the late vakil. During his 
life, the vakil had bestowed great honour on him by ordering 
1. G.M., p.298. I.O.R. G/29/17. 28th. June, 1781. 
2. R.M.M., p.76. 
3. Ibid., p.75. G.G., p.238. 
4. R.M.M., p. 75. 





















his courtiers to offer him the reverence, which was only due 
to his own sons. 1 Furthermore, he had allocated a separate 
house, close to his residence, for Jac far Khan, who was great-
ly incensed by the licentious conduct of his half-brothers. 2 The 
c -
discord between J a far Khan and his half-brothers was a cause 
of grief for his father, Sadeq Khan, whose efforts to mediate 
and put an end to the quarrels had on all occasions failed; 
J a c far Khan had even cut off relations with his father. 3 In 
short, the three sons had alienated everyone, from their own 
brother to the lowest of their subjects, thus seriously damaging 
the reputation and good name, which their father had estab-
lished through the years. Furthermore, they had jeopardized 
the monarchy and the power of the Zand house. It appears that 
Sadeq Khan had no control over their activities, and he was 
in despair, because of their excesses ... 
Waring suggests that even Akbar Khan (Zaki Khan's son), who 
was much in debt to Sadeq Khan for his safety, as he was 
0 
nearly blinded or killed by Abol Fath Khan, had Sadeq Khan 
not intervened on his behalf, fled to Esfahan to joi~ cAli Morad 
Khan, only because he "resented the indignities they had offer-
ed him". 5 This view seems to be simplistic, since it could not 
be the sole cause of such a foolhardy act, that is, to escape 
in broad daylight despite the efforts of many soldiers to cap-
ture him. 6 It appears that he was fearful of being exposed to 
the same fate as the other Zand nobles. However, the outrag-
eous conduct of Sadeq Khan's sons had even antagonised his 
own supporters, that is, Zand nobles like Morad Khan, Khoda 
Morad Khan and Hushiar Khan Zand, who had persuaded ~adeq 
1 • .§..:.~.:.· p.332. 
2 • .§..:..§..:.• p.238. 
3. Ibid. 
4 • !.:.~.:. t p • 2 7 1 • 
5. Ibid. 
6 • ~.:. ~ .:. ~ .:. t p • 7 6 • 
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Khan to push the king, A bol Fa th Khan, aside and usurp his 
throne. These nobles deserted cAli . Naqi Khan in the battlefield 
before the army of Shiraz met the forces of cAli Morad Khan. 1 
As the kalantar of Shira z affirms, during these events two-
thirds of the tribes had gathered round cAli Morad Khan 1 s stan-
dard, with very few tribal warriors remaining in the city of 
Shiraz. Despite this assertion, Golshan-e-Morad states that the 
army sent to cEraq to confront cAli Morad Khan numbered about 
25,000; 2 this is probably greatly exaggerated. However, cAli 
Morad Khan stayed nearly a year at Esfahan, 3 in which place 
he had established a real court, receiving presents from his 
vassals and appointing governors to the provinces, which had 
come under his sway. Sadeq Khan, however, was not prepared . 
to tolerate another monarch in his kingdom. He, therefore, com-
e -missioned his son, Ja far Khan, to advance towards Kohgiluyeh 
and Behbahan and bring these areas back to his father 1 s suzer-
ainty. Incidentally, the cause given for appointing J a c far Khan 
to this task is, that Sadeq Khan was in the habit of consulting 
the latter on the affairs of state and placed great trust in his 
judgements. This was resented by his half-brothers, who began 
to backbite against him and went as far as accusing him of 
having secret communication with cAli Morad. Khan ... Whether. the 
allegations were well-founded or not, we cannot decide, but 
as Jac far Khan joined 'Ali Morad 1 s camp later, one is apt to 
think that there must have been some truth in the matter. 
However, Sadeq Khan does not seem to have taken these accusat-. c 
ions seriously. If he had done, he would not have let J a far 
- c -Khan out of his reach. Thus, J a far Khan proceeded towards 
that quarter, with many prominent chiefs in his company, 
1. R.M.M., p.75. T.S., p.271. 
2. G.M., p.336. E.I.C. resident gives the number 12,000; I.O.R. G/29/17, Bushire, 
June, 1781. M.T., p.347. 
3. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 14th Feb. 1780. 
4. G.M., p.332. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bushire, 28th. June, 1781. 























including Mo~ammad A c zam Khan Afghan, who was to play a 
major role in the last episode of the Zand and Qajar content-
ion. Among the chiefs, who accompanied Jac far Khan, was a 
certain Ka 'i Morad Khan, the chief of a local tribe of Kohgiluy-
eh, who had been kept in Shiraz as hostage due to his mis-
chievous character. 1 At this stage he was released and became 
c -
a confidential servant of ] a far Khan. He had taken it upon 
himself to persuade the local tribes of Kohgiluyeh to abandon 
hostile sentiments towards the government at Shiraz and come 
to terms with it. 2 On arriving in the district, he went into the 
tribal areas and, instead of abiding by his promises, he set 
himself up as a warlord. He gathered a large force and actu-
c ally defeated the force under the command of Mohammad A zam 
- c -Khan. It was only when ] a far Khan opposed him in person, 
that he was defeated. These events took place in the year 
1194-1195 A.H./1780-1781 A.D., before cAli Morad Khan advanced 
towards Shiraz for a decisive confrontation. 3 
c Ali Morad Khan summoned all his military chiefs, as well as 
his courtiers, to consult them about his next move and whether 
it was expedient to advance to Shiraz and topple a government, 
which was based on oppression and had deprived the sons of 
the late Vakil of their inheritance. This he believed to be his 
duty, since he was the only Zand noble capable of undertaking 
such a task. He claimed that, if he succeeded in his endeav-
our, he would withdraw from worldly affairs and would retire 
to a peaceful place ... (As early as December, 1779, he had de-
clared to Solaiman Pasha his intention to attack Shiraz.) This 
was, however, a ploy to gain the consent of his courtiers. As 
we shall see later, he had no intention of adopting this course 
of action. It appears that the courtiers unanimously approved 
1. G.M., p.332. See the chapter on Lotf cAli Khan. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. I.O.R. G/29/17. Jan./Feb. 1780. 







of his designs and he set about preparing his forces for the 
expedition. Apparently, the arrival of Akbar Khan, Zaki 
Khan 1 s son, was a decisive and encouraging signal to cAli 
Morad Khan to execute his long-standing desire to become the 
sovereign, 1 despite his vociferous denial of having such des-
igns. For nearly two years before his attack on Shiraz, he was 
virtually independent in the whole of cEraq (1193-5/1779-81:, 




in Esfahan, Akbar Khan took it upon himself to recruit 
to fight Sadeq Khan. After a short while, he gathered 
10,000 ca;alry. 2 It took cAli Morad Khan two months to 
prepare for his military exploits and, in July 1781/Rabic 1195, 
he encamped in Abraj. 3 At this stage, it is essential to relate 
the events, which happened in Shiraz while the news of the 
approaching army from Esfahan reached the monarch and his 
courtiers. It appears that Sadeq Khan had taken proper meas-. 
ures to prevent his enemy 1 s advance. He had commissioned his 
son, Taq i Khan, to be stationed in the vicinity of the town of 
Abadeh, to watch over the activities of cAli Morad Khan. Sadeq 
Khan had also sent cAli Naqi Khan, another of his sons, to the 
province of Kerman. We have no account of the occurrences 
there. It appears that the governor, despite his support for cAli 
Morad Khan, admitted cAli Naqi into the city and presented him 
with the usual tokens of acknowledgement, as is stated by Gol-
shan-e-Morad... Although this source seems to have confused the 
trips that cAli Naqi Khan made to the south, and omits to men-
tion that he returned to Shiraz after his expedition against 
Yazd, it is nevertheless the only source, which contains any 
information in this respect. 
1. R.M.M., p.76. T.S., p.272. I.O.R., G/29/17, 20th Dec. 1779. 
2. T.S., p.272. 
3. R.M.M., p. 76. 




c Ali Naqi Khan left Kerman, after having received an urgent 
summons from his father. He arrived in the capital after two 
of his brothers, Taqi Khan and Has an Khan, who had been sent 
out of Shiraz to defend the city, had been defeated and Shiraz 
was under siege. 1 Apparently, Hasan Khan's army had been dis-
persed even before an engagement took place. The sources give 
various reasons for this event. Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh asserts that, 
on Friday, 20th Rajah, 1195/ 12th July, 1781, a fight broke 
out between the Lari and Dashtestani troops over the distribut-
ion of provisions and it led to the disorderly desertion of all 
the soldiery. 2 Malcolm, who takes much of his information from 
the above mentioned source, alleges the same reason for the in-
cident. Golshan-e-Morad, however, greatly differs from these 
sources. It states that there had been a dispute between the 
Lira vi and Mamas ani tribes against the Laris, in which Sadeq . 
Khan had been the arbitrator. He had taken the side of the 
malefactors, the Laris, by ruling that both parties were at 
fault. This unjust act had seriously displeased his tribal war-
riors. They were awaiting an opportunity to avenge the injust-
ice done to them. Shortly afterwards, the Mamas an is were 
assigned to proceed towards Esfahan, under the command of 
~as an Khan. This gave them a good chance to show their dis-
affection. On arriving on the plain of Hazar Baiza, they desert-
ed their chief and set off for their homes collectively. Has an 
Khan had no option other than a hasty flight to Shiraz. 3 
This incident is clearly indicative of the rivalry and discord 
between the sedentary and nomadic elements, in the period un-
der study. Indeed, it is a characteristic feature of Zand rule. 
Each faction sought greater influence and power, and keeping 
them at bay, or gratifying their greed, was the dilemma the 
rulers had to contend with. Many of the upheavals and tumults 
1. R.M.M., p.77. T.Z., p.17. G.G., pp.237 and 241. 
2. T.Z., p.17. H.P., Vol.2, p.164. 
3. G.M., p.331. 
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had been caused by one or other of the factions. Thus, the 
rulers were, in fact, at the mercy of their own subjects, how-
ever much they appeared outwardly to be despotic, oppressive 
and cruel in their administration. 
Sadeq Khan suddenly found himself in a serious predicament. 
Either he had to stop <Ali Morad Khan's advance, or else his 
monarchy was lost. It appears that his apprehensions were so 
intense, that he intended to challenge the foe in person. We 
are informed of this by the E. I. C. resident. 1 This was, how-
ever, contrary to the policies he had hitherto adopted, that is 
to say, not to leave the city on military expeditions, probably 
on account of his advanced age, or else out of fear of leaving 
the administration in the hands of others. On the arrival of 
Has an Khan at Shiraz, the monarch held a meeting, to which 
all the dignitaries were invited. This was to decide on the 
best line of resistance to the approaching threat of a siege. 
Mirza Mohammad Kalantar expressed his views on this matter 
as follows: 
"now that you have alienated the tribes and they 
would not be conciliated to your cause, it would 
be advisable to banish their families from the city 
altogether. As they would certainly attempt to con-
duct their families to a place of safety, · they will 
leave <Ali Morad's camp. Thus, cAli Morad Khan 
would be forced to leave his position near the city 
or else come to an agreement with the government 
at Shiraz. " 2 
This course of action was adopted at first, and ~adeq Khan be-
gan fortifying the citadel, but he was warned that the tribes 
might not react the same way as they had anticipated. There-
fore, he changed his mind and began to subject the families 
of the unhappy tribes to the most cruel treatment, charging 
1. I.O.R. L/P&S/9/76. Box 10. 1810. 














































his henchmen to levy emergency taxes and heavy fines on them. 
Whoever refused or, indeed, could not pay the taxes, was beat-
en, tortured and even m uti la ted. These measures had the re-
verse effect. The tribes foresook their families altogether and 
showed great resilience in their support for cAli Morad Khan. 
This did not alter the sad fate of the tribes. Their clamour 
was a constant torment for the citizens, 1 to such an extent 
that the kalantar, who never mentions the Lak tribes without 
a word of abuse, which signifies his hatred for the tribal ele-
ments, had to intervene on their behalf and release them from 
some of their misfortunes. 2 
The siege lasted nearly nine months, 3 during which period the 
inhabitants were harassed by numerous shortages, of which the 
first and foremost appears to have been the scarcity of fuel ... 
Again the kalantar elaborates on the ~ in which N•.;.,. 
everything suitable for consuming as fuel haa----Deen burnt, from 
the trees of the orchards down to the doors and windows of the 
houses.· As a result of the shortages, prices had risen to an 
astronomical height. A Man of Rogan (about seven and a half 
pounds of cooking oil) was sold for 2 Tomans; a cow fetched 
10-15 Tomans, 5 as compared to the prices, which were fixed dur-
ing the life-time of the Vakil, that is: one shahi Man ( 15lbs) 
of Rogan was 800 Dinars,5 and a cow was 1 Toman. 7 
1. A. quarter in Shiraz had been allocated to the Lak and Zand tribes, as Waring saw 
in 1803 it was destroyed by Aqa Mohammad Khan. It was probably near to the Kalantar's 
residence. Vol.2, p.33. 
2. R.M.M., p.78. 
3. I.O.R. G/29/21. Bussora, 2nd Oct. 1781. Giti Goshay states it was about a year. 
Joseph Amin gives it as 13 months. 
4. R.M.M., p.79. 
5. Ibid. Francklin in 1789 states that one Toman is equal to 10-15 Rups. See the 
table of foreign coins. 
6. There was 1000 Dinars in a Toman. 
7. R.T., pp.315-316. The inflationary prices become more striking if compared to 











Despite all these complaints a bout the food shortage, the city 
seems to have been well supplied with provisions, since it was 
only after five months of the city being under siege that the 
shops were forced to close. 1 It should also be noted that dur-
ing these five months, no caravan had been able to enter the 
city. This suggests that either the granaries, or the shops, 
were well-stocked before the siege started. At this stage, the 
notables, disgusted with the state of affairs and the obstinacy 
of the Khan, prevailed upon him to write to c Ali Morad Khan 
and resolve their differences through peaceful means. The Khan 
did not yield to their representations. They even suggested 
that, if he reckoned this to be a sign of weakness and below 
his dignity, they would do it on his behalf. The Khan was un-
moved, until the siege came to its sixth month. It was then, 
that two of the ministers set forth to find a solution, but it 
was too late. Up till then, about 6000-7000 people had died, or 
had been mutilated, either in the war or at the hands of the 
Khan's henchmen. 2 
There is no rational explanation for Sadeq Khan's obstinate . 
resistance. He knew perfectly well that his own courtiers were 
not loyal to him. Indeed, on one occasion, a few of the court-
iers: namely, Mirza }ani, a cousin of Mirza Mohammad Rabic , 
the superintendent of the court (Nazer Divan), . Mfrza Shafic Af-
shar and ljaydar Mirza, the last of the ~afavid princes (the 
-c -son of Esma il Ill, who was kept in Shiraz), secretly wrote to 
'Ali M orad Khan, promising him their cooperation. They vowed 
that they would give away the gate under their charge should 
c Ali Morad Khan approach it at a certain time. The plot was 
Cont'd: ••• Esfahan a cow, g1v1ng in one day a Shahi maund {sic) or 15lbs of milk, 
cost 24 Rupees; that is, about two Tomans (p.123). The kalantar gives the price of 
tobacco as 2 Tomans {presumably for a Man); whereas, in 1856, Binning gives it as 
1s. 6d. for two Mans (Vol.2, p.47) - One Toman was equal to £2-10s. 
1. R.T., pp.315-316. 



























discovered. Mirza Jani, rather naively, went to the Khan's 
audience with the letter, which he had received in reply, in 
his pocket. The Khan, having been previously informed of the 
conspiracy, questioned him as to the truth of it. Mirza Jani 
denied the charge. He was subsequently searched and the letter 
was found. At that point, the Khan ordered all the plotters to 
be executed. 1 This event is 
who attributes the misfortune, 
Khan, to this sacriligious 
dar Mirza. It appears that, 
much regretted by the Kalantar, 
which befell the family of Sadeq . 
act, that is, the killing of Hay-
after the discovery of the plot, 
Sadeq Khan intensified his severe treatment of the inhabitants, . 
"murdering, strangling and mutilating the people occurred day 
and night". 2 
J a c far Khan's alliance with cAli Morad: 
We have, in a previous section, mentioned that Jac far Khan, 
being the eldest son of the monarch, was in constant discord 
with his half-brothers. This, in effect, had alienated him from 
his father, too. 'Ali Morad Khan, having previous knowledge of 
the quarrel, found it an ideal pretext for wooing the support 
c -and alliance of Ja far Khan. He wrote letters to him, acknow-
ledging his right to the kingdom as a Zand prince and sug-
gested that, in the case of victory over the government at 
Shiraz, he was prepared to give him a fair share of the king-
dom. He also promised that Sadeq Khan and his sons would not 
be molested if Shiraz fell. 3 Apparently, cAli Morad Khan was in 
a state of terror that Jac far Khan would take sides with his 
father and attack him, while encamped on the outskirts of Shir-
az... Thus, he directed his efforts to winning the support of 
the latter. There is, however, another version of the story, 
1. G.M., p.344. Loc. cit., p.78. 
2. Loc. cit., p.78. 
3. G.G., p.240. 
4. Ibid., p.239. 
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which is that the chiefs of the forces accompanying c Ja far 
Khan had conspired to seize Ja 
c far and deliver to cAli him 
M orad Khan, 1 and that this was the prime cause of c Ja far 
Khan's joining the latter's camp. 
However, Ja c far Khan set off from Behbehan, where he had 
been stationed for some time past, and advanced towards cAli 
Morad' s camp, the latter sending a few dignitaries to meet his 
half-brother and receiving him with every mark of distinction. 2 
This event must have greatly weakened the position of Sadeq . 
Khan and further damaged the strained relations with his son. 
The distress within the capital encouraged the inhabitants, and 
especially some of the most confidential guards3 of the Khan, 
to betray one of the gates to the city, known as Bagh-e-Shah ... 
They called in Akbar Khan, who was encamped in a position 
very close to the gates. He rushed in, but before he could sec-
ure his position, <Ali Naqi Khan was informed of the event, and 
with great gallantry, the latter fought the invaders, forcing 
them to retire. However, another of the gates was given away 
and this could not be remedied. 5 Sadeq Khan ordered his sons . 
to retire to the Ark and secure the fortifications. 6 
When cAli Morad Khan entered the city on Tuesday, 18th Rabic 
I 1195/3rd March, 1782, Sadeq Khan had taken refuge with his . 
sons and ministers in the citadel. Golshan-e-Morad asserts that 
~adeq Khan had taken two of <Ali Morad Khan's sons into the 
citadel and, in order to solicit the latter's pardon, he had 
bestowed robes of honour on them and sent them to the camp of 
1. G. M., p.334. 
2. Ibid., p.335. 
3. E.I.C. Resident states that two Cauns delivered the city. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 
29th March, 1782. 
4. G.G., p.242. G.M., p. R.M.M., p.79. T.Z., p.19. O.H.T. , p.133. 
5. Ibid. T.S., p.273. 






their father. cAli Morad Khan, however, did not make any prom-
ises and only said that he would decide on the matter when he 
met Sadeq Khan. 1 Sadeq Khan, before stepping out of the cita-
del, asked 'Ali Mor~d to take an oath on the Qur'an not to mol-
est him; Akbar Khan took the oath on cAli Morad Khan's behalf 
c -and soon violated it. Eventually Ali Morad granted amnesty 
to the besieged and they gave themselves up with promises of 
safety and security. As usual, the promise was violated and 
~adeq Khan was deprived of his eyesight and his son, cAli Naqi 
Khan suffered the same cruelty. 2 It is curious that Kalantar 
believes he was killed,in 8 with some other sources. r.~, , •... ') 
It appears that Sadeq Khan took his own life after this sad . 
incident. There are various versions as to how he committed 
suicide. It is, however, most likely that he consumed an 
amount of opium and died as a result. 3 
He was a man of great valour and spirit, as is asserted by 
all the sources... He was a distinguished soldier and a compet-
ent ·commander. The kalantar, with his bitter pen, accuses him 
of vanity and boastfulness about his bravery, 5 but one is in-
clined to think that this accusation stems from the fact that 
Sadeq Khan never left Shiraz after he assumed the reins of gov-
ernment •. 
Sadeq Khan, in his career as a monarch, attempted to re-est ab-. 
lish the power of the Zands in the areas lost to the kingdom. 
In the many expeditions, which his forces 'undertook to Esfa-
han, Yazd, Kerman and the western provinces, such as Beh-
behan and Kohgiluyeh, he was relatively successful. In view 
1. G.M., p.368. 
2. G.G., p.243. T.S., p.273. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 25th April, 1782. 
3. Ibid. 
4. O.M.T.S., p. H.P., Vol.II, p.161. G.G., p.243. 
5. R.M.M., p.79. 
·.~ 
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of the fact, however, that there was a more capable and evid-
ently more popular pretender of the Zand dynasty, cAli Morad 
Khan, who had at different times brought these areas under his 
flag, Sadeq Khan's efforts proved futile. From the impression 
given by the resident of the E. I. C. in Bushehr / he was just, 
condescending and liberal, but, of course, these qualities were 
totally lost, when he acquired the supreme power in his hands. 
He became avaricious, cruel and haughty. 2 As to his avarice, 
one may assume that he was faced with the same dilemma, as 
that which faced all the successors of the Vakil: namely, that 
the great expenses of military expeditions could not be pro-
vided for by the usual revenues, which came to the treasury, 
and he did not have any means of raising cash, except by 
squeezing the poor inhabitants of the capital or other cities, 
which were tributary to his government. 
At one point, he had to devise a rather ingenious means to 
raise funds, as we learn from the E. I .C. resident: 
"he had permitted Coja Yacoob your honour's broker 
to come to Bush ire under a promise and security, 
however, that he will either return himself, or 
send his son to Shyras, at the expiration of two 
months. Sadoo Caun in a letter received by Coja 
Yacoob informed us that he had granted humbly in-
dulgence in order to settle some accounts with us 
and some other affairs, but his real errand is to 
collect a sum of money to distribute among the 
Cauns and his ministers. " 3 
"In order not only to obtain his own (Khajeh Yac 
qub) release, but the release also of Shaikh Dew-
is's son and the rest of the principal people at 
Bussora who have been prisoners at Shyras /Sic 7 
since the capture of the town by the Persians ..... -
1. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 3rd Feb. 1779. 
2. R.M.M., p.80. 
3. I.O.R. G/29/17. Factory records, letter sent by Abraham and Latouch, Bussora 18th. 
May, 1780. 
4. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 18th May, 1780. 






Besides these schemes, he was anxious to use his power to pro-
tect the trade of the country, since it was one of the sources 
of revenue. Again we are informed by the resident that, when 
Ra 'is Baqer of Tanqestan attacked and plundered Bushehr, 
Sadeq Khan ordered him to repair to Shiraz and restore to the . 
merchants, whatever he had taken. 1 His sons also had a major 
part in his thirst for amassing wealth, that is, they probably, 
for their own ends, made use of their notorious lutis to mu let 
and extort money from the people. It was one of the main 
causes of the tribes' disenchantment with his administration. 
His rule lasted for more than two years and he died on 20th 
Rabicl, 1196/Sth March, 1782. 2 
Two of his sons, cAli Naqi Khan and Taqi Khan were killed at 
the same time; the former was a gallant young man, who 
showed great resilience during the siege of Shiraz. 3 His third 
son, Hasan Khan died suddenly during the siege apparently 
from an unknown cause... He had many other sons, who were 
infants at his death and were kept at the harim in Shiraz. 5 
• 
1. I.O.R. G/29/17. 28th August 1779. 
2. R.M.M., p.79. 
3. G.M., p.347. 
4. Ibid. R.M.M., p.78. 







THE RULE OF 'ALl MORAD KHAN 
c Ali Morad Khan entered the city of Shiraz on Thursday, 22nd. 
Rabic I, 1196/ 7th March, 1782. The festival of Nouru.z was held 
with great pomp and magnificence, on Wednesday, 5th Rabi) 1, 
1196/19th March, 1782. The new sovereign appointed his confid-
ential courtiers to appropriate the treasures belonging to ~adeq 
Khan. 1 Apparently, they were unimaginably immense. 2 It ap-
e - -pears that Ali Morad Khan gave strict orders that the shops 
and houses should be secured as a safeguard against looting; 
but despite this, many of them were pillaged. Moreover, the 
merchants had to pay the sum of forty Tomans each as a pen-
alty and security for their property. 3 
Golshan-e-Morad states that 'Ali Morad Khan invited his court-
iers to a meeting, in order to decide on the elevation of one 
of the late Vakil's sons to the throne. This was strongly dis-
puted, as they all believed that the chaos and bloodshed, 
which had occurred, were due to the incompetence and ineptit-
ude of these idle youths. The discussion over this issue went 
on for some time, until 'Ali Morad Khan yielded to the wishes 
of his courtiers; thus the unfortunate sons of the Vakil were 
blinded .. and forever banished from the scene. 
Mirza Mohammad, in his Ruznameh, asserts that they were 
immediately deprived of sight, and there was no such meeting. 5 
1 • .§..:.~.:.· p.369. 
2. Ibid., p.370. 
3. B..:.!.:_p.440.G.G., p.248. 
4. G.M., p.370. 
5. R.M.M., p.Bl. 
.. ;: 
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The EIC resident does not provide us with any information on 
this question. He says: 
"It is not, however, known what has been the fate 
of two sons of Carim 
sporting whom Ally 
Caun, some say they 
others, that they have 
Ca un under pretence of sup-
Morat Caun opposed Sadoo 
are confined in the citadel, 
been put to death." 1 
It is curious that Lotf cAli Khan admits that his grandfather 
(Sadeq Khan) committed this act. It is quite possible, however, 
that he even did not know the true facts after all, and that 
they were deprived of sight by cAli Morad Khan's order. 2 
A month elapsed before the new sovereign pronounced his intent-
ion to transfer his court to Esfahan. 3 Apparently, this sudden 
decision came about at the instigation of some courtiers, who 
were aware of his weakness of character and suspicion towards 
the notables of Shiraz. He had previously appointed Mirza Mo~­
ammad as the Beglarbegi of Fars and had received the presents 
made on such occasions, amounting to 6,000 Tomans... He set 
about extorting immense amounts of money from the inhabitants 
by fines and imposts. The instigators of the move were appar-
ently six of the <Eraqi and Kashani courtiers, whose hostility 
towards the Shirazis induced them to backbite against the not-
ables of Fars. 5 cAli Morad Khan thus ordered all the notables 
of F ars to prepare for departure. On the 2nd ] amada ll, 1196/ 
15th May, 1782, 6 the caravan set off for Esfahan, and he, him-
l.I.O.R. G/29/21. Bussora, 25th April, 1782. 
2.D.K., p.clxix. 
3. G.JII., p.374. 
4.R.M.M., p.79. 
5. Ibid. There is 11ention of a certain Mirza Shafic ( R. M .-M. 79 ) 
whose position is not known. It 11ay have been a--.t's'nke on the part of 
the copyist and this person, in all probability, was the minister tocAli Morad Khan, 
M• - R b"c h 1 f · c c · 1rza a 1 • T e centra parts o Pers1a was known as Eraq-e- AJam. 
6.R.M.M., p. 80. 




self, followed it on the 29th/11th June, 1782. 1 It appears that 
he took the precaution of transferring all the Kalantars, local 
magnates and Kadkhodas of the districts, as well as those from 
the city of Shiraz, to Esfahan. 2 However, cAli Morad Khan freed 
all the hostages, who were kept in the court of Shiraz, includ-
ing Ahmad Khan Donboli, the governor of Khoi and Solmas, to-
gether with a few of the chiefs of the same tribe. Khodad ad 
Khan, the son of Najaf Qoli Khan, the Beglarbegi of Tabriz, 
was also released and appointed to replace his father, who was 
infirm and weak, as a result of old age. 3 Apparently, Najaf 
Qoli Khan had requested the release of his son... ~eid Mer-
ad Khan was charged with the government of Shiraz, while Abol 
Fath Khan and his brothers, all the infant children of Sadeq 
Khan, and the ladies of his l)arim, as well as the Vakil's, 
were left behind in Shiraz. 5 
<Ali Morad Khan arrived in Esfahan on the 7th Ramazan 1196/ 
16th August, 1782. There was one gu~st at the court of Shiraz, 
that is N asrollah Mirza, Shahrokh Afshar' s son, who had 
sought asylum in Shiraz after his misfortunes. He was taken 
along to Esfahan, but, on the way, he managed to escape and 
with a few adherents headed for Khorasan. His escape was ig-
nored by the monarch. 
Akbar Khan and his melancholy fate: 
This chief was the son of Zaki Khan, who had fled from Shiraz 
and joined cAli Morad Khan at Esfahan. CAli M orad Khan, who 
was much indebted to him for many of his successes in differ-
ent expeditions and, most of all, in the capture of Shiraz. It 
was thanks to Akbar Khan's courage, military prowess and per-
c - -severance, that the citadel fell and Ali Morad Khan became the 
1. G.M., p.344. G.G., pp.243-4. 
2. G.G., p.244. G.M., p.374. 
3. G.M., p.374. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., p.385. 
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master of the city. However, cAli Morad Khan had ample opport-
unity to witness this bra very and began to fear him, especi-
ally since Akbar Khan went about with a great many tribal 
warriors, who were his constant companions while he was at 
court. 1 The fact that Akbar Khan, rightly, attributed the fall 
of Shiraz to his own military skills, made cAli Morad Khan even 
more apprehensive. 
Golshan-e-Morad believes that cAli Morad Khan's displeasure had 
been caused by the ruthless conduct and the indignities Akbar 
Khan had afforded to Sadeq Khan and his sons, without the . 
sanction of the Khan, despite a solemn oath upon the Quran not 
to molest them. 2 This allegation appears to be unfounded, since 
c Ali Morad Khan never took an oath to that effect. As a matter 
of fact, when Sadeq Khan had retired to the Ark of the city, 
he had given robes of honour to two of 'Ali Morad Khan's sons, 
Shaikh V a is and Ahmad Morad Khan, and had sent them to the 
c - -camp of their father, to solicite his pardon. Ali Morad Khan 
replied that he would decide on that point when they met. To 
this Sadeq Khan had agreed, on the condition that he took an . 
oath not to harass him and his family. Again cAli Morad Khan 
had declined and Akbar Khan had sworn upon the Quran in-
stead. 3 Evidently, cAli Morad Khan did not wish to have any 
part in the matter; thus, he had left open the option to his 
commander, Akbar Khan, to proceed at his own discretion. c Ali 
Morad Khan was also prudent not to alienate Jacar Khan. However 
Akbar Khan was accused of having plotted against his master; .. 
but the reality was that 'Ali Morad Khan was jealous of him. 
Franklin states that the proof of the design was clear. 5 This, 
however, contrasts with the doubtful view expressed by Mal-
1. G.M., p.372. 
2, Ibid., p.368. 
3. Ibid. 
4. O.M.T.S., p.135. T.S., p.274. 
5. O.M.T.S., p.333. 
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col m, who asserts that: 
"It could not have been difficult to persuade Aly 
Moorad of the dangers he had to apprehend from 
his ambitious cousin, he believed or affected to be-
lieve, that he was guilty. " 1 
Indeed, Akbar Khan appears to have been extremely ambitious. 
There is an instance which clearly indicates that he had set 
himself up as an able chief, who was not prepared to share 
the success of his gains. 
During the siege of Shiraz by cAli Morad Khan's army, J a c far 
Khan was on the verge of defeating the army of the city. Ak-
- c -bar Khan, fearing that Ja far Khan would benefit from his suc-
cess, and thus deprive him of his share, withdrew and left 
J a c far Khan on his own. This encouraged 'Ali Naqi Khan to 
c - c -attack J a far Khan fiercely. Although J a far Khan managed to 
force the Shirazi army to flee, he was very disappointed to 
miss such an opportunity of complete victory. 2 This incident 
also shows the element of rivalry and jealousy, which existed 
c 
between the two chiefs. It is hardly surprising that J a far 
Khan blinded and subsequently murdered Akbar Khan. 
Akbar Khan was universally praised for his many talents. His 
death, thus, occasioned great regret on the part of many, who 
had come into contact with · him and witnessed with admiration 
his unequalled bravery. It is regrettable that the fears of a 
despot did not spare the lives of the very person, who brought 
him into power. 
'A.Ii Morad Khan and his attempt to curtail the Qajars: 
While on the march towards Esfahan, news arrived that the 
1. H.P.~ Vol.II, p.166. 
2. G. M., p.353. 
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Qajars had attacked and captured Qazvin and had advanced to-
wards Hamadan, Qalamro and Alishekar. Morad Khan Zand was 
commissioned to proceed to Qazvin and challenge the governor 
installed there by the Qajars. Morad Khan, without even stop-
ping in Qazvin, proceeded to Hamadan, where he was defeated 
in an engagement with the Qajars. This was mainly due to the 
fact that his army, who had not had a chance to . rest 
were exhausted and, therefore, unable to give of their best in 
combat. Morad Khan retired to Hamadan, while the Qajars re-
turned to Qazvin. At this stage, Aqa Mohammad Khan was in-
formed of the arrival of 'Ali Morad Khan i~ Esfahan. He, there-
fore, ordered his brother, c -J a far Qoli Khan, and his army to 
evacuate Qazvin and retire to Mazandaran,1 apparently to consol-
idate his power in the territories he had already conquered. 
Morad Khan entered Qazvin and, having manifested rebellious 
intentions, he was summoned to Esfahan and deprived of his 
charge. On his arrival at the capital, he was blinded and im-
prisoned. 2 
The state of affairs in Shiraz has reached us through the kal-
antar, who received letters from his associates there. The gov-
ernor of Shiraz, Seid Morad, had treated the inhabitants so . 
cruelly, that many would have preferred the hardship of the 
siege, rather than the injustices of his office; while others had 
long since fled3 to various parts of India and Turkey. This 
allegation is endorsed by the French ambassador, Ferrieres 
Sauveboeuf, who was commissioned to the court of cAli Morad 
Khan and witnessed the despair of the populace. He states: 
"un grand nombre de Persans se sont refugies a 
Bagdad & a Bassora pour y oublier dans le repos 
d' heureux loisirs les fureurs de leurs compat-
riotes." .. 
1. G·.M., p.388. 
2. Ibid. 
3. R.M.M., p.Sl. 
4. H.P., Vol.I, p.76. 
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Seid Morad Khan appears to have extorted vast amounts of cash 
from the populace in Shiraz. He went as far as flogging poor 
Abol Fat~ Khan to recover the jewellery that he was supposed 
to have concealed. 1 
These measures are sharply contrasted with the policy adopted 
by 'Ali Morad Khan himself, who took great care to prevent in-
justice and extortions by officials. At one stage, some of his 
Ku rdish soldiers of the Baban tribe committed many acts of ex-
cess towards the inhabitants. This reached cAli Morad Khan's 
ears and he announced his decision to punish them. Yet he did 
not issue a decree to that effect, while one of his courtiers 
spread the news to the inhabitants. The people then took the 
matter into their own hands and attacked the soldiers, disarm-
ing and plundering all their effects. cAli Morad Khan, learning 
of the outrageous conduct of his subjects, ordered that all 
those, who had anything to do with the incident, should be 
severely punished. This measure caused many instances of in-
justice, since the ordinary passers-by in the Bazar were also 
apprehended and punished. 2 Another example of his love for 
justice is manifested in the severe treatment of the son of 
Mirza Rabic , his own minister, q.s s-tated by · Ferrieres Sauve-
boeuf: 
"le fils de Mirs a Rabbi, premier ministre d 'Ali Mou-
rat-Khan, lui fut denonce""' pour avoir abuse,. par vio-
lence d' une jeune fille. Ce souverain ordonna sur-
le-champ que lorsque Mirsa Rabbi seroit un cons-
eil, son fils recevroit deux cent coups de b~tons 
~ la porte de palais. "3 
1. Op. cit., p.74. 
2. G. M., p.392. 
3. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.52. 
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J a c far Khan and the emergence of hostility: 
We have related in the previous chapter that Jac far Khan join-
c - -
ed Ali Morad Khan's camp, only when he had been assured 
that his relations would not be molested, and also on the con-
dition that he would be given a· fair share in the government. 
Ja cfar Khan was disappointed on both these accounts. Further-
more, he was rejected and subjected to constant harassment, 
due to the monarch's jealousy. 1 Apparently, he was forced to 
dismiss his personal guards and to manage with very few ser-
vants, merely to avert the apprehensions, which cAli Morad 
Khan harboured. cAli Morad Khan even tormented J a c far Khan's 
associates. For instance, 
"there was a man of high birth who had assumed 
the guise of Sufis and was much respected for his 
saintly benevo1ence and purity of manners. He, as 
a companion lived in the court of Ja cfar Khan. " 2 
This Sufi saint, apparently Nur cAli Shah, was sought after by 
the dignitaries of Fars and this, in effect, had made him dang-
c -
erous, in case he was used as a link between J a far Khan and 
the notables in a conspiracy. Howev;er, Nur cAli Shah and other 
of the Sufi Saints, were banished from Esfahan with much in dig-. 
nity and insults. 3 The Mollas in the city had a share in this 
affair, as they had warned that the true faith was endang-
ered ... 
c Ali Morad Khan, in his despair to find a means of severing 
the link between the Farsi Notables and the tribes with Jac far 
Khan, decided to commission him to undertake a military assign-
ment. He was, therefore, sent to Kurdestan and Ardalan, in 
1. G.G., p.245. 
2. Ibid.", p.345. 
3. H.P., Vol.2, p.419. T.H., Vol.2, p.l72. 
4. H.P., p.v.2., p.419. 
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order to restore peace in those areas. The pretext for the ass-
ignment was that Khosro Khan, the Va1i of Ardalan, had for 
some time past refrained from acknowledging the government at 
Esfahan and, even when cAli Morad Khan had sent him a robe 
of honour with presents, he had failed to pay the tribute and 
revenues demanded of him. 1 Moreover, the chief of the Kurdish 
Baban tribes had killed the governor of Sanqor and established 
himself in his position. 2 The expedition was, however, fruitless 
as Khosro Khan, learning of J a c far Khan's approach and finding 
out that his own brother had conspired against him, fled his 
governorate and reached Esfahan without meeting the army sent 
to deal with him. He took refuge in the royal stables (Bast) 
3 c -and was subsequently pardoned. Ja far Khan, however, estab-
lished himself in that area and began to entertain the idea of 
rebellion, when a suitable opportunity should arise. 
The arrival of the Russian ambassador: 
In the year 1197/1782-83, an Armenian, by the name of Yac qub 
arrived at the court of Esfahan, on behalf of the Russian Emp-
ress, Ca therine I I. The purpose of the embassy was that, as 
the two great powers, Russia and Qttoman Turkey had commen-
ced hostile military operations, the Empress expected the Per-
sian monarch to honour the articles of friendship treaty signed 
in 1733-35, and to allow Russian troops to pass through his 
dominion in their attack on Qars and Arzrum. She also request-
ed the Persian monarch to send a punitive detachment to reduce 
the Lazgis in Daqestan, who caused much inconvenience to the 
Russian government with their inroads into their Empire. cAli 
Morad Khan, with great diplomacy, declined the first request, 
stating that he was on friendly terms with the Ottoman soltan, 
and that the treaties, which his predecessors had signed with 
1. G.M., p.388. 
2• Ibid. 
J. Ibid., p.389, 
.. 
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Turkey, were sacred to him. As to the second request, he re-
plied that he would notify his Beglarbegi in the province of 
Dagistan to take the necessary measures against the Lazgis. He 
also sent an Ambassador, Mohammad Khan Mokri, to the Russian . 
court, in company with the Russian embassy, with suitable pres-
ents. 1 
<Ali Morad Khan and religion: 
Unlike most of the Zand rulers, cAli Morad Khan appears to 
have had great zeal for religion. On many occasions, he vis-
ited the shrine of Mac ~umeh, 2 and vowed to repair and redecor-
ate it, if he won over his opponents. He also promised to pres-
ent the shrines of Ottoman cEraq with enormous donations. In 
the year 1197/1782-83, he commissioned many of the best crafts-
men to proceed to the cAtabat, in order to renew the tile work 
of the tomb of cAli, together with many precious chandeliers and 
magnificent carpets made in the village of Jusheqan, plus the 
amount of 20,000 gold Tomans (Tabrizi) for the renovation of 
the shrine. The sum of 12,000 gold Tomans was allocated for 
the redecoration of the shrine of Hosein the third Emam; 8,000 
for the shrine of his brother cAb hi~, with fine carpets and a 
wooden sepulcre, inlaid with ivory, worked by the illustrious 
artisan, Rahim Najjar Bashi. 3 The amount of money sent a pp-. 
ears to be grossly exaggerated. Mirza Mohammad Kalantar gives 
the sum as 20,000 total. He appointed Mirza A~mad, the son of 
Mirza Mohammad <Ali Sadr , to execute the work, if the money 
was sufficient to carry out the monarch's wishes to the best of 
his ability and if not, to inform him to send more. Were the 
1. G. M., p.394. . According to the Russian docu1ents, which I have not 
oeeR able to consult cAli Horad Khan had taken the initi.ative to establish friendly 
relations with the Elipress of Russia, on condition· that ·he would give the right to 
the Russians to trade in the north of Persia. 
2. The sister of E1am Reza, the Eighth Emam of the Shica. 
3. G.M., p.393. 
.. 
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donation to exceed the expenses, the remaining sum should be 
given to the Osuli Mojtahed, Mohammad Baqer Behbehani to 
donate to the needy. The repair work was finished and a new 
mosque was also built, but Mirza Ahmad died amidst it, and 
the mosque was never completed. 1 'Aii Morad Khan appears to 
have acknowledged, with this act, the Osuli school, and its ad-
herents, against the Akhbaris. His love. for cAli was so excess-
ive that, whenever 'Ali' s name was mentioned, the tears flowed 
down his face. 2 He was also greatly superstitious and is report-
ed to have requested Fai z cAli Shah to prepare a charm 
( Telesm). for him to gain victory over his foes. 3 He was also 
known to have a strong belief in astrology. 
The expedition against Mizandarin: 
After the failure of Amir Guneh Khan in his expedition against 
Mazandaran, 'Ali Morad Khan was annoyed and dissatisfied with 
him, but he did not show his wrath. Amir Guneh Khan's sister 
was one of the ladies in his harim and the company of the 
good lady compensated and arrested the wrath of the monarch 
for the defeat he had sustained... Besides, he hoped that Aqa 
Mohammad Khan would be satisfied with the two provinces of 
Mazandaran and Astarabad, which were his hereditary domin-
ion. 5 However, Aqa Mohammad Khan, in his attempt to expand . 
his territories, attacked Qazvin, Hamadan and Gilan, with its 
dependencies and reduced all these areas into submission. 6 He 
further attempted to capture T.ehran. 7 These acts of utter dis-
regard for Zand suzerainty, induced cAli Morad Khan to curtail 
1. G.M., pp.393-4. 
2. ~' p.82. G. M., p.393. 
3. T.H., v.J, p.l87. 
4. ~~' p.400. 
5. ~ p.400. 
6. Ibid., p.247. 
7. G. G., p. 248. G. M. , p. 401. 
• 
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the Qajar exploits by military expedition into Mazandaran. 
The Zand monarch had received many letters from the inhabit-
ants of Mazandaran, who had beseeched him to relieve them 
from the grip of the Qajars. 1 Waring even asserts that a miss-
ion had come to the court of Esfahan to represent the Mazandar-
anis' case. They had arrived in the year 1782/1196-97, and 
had communicated their grievances to the minister of the Mon-
arch, to the effect that, when Aqa Mohammad Khan had be-
sieged the town of Sari, 
"the adherents of the family of the Zands had be-
held the success of A Moohummud with envy, per-
haps regret; and many of them had retired from 
this scene of mortification to lsphahan." 
"The minister listened with attention to their remon-
strances, and through him, they represented to the 
king, what the servility of his courtiers had never 
ventured to whisper; that his authority was unac-
knowledged on the borders of the Caspian sea, and 
that A Moohummud Khan, a Qajar, presumed to con-
tend with him for the Persian throne. " 2 
The men had further stated that the Qajar pretender was 
"by no means formidable; and that if they were 
assisted with a small body of troops, and an ex-
perienced commander, they would reduce him to 
subjection. " 3 
There is no evidence to endorse this allegation, although we 
are assured that the general populace were disgusted with the 
tyranny and avarice of the Qajar chief, and that they had 
written to Esfahan, requesting assistance to fight him... This 
1. R.M.M., p.83. 
2. T.S., pp.277-8. 
3. Ibid. 





is substantiated by the fact, that the cities and towns of Maza-
ndaran succumbed to the rule of the Zands with joy. 1 However, 
<Ali Morad Khan was determined to challenge the power of the 
Qajars. He was so adamant in his decision, that he refused to 
heed the opinion of his courtiers, who opposed the idea. 2 He 
threatened that anyone, who attempted to stop him, would be 
dealt with as the enemy of his kingdom. Incidentally, perhaps 
the only reasonable explanation for his courtiers 1 opposition to 
this expedition, was the state of cAli Morad Khan 1 s health, 
which had deteriorated because of heavy drinking. 3 
c Ali Morad Khan took the precaution of trying to establish an 
alliance with the governor of Gilan, Hadayat Khan, by sending 
an envoy, Mirza cEnayatollah Esfahani, to ask for his daugh-
ter's hand in marriage... Furthermore, he made ample prepar-
ations for this expedition. Apparently, he recruited such forces 
that it took him a week to review them in Tehran. 5 The French 
ambassador states that his army numbered a bout 60,000;' this 
was the largest force that a Zand ruler had ever gathered af-
ter the death of the Vakil. Thus, cAli Morad Khan sent his 
young son, Shaikh Ovais (Vais) at the head of a force, under the 
command of Mo~ammad ! aher Khan , Zand, 7 a military general 
of great ability, to Mazandaran. Shaikh Vais was ordered to 
halt at Firuzkuh, until the monarch himself arrived in Teh-
ran. 8 However, Shaikh Vais, who was a youth of 18 years, 
1. R.M.M., p.83. G.G., p.249. G.M., p.400. 
2. R.M.M., p.83. 
3. Ibid., p. 
4. Ibid., p.83. G. M., p.394. 
5. G. M., p.403. 
6. M.H.P., Vol.!, p.291. G.M., p.403. 
7. G.G., p.249. G.M.,Pp.405-6. T.Z., p.21. 
8 • G • M • , p • 40 1. 
> 
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advanced towards Mazandaran, and was met everywhere with 
a friendly welcome. He proceeded to Sari without much diffi-
culty, and stationed his army there. 
It was at this time that two of the Qajar chief's brothers came 
to the Zand camp and encouraged Shaikh Vais to attack Astara-
bad, 1 Aqa Mo~ammad Khan's stronghold. Immediately, the whole 
province of Mazandaran came under Zand rule, as we are in-
formed by the EIC resident. 2 Shaikh Vais Khan stayed in Sari, 
while Mohammad Taher Khan, his commander, marched towards 
Astarabad. After having negotiated a difficult pass, he did not 
secure it by leaving a detachment there. 3 The Qajars, aware 
of the importance of the pass, blocked it and, thus, prevented 
the Zand camp from rece1 v1ng food and provisions. A serious 
famine broke out and the soldiers were reduced to eating the 
flesh of their pack animals. Many of them fled and the two 
Qajar chiefs in the Zand army also deserted Mo~ammad !aher 
Khan... Finding his position untenable, he, too, retired with 
the remainder of his army, to the town of Sari. 5 
While in Tehran, cAli Morad Khan summoned ] a c far Khan to join 
his camp. The latter accordingly arrived in Tehran, only to be 
sent on another expedition. 6 On his return to the Western prov-
inces, he resolved to rebel against 'Ali Morad Khan, probably 
having seen the monarch and assessed his desperate situation, 
in respect to his health. The retreating troops of Mohammad 
Taher Khan fell in with the Qajars. Most of the troops were 
slain, while their commander was captured and taken before 
1. G ~M. , p. 406. 
1. I.~.R., G/29/22. Bussora. 6th Nov. 1784. 
3. ~p.249. G.M., p.407. T.Z., p.22. 
4. G.M., p.407. 
5. Ibid., p.408. T.Z., p. 
6. G.G., pp.254-5. G.M., p.404. 
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Aqa Mohammad Khan, who had him put to the sword. 1 The mort-
ifying news reached Shaikh Vais and his forces. Many of his 
military chiefs deserted him and fled to Tehran. The unfortun-
ate youth hastily retired to Tehran too. 2 Apparently, 'Ali Morad 
Khan was so indignant that he ordered his son to be slain. 3 
This command was, however, altered and he agreed to put to 
death the chiefs, who had deserted his son ... 
Another detachment, under the command of Rostam Khan Zand, 
was sent to challenge the Qajar; this force was defeated also. 5 
<Ali Morad Khan stayed in Tehran more than seven months. He 
was afflicted by dropsy and his condition worsened, because 
of the unwholesome climate of Tehran. 15 Apparently his liver 
was infected and the physicians did all they could to bring 
back his failing health. Thus, they advised him to return to 
Esfahan/ This view is expressed by his historian, the author 
of Go.tshart-e-Morad, while the reality was that the news of 
J a c far Khan's rebellion had reached him and he was anxious 
to return to his capital. 8 He left his son as the governor in 
- - c Tehran and proceeded towards Esfahan. On the 22nd Rabi 11, 
1196/Sth March, 1785, cAli Morad Khan left Tehran. Five days 
later he arrived at Kashan and, although the cold season had 
set in, he commenced his march after two days halt. Apparent-
ly he died on his way to Esfahan, at a distance of one day's 
march from Kashan, on the 30th of the month of Rabic I l/13th 
March. 9 His death was concealed from all, save a few of his 
wives, who were strictly forbidden from mourning until the pro-
1. G.G., p.250. 
2. G. M., p.409. G.G., p. 251. T.Z., p.23. 
3. G.M., p.409. 
4. G.G., p. 251. 
5. G. M., p.410. 
6. Ibid., p.411. 
7. Ibid. 
8. G.G., p.256. I.O.R., G/29/22. Bussora, 26th Sept. 1784. 
9. G.M., p.412. 
... 
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cession reached Esfahan. 1 The notables in his party were appre-
hensive that the news of his death would occasion a tumult in 
the army, and that the treasures would be plundered. This, 
however, did not occur, despite the event being known to every-
one. The villages and towns on the way were pillaged, while 
the soldiers left their dead master to march homewards. 2 Ferr-
ieres Sauveboeuf asserts that the treasures were plundered and 
even the ladies of the I). a rim were dishonoured by the soldiers, 
c - -except the daughter of the Vakil ( Ali Morad Khan's daughter-
in-law) and his newly-wedded bride, Hedayat Khan's daugh-
ter, who was guarded by fifty Georgian guards.2 
Before we relate the events, which took place in Esfahan on 
the death of <Ali Morad Khan, we will examine the causes and 
the results of the defeat, which the Zands sustained in Mazan-
daran. The preservation of the integrity and security of his 
domain was so crucial for <Ali Morad Khan, that, for the first 
time in the rule of the Zands, he brought very large forces to 
the northern provinces, in order to curtail the exploits of the 
Qajars. Indeed, Sir Harford ]ones is absolutely right in his 
statement, 
"in the year 1784, Aly Morad marched with such a 
force from Isfahan, that, had he lived to employ 
it as he intended, he would in all probability 
have reduced the Kajars to nearly the same state 
as that in which they were during the reign of the 
Vakil. " 3 
However, the force, which cAli Morad Khan had assembled, was 
employed to an extent. Unfortunately, lack of familiarity with 
the geography and climate of Mazandaran, on the part of the 
commanders, and the fact that the soldiers had come from the 
1. G. M., p.412. 
2. Ibid. M.H.P., p.v.l.294 • 
. -
3. ~' p.cxv •. 
.. 
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central areas of Iran and were not used to the humidity of the 
northern parts of the country, had made a victory difficult for 
them. Futhermore, the Zand forces were not used to the tactics 
of the Turkmans, who were, indeed, very effective in their hit 
and run night attacks. 1 Although the Zands themselves are 
known to have used such tactics, the size of their army on 
this occasion prevented them from any such enterprise. The 
army, once stationed in one place, lost all its discipline and 
took to all sorts of excesses, to the disgust of the inhabit-
ants.2 It was, therefore, very easy for the Qajars to take full 
advantage of their disorder and contribute to the disintegration 
of their army. Apparently, the Qajar tribe and their neigh-
bours, the Turkmans, waged constant attacks on the Zand army 
to the extent that the soldiers found their situation absolutely 
desperate. 3 
However, the defeat of such a force was the beginning of an 
era, in which the Qajars became offensive and the Zands were 
pushed to be on the defensive. In fact, there was never a 
chance for the Zands to carry their arms into Mazandaran 
although the EIC resident informs that c Khan again, us Ja far 
intended to do so.... The plan never materialized, however. 
Another cause of the disastrous defeat of the Zands was the con-
dition of the Zand monarch, who was fatally ill; his courtiers 
and military chiefs were in constant dread of his death, in 
which case they would be placed in a precarious position. In 
an absolutist state, where the might of a monarch is the only 
check upon the very closest of his courtiers, once his grip is 
loosened, there is no limit to the lawless rapine and thirst for 
power of the ones, who have the means and power to try their 
luck. 
1. ~· p.87. 
2. G.G., p.249. Zinat al-Tavarikh. Ms Tehran. n.p. 
3. _G.M., p.408. G.G., p.250 •. 
4. I..O. R •. G/29./22 ._._.~.art.2. Bussorah, 24th. Jan. 1789. 
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At all times, the Kalantar of Fars bitterly reproached cAli Morad 
Khan for his neglect of the war and his preoccupation with his 
new bride, the daughter of Hedayat Khan. 1 It is also asserted 
by Golshan-e-Morad, in which the author ironically states that 
the monarch was more excited by the news of the arrival of his 
bride, than the news of the victory in Mazandaran! 2 Be that 
as it may, <Ali Morad Khan's greatest negligence was in send-
ing his young, inexperienced son to Mazandaran, as the latter 
had no control over his army, compared to that of his father. 
It is evident from the incident that, before the prince decided 
to vacate the town of Sari, his Mafi and Nankoli generals des-
serted him and fled to Tehran, 3 thus forcing the young prince 
to retreat. Had <Ali Morad Khan carried out the expedition in 
person, the outcome would have been totally different. His poor 
health, however, had prevented him from such a venture. 
c Ali Morad Khan was, however, the sole successor of the Vakil, 
who could challenge the growing power of the Qajars. His ad-
ministration had gained him the confidence of the people and 
had filled his treasury with the cash, of which all the Zand 
contenders appeared to be in need. The grandeur and extra va-
gance of his court was indicative of affluence and magnanim-
ity. At the festival of Nouruz, he always spent his treasures 
lavishly and, knowing the character of his army, he liberally 
donated money and presents to his generals and soldiers ... 
To sum up the reign and character of cAli Morad Khan, one can 
assert that his rule was comparably peaceful and unchallenged. 
The Qajar pretender, Aqa Mohammad Khan, appears to have had . 
great respect for him and did not venture to issue out of Maz-
andaran, as long as this capable monarch was alive. He had 
1. G.M.~·p.49o. R.H.H;, v.83. 
2. Gd4,. ,. p~o406~ 
3. Ibid., p.409. 
4. Ibid., p."39·3. R. T., ·p.436. 
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said to those of his courtiers, who urged him to advance to 
c Eraq-e- c A jam, that it would only be possible for him to cap-
ture cEraq when the "respectable blind man" was dead. 1 The 
c - -
dominion, over which :Ali Morad Khan ruled, was extended from 
Fars to all the islands of the Gulf and the coast line, as far 
c 
south as the mouth of Shatt-al Arab. He received tribute from 
Kerman, Yazd, Hamadan, Ardalan, Gilan 2 and the whole of 
cE c A' H bl d raq-e- Jam. e was a capa e comman er, as well as a 
good administrator; his justice was harsh and indiscriminating; 
it went as far as punishing the young son of his much beloved 
minister, Mirza Rabic . Further, he even antagonized his soldier-
y to prevent his subjects from suffering their rapine and avar-
ice. 3 He was generous and liberal to everyone, who served 
him, from an ordinary soldier to his minister. But there is a 
curious instance of avarice, which is related by Ferrieres 
Sauveboeuf, that: 
"Ali Mourat Kan fit fouilles en plusieurs endroits 
du palais d 'Hispahan, que Nadir Sha avoit ha bite, 
ou pretend meme qu 'il n' avoit pas perdu ses 
peines ..... 
This account is further endorsed by Rostam, who acknowledges 
that cAli Morad Khan confiscated the house belonging to Mirza 
J a c far, Karim Khan's minister, where his brother, Mirza ~adeq, 
was a resident. The house was searched for treasures and he 
found about 100,000 Tomans gold coins and valuables hidden in 
a wall. 5 
He received ambassadors from a few foreign countries: France, 
1. H.P"., p.v.2. p.169. Kur-e-Moteshakhes; thus Aqa Moha•mad Khan usually addressed CAli 
Morad Khan. 
2. G. M. , p. 403. 
3. R·. T •' p.436. 
4. ~~-H.P., Vol:rr, p.74. 
5. G.H., p.392. 
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Russia, and Ottoman Turkey. 1 Incidentally, it is interesting to 
note that, although the Russians had entered into close alli-
ance with the Qajars, the Empress sent her envoy to the Zand 
court, which was an official acknowledgement of the Zands 
-- c rather than their rival, the Qajars. Had Ali Morad Khan lived 
longer, he would have revived theecconomy and established the 
Zand house in the same way as tfie~ Vakil had done. His death 
threw the country into fresh disturbances and subjected the mis-
e 
erable inhabitants to new calamities. 2 
The events subsequent to <Ali Morad Khan's death: 
On the arrival of cAli Morad Khan's corpse in his capital, 
Baqer Khan, a humble Kadkhoda, who had been promoted to the 
rank of governor of Esfahan, having amassed a great wealth 
during his term of office, attempted to lay claim to the throne. 
He sent some troops out of the city to appropriate the royal 
treasures and, also, admitted the tribal warriors, who were 
wandering around the city, into the capital. 3 He lost no time 
in gaining their support, by way of handsome bonuses and, 
strangely enough, more than 6000 men of the Lak tribes gather-
ed round his standard ... 
It has been previously stated that Jac far Khan was summoned 
to the camp, while cAli Morad Khan was stationed in Tehran. 
Thus, Ja c far Khan marched to Tehran, only to be sent away 
again after a short stay, to the province of Khamseh. 5 There 
had been, for some time past, many rebellions, mainly carried 
out by a courageous and, at the same time, troublesome chief 
of Afshar origin~ c Ali Khan Zayerlu.' cAli Morad Khan also 
1. R.T., p .441. G.M., p.396. 
2. H.P., Vol.1, p.293. 
3. G. G., p.258. 
4. R.M.M., p.84. 
5. G.G., p.255. G.M., p.404. T.Z., p.21. 
6. G.M., p.400. G.G., p.255. 
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wanted to keep an eye on the province of A~arbayjan, where 
the local chiefs had only paid lip service to the Zands and 
had refused to pay the usual tributes. 1 However, J a c far Khan 
proceeded to Khamseh, where he was admitted unopposed, since 
c - - - -Ali Khan had fled to A~arbayjan on his approach. 2 It was 
there that the former resolved to throw off the allegiance to 
his half-brother, and set himself up as a contender for the 
throne. 3 The news reached <Ali Morad Khan and, despite his ill-
ness, he hurried towards his capital, at the same time issuing 
c -decrees to the chiefs of J a far Khan's army, to desert him im-
mediately. This order was obeyed, because of the close ties 
which existed between these chiefs and the monarch. 
J a c far Khan was deserted, while on the outskirts of Hamadan, 
on his way to the capital, Esfahan. He was denied entry into 
the town of Hamadan and he, therefore, headed for the district 
of Kazzaz. There, many of the soldiers, who had fled the Zand 
army in Mazandaran, after the disastrous defeat of that army, 
joined him ... Jac far Khan besieged the citadel in Kazzaz, where 
the governor had retired in order to repel him. The citadel 
was captured in a short time and the news disturbed the ailing 
c Ali Morad Khan further. He proceeded from Kashan in great 
haste and died en route to Esfahan. 5 Giti Goshay asserts that 
c Ali Morad Khan was alive until he reached the gates of the 
city, and it was then that he perished, as a result of having 
been kept in the cold. 1 This allegation appears to be baseless, 
since he had probably died much before that, as the Kalantar 
informs us. 
1. G.G., p.256. 
2. Ibid., p.255. 
3. T.Z., p.23. G.G., p.256. R.M.M., p.83. 
4. G.G., p.257. 
5. T.Z., p.23. G.M., p.411. R.M.M., p.83. 
6. G.G., p.258. 
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Some of the Zand chiefs left the dead monarch's party to join 
c -
Ja far, Khan and inform him of the incident. 1 He, thus, rushed 
to Esfahan and within a short time reached its outskirts. Baqer 
Khan apparently sent out his brother to challenge J a c far Khan, 
but he did not effect a substantial resistance and, after two 
days, the tribes of Mafi, Zand and Bajelan staged a coup 
and attempted to capture Baqer Khan. 2 The event, as related 
by Golshan-e-Morad deserves notice, since it is significant to 
note how the tribes could exert their power in time of emerg-
ency and, at the same time, how easy it was to buy them off. 
While Baqer Khan was reviewing his army, these tribes gath-
ered in a corner awaiting their turn. When their names were 
read out, they rushed towards Baqer Khan, shooting their rif-
les in all directions. 3 Baqer Khan, in his horror, managed to 
escape the attempt and took refuge in one of the towers. He re-
sisted the enemy until night fell, when he climbed to the roofs 
of the royal palaces and, since they were connected with each 
other, he reached the gates and set off on foot for his village, 
Khoraskan... Eventually, he got hold of horses and, with his 
brother and his son, effected his escape. 5 
On the following day, Saturday 19th February, 1785/Bth Rabic I I 
1199, Ja c far Khan entered the city of Esfahan.' Baqer Khan 
had ruled for a space of five to six days. He was, however, 
captured at some distance from the city and returned. His life 
was spared, although he was beaten and tortured to yield up 
his possessions. Apparently, about 100,000 Tomans (Tabrizi) 
with an immense amount of jewellery and valuables were recov-
ered from him and his relations. 7 Mirza Rabic, the minister to 
1. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.294. G.G., pp.258-9. 
2. R.M.M., p.85. T.Z., p.24. G.M., p. 413-4. 
3. G.M., p.414. 
4. G.G., p.290. 
5. Ibid. 
6. R.M.M., p. 85. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bussora, 1785. 
7. G.M., p.414. R.M.M., p.86. 
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the deceased monarch, was reprimanded for not having opposed 
Baqer Khan in his mad designs and all his wealth was confis-
cated. The minister, after being disgraced, applied to the new 
sovereign to allow him to retire to the holy shrines of Ottoman 
Turkey; his request was granted and he proceeded thither. 1 
c . - -During all this time, the corpse of Al1 Morad Khan was lying 
at a Mosque outside Esfahan. After establishing himself in Es-
fahan, J a c far Khan sent his eldest son, Lo!f <Ali Khan to bring 
the corpse into the city and buried it with due respect. 2 It 
appears that Mirza Rabic , with the assistance of a Kadkhoda, 
transfered the corpse to Najaf, to be interred in the shrine of 
<Ali, the first Em am ( 1202). This was confirmed by pilgrims who 
visited the shrine. 3 
Shaikh Vais Khan and his fate: 
c Ali Morad Khan had ten children; his eldest son was Shaikh 
Vais, who was only 19 when his father died... He was stationed 
in Tehran, by order of his father. At the death of cAli Morad 
Khan, his son vacated Tehran in terror, as is related by the 
French envoy, who happened to be still in Tehran at the time. 
"Le fils aine d 'Ali Mourat Kan, aupres de qui 
j 'etois reste a Teyran, (sic) petrifie a la nouvelle 
de la mort de son pere, partir a la hate a vec 
quelques domestiques pour se rendre a Hispahan 
ou il fut fait prisonnier par son oncle. " 5 
Incidentally, the unfortunate ambassador was plundered of all 
his property in Tehran and the governor of the town took pity 
1. G.M., p.414. 
2. Ibid., p.415. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p.416. 








on him and gave him an escort to conduct him to Esfahan, 
where he arrived on the 20th April, 1785/8th Jamaaa II, 1199. 1 
He left Persia after a few months as an Arab trader. J a c far 
Khan took possession of the royal treasures and the household, 
and was enthroned two days after the late monarch was bur-
ied. 2 Shaikh Vais Khan was subsequently deprived of his eye-
sight. He appears to have no claim to the throne or rather no 
support in his claim; perhaps the courtiers, after their exper-
ience with Abol Fath Khan (an inexperienced youth) were disill-. 
usioned with the idea of supporting a young prince who, like 
Abol Fath Khan, was a drunkard too. 
His first measure to establish his government was to appoint 
a capable minister. A meeting attended by all the notables was 
held and, there, Mirza Mohammad Hosein Farahani, the late . . 
Sadeq Khan's minister, was unanimously elected to the office • . 
The position of Sadr was occupied by Mirza Mohammad Baqer 
Gilani. 3 J a c far Khan had been informed that A.q a Mohammad 
Khan had left Sari on the 3rd Rabic I I, 1200/3rd February, 
1786, for ~raq-e-c A jam. He, therefore, set about recruiting an 
army to oppose him ... 
Aqa Mohammad Khan first approached the town of Tehran, 
where he met with stiff resistance from Ghafur Khan, the gover-
nor. Thereafter, the Qajar army proceeded towards Qum, which 
Najaf Khan, a kinsman of the new Zand king, had fortified in 
expectation of an enforcement sent from Esfahan5 and had sett-
led himself there. The Qaj ar army surrounded the town of Qum, 
which did not have a citadel. Najaf Khan defended the place 
1. M.H.P., Vol.!, p.296. 
2. G.M., p.417. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p.418. R.M.M., pp.86-87. 
5. G.M., p.418. 
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for nine days and, finding his efforts futile, fled the town. 
He arrived at the town of Kashan, before proceeding towards 
Esfahan. 1 Ahmad Khan, the son of Azad Khan Afghan, had been 
sent to Kashan at the head of a respectable number of troops, 
but his tribal warriors of the Mafi and other Lor elements de-
serted him on the battlefield, while he was engaged in a com-
bat with the Qajars. 2 This incident forced the Afghan chief to 
flee. The unfortunate inhabitants of the town of Kashan, who 
were by no means warlike, and were mostly engaged in the 
silk weaving industry, 
don them by sending 
Mohammad Khan had 
therefore, halted one 
the following day. 
appealed to Aqa Mohammad Khan to par-
their cOlama to solicite amnesty. 3 Aqa 
no time to spend on the Kashanis; he, 
night there and advanced to Esfahan .. on 
Ja cfar Khan spent the festival of Nouruz, which occurred on 
Sunday, 8th Jomada I, 1200/9th March, 1786, in Esfahan, 5 
while these events were taking place. On the arrival of 
Ahmad Khan from Kashan, J a c far Khan had every intention of 
fighting his foe, the Qajars. But he was persuaded by the not-
ables of Fars, who had been away from their homes for nearly 
three years, to march towards Shiraz, where the governor, ~eid 
Morad Khan, had failed to acknowledge the new sovereign. 6 Be-
sides, the treasures within the city of Esfahan were so immense 
that it would have been unwise not to transport them to a 
place of safety. 7 Thus Ja c far Khan set off for Shiraz, with all 
his courtiers in his company. He had made a terrible mistake 
1. G.M., p.419. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p.420. 
4. G.G., p.266. G.M., p.420. 
5. G. M., p.419. 
6. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bussorah, 12th Sept. 1785. 
7. M.H.P., Vol.!, p.297. 
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in not having secured the citadel of Shiraz while he was 
at Esfahan, despite numerous requests on the part of the kalan-
tar, Mirza Mohammad, that he should do so. 1 The kalantar bit-
terly criticizes Jac far Khan and his minister, for not having 
listened to his advice. He describes the situation in Shiraz, re-
marking that ~eid Morad Khan had actually antagonized all the 
the populace. He had not paid the salaries of the soldiers in 
the garrison in the city for three years. His avarice and mal-
treatment had dispersed a great number of the Farsis all over 
the kingdom, as far afield as Basra. 2 These accounts lead one 
c -to the assumption that Ja far Khan did not see any need to 
send an army there, while the governor himself had done 
enough to leave no room for reconciliation with the inhabitants. 
Jac far Khan had no doubt that Seid Morad Khan would submit 
to his rule, on his approach to the city. 
The EIC resident, however, informs us that Jac far Khan had 
c -sent his eldest son, Lotf 1\li Khan, with a detachment to cap-
ture Shiraz, 3 but this is not confirmed by any other source. 
The hasty departure of J a c far Khan from Esfahan occasioned 
great tumult in the city. The Lutis, who had allied themselves 
• 
with some Afshar tribal warriors and the late cAli Morad Khan's 
personal guards, conspired to plunder the treasures, while the 
king was on the march... Apparently, J a c far Khan had distrib-
uted . mules and other pack animals to his courtiers to prepare 
for the departure. Thus all the Gholams (guards) had been 
sent out of the city to arrange for the march. Ja c far Khan did 
not sleep that night, as a result of the disturbances and con-
fusions in the city. The following day, while 500 camels laden 
with the treasures left the city, a large number of rioters start-
ed shooting around the caravan, exciting great alarm in the 
1. R. M. M. , p. 87. 
2. Ibid., p.81. 
3. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bussorah, 19th March, 1785. 
4. G.G., p.266. T.Z., p. 
- 122 -
procession. 1 The rioters, numbering a bout 2000 horsemen and 
infantry, blocked the roads and it was with great difficulty 
c -
that Ja far Khan managed to find his way out of Esfahan. 2 The 
camels were chased by the rabble and the muleteers, who were 
in league with them, loosened the reins of the animals and, 
consequently, a great part of the treasures was looted by the 
rioters. 3 
Who exactly the instigators of the incident were is not known, 
but we are informed that shopkeepers were involved in it and 
apparently, the sons of Haji Mo~am~ad cAli cAllaf (wheat chand-
ler), later to become the wealthiest family in Esfahan and hold-
ing high stations as the governor of the city, were the main 
perpetrators of the crime. Darvishes were also involved in the 
affair,.. but what order they belonged to is not known to us. 
The incident is illustrative of the potential trouble and turbul-
ence the inhabitants of large cities concealed under a very 
peaceful facade; and it also shows that the rule of the Zands 
was challenged, even in their capital. It is curious that the 
c -Darvishes had taken part in the unrest, since Ja far Khan was 
on very good terms with them. Apparently, he had consulted a 
Sufi, as to the advisability of leaving Esfahan, and had acted . 
according to his recommendation. 5 
c - 6 Ja far Khan was accused, more than once, of being a coward, 
since on many occasions he refrained from meeting the foe in 
the battlefield, and fled in 
solely due to his cowardice. 
know that, in an extensive 
1. T.S., p.282. T.Z., p.27. 
2. T.S., p.282. 
3. G.G., p.268. 
4. R.T., p.448. 
5. Ibid., p.449. 
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means of defence (which traditionally was a wall or a citadel), 
he had very little chance of holding out against a large and 
formidable army, like that of the Qajars. 
c -
Ja far Khan was, however, faced with another dilemma: the re-
volt of Seid Morad Khan in Shiraz. Apparently, Seid Morad 
- . c 
Khan had been encouraged to challenge the power of J a far 
Khan, when he learnt of his disgraceful flight from Esfahan, 
as we are informed by Francklin: 
"When intelligence of J aafar Khan's distressed situat-
ion and approach first reached Seuid Morad Khan, 
that noble man began to entertain an idea of ex-
cluding him, and of assuming the government him-
self."1 
The source of this allegation also affirms that the governor 
had abandoned his ambitious design, partly because he had no 
support among 
result of the 
the soldiers in the garrison, and partly as a 
minister, Mirz~ Mohammad Hosein' s intercession . . 
with a promise of amnesty and safety. 2 This account is verified 
in that Seid Morad Khan had no chance of resistance, as we 
are informed by the E1C resident, 3 but whether it was due to 
the medifation of the minister cannot be proved. The E1C resi-
L/ c -dent asserts that J a far Khan's eldest son w~s leading an 
army of six thousand to Shiraz... The governor of Shiraz, Seid 
. c - • 
Morad Khan, opened the gates of the city to Ja far Khan, who 
entered the city on 24th Jomada 11, 1200/24th April, 1786. 
J a c far Khan pardoned the impudent governor, after having re-
ceived a handsome present from him. 5 Thus Seid Morad Khan 
was stripped of his office and a kalantar was appointed 
1. O.M.T.S., p.339. 
2. G.M., p.386. 
3. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bussorah, 19th March, 1785. 
4. I.O.R., P/D/72. Bussorah, 19th March, 1785. 
5. G.G., p.269. 
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to take charge of the civic affairs of Shiraz, 1 since the old 
kalantar, Mirza Mo~ammad, was left behind at Esfahan, or rath-
er had decided to stay there, despite the strong protestations 
of his friends and colleagues. 2 
It appears that Mirza Mohammad, being totally disillusioned 
with the Zands, had resolved to join Aqa Mohammad Khan, . 
thinking that he would be of use in Aqa Mohammad Khan's 
efforts to set himself up as a ruler, and thereby bring about 
peace and stability. The kalantar was soon disappointed in his 
expectations. On many occasions he endeavoured to obtain his 
freedom to join the Zand king, but he was denied release. 3 
This unhappy man died in Tehran shortly afterwards in 1200 ... 
However, Haji Ebrahim was appointed as the kalantar of Shiraz 
and the province of Fars. 
Aqa Mohammad Khan conquers Esfahan: 
• 
The Qajar army did not meet with any resistance in the city 
of Esfahan, when they made their entry on the 2nd May, 17855 I 
16th Rabic 11, 1199, within the space of one day of the Zand's 
departure. The French envoy gives an account of the event, 
"toute son rA.qa Mohammad' s 7 armee se logea dans 
la ville qui fut impitoyablement saccagee; jamais 
elle n' avoit eprouve autant d 'horreurs, meme lors-
qu' elle fut pillee par les Aguhans (sic); les 
troupes· dont il y en avoit beaucoup de Tartares, 
s 'y livrerent a tous les exces d' une fureur bar-
bare, & commirent toutes fortes d 'a trocites. " 6 
1. G.G., p.269. T.Z., p.26. 
2. I.e. ~aji Ebrahi•, who had taken great pains to encourage the kalantar to accom-
pany the king's party to Shiraz. 
3. R.M.M., p.93. 
4. Ibid., p.V. Introd. 
5. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.297. 
6. Ibid., pp.297-8. Malcolm states the date of Aqa Mohammad 1s entry as 6th May (op. 
cit., Vol.II, p.l70). 
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It is strange that the EIC resident's account of the occupation 
of Esfahan is totally different from the envoy's, and speaks of 
the mild and clement treatment of the population. 1 
Aqa Mohammad Khan stayed in the city for about forty days 
and then set off to meet the Bakhtiaris, who had gathered a 
large force against him. He reinstated Baqer Khan, the ex-
governor of the city, to .his office. 2 Aqa Mohammad Khan left . 
Esfahan on the lOth Ramazan, 1200/7th July, 1786. Mirza Moham-
mad kalantar verifies the allegations of the French source. He 
asserts that Aqa Mo~ammad Khan had nothing in mind except 
to collect riches and he spent every moment in torturing and 
mulcting unfortunate, innocent souls. 3 Giti Goshay also affirms 
that he extorted a great amount of money from the inhabitants, 
apparently as the revenues for the past six months... Some 
sources assert that Aq a Mohammad Khan was encouraged to take . 
possession of Esfahan by some of the notables within the city. 5 
Baqer Khan Khorasani seems to have been behind this, since 
he was released from prison before J a c far Khan departed. The 
latter had shown so much kindness to him, as to even conduct 
Baqer Khan out of the city by an escort, since Baqer Khan had 
many enemies, who were anxious to lay their hands on him. 
Apparently, Baqer Khan sent his two sons out of the city to 
welcome the Qajar chief, and he had made ample preparations 
to welcome him. 6 Although Malcolm finds it unlikely that Aqa 
Mohammad Khan had previous communications with the city not-. 
ables, 7 the fact that Baqer Khan was reinstated to his office, 
does not rule out this possibility. Baqer Khan was, however, 
1. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bushire, 12th Sept. 1785. 
2. G.G., p.269. 
3. R.M.M., p.92. 
4 • .§..G., p.270. 
5. Ibid., p.269. 
6. Ibid. 
7. H.P., Vol.II, p.170 (footnote). 
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forbidden to leave the royal palaces, due to his ambitious and 
troublesome character. 1 ln order to secure his rule in Esfahan, 
Aqa Mohammad Khan expelled all the tribes partial to the 
cause of the Zands, including the Mafi and Chahar Duly. The 
Mafi tribe changed their course to Mazandaran half way, and 
set off for their home in Kermanshah. 2 Some of the tribes had 
left the city before the Qajars arrived, probably knowing what 
lay in store for them. 3 
Esfahan, a city of great extent and industrial bustle, was also 
an emporium of trade with the south, as well as the north of 
the kingdom. This made it essential for the Zands not to give 
it up easily. Thus J a c far Khan recruited an army of about 
20,000 men by nearly going through the enormous treasury of 
his capital. Giti Goshay asserts that it was only after Jac far 
Khan had spent immense riches, that the notables and military 
generals agreed to serve him... He himself assumed the command 
of the army, left the city on the 1st of Ramazan, 1200/28th 
June, 1786, and encamped on its outskirts to observe the relig-
ious rituals. 5 His opponent, Aqa Mo~ammad Khan, having 
fought with the Bakhtiaris, retired to the Qahiz Chaman (past-
ure land), in order to rest and prepare for fresh exploits.' 
Aqa Mohammad Khan summoned Baqer Khan, the governor of Es-
fahan, to his camp, where he was dismissed from office, but 
was commissioned to 
occur. 7 Baqer Khan 
1. G.G., pp.269-70. 
2. Ibid., p.270. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p.272. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., p.270. 
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a siege should it 
of a few lesser 
- 127 -
towns, i.e. Qomsheh, Natanz, Ardastan and Qohpayeh. 1 
Baqer Khan, on his arrival in the city of Esfahan, gathered 
provisions and placed them in the citadel of Tabrak, on the 
outskirts of the city. Furthermore, he transferred the canons 
placed in the great Maidan, Naqsh-e-Jahan to the gates of that 
2 c -citadel. Ja far Khan commenced his march at the end of Rama-
~an. As he approached the town of Qomsheh, Baqer Khan re-
c -tired to Tabrak citadel. Ja far Khan sent a detachment to be-
siege the citadel, while he proceeded to Esfahan and entered 
it unopposed. 3 Baqer Khan was besieged for about four months, 
during which time he defended himself with spirit and courage. 
He was in daily expectation of an enforcement from the Qajars, 
but it never materialized... Apparently, he had been entreated 
to give himself up in exchange for pardon and, although he 
was prepared to do so, on every occasion his associates had 
dissuaded him, until the gates were betrayed to the Zand army 
by his own men and the citadel fell. 
Baqer Khan was brought to the Zand camp and was executed 
on the spot. 5 It appears that Ja c far Khan, when departing 
from Esfahan, released Baqer Khan from prison and, in the 
great mosque, the Masjed Shah, he condemned his ingratitude 
c -
and treasonable conduct towards his late master, Ali Morad 
Khan, and warned him that should he venture such acts once 
more, the consequences would be dire. 1 This, however, did not 
discourage the ambitious kadkhoda in his pursuit of power and 
his conduct met with the punishment it deserved. His unfortun-
ate wives and children were sent to Shiraz, save two of his 
1. G. G. , p. 271. 
2. Ibid. 
3· G.M., p.422. T.Z., p.31. I.O.R. G/29/22. Part.2, p.203. Bussora, 27th Oct. 1786. 
4. R.M.M., p.85. G.G., p.273. 
5. T.Z., p.32. G.G., p.274. 
6. G. M., p.424. 
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sons, who had been taken as hostages along with the Qajar 
chief. 1 Aqa Mohammad Khan, after dispersing the Bakhtiaris, 
set off for Kermanshah to subjugate the Mafi tribe, who had 
disobeyed his orders, as related previously. This large and 
gallant tribe not only defeated the Qajars, but forced Aqa Moh-
ammad to flee as a result of his troops' desertion. 2 The mortifi-
cation caused by the news of the fall of Tabrak, was another 
blow to him. His army defected and many of his men joined his 
rival, the Zand ruler. He retreated to Tehran, planning to fort-
ify it, should the Zands follow him to that area. 3 At this 
stage, the Qajar chief was much reduced in his power and, if 
the Zand ruler had had the courage, or rather the chance, of 
attacking him in Tehran, it would certainly have been the best 
opportunity to eliminate him once and for all. Aqa Mohammad . 
Khan, in his battle with the Bakhtiaris, had sustained no less 
than 3000 dead, as well as many casualties. That is probably 
c - -why the EIC resident expected J a far Khan to advance to Mazan-
daran, but the latter unexpectedly returned to Shiraz ... 
The Russian invasion of the Northern provinces: 
Catherine I I, the Empress of Russia, in pursuit of territorial 
expansions, had concluded a treaty with the Vali of Georgia, 
Heraclius (Erkli), in 1783, according to which the RussiarEmpr-
ess recognized the latter's right to his dominion, while he be-
came tributary to Russia, instead of the Persian government. 
The treaty was signed on the 24th July 17835 , at nearly the 
same time as the Russian delegation arrived at the court ofc Ali 
Morad Khan. It appears that, since the Russians were prepar-
ing for a war with the Ottoman Empire, it was of crucial impor-
1. G.G., p.274. T.Z., p.30. 
2. T.Z., p.30. G.G., p.275. 
3. Ibid. 
4. I.O.R., P/0/E Vol.72, 12th Sept. 1785. D.K., p.cxv. T.Z., p.34. 
5. H.P., Vol.II, p.214, and Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, N.Y., 
1908,Pp. 20-21. 
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tance for them to be at peace with their other neighbours and 
even to solicit alliances with them if possible. With this idea 
in mind, and at the same time aware of the internal unrest 
and division, which existed in the Persian Empire, Catherine 
sent about 6,000 troops to the province of Shirv~n, as is report-
ed by the French envoy. 
/ 
"afin que les Persans occupes de leur guerres intes-
tines, fussent moins attentifs a ce qui se passeroit 
du c8te de la Georgie; plusieurs routes tracees de-
puis Astrakan jusqu 'a Tifflis, & d' autres endroits 
du mont Caucase, prouvoient · quelques intentions 
particuli~res ainsi que 1' arrivee de six mille 
Russes, cantonnes dans la province de Chirwan. " 1 
The EIC resident also asserts that he had heard rumours to 
that effect. 
"The Russians have taken possession of Erivan, Gan-
ja & Tauris & several other inferior places in the 
provinces of Erivan & Azarbjaun (sic)." 
He goes on to say that there was no confirmation of this inform-
ation. 2 
In fact, there had been a large Russian force arriving at Taf-
lis, in accordance with the treaty signed between Russia and 
Georgia, to which allusion has already been made. Erkli, the 
Vali of Georgia, had long planned to annex Ganjeh to his dom-
inion and indeed, in the treaty, the Russians had taken it up-
on themselves to assist him in his expansions. 3 The Russian 
force, which had arrived at T atlis, was only to protect the terr-
itories of Georgia. They stayed there for about four years and 
then withdrew,.. since the Empress needed to employ her army 
1. M.H.P., Vol.I, pp.296-7. 
2. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bush ire, 12th Sept. 1785. 




elsewhere. It was then that Aqa Mohammad Khan managed to 
attack Taflis and not only forced the Vali to take shelter in 
the mountains, but also plundered the city and gave away the 
inhabitants as slaves to his soldiers. 1 
Intertribal contention: Esma c il Khan Zand 's revolt: 
As related before, an Afshar chief, cAli Khan, had on many 
occasions thrown off his allegiance to the Zand rule and, each 
time, he had been pardoned. This time, cAli Khan, the turbulent 
chief, had allied himself to the Qajars but, after the defeat of 
their army in Kermanshah, he deserted them and went to his 
home town. 2 On his arrival in Esfahan, Jacfar Khan commission-
ed Esmacil Khan, a close kinsman of his, to proceed to Khamseh 
and to bring it back under Zand suzerainty. The latter march-
ed to Qalamro with great determination. 3 On arriving at the 
village of Brujerd, he exacted and extorted money from the in-
habitants, both rich and poor. He gathered about 200,000 Tom-
ans in cash and valuables, thereby alienating the populace ... 
Furthermore, he recruited some local insurgent elements into 
his service and pronounced himself opposed to his master. ] a 
c far Khan had prudently sent a few of his confidential serv-
ants along with Esma cil Khan and was constantly aware of his 
activities. c -Esma il Khan had, however, .discovered the plot and 
seized and put the informers to death. 5 He settled his troops 
in Hamadan, while he left Qorban Khan, of the tribe of Bajelal'\ 
in Brujerd as its governor. Qorban Khan had rebelled against 
the government at Shiraz, and Esmacil· Khan had been design-
ated to subdue him, but instead, he made him the governor of 
c -Brujerd. Although it was in the depth of winter, Ja far Khan 
1. M.S., p.23. 
2. T.Z., p.30. 
3. G.G., p.279. T.Z., p.31. 
4. T.Z., p.32. Fava 1ed al-Safavieh, p.138. 
5. G.M., p. 425. 
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addressed himself to subjugating these rebels. He proceeded to-
wards Hamadan in the first half of the month of Rabic I, 1200/ 
early January 1786. While 
garrison was left in the city to consolidate the Zand victory, 
and a governor was also appointed to the city. Mirza Jani 
Fasa'i, a figure who was to play a major role in the last 
phase of the Zand and Qajar power struggle, was the new Hak-
em. As was often the case, the insurgents who had gathered 
round Esmac il Khan dispersed at the approach of a more power-
c - - -ful army. J a far Khan besieged Qorban Khan in the citadel 
of Hadi Khan. The news of the desperate situation to which 
Esmac il Khan had been reduced, reached the besieged force, they 
on their part captured their leader and delivered him up to 
Jacfar Khan. 2 
Khosro Khan, the Vali of Ardalan, was another chief who had 
to be punished for his misconduct. It appears that he had tak-
en a stance against J a c far Khan from the beginning of his 
rule. The sovereign had sent him a robe of honour with decrees 
expressing the favour and friendly sentiments of the king to-
wards him. Khosro Khan had not only ignored the implications 
of this mark of favour, that is, the demand for the usual trib-
ute and customary presents, but he also excused himself from 
attending the court on some unacceptable pretexts. 3 Thus Jacfar 
Khan had sent him messages, which contained insult, and this 
had aggravated the resentment further. The strained relation-
ship between Jac far Khan and the Ardalan Vali gained moment-
um, when Esmac il Khan Zand fled to the territories of Ardalan 
and allied himself to Khosro Khan ... At this stage, Jac far Khan 
resolved to march to Ardalan on a punitive expedition .. 
Esma c il Khan had also managed to form a confederation of 
1. T.Z., p.32. 
2. Ibid. G. M.,. p •. 442. 
3. G.M., p.425. 
4. G.G., p.258. T.Z., p.33. 
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local chiefs in his attempt to gain independence from the gov-
ernment at Shiraz. 1 The ones who had joined his clique included 
Mohammad Hosein Khan Garrusi, cAli Khan Khamseh, and the 
Qaragozlu tribal warriors. Thus, he had formed a large army. 
Khosro Khan, however, was not certain what would happen if 
the Zand army defeated him and his allies. 2 Hence, he de-
clared his allegiance to the Zand rule, by sending an envoy 
to ] a c far Khan's camp, promising to pay his arrears and pro-
vide the king with cavalry if required; yet he abstained from 
attending the camp in person. The conduct of the Vali, being 
contrary to practice in the kingdom, induced the king to give 
battle against the disobedient chief. 3 This, however, cost the 
Zands dearly; he was severely beaten by the Vali and was 
forced to retire to Esfahan. The cause for the defeat of the 
Zand army is given by the court historian as being the intense 
cold, while most of the troops were from the Garmsir region 
and were not used to the inclement weather of the western prov-
inces. They found it absolutely impossible to resist the severe 
cold and defected... Although this could well have been one of 
the main reasons, there is also another contributory cause, 
that is, the desertion of the Turk ish-speaking tribes from the 
Zand army, and their then joining the opposite faction. 5 Mal-
colm asserts that Khosro Khan had no intention of opposing the 
c -Zand, but the hostile conduct of ] a far Khan forced him into 
it. On this occasion Malcolm says that Khosro Khan was in debt 
to the Qajar for his hereditary place, which had been usurped 
from him, and Mohammad Has an Khan returned it to him... Khos-
ro Khan captured a few towns, while Aqa Mohammad Khan was 
1. G.G., pp.283-4. 
2. Ibid., pp.284-5. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p.287. 
5. Ibid. 
6. T.Z., p.34. G.G., p.288. 
- 133 -
preparing to curtail his expansions. He thus left Esmacil 
Khan to meet the Qajars. He could not resist them and was de-
feated. Aqa Mohammad Khan deemed the measure sufficient and 
returned to Gilan, but Khosro Khan had no choice except for 
alliance with the Qajars, since he had antagonized the Zands. 
During the whole course of the Zand rule, the pern1c1ous event 
of tribes deserting, occurs so frequently that it appears to be 
the order of the day. An army is recruited and paid by one 
party, but there is no guarantee of the loyalty of the troops. 
In a section on the tribes, 1 we will discuss this question in 
some detail. However, more often than not the Zands had suffer-
ed from this malpractice. Although such behaviour appears 
senseless and spontaneous, it may be seen as an unavoidable 
consequence of the nature of an army composed of tribes. 
Attempt to seize Esf'ahan, the Khorasani adventure (1200/1786): 
The Zand rule was challenged from all sides and even the less 
important chiefs of the province of Khorasan ventured to make 
an assault on Esfahan, 2 while Jac far Khan was busy in the 
west of the kingdom. Mohammad Khan and Esmac il Khan cArab-
e- c.Ameri, the chiefs of Jandaq, a little town on the periphery 
of the desert, needed the assistance of other local chiefs, to 
execute their designs. Thus, they wrote to Amir Mohammad Khan 
the chief of the town of Tabas,- and asked him to provide them 
with calvalry in exchange for payment of their arrears of two 
years. The idea of recovering two thousand Tomans cash appeal-
ed to him and he, in turn, sent about 400-500 horsemen to J an-
daq. 3 Mo~ammad ~osein Khan had gathered upwards of 3000 men 
from his dependencies, i.e. Na!anz, Ardestan and Qohpayeh.,.. 
1. See Chapter 8. 
2. T.Z., p.34. G.G., p.288. 
3. Ibid. 
4. G.G., p.289. 
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With his troops he marched on Esfahan; the news of the defeat 
c -
which Ja far Khan had sustained at the hand of the Kurds fur-
ther encouraged him in his exploit. 
] a c far Khan immediately commissioned his brother, eA bdollah 
Khan, to advance to Esfahan as a precautionary measure. 1 Also 
c Ali Qoli Khan, the chief of Kazeroon, a man of great valour 
and gallantry, was sent to challenge the assailants in the 
battlefield. Jac far Khan entered Esfahan on the 12th Jomada 11, 
1200/12th April, 1786, 2 only a few days away from the new 
year's festival. He set about organizing his army, having con-
templated a retributary attack on Hamadan and thereabouts. He 
was, however, disappointed in his schemes, since he was faced 
with another dilemma; that is, the revolt of 'Ali Qoli Khan. 3 
Having ably forced the joint Khorasani forces to succumb, cAli 
Qoli Khan had taken many of them prisoners. The captives had 
appealed to cAli Qoli Khan to intercede on their behalf. When 
the procession reached Esfahan, he had of his own account pro-
mised them amnesty... Hence, when cAli Qoli Khan heard that 
c -]a far Khan had violated his word, he became highly offended 
and rushed to the king's presence. He reprimanded and re-
proached him for his action, but this apparently had the oppos-
e -ite effect, and ] a far Khan not only ordered the chief of the 
prisoners to be put to death, but denuded the soldiery of their 
armour and sent them home. 5 
<Ali Qoli Khan, incensed by the disrespect afforded to him, ord-
ered his followers to prepare for departure. This was readily 
conceded due to the length of their service. The Kazeruni 
troops marched homeward without having been given permiss-
1. G.G., p.289. 
2· G.M., p.429. 
3. T.Z., p.35. 
4. Ibid. 
5. G.G., p.290. 
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ion. 1 ] a c far Khan learnt of the event in the morning and sent 
word to all the governors and the chiefs en route to Kazerun 
to prevent ~li Qoli Khan from passing through their jurisdict-
ion, and to capture him if possible. The decree served to dis-
perse the adherents of the Kazeruni chief, who retired to his 
territories. 2 Golshan-e-Morad asserts that the captives were plun-
dered by a group sent by ] a c far Khan. 3 It is, however, dub-
ious whether it was J a c far Khan's measures, which had caused 
c Ali Qoli Khan's defection. It appears that it was the usual 
practice for the overlord to disarm a force, which had been tak-
en prisoner and to release them from service. There does not 
seem to be any reason for cAli Qoli Khan's leaving the camp of 
the sovereign, unless we take the assertion of Giti Goshay as val-
id. This source refers to the ambitious character of <Ali Qoli 
Khan and to his having harboured rebellious intentions in his 
mind... He found a good pretext to execute his designs on the 
occurrence of this incident. This is, however, endorsed by the 
foreign traveller, Francklin, who happened to be in the coun-
try at the time. 
"At this period, Ali Kouli Khan, Hakim (or govern-
or) of the city of Kazeroon, a place situated be-
tween Abushehr and Shirauz and dependant on the 
latter, thought proper to throw off his allegiance 
to Jaafar Khan, to whom he had before submitted, 
and whose power he had acknowledged. " 5 
c . -
Apparently Ja far Khan had tried to conciliate the chief, but 
he had failed; many courtiers had tried to mediate between the 
two with promises of amnesty, but to no avail. 
1. G. G. , p. 290. 
2. Ibid., p.291. 
3. G. M., p.430. 
4. G.G., p.290. 
5. OMTS, p.138. 
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] a c far Khan spent the Nouruz festival in Esfahan 0 This occurr-
ed in the month of Jomada I, 1200/May 1786o Then he set off 
for the capital, Shirazo 1 There is good reason to believe that 
the king was apprehensive of the outcome of a powerful chief's 
defection and that was why he immediately left Esfahan to re-
turn south o Moreover, Aqa Mohammad Khan had commenced his 
march to recapture Esfahan o 2 cAli Qoli Khan, while in his own 
territories, allied himself to the Mamas ani tribal warriors and 
even marched towards Shirazo 3 ] a c far Khan sent a detachment 
under the command of Reza Qoli Khan Shahs a van and Mohammad 
Reza Khan Bayat, to march to Dasht-e-Arjan, where the Kazer-
unis were stationed. The two Shirazi commanders, having failed 
to secure their position, while encamped, were completely rout-
ed and pushed back to Shiraz... There is a great difference be-
tween Giti Goshay and Golshan-e-Morad on this point. The latt-
er asserts that through the mediation of Shaikh Mo~ammad 
<.Arab, who was a Mojtahed, and the judge of the army ( Qazi 
c - - -Asgar) and Mirza Khalil Farahani, one of the Mostoufis of the 
court, <Ali Qoli Khan yielded and returned to the court, 5 while 
Giti Goshay informs us that Lotf cAli Khan was commissioned to 
attack the town of Kazerun, should the chief fail to obey the 
advice of the courtiers sent to appease him. cAli Qoli Khan, thus 
unable to repel a large force, found it expedient to present 
himself at court.' He was, however, assured that his person 
and property would be safe. But after a short while had elap-
sed, he was captured and imprisoned. 7 Francklin even affirms 
that he was arrested on entry. 
1. G.G., p.291. 
2. T.Z., p.36. G.G., p.292. 
3. G.M., p.440. 
4. Ibid., p.441. M.T., p.350. 
5. G.M., p .441. 
6. OMTS, p.341. T.Z., p.31. 
7.0MTS, p.341. 
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"On his arrival, he was seized, confined as a close 
prisoner in the citadel, and all his effects were 
confiscated. There is little probability of his en-
largement (sic) unless a revolution in the govern-
ment should happen. " 1 
Francklin was too right in his anticipation. In fact, the prison-
er brought about the revolution himself. cAli Qoli Khan had ar-
rived at the court of Shiraz by the end of the month of Sh cab-
an 1200/26th June 1786. He was imprisoned by 13th Ramazan 
1200/lOth July, 1786. 2 Therefore he must have been at large for 
less than one month. Again the sources are at variance as to 
the cause of his imprisonment. Giti Goshay accuses him of hav-
ing plotted against the ruler, 3 whereas Golshan-e-Morad speaks 
of his arrogance and disrespectful behaviour towards his mas-
ter, as well as the courtiers... It appears that his rivals at 
the court contributed to his downfall. Yet again, another ins-
tance of the fierce battle between the two elements in the 
court, that is, the tribal nobility and the urban notables, 
struck another blow at the security of the kingdom. 
Punitive expedition to the south: 
The imprisonment of the governor of Kazerun, cAli Qoli Khan, was 
c -expected to occasion dissension in the region. Thus ] a far Khan 
wintered in Shiraz and at the beginning of March, his brother, 
Mohammad Khan, was commissioned to subdue the Mamasani 
tribes, which was achieved and the latter returned to camp. 
c Khan with force off for Kazerun. His aim ]a far a set was to 
install the newly appointed governor, CAli He mat Khan Kolia 'i, 
in his position and, also, to punish some of the local chiefs 
of the southern provinces, including the Shaikh of Bushehr, 
1. OMTS, p.341. 
2. G.M., p .441. 
3. G.G., p.297. 
4. G. M., p.441. 
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who had not paid his revenues for nearly two years. 1 J a c far 
Khan encamped at the town of Kazerun, while his men proceed-
ed to Bushehr, where the shaikh, as a matter of course, pre-
pared to defend himself. This was fortunately avoided, since 
some of the courtiers mediated on his behalf and, with the pay-
ment of a large sum, he diverted the attention of the Zand rul-
er from the area which he governed. 2 The EIC resident asserts 
c -
that J a far Khan: 
"has lately extorted a considerable sum of money 
from the inhabitants of Bushire & there are now 
a number of his people with the Chaub (sic) 
shaikh demanding tribute for their master. "3 
Apparently, c -J a far Khan had also sent his forces to plunder 
the Bani Ka c b tribe, and they had been pillaged of their live-
stock to the number of 800 mules and 3000 sheep ... 
c -Ja far Khan passed the new year's festival at Behbehan, where 
he received the tribute of Shaikh Qazban, the Bani Kacb 
. c -
Shaikh. Having achieved these victories, J a far Khan returned 
to Shiraz and encamped on its outskirts, to prepare for an ex-
pedition towards Kerman. 5 At this stage, he received the envoy 
from the governor of Kerman, Seyed Abolhasan, who acknowled-. 
ged the Zand suzerainty with the usual presents. Having re-
cruited a large army, and wishing to employ it, J a c far Khan 
planned to march on Yazd. The governor of Yazd had, for a 
long period, refrained from paying the Divani taxes and duties 
on the pretext that the drought 'had damaged the crops (and 
by sending a small contribution to the Zand court, and the 
Qajar chief had pocketed the revenues demanded of him) . 1 Taqi 
1. OMTS, p.343. He had also offered help to Reia Qoli Khan Kazerun.(p.342). 
2. Ibid. I.O.R. G/29/22. Bussora, 15th March, 1787. 
3. Ibid. 
4. G.M., p.442. G.G., p.299. 
5. G.M., p.443. 
6. Ibid., pp.443-4. 
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Khan, the cunning governor, had expected one of the contend-
ers to attempt to subdue him, but that it would not happen 
yet. 1 Hence, Taqi Khan was taken by surprise and hurried into 
the nearby citadel, Narin Qalc a, while Mo~ammad Khan, Jac far 
Khan's brother, besieged him. Golshan-e-Morad states that he 
twice sent representations to the Zand camp to solicit pardon, 
with the promise of payment of the arrears, but it was not 
accepted; the second time one Mojtahid Moll a Mo~ammad Aljeh 'i 
with a few seyeds and colamas. 2 Furthermore, Taqi Khan asked 
assistance from the chief of 1'abas, Amir Mohammad Khan, and 
set about resisting the assault. 3 
The siege lasted for some time, while provisions became scarce 
in the Zand camp and the army was much reduced as a result. 
Although ] a c far Khan had ordered Farsis to provide him with 
food and fodder, it was not sufficient for such a large army ... 
Amir Mohammad Khan, in the meantime, arrived at Yazd and en-
tered th~ citadel. Apparently, ] a c far Khan was again betrayed 
by his troops, that is, the Lari soldiers under their chief, Mo~­
ammad Khan, the son of Nasir Khan, deserted their post and 
the Zand ruler suddenly found himself with very few men. The 
rest of the army having fled, he subsequently retreated to-
wards Shiraz. 5 
Seid Morad Khan arrested and imprisoned: 
This incident is related under a separate heading, as it has 
great importance for the political situation. ~eid Morad Khan 
was the man who, with the aid of a few other prisoners, assas-
c -inated ]a far Khan and actually usurped the throne for more 
1. T.Z., p.38. G.G., p.301. 
2· G.M.; pp.444-5. 
3. T .z. ,, p.38. G. G., p. 301. 
4. Op. cit. 
5. G. M.·, p. 447 •· G.G., p.302. 
- 140 -
than two months. However, this will be related in due course. 
Before departing for Yazd, ] a c far Khan ordered the seizure of 
Seid Morad Khan and that he be put in chains. 1 It appears 
that he had planned the arrest for a long time. Hence, on the 
23rd April, 1787/25th jamada II, 1202: 
"during the festivity of cheragoons, (a ceremony and 
festival made in honour of the second son of ] a af-
ar Khan, at the time he underwent the operation 
of Sunnat, or circumcision, prescribed by Mahomed-
an law), this unhappy nobleman, on his capture, 
was conveyed to the citadel, where he was severe-
ly beaten: his effects were taken from him, amount-
ing to an immense sum, mostly the treasures of Ker-
im Khan, which had been confided to his care at 
the time of Ali Murad Khan's departure for Ispah-
an. "2 
The source of these assertions is Francklin, who actually wit-
nessed the festival and most probably heard the inhabitants op-
inion on the subject. He further suggests that: 
"the crime pretended to be alleged against him was 
a conspiracy against the government; 3 but the 
people at Shiraz generally supposed that his impris-
onment was solely owing to his having formerly con-
ceived an opposition to Jaafar Khan, who still kept 
it in his mind, and who was jealous of his remain-
ing power, and perhaps tempted at the same time 
by his wealth." .. 
Although Francklin assures us that his account is authentic, 
it is not verified by other sources. Indeed, on the contrary, 
two of the first hand sources, Golshan-e-Morad and Giti Gosh-
- affirm that there conspiracy, by which cAli Qoli !_!, was a 
Khan and Se id Morad Khan . attempted to eliminate the king.' 
1. T.Z., p.37. OMTS, p.345. 
2. OMTS, p.345. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. G.G., p.297. G.M., p. 449. 
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Hence, by means of secret intelligence, J a c far Khan discovered 
the plot and that was why Seid Morad was confined in the cit-. 
a del. Again, unlike what Francklin assumes to have been the 
case, the captive was not deprived of his eyesight. 1 How-
ever, it is interesting to note that Francklin asserts that: 
"all transactions respecting state prisoners in Per-
sia are dark & secret"; 2 
and that could have been the cause of his mistake. 
The expedition against Lar: Lotf <Ali Khan's first assignment: 
c 
Ja far Khan held Mohammad Khan Lari responsible for his 
feat Yazd. Thus, he his eldest c -at sent son, Lotf Ali Khan, 
by then was 19 years of age, on a mission to punish him 





<Ali Khan, on his arrival, besieged the citadel of Lar, while 
he discovered that the citadel was left to the charge of a relat-
ion of Mohammad Khan, who was engaged in gathering troops 
in the neighbourhood of Lar. Encamped at the gates of the cita-
del, Lotf cAli Khan was attacked from two sides by the Lari 
chief and his brother, <Abdollah Khan. In the ensuing battle, 
the Zand prince gained a victory and returned to Shiraz with 
many of the local notables in his company... As we are inform-






"demolished the fortifications of the place, some per-
sons of distinction taken at the surrender of the 
place have been conducted prisoner to Sherauz. " 5 
T.Z., p.37. 
OMTS, p. 347. 
G.G., pp.302-3. 
Ibid. 
I.O.R. Bombay, Secret and Po~itical, Range D. Vol.75. Bussorah. 1787. 
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] a c far Khan's brother defects: 
On this subject, we have to rely solely and absolutely on the 
EIC and the I.O.R. records. There is no mention of this defect-
ion in any of the Persian or European authorities. However, in 
the year 1787, 1 Farz cAli Khan, a younger brother of J a c far 
Khan: 
"in consequence of some unkind behaviour towards 
him on the part of J a afar Khan, deserted from his 
service and joined the party of his competitor, 
Mahomed Khan Cajar (sic). On the 27th. July he 
arrived at Maghil where the resident at present 
lives & claimed his protection. " 2 
The resident, however, does not elaborate on what the unkind 
behaviour might have been, how long the man was in the serv-
ice of the Qajar chief, or what caused him to defect from the 
Qajar·' s service and claim the EIC agent's protection. 2 However, 
it appears that Farz 'Ali was received with much civility and, 
after a few days, was conducted to the government house on 
the invitation of the Motesalem of Basra. 
"The Mussaleem with a view of g1v1ng credit to his 
government & to the guest of the resident received 
Firz Ally Khan (sic) to pay his respect to the 
Pasha and to say his prayer at Maschad All-
ee (sic). Then to return to Bussora and subsequent-
ly to endeavour to obtain pardon from Jaafar Khan 
through the friendly medium of the Pasha and the 
resident. "3 
Apparently, Farz ~li Khan, after having performed his pilgrim-
age to the holy shrines at Najaf and visiting the Pasha of Bag-
dad, returned to Basra. He was able to visit the principal 
Molla, who was presumably Mirza Mohammad Baqer Behbehani, 
1. OMTS, p.348. M.T., p.352. 
2. I.O.R. P/D/75. Bussorah, 14th August, 1788. 
3. Ibid. 
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the founder of the new o:uli Shic a school at Najaf. "He returned 
to Ba~ra" on the 30th November and then he proceeded towards 
Hoveza in his return to Persia. 
"The principal Moolla of Meschad Ally, has furnished 
Firz Ally Khan with his commands to J aafar Khan 
in which he directs him to receive, to favor & par-
done his partners. As J a afar Khan must necessarily 
pay attention to the commands of the Moolla, the 
resident has ventured to address to the Khan a con-
ciliatory letter on the subject of his brother's past 
impudent conduct. " 1 
There is, however, no information as to whether the mediation 
of the resident and the commands of the Molla helped to pro-
cure the pardon for the unfortunate brother. We do not know 
if he even came back to the court of Shiraz. This event must 
have been a great embarrassment for the Zand ruler and that 
is probably why the court historian decided to ignore the inci-
dent altogether. We may assume by the account given of the 
mild disposition that Jac far Khan was known to have had, that 
he pardoned his brother. 
Second attempt to recapture Esfahan: 
J a c far Khan once more ventured to reduce Esfahan into submiss-
ion. Aqa Mohammad Khan, who for the first time appeared in . 
the province of Fars, intended to plunder the Qashqac i tribe, 
-c but he was disappointed in his hopes. The Qashqa is fled to 
the mountains and he encamped at the Gandoman pasture for a 
month, where the scarcity of provisions made him advance to-
wards Shiraz. He encamped at a place known as MashhacDmal-
Na bi (Mother of Solomon). 2 J a c far Khan had no intention of 
fighting Aqa Mohammad Khan, who waited for a while and then 
returned to Esfihan. The Qaj ar chief left his brother, c Ali Qoli 
1~ I.O.R. Bombay, Secret and Political, Range E. Vol.1. 9th Jan. 1789. 
2. G.G., p.307. 
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Khan Qaj ar, as the governor there. 1 From there he proceeded 
to Tehran. 
This was the ideal opportunity for the Zands to regain Esfah-
an. 2 ] a c far Khan left Shiraz on 20th September, 1788/19thZel-
~ajje, 1202, and took Esfahan on the 20th October, 1788/10th 
Muharram, 1203. The expedition was rather a bloodless one, 
since the Qajar governor fled the c:;ity and, without opposition, 
the Zand army entered Esfahan. Aqa Mo~ammad Khan, immediate-
ly after receiving information of the event, marched on the city 
and ] a c far Khan left Esfahan and returned to Shiraz. The EIC 
c resident seems rather surprised at the sudden return of ] a far 
Khan to his capital. 3 Giti Goshay asserts that the Zand ruler 
held a meeting to consult his courtiers as to the advisability 
of staying and fighting the foe. He found all his people oppos-
ed to the idea and, knowing that they would not support him 
should he venture a battle, he vacated the city for Shiraz ... 
He arrived there at the end of ~afar 1203/30th November, 1788. 
Second mission of Lotf cAli Khan and the death of Jac far Khan: 
Lotf <Ali Khan was again commissioned to reduce the rebellious 
elements in the southern parts of the kingdom. It appears that 
in the previous expedition, Lotf cAli Khan had not been able to . 
capture the sons of Nasir Khan, Mo~ammad Khan and cAbdollah 
Khan. Hence, he proceeded to Lar again. Moreover, the inhab-
itants of Gallehdar had not only refused to pay the tribute de-
manded of them, but had also slain the tax gatherers, who 
had been sent to their principality. 5 The populace of the port 
of cAsaluyeh had assisted the Lari rebels and Lotf cAli Khan 
1. G.G., p.307. 
2. I.O.R. Bombay, Secret and Political, Range D. Vol.l. 9th Jan. 1789. 
3. Ibid. 
4. G.G., p.310. He left the city on 16th October, according to Giti Goshay. 
5. T. z. ' p. 45. 
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was first and foremost inclined to punish them. 1 
At his departure, which took place in the month of Rabic I, 
1203, his father, Jac far Khan, became very ill, apparently as 
a result of poison mixed with his food. 2 For some days he did 
not leave his bed, at which time the prisoners in the Ark man-
aged to bribe a Gholam and obtain means to cut their chains. 
During the night of 24th ] anuary, 1789/26th Rabic I I, 1203, they 
came out of the prison and crept into the king's private quar-
ter, where only his mother was awake at his bedside. 3 She 
c heard the noise and, in terror, screamed for help. Ja far 
Khan, despite his illness, got up to fight the assailants and 
even wounded one or two of them; but he was overpowered and 
killed by Ebrahim Khan, son of Esma c il Khan Zand, a youth 
of tender age... His head was severed and thrown down from 
the Ark. 
Seid Morad Khan ·immediately assumed the government and, by 
distributing money among the tribes, he gained their support. 5 
The assassins were placed in key positions, in order to avoid 
further bloodshed. cAli Qoli Khan became the commander of the 
forces in Fars and managed to quell the Lor tribes in the city 
of Shiraz. 1 Apparently, the sons of cAli Morad Khan were among 
·the prisoners in the Ark, but they had no role in perpetrating 
the crime. 7 The main elements involved in the assassination of 
1. T.Z., p.45. 
2. Ibid., p.46. 
3. G.M., p.458. 
4. G. G., p.313. T. Z., p.47. 
5. G.M., p.458. M.T., p.351. 
6. G. M., p.458. 
7. Both of the•, that is Shaikh V a is and Ah1ad Morad Khan, had been deprived of 
their eyesight a while before (G.M., p.449); during Jacfar Khan's last expedition 
to Behbehan. The reason, as given by Golshan-e-Morad, was that a few of the court-
iers had consJ:1ired to appoint one of these princes to the no1inal kingship and dis-
pense with Ja cfar Khan (G. M., p.450). The plot had been disclosed and the poor boys 
had been blinded so as to prevent them from any further attempt. 
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J a c far Khan were cAli Qoli Khan, Seid Morad Khan and his bro-
ther Shah Morad Khan. 1 Jacfar Kh.an died on the 26th Rabicll, 
1203/24th Januar![, 1789. His rule was for nearly four years 
and he was aged between 35 and 40 years when he died. 2 
T.he EIC and Karim Khan's successors: 
The death of Karim Khan occasioned a lapse of a few years in 
the relationship between the court of the Zands and the EIC. 
At the death of the Vakil, Sadeq Khan, his brother, was at Bas-. 
ra. He had been commissioned for the second time to proceed 
to that city and take the administration in hand. 3 The Persian 
governor of the town, cAli Mohammad Khan, had been killed by 
the Arab tribes and his deputy had asked the Vakil to take 
proper measures to replace him... ~adeq Khan, during his stay 
in the city of Basra, went out of his way to ease up the con-
fusion of the people and revive trade. The EIC agent writes: 
"So far he has succeeded in the former. Karim Khan 
had written a friendly letter to the president of 
the board and Sadeq Khan had also written letters 
since a report had been spread that the company 
wished its presidency at Basra to be withdrawn. 5 
He took care to settle all the accounts of the late governor 
with the Company. 1 cAli Mohammad Khan had purchased clothes . 
to the value of 1500 Tomans, which he had not paid for. 7 
Sadeq Khan paid half of the amount in question by sending . 
1. G.M., p.450. 
2. I.O.R. Bo1bay, Secret and Political, Range D, Vol.1, 24th March, 1789. 
3. G.G., p.214. Zinat al-Tavarikh. Msc. Tehran. n.p. 
4. Ibid. 
5. I.O.R. G/22/18. Bussora. 3rd Feb. 1779. 
6. Ibid. 26th May, 1779. 
7. Ibid. 
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500 Crates of dates to the resident of the EIC. He further prom-
ised to honour the remittance when he arrived at Shiraz. 1 He 
never entered Sh-traz while his rival ~aki Khan was alive, and 
it was only after the death of ~aki Khan, that ~adeq Khan 
placed himself as the guardian of Abol Fath Khan in the gov-
ernment. He released the prisoners from Basra, who were kept 
in Shiraz. 2 Moreover, when Bushehr was ransacked by a local 
chief, Rais Baqer, Sadeq Khan ordered him to return whatever 
had been taken from the inhabitants and to vacate the place 
immediately. 3 But he failed to pay the debt which he had pro-
mised. 
The EIC. was expecting an opportunity to apply to his success-
or, 'Ali Morad Khan, but he reckoned it a waste of expense on 
the part of the Company and subsequently gave up the idea ... 
During this time trade was greatly reduced and this caused an-
xiety among the Company's directors. Thus, they assigned the 
task of investigating the causes of the decline to a certain Mr. 
Matcham, who was on his way to England from the Bengal estab-
lishment. In 1783, the resident at Bushehr received a letter 
from his superiors, acquainting him with the plan and ordering 
him to assist Mr. Match am in his endeavour. 5 Mr. Match am arr-
ived a little after CAli M orad Khan had died, and we have a 
letter, dated 14th March, 1785, in which the resident informs 
his superior of the impossibility of the trip to Esfahan and 
Shiraz, as was intended by Mr. Matcham. 6 Thus, he decided to 
wait in Ba~ra until one of the contenders for the crown of Per-
sia, that is J a c far Khan and Se id M orad Khan, should emerge 
as victor. 7 However, the trip and the intended investigation 
1. I.O.R. G/22/18. Bussorah, 26th May, 1779. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 28th August, 1779. 
4. Ibid. Bussorah, 6th November, 1784. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. P/D/72. Bushire, 15th March, 1785. 
7. Ibid. 
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were never carried out, since the resident deemed the roads un-
safe and the trip impossible. 1 
( 
'..i..: 
It was in 1786 that the EIC opened communication with the 
court of Shiraz. This had been occasioned by the arrival of 
c -two Englishmen at the camp of ]a far Khan near Kazerun. 
c -Thus, the resident received a letter from ]a far Khan, dated 
Safar, 1201/December, 1786, to inform him of the arrival of two 
Englishmen at his camp and that he had sent a Mehmandar 
(official host) to conduct them to Bushehr. The reason for their 
being sent to Bushehr was that they claimed to have come on 
the part of the king of England and were expecting an envoy 
from the court of Dehli to conclude a business treaty with the 
king of Persia. 2 ] a c far Khan, however, stated in his letter, 
that he was unaware of the nature of the business treaty and 
that, when he found out the purpose of it, he would give his 
answer. 3 
Major Morrison and ,a young officer in his company, 




Beg.,. In a letter dated 27th December, 1786, the resident ac-
knowledged the receipt of the Farman from the court of Shiraz. 
He also stated that he knew nothing of the two gentlemen, who 
had arrived there. He did not know, on whose part they had 
come, and what their business was. 5 He did, ,however, have the 
courtesy to thank the Khan for his kindness towards his coun-
c - -trymen. Ja far Khan had ordered Shaikh Na;er, the shaikh of 
Bushehr, to pay the resident for their expense s. 6 However, Maj-
or Morrison and his companion, Biggs excited great suspicion 
in the Company's circle, as they had no clue as to the purpose 
1. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bushire, 15th March, 1785. 
2. Ibid. P/D/74. Bushire, 5th Jan. 1787. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 27th Dece1ber, 1786. 
6. Ibid. 
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of the Major 1 s mission. They were worried that he might be a 
French agent. Hence, the directors of the Company commanded 
their agents to keep ran eye on his activities' and the resident 
dutifully promised to watch him and prevent him, with the ut-
most determination, from concluding any treaty with the king 
of Persia prejudicial to the Honourable Company 1 s interest. 1 
The character and conduct of Major Morrison deserves particul-
ar notice. He was not sent, as he claimed, on behalf of the 
was in the 
- c_ 
service of Shah A lam, the King of England, but 
Grand Mogul. 2 He had served the El C for a while, and then 
had resigned from his post to enter the service of the king of 
- C-
Dehli. Apparently, he had persuaded Shah Alam, to recruit Brit-
ish officers in his army and to enter into a treaty with the 
Company to provide him with modern arms and ammunition. 3 In 
·England, Morrison had written to H. Dundas, the director of 
the EIC board, to obtain his approval of the plan. He then set 
off to the court of Persia, in order to persuade J a c far Khan to 
- C- C -do the same as Shah Alam ... Ja far Khan did not, however, seem 
enthusiastic about the plan. In a letter with no date, which 
Major Morris on wrote to J a c far Khan, he promised to conquer 
all Persia for him in four years. 
"If you will send two of your trusty people with 
about ten Lacks of Rupees to Bussora in order that 
they may proceed with me to Europe to engage 
such persons as are necessary, according to the 
enclosed list to purchase great guns & small arms 
& other articles of war which we shall return 
with." 5 
This list alluded to has unfortunately not survived, but the 
1. I.O.R. P/D/74. Bushire, 5th Jan. 1787. 
2. Ibid. 




content of the letter is enough to lead one to the conclusion 
c -
that J a far Khan had talked about military situation with 
the Major and had a~ed him to purchase ammunition for him. 
Major Morrison waited in Ba~ra for an answer to his letter, 
c -
but we have no evidence that Ja far Khan replied to his letter, 
probably due to shortage of cash. Thus Major Morrison left for 
England. 
Major Morrison, however, did not give up his plan. The next 
we hear of him is in England, where he arrived in February, 
1788, bombarding Henry Dundas with a barrage of statistics 
and excerpts on the subject of how it would be profitable to 
the Company to enter into such contracts with the courts of Deh-
li and Shiraz. 1 The affair appears to have dragged on until 
much later and, on 3rd March, 1796, there is a letter written 
by H. Dundas to the chairman of the committee, about General ? 
Morrison' s proposed treaty with Persia: 
"which has for its object on this part ( EIC) the 
cession of the principal ports in the Gulf, of ·sup-
plying them with Tin, Copper & on our part (Eng-
land) the furnishing them with officers & soldiers 
to instruct them in European discipline. " 2 
This occasion made it possible for the court of Shiraz to enter 
into a friendly relationship with the agents of the Company in 
- c -
Bushehr and Ba~ra. Mirza Mo~ammad ~osein, Ja far Khan's min-
ister, together with the Farman of his master, wrote a letter 
to the resident, offering him assistance and his service. 3 The 
resident acknowledged his kindness, by reciprocating his offers 
of service to the minister and his master.,. This was the pre-
lude to a beneficial and constructive relationship with the 
1. Melville Papers, J.C.A.S., Vol.17. 1930 
2. I.O.R. G/29/21, p.449. 3rd March, 1796. 
3. Ibid. P/D/74. 27th December, 1786. 
4. Ibid. 
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court at Shiraz, which lasted as long as Jacfar Khan lived. 
J a c far Khan was aware of the profits that would accrue to his 
kingdom, from having a commercial relationship with the for-
eign companies. Thus, when Harford }ones, from the residency 
of Ba~ra, came to Shiraz in the summer of 1787 for the benefit 
c -of his health, J a far Khan received him with much kindness 
and he was given an audience in the company of W. Francklin, 
who was then in Shiraz. 1 On that occasion, Jacfar Khan expres-
sed his earnest desire to see the foreign merchants trading 
with his kingdom and assured them that they would meet with 
every assistance in his power. His minister, Mirza Mohammad 
Hosein, who had made the acquaintance of Harford }ones, while . 
he was in Basra (that is, in the capacity of minister to ~adeq 
Khan), also made ample manifestation of his friendship towards 
the EIC agents and even invited Harford }ones to visit Shiraz 
again as his own guest. 2 Hence, the resident at Bushehr wrote 
c -a letter to J a far Khan, thanking him for his hospitality to-
wards the joint factor at Basra, Harford }ones. It was then, 
that Jac far Khan sent a Farman to the resident, with a robe 
of honour. 3 
These proceedings induced the Company's directors to 1ake advan-
tage of these encouragements. The factory at Bushehr had for 
long been deemed as a useless expense to the Company. Its 
state had been worsened by the Shaikh of Bushehr' s demanding 
the EIC to pay tax on the imports and exports made by the 
Company... The Company had been exempt from such payments 
by the Farman, which gave them the privilege of conducting 
1. OMTS, p. 77 • 
2• D.K.' P· cxxiv 
3. I.O.R. P/D/75, p.299. 1788. 
4. Ibid. Bombay, Secret and Political. Range 0/ Vol.74, p.122, 1788. 
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their commercial transactions without any obstacles during the 
reign of Karim Khan. The above-mentioned Farman had been 
lost and the resident --eould not convince the Shaikh of those 
privileges, or rather, it was not in the Shaikh' s interest to 
accept them as valid. 
At this stage, the directors of the EIC resolved to make repres-
c -
entations to Ja far Khan, in order to put the factory at Bush-
ehr on a more favourable footing, similar to those that existed in 
Ottoman Turkey . 1 It appears that the Company's directors wrote 
a letter to Jacfar Khan without acknowledging him as the sover-
eign of Persia. Thus, the agents of the Company were worried 
that the letter would not meet with a favourable response. 
Hence, it was taken back from the Shaikh of Bushehr, who was 
charged with the delivery of it, so that it could be altered. 2 
However, as was rightly anticipated, the Khan readily complied 
with their representations; they were made exempt from payment 
~ - - t 1 ~~ of tax and even the poR-:_ax (Rahdari) was removed from all [~ ~· 
the merchandize, which was imported to the kingdom. This Far-
man was received by the resident at Bushehr, in January, 
c 1788. 3 Ja far Khan took the opportunity of accepting the resid-
ent's offers of his service and requested him to procure what-
ever rarities could be found in Ba~ra, to be purchased for him 
and a bill of costs sent to him ... 
The ban on the export of Kermani wool: 
c 
Despite his boundless favour towards foreign merchants, Ja far 
Khan was by no means prepared to sacrifice the trade and in-
dustry of his dominion for their sake. 5 Thus, knowing the im-
1. I.O.R. P/D/75., p.123, 1788. 
2. Ibid., p.290. 
3. Ibid. pp.124-5, 8th Rabf II, 1202/8th January, 1788 (18th January). 
4. Ibid., p.299. 
5. Ibid. G/29/21. Report on the British Trade with Persia, 1791. See Appendix 
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portance of the export of the Kermani wool, for the consumption 
of the factories in Britain, he imposed a ban on its export. 1 
:ft 
Incidentally, the resident at Bushehr states that the expenses 
for the upkeep of the factory in Bushehr were justified, as it 
could be used for the purchase of Kermani wool and the drugs, 
which were the products of Persia. This shows a wide demand 
for these items. However, the ban not only made the purchase 
of wool difficult, but also made its price jump up. In a letter 
written by S. Manesty of the Basra residency, he orders the 
resident at Bushehr that the prices at which wool was pur-
chased, should not exceed the fixed price which had been set 
by the directors of the Company in 1787. 2 
The ban was aimed at the protection of the Shawl industry set 
up in Kerman and, although the quality of that item was not 
as good as those of Kashmir, it provided for home consumption. 
This, in effect, discouraged the importation of Indian Shawls. 
It appears, however, that, despite the ban, the resident was 
able to procure a certain amount of wool every year. 3 Although 
the trade in wool had been hampered by this measure, trade 
in general was thriving. ·In the year 1788, the merchants of 
Bushehr made the largest ever importation from India... The 
amount of this consignment is not available to us. 
The dispute between the EIC agents and the Shaikh of Bushehr 
was not only on the issue of tax and rahdarf. It appears that 
the Shaikh was actively involved in the trade of the southern 
regions. Thus, induced by motives of self interest, the Shaikh, 
"considered himself entitled on the arrival of vessels 
1. I.O.R. G/29/21. Report on the British Trade with Persia, 1791. See Appendix 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. G/29/18 Part.1.ff.1.201. 1784-1792. 
4. Ibid. G/29/21. Report on the British Trade, op. cit. 
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"& foreign merchants to a preference ,& to have the 
refusal of their importations. " 1 ' 




"uniformly invited the principal merchants of the 
place to take a share in the purchases which he 
made & therefore it was more severely felt by the 
British residents and the inferior order of the mer-
chants. " 2 
above statement was written at a later period than 
dispute was going on and was also written by one, 




was highly incensed by the conduct of the Shaikh and bitterly 
complained to his superiors about him. He asked for an applic-
ation to be made to the Khan at Shiraz about his officer, 
Shaikh Naser. 3 Apparently, the last straw was the Shaikh' s 
"refusing to, permit a pilot to go on board the 
Drake (ship), to carry that vessel out of the inner 
road at Bus hire." .. 
This was, in the resident's opinion, unpardonable and disgrace-
ful to the Company's factory there and consequently to the nat-
ion. !5 He thus reckoned it 
"would infinitely more lend to the credit of both to 
withdraw the factory than to keep it on the pres-
ent footing deprived of its consequences & insulted 
in its privileges."' 
1. I.O.R. G/29/21 Report on the British Trade, op. cit. 
2. Ibid. 





These maladies and the kind sentiment expressed by J a c far 
Khan, induced the directors of the Company to apply to the 
Khan for an alteration in the terms, on which the factory had 
been established, and the Khan was on the verge of making 
these changes, when he was assassinated. According to Harford 
}ones and S. Manesty: 
"the murder of the Zand king was the result of the 
serious dispute between Jaafar Khan and his vass-
al, the Shaikh of Bushehr. " 1 
This allegation is not substantiated by any other source and, 
in fact, all the sources are completely silent on the subject. 
However, only one of the Persian sources remarks on the Shaikh 
being treated badly by J a c far Khan. 2 Thus, the idea of hold-
ing the Shaikh responsible for the death of his master appears 
to be unfounded, unless the factory resident was in possession 
of some information to which we do not have access. There is 
no doubt that Jac far Khan was partial to the Company's agents 
and their grievances and had actually taken their side in the 
dispute, which is clearly shown by the tenor of his Farmans 
to the resident. But whether he was murdered as a result of 
that, is doubtful. 
1. I.O.R. P/D/75. Bussorah, p.120. 1788. 










JAcFAR KHAN'S SUCCESSORS 
After the murder of J a c far Khan, Seid Morad Khan declared 
himself the new sovereign and, according to the customary 
practice, informed all the governors and the Khans of his acc-
ession. Coins were minted in his name. The notables, who were 
partial to his rule, set about serving him, whereas the dissid-
ent nobles accepted his supremacy with distaste. 1 Seid Morad, 
aware of the support, which the young, rightful heir, Lotf cAli 
Khan, enjoyed among his subjects, took the precaution of writ-
ing letters to the military chiefs in his company and acquaint-
ing them with the developments. He threatened them at the same 
time, that, if they did not leave Lotf <Ali Khan's service immed-
iately, their families would not be spared the atrocities that 
would befall them. His threat had the desired effect and the 
army dispersed almost instantly. 2 
In the confusion and chaos which ensued after the news reach-
c -ed his camp, Lotf Ali Khan managed to reach his horse and, . 
accompanied only by his minister and a few adherents, he pro-
ceeded towards Bushehr. We are. informed by the resident of the 
EIC that: 
"Lutf Ally Khan the son of J aafar Khan who at the 
time of his father's death was in the province of 
Kerman at the head of a large army, arrived in 
the night of 31st January with a few adherents at 
Bushire and has claimed the protection of Shaikh 
Nassir. "3 
1'. !'.:. ~.!. ' p • 4 8 • 
2 • ~.!. ~.!. ' p • 3 1 5 • 




On his arrival there, he was received with attention and hospit-
ality, although we are informed by one of the sources, that 
the Shaikh of Bushehr had been badly treated by J a c far Khan. 1 
Se id M orad Khan, having learnt of his taking refuge in Bush-. 
ehr, ordered the Shaikh to deliver him up to the government 
of Shiraz. The EIC resident at Bushehr writes in a letter that: 
"Suid Morad Khan quitely rules Schyraus and that 
Shaikh Nassir has refused to comply with a request 
made by Suid Morad Khan for the delivery to him 
of Lutf Ally Khan. " 2 
Unfortunately, the Shaikh, who was by this time more than 
eighty years of age, died after a short time: that is, on the 
11th April, 1789/Sth Rajab, 1203. However, he charged his son, 
Shaikh Nasr to assist Lo~t <Ali Khan in his attempt to gain the 
throne. As we are informed by the resident in Bushehr: 
"Shaikh Nassir has proceeded to Scheraus with Lutf 
Ally Khan and has left his brother Shaikh AbduReh-
im in command of Bush ire. "3 
The new Shaikh of Bushehr was not the only aid to Lotf cAli . 
Khan. The governor of Bandar Rig had also joined his forces 
and he, too, proceeded to Shiraz in his company. 
Lotf cAli Khan was provided with a large force, mainly consist-. 
ing of the cArab tribes from the coast with the Farsi riflemen. 
Prior to their departure towards Shiraz, the Shaikh had written 
to his friends in the city, encouraging them to make an effort 
to dislodge the usurper, Seid Morad Khan. The city notables, . 
in the meantime, had allied themselves with the elements par-
1. M.T., p.352. 
2. I.O.R., Factory Records, G/29/18, Pt.3, 1784-1792. 
3. Ibid. Range E, Vol.1, Bushire, 1789. 
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tial to the cause of the young prince, 1 and they were at work 
to topple Seid M orad. 
Giti Goshay asserts that seven days after the death of the late 
Shaikh, that is, on the 26th Raj ab, Lo~f cAli Khan departed 
from Bushehr on his march towards Shiraz. 2 The EIC resident 
also asserts that it was on 26th Rajab 1203/22nd April, 1789, --that he set off. This date is accurate, as the resident was act-
ually in Bushehr at the time. 3 
His information about the subsequent events also appears to be 
accurate. The number of the troops, who accompanied the Zand 
prince is not mentioned in other sources. We learn from the res-
ident that: 
"encoura-ged by invitations from Sheraus and by the 
assistance rendered to him by the principal people 
who govern the country in the vicinity of Bushire, 
Lutf Ally Khan marched from thence on the 22nd 
April. with an army consisting of 6000 men."~ .. 
It took him only a few days to achieve his objective, as we 
learn that: 
"early in the month of May he obtained possession 
s 
of Scherauz where he now rules."·· 
The resident, however, provides no information on the events 
which took place in Shiraz, and the plot to overpower ~eid Mor-
ad Khan. The latter, who was expecting Lotf cAli Khan to make 
an attack on Shiraz, recruited troops in order to stop his pro-
gress. Before Lo~f cAli Khan approached the city, he sent out 
an army, at the head of which he had placed his own brother, 
1. T. z. ' p. 48. 
2· G.G., p.317. 
3· I.O.R. Factory Records, G/29/18. Pt.3 & Range E, Vol.1, 1789. 
4· Ibid. Bombay secret & poiltical, Range E, Vol.1, Bushire, 1789. 
5. Ibid., Factory Records G/29/18. Pt.3, 1789. 
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Shah Morad Khan. Shah Morad Khan marched towards Bushehr, 
and encamped at a distance of six farsangs ffom the camp of 
the prince near Daleki. 1 Lotf cAli Khan marched towards the 
camp of his opponent. On his way, he was joined by some of 
the Shirazi troops, who informed him that the commander sent 
out from Shiraz to confront him, had been seized by the chief 
second in command, cAli Hemat Khan-e-Koli'a 1i, and that the 
army had declared itself in favour of Lotf cAli Khan. 2 
Lotf cAli Khan, delighted by the turn of events, hastened to-
wards Shiraz. He proceeded as far as the town of Kazerun, 
where he received the news of a conspiracy having been carr-
ied out in the capital, Shiraz. Mirza Mohammad Hosein had 
sent a messenger to inform him of the developments in the cap-
ital. 3 
The notables, like Mirza Mohammad Hosein, the minister, and 
~aji Ebrahim, the kalantar of the city, had gained the support 
of the tribes in the city and, as a result of an uproar, Seid 
Morad Khan had been forced to take refuge in the Ark. The not-
ables were awaiting the entry of the new sovereign into the 
capital. It appears that prior to the departure of the army, 
which was commissioned to halt the advance of Lotf cAli Khan, 
the notables had arranged with some of the military chiefs to 
ea pture their commander and inform the city notables of their 
success, so that they could execute their scheme within the 
city.' 
On the lOth of Sha c ban, 1203/7th May, 1789, the city was secured 
by the supporters of Lotf cAli Khan and, on the 11th Shacban, 
1. I.O.R., Factory Records, G/29/18 Pt.3, 1789. 
2. G.G., p.317. 
3. Ibid., pp.317-18. 
4. Ibid., p.318. T.Z., pp.49-50. M.T., p.352. 
• 
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he arrived in Shiraz, covering the distance of many farsangs 
in twenty-four hours. The Ark was immediately besieged and, 
after a faint resistance, ~eid Morad Khan gave himself up, and 
was blinded for his perfidy. 1 The resident in Bushehr writes: 
"Lutf Ally Khan has severely punished in different 
ways all the khans concerned in the murder of his 
father except Ally Kouli Khan to whom from polit-
ical motives he has granted a pardon. " 2 
c Ali Qoli Khan was a chief of considerable influence in the 
southern regions and Lotf <:A.li Khan was prudent not to antagon-
ize him. 
The events taking place in Shiraz had not passed unnoticed by 
the Qajar pretender, Aqa Mohammad Khan, who was expecting 
such events would essentially assist him in his pursuit of pow-
er. At the head of a large army, he advanced towards Shiraz. 
On the way, he learnt of the successful accession of Lotf cAli 
Khan. This, however, did not discourage him from continuing 
on his course. He encamped at Baiza. The news of his arrival 
was reported to the Zand monarch in Shiraz, who gathered 
troops with great haste, in order to confront his enemy. 3 
Events Taking Place in Shiraz After the Murder of Jacfar Khan: 
Mojmal-al-Tavarikh is the only source, which relates the pact 
concluded between the city notables, to the effect that they 
c -would unanimously support the cause of Lotf Ali Khan, as long . 
as his conduct was mild and respectful towards them. Should 
he venture any act of reprisal on the murderers of his father, 
i.e. cAli Qoli Khan Kazeruni, who was the major element in the 
assassination, they would not have any obligation of loyalty 
1. G.G., p.318. T.Z., pp.49-50. M.T., p.352. 
2. I.O.R. Factory Records, G/29/18, Pt.3, 1789. 




towards him. 1 This pact between the notables had apparently 
c . -
taken place the day before Lo~f Al1 Khan entered his capital. 
We do not have all the names of the notables, but there is, 
however, mention of the Mirza ]ani Fasa'i, cAli Qoli Khan, ~aji 
Ebrahim Kalantar, with the author of Mojmal-al-Tavarikh, who 
asserts that he was present at that meeting. 2 The notables pres-
ent took an oath of fidelity to the new prince and, to make 
sure that cAli Qoli Khan Kazeruni would not violate his promise, 
Haji Ebrahim entreated him to take up his residence in the kal-. 
antar Is house. 3 It appears that the whole plot was designed 
to secure the safety of the Kazeruni chief, cAli Qoli Khan, who 
seems to have enjoyed great ,power and influence. Unfortunate-
ly, we cannot ascertain what was the source of his power. It 
could either have been his wealth, or else the support he enjoy-
ed by the tribes of the south. 
On the second 
Haji Ebrahim, 
c - -day of Lotf Ali Khan's arrival, the kalantar, 
presented cAli Qoli Khan to the prince. He was 
pardoned and was even bestowed with a mark of honour ... 
Among those, who had been involved in ] a c far Khan's assassin-
ation, was an obscure character by the name of Mirza Mehdi 
Lashgar Ne.vi.s. This person, as Harford ]ones writes, was 
"a Scoundrel who had formerly been disgraced for 
peculation with the loss of his ears; and who, 
when the head of the late unfortunate monarch lay 
in the square before the citadel, insulted by the 
rabble, cut from it the ears, in revenge for his 
own, justly forfeited. The pardon of this man had 
been obtained from Lutf Ally Khan, by assurances, 
from interested persons, that he had not been guil-
ty of this foul act, though many persons had been 
1. M. T., p.352. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p.353. 
4. Ibid. 
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"witnesses of its perpetration. " 1 
The interested persons, mentioned above, were Haji Ebrahim . 
and his associates. Apparently the king had said that: 
"If the accusations had been true, he freely forgave 
the Meerza from the consideration that he had for 
his mediator. " 2 
In any case, the agreement mentioned by the author of Mojmal-
al-tavarikh is not supported by other sources. This may be be-
cause the persons involved had taken the precaution of utmost 
secrecy in their acti'vities, and of not letting anyone outside 
their circle be present However, the subsequent treachery of 
Haji Ebrahim, and the very people who are supposed to have 
been present at that meeting, strongly supports the authenticity 
of the allegations by Mojmal-al-tavarikh. The event is, how-
ever, endorsed by Fasa'i's Farsnameh, whose grandfather was 
one of the prominent figures present. 3 
The Causes of the Fall of Seid Morad Khan's Government: 
Seid Morad had tried once before to establish himself as king. 
On this, his second attempt, the populace of Shiraz were well 
acquainted with his administration. As the kalantar, Mirza Moh-
ammad, informs us: 
"his avarice and cruelty was to the extent that peo-
ple had forsaken their homes to be out of his 
reach and had dispersed all the quarters of the 
country. He had not paid the salary of the troops 
for three successive years and that was the main 
cause of his downfall.""' 
1. D.K., p.cxxi-cxxii. 
2. H.P., Vol.II, p.181. 
3. F.N., part II, p.30. 













Bearing this in mind, one wonders how this same man was able 
to establish himself in the government of Shiraz again. The 
only logical explanation would be, that the country was in a 
state of chaos. Furthermore, he gave over a great amount of 
royal treasures to gain the support of the tribes. 1 
However, Se id Morad Khan ruled the kingdom only for a brief 
peri9d: only for two and a half months. There was, however, 
enough time for the EIC resident to make contact with him. We 
have a letter from the resident that states: 
"in compliance with the command of the honorable 
the president, the resident had by letter anoun-
ced to Said Morad Khan the present ruler of Sher-
auz the event of the honorable the president hav-
ing assu'fed the charge of the government of the 
western side of India and the desire which he en-
tertains to strengthen the friendship which has so 
long subsisted between the English and Persian nat-
ions, in order however to enable the honble. pres-
ident on future necessary occasions to write letters 
to the king of Persia in point of formality. " 2 
The president's designs to establish friendly relations with 
Seid Morad Khan was curtailed by his overthrow, mainly at the 
hands of the city notables and the Zand nobles, i.e. the sons 
of Nazar cAli Khan, the former governor of Kerman. 3 The alleged 
invol~ement of Na:ar cAli Khan's sons is not supported by other 
sources; only Giti Goshay assures us that they were the conspir-
ators. This plot resulted in the capture of Shah Morad Khan, 
the brother of the usurper and, consequently, brought about 
Seid Morad Khan's downfall. 
The first confrontation with his Qajar rival, after Lotf cAli 
Khan assumed power, resulted in the latter's defeat, partly be-
1. G.M., p. 458. 
2. I.O.R., Bombay secret & political, Range E, Vol.1, 1789. 
3. G.G., p.318. 
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cause he had not enough time to organize his troops. As we 
are informed by the official historian, his defeat was due to 
the treachery of his uncle, Mohammad Khan, who had ambitious 
designs and was hoping that, by the defeat of his nephew, he 
would be able to promote his cause. 1 
The situation came about as follows: Aqa Mohammad Khan en-
camped his troops in Bai~a at the beginning of the month of 
Shavval 1203/27th June, 1789. He stayed there for about 30 to 
40 days, while the Zand prince was preparing to meet him in 
the field. He gathered a force numbering up to 25,000, while 
his opponent was at the head of 60,000 men. 2 
Lotf cAli Khan took the field in the middle of ~elqa c deh 1203/ 
August, 1789. In the battle which ensued, Lotf cAli Khan's 
uncle, Mohammad Khan, deserted and marched towards the 
abode of the Mamasani tribes, who were related to him on his 
mother's side. This was a serious blow to the army of the 
Zands and the prince had no choice, except to retreat to the 
citadel. 3 Lotf <Ali Khan fortified the citadel as best he could. 
He moved the heavy artillery into the capital and placed them 
in strategic positions. He further divided his troops into divis-
ions and allocated them to the charge of the towers and the 
gates. 
Aqa Mohammad Khan advanced to the outskirts of Shiraz, where 
he erected batteries and . entrenched his forces... A siege was 
laid on the city which lasted more than two months, during 
which time a force came out of the city to fight the besiegers 
daily. The scarcity of the provisions placed the Qajar army in 
a vulnerable position. Eventually, the Qajar chief found his 
1. G.G., p.322. 
2. T.Z., pp.50-51. 
3. Ibid., p.51. G.G., p.323. 
4. T.Z., p.52. G.G., p.324. 
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efforts futile and ordered his troops to retreat to Tehran, 1 in 
~el~ajjeh/September, 1789. 
The Nouruz occurred on a Wednesday of the month of Rajah 
1203/March 1789. The Zand king favoured his courtiers with 
bonuses and gifts on that occasion. 2 As the season for military 
expedition approached, that is, in May 1789/Shacban 1203, he 
received news of the arrival of the Qajar chief in the Gandom-
an pasture (Chaman). He thus set about preparing his army 
for an engagement. 3 
The Zand prince encamped outside the city, where he was 
joined by the military chiefs and his vassals; while Aqa Moham-. 
mad Khan, having heard of a rebellion in A~arbayjan, found 
it more expedient to quell that first and have a free hand to 
pursue his plans to capture Shiraz... With the Qajars having 
marched away from Fars, Lotf cAli Khan decided to employ his 
army in another exploit, since he had spent much time and 
money recruiting them. He had for some time intended to subdue 
Seyed Abol ~asan, the rebellious governor of the province of 
Kerman, who had refused to pay tribute to the government of 
Shiraz over a considerable period of time. Seyed Abol Hasan 
•· 
had further antagonized his colleague, Mo~ammad ~osein Khan, 
the governor of Barn, and had caused him to complain to Shir-
- c -az. This event gave Lo:f Ali Khan a suitable pretext to march 
on Seyed Abol Has an's territories. 5 
Lotf <Ali Khan's Expedition Against Kerman: 
The character of the Kermani governor merits a description at 
1. G.G., p.324. T.Z., p.52. 
2. G.G., p.325. T.Z., p.52. 
3. Ibid. 
4. T.Z., p.52. 






this point. Seyed Abol ~asan was the spiritual leader of the 
sect of the Ismacili in Persia and India. He received great don-
ations in cash and kind from his followers, and was even don-
ated land and property in the country. Tarikh-e-Kerman 
assures us that he was an honest and righteous man, who 
spent his revenues on the constructive schemes of public util-
ity, 1 but we have no evidence to support that. We do, how-
ever, know through the EIC resident that he had amassed great 
wealth, which he had deposited in the citadel, · Shahr-e-
Babak. 2 
Lotf cAli Khan set off for Kerman at the beginning of autumn. 
On his departure, he received an unexpected guest at his 
camp. The brother of his fierce enemy, Aq a Mo~ammad Khan, 
Reza Qoli Khan Qajar, who had once before defected the service 
of his brother, during the reign of cAli M orad Khan, and had 
joined Shaikh Vais Khan's camp, while at Mazandaran. 3 Lotf 
c Ali Khan left his younger brother in the capital as his vicer-
oy, while l!aji Ebrahim was appointed to the charge of civil ad-
ministration in the capital. Two of the Zand nobles were com-
missioned to guard the citadel and the royal seraglio. 
According to Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh, Lo:f cAli Khan left his capital 
at the start of the month of Safar 1204/late October, 1789 ... He 
spent a few days outside the city, in order to attend to cer-
tain unfinished business. On the point of departure, he re-
ceived a delegation from Kerman, consisting of some. _notables .. 
They brought the customary presents together with a letter, in 
which the Beglarbegi declared his allegiance, promising at the 
same time to pay his arrears, on the condition that the king 
called off his expedition. 5 
1. T.K., pp.332-333. 
2. I.O.R., P/E/V.5. 
3. G.G., p.326. 
4. T.Z., p.53. 
5. Ibid., pp.53-4. G. G. gives this event in a different manner; that is, when Lotf 
'Ali ~ besieged Ke;rn, the notables like Shaikh al-E slam and Qazi came out to tfie 
camp of the Zands with 20,000 Tomans as Pishkesh and the promise of allegiance. 
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Lotf cAli Khan dismissed the idea of cancelling his trip. He in-
sisted, however, that the governor should present himself at 
the royal camp personally. 1 Allowing, however, for reconciliat-
ion, should the governor change his mind and come to his 
camp, he promised that he would return to the capital immed-
iately.2 
Lotf cAli Khan advanced towards the province of Kerman. On 
arriving at the town of Sirjan, the governor, Mohammad Re~a 
Khan Korrani, came out to meet him with suitable presents and 
provisions for his troops. Lo!f cAli Khan intended to take poss-
ession of Shahr-e-Babak first and, then, proceed towards the 
seat of the governor of Kerman, Gavashir. The Korrani chief 
disagreed with this idea on the grounds that Shahr-e-Babak 
had a very strong citadel, with a supply of ammunition, which 
could last the inhabitants as long as five years. 3 Furthermore, 
the citadel was defended by a close relation of the Beglarbegi, 
Mirza Sadeq, whose relationship with his troops, the cAtaoliahi . 
tribes, was that of a Pir with his Morids (saint and discip-
les). The inhabitants also considered the Beglarbegi as their 
spiritual leader and would fight for him to the last gasp ... 
The chief of Sirjan induced the king to assail the town of Gav-
ashir' which was a large place and its citadel had many loop-
holes, which could be easily penetrated by a well organised 
army. 5 Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh asserts that on his way to Gavashir, 
Lotf cAli Khan sent an envoy to the governor in order to per-
suade him to submit. While he was on the march, he received 
the governor's envoy together with some of the governor's relat-
ions. The envoy produced a letter which contained the accept-
ance of the king's terms, that is, to send his brother to the 
1. T. z. ' p. 54. 
2. Ibid. 






court as a hostage, the payment of the tribute demanded of 
him, on the condition that the king did not proceed further 
than Sirj an. 1 
Lotf cAli Khan received news, to the effect that the governor 
had arrested the people of high rank partial to the Zand rule 
and was preparing for a siege, should his request meet with 
an unfavourable response. 2 
There is great confusion in the order of the events in Tarikh-
e-Kerman, since it is difficult to disentangle the two attempts 
made by the Zand prince to reduce Kerman. It appears that the 
author of Tarikh-e-Kerman took most of his information from 
other sources and confused them. The author of this book 
asserts that Lotf <Ali Khan stayed about twenty days outside the 
town, and that a force came out of the citadel twice to fight 
him. On both occasions, the Kermanis were defeated, until the 
governor made a night raid on the Zands, raiding the cattle 
in their camp, 3 and thus discouraged him from further attacks. 
This event is not mentioned in other sources, and Tarikh-e-
Kerman is deficient in its account, regarding the main reason 
for the Zand army's withdrawal from outside the citadel at 
Gavashir. 
Intense cold and heavy snowfalls had blocked the roads and 
the army was faced with severe famine. As a result, a great 
number of the troops died of hunger, even if they survived the 
cold... Eventually Lotf <Ali Khan found the condition of his army . 
precarious, as there was the danger of the whole force being 
dispersed. Thus, he left the province of Kerman and, in the 
month of J amada' I 1205/J anuary, 1791, entered his ea pi tal. 5 
1 • !.:. ~.:. ' p p • 5 4 - 5 5 • 
2 • .!. E.!E..:. ' p • 5 5 • 
3 • !.:. !.:. ' p • 3 4 4 • 
4 • !.:. ~.:. ' p • 5 6 • 
5. Ibid. 
! •... . 
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Giti Gosh ay differs from Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh in the events, which 
took place during the siege. The former source states that, 
while the Zand army laid siege to the citadel, the governor 
sent out the Shaikhal-Eslam and the Qa~i of the city to proceed 
to Lotf <Ali Khan's camp, entreating him to raise the siege and 
promising, on behalf of the governor, to meet his demands. 
They even suggested paying 20,000 Tomans for his return to 
Shiraz. Lotf ~li Khan did not accede to their terms on account 
of his excessive pride, and demanded that the governor should 
seek pardon in person for his insolent conduct. 1 
Farsnameh-e-Naseri states that the scarcity of food was such, 
that the soldiers had to eat the flesh of their horses and 
asses. When this was no longer. possible, they decided to leave 
their posts. Lotf ~li Khan, finding himself in this predicament . 
followed them and returned to Shiraz. 2 
Giti Goshay asserts that he left a garrison in Sirjan with the 
eldest son of Mohammad Hosein Khan Sistani, Amir Saif-al Din. 3 
This is contradicted by Tarikh-e-Kerman, which gives the town 
as Mashiz ... 
Tarikh-e-Kerman also gives us information on the events that 
took place outside the citadel of Kerman. Apparently, the king, 
having found the siege more detrimental to his own cause, 
rather than the inhabitants of the city, requested assistance 
from the neighbouring chiefs, like Mohammad A c zam Khan Af-
ghan, the ruler of the areas adjoining Kerman, like Narmashir, 
Kha bis, etc. ; but due to some disagreement between the Afghan 
chiefs at this time, the assistance never materialised. Lotf cAli 
Khan also demanded troops from Mohammad Hose in Khan Sistani, 
1. G.G., pp.326-7. 
2. F.N., p.232. 
3. G.G., p.328. 
4. T.K., p.345.f.n. 
- 170-
the governor of Barn. The governor also had some dispute with 
the inhabitants of his jurisdiction and was so much involved 
that he could not respond favourably to the summons of his mas-
ter. He did, however, send two of his sons, ] ahangir Khan and 
Amir Mohammad cAli, at the head of 150 cavalry to the Zand 
camp. 1 This information is not given in other sources, but 
there is no particular reason to doubt the authenticity of this, 
as it is quite natural for a ruler to summon his vassals to his 
aid in time of emergency. 
The events of the year 1205/1790-91 were of great importance 
for the Zand house, since Lotf 'Ali Khan decided to make an 
expedition against the city of Esfahan, which by now was com:-
pletely in the hands of his Qajar rival. This event resulted in 
his being deprived of his throne and his ~ubsequent murder by 
the Qajars. 
Lotf cAli Khan spent the rest of the winter in Shiraz, preparing 
for his military expedition, while Aqa Mohammad Khan was en-. 
gaged in subjugating his brother, Morteza Qoli Khan, and some 
minor revolts in the province of Mazandaran. 2 
Having achieved his objectives: that is, the crushing of the 
re bel lions and the murdering of his brother' the Qaj ar chief 
set off for the province of A~arbayjan, where for some time ear-
lier, a chief of the Shaqaqi tribe, Sadeq Khan, had thrown off . 
allegianc'e to any government, declaring himself independent. 
He had, moreover, taken possession of the city of Tabriz. 3 This 
chief fled at the approach of the Qajar army and, with very 
little effort, Aqa Mohammad Khan subdued all parts of Azar-
bayjan. This was due to strife and discord amongst the local 
chiefs, who did not offer any resistance to the supreme power 
1. G.G., p.344. 
2. Ibid., pp.332-3. 
3. Ibid. 
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of a stronger chief. 1 Aqa Mo~ammad Khan returned to Tehran, 
having left his nephew, Baba Khan (later Fath cAli Shah), in . 
charge of the city of Esfahan during his absence. 2 
At the end of the year 1789/1204, Mirza Mohammad Hosein, the . . 
minister to Lotf cAli Khan, left Shiraz on a pilgrimage to 
Mecca. On his trip back from there, he stayed in Basra, where 
he met with hospitality from the residents of the EIC, Mr. Man-
esty and Harford ]ones. They took the opportunity of showing 
the minister the gratitude of the English community there, for 
the services which the minister had rendered them, during the 
siege and the capture of Basra by the Persian army. 3 The EIC 
resident at Basra states that in several interviews, which the 
minister had there, he 
"expressed in the most polite terms & in the most 
forcible lang~a~, the general desire of the Khan 
/Lotf 'Ali Khan I to cultivate the friendship of the 
British nation & to give the highest encouragement 
to such British traders as might visit Persia, on 
his own particular inclination to render kind and 
friendly services to them & in our last interview 
with him previous to his departure for Bagdad 
Meerza Mahomed Hossien declared the sentiments of 
the Khan on the subjict of establishment of British 
factories in the king do m of Persia in so full & so 
encouraging a manner that we ventured to mention 
to him our idea of a new modification of the 
Honble. Board ..... 
It appears that the minister was commissioned by Lo!f 'Ali Khan 
to negotiate with the residents, but we have no information 
about the purpose of his visit to Bagdad. It could, however, 
have been a friendly gesture towards the Pasha of Bagdad, 
1. G.G., p.332-3. 
2. T.Z., p.57. 
3. I.O.R. G/29/18, Bussora, 1789. 
4. Ibid., Factory Records, Bushire, 1790. 
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aimed at establishing good relations with the neighbouring 
P ashalik. The friendly sentiments of the minister were further 
substantiated by the Farmans, which Lotf cAli Khan sent the 
resident at Bushehr, and which had convinced him that 
"the Khan would consent to place a factory in 
Persia on the footing of the factory here/Basra 7 & 
to levy only trifling customs on British property 
landed at Bushire or conveyed to Schyraus, as for 
sale we beg leave respectfully to express the hope 
that you will comply with the wishes of Meerza 
Mahomed Hossien whose conduct towards us in all 
occasions demands our particular attention. " 1 
The friendly overtures and encouragement made by Lotf cAli 
Khan to the British, did not in any way alter the commercial 
stagnation, which had long since set in, in the Gulf region. 
As we see later on, the Khan had even gone as far as giving 
permission to the British to establish a new factory on the is-
land of Kharg, but the scheme never materialized, partly be-
cause of the precarious position of Lotf cAli Khan in his govern-
ment. As it was stated by the resident: 
"the present critical situation of the Khan, prevents 
our offering to your consideration our sentiments 
on the subject of the establishment in question. " 2 
Lotf CAll. Kh- h d n an a , however, good reasons to try and solicit 
the friendship of the resident, since he was hoping to get assis-
tance from them in his contest with his Qajar rival for the 
kingdom. 
Apparently, the request made by the resident in Ba~ra had 
brought about the question of the establishment of the new fac-
ory. We have information on the subject from a letter, dated 
the.i8th of December, 1790/11th Rabic!!, 1205. 3 The proceedings 
1. I.O.R. G/29/18 Factory Records, Bushire, 1790. For the plan particularized on 
the factory in Persia, the reader is referred to the Report on the Coaaerce of Per-
sia, included in the Appendix. 
2. Ibid., Pt.4, Feb., 1792. 


























involved in giving the grant of the island of Kharg took Lotf 
~li Khan two years to decide on. This was rather late, since 
shortly afterwards he lost possession of the island to the hos-
tile Shaikh of Bushehr, who was not at all inclined to agree 
to such a proposition. The Khan was well aware of the fact 
that such a small kingdom, which had been left to him, could 
not provide him with the revenues he would need in his battles 
with the Qajar chief. By this time, he had collected such im-
mense treasures, which enabled him to recruit armies of 60,000 
men. We will relate in a later chapter that, while the Qajar 
chief besieged Gavashir, he even built another city, beside the 
old one, for his troops to live in. 1 
The expeditions undertaken by Lo~f <Ali Khan were aimed prim-
arily at increasing his revenues. Unfortunately, the period of 
anarchy and lawlessness had gone on for so long that none of 
the local chiefs were prepared to submit to a Zand, especial-
ly since the Qajar chief had actually conquered the whole emp-
ire, leaving only Fars for his opponents to rule. 2 It was quite 
natural that the local chiefs were more in dread of the Qajars 
rather than the Zands, whose power was greatly diminished. 
When Lotf <Ali Khan failed to reduce the weal thy and powerful 
governor of Kerman, he thought of another means to raise mon-
ey. He summoned the resident of the EIC in Basra to his court 
at Shiraz, in order to enter into business with him. He offered 
Harford }ones the opportunity to buy the famous jewels, which 
he had inherited from his ancestors. As he admitted: "These 
foolish things are of no use to me". 3 Indeed, this was true; 
what he really needed was ready cash, with which he could 
buy the fidelity of a mercenary army. 
1. T.K., p.361. The footnotes relate this event from a copy of G.G., which I have 
not been able to trace. 
2. Ibid., p.343. 
3. D.K., p.clxxxii. 
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Expedition Against Esfahan: 
Lotf cAli Khan undertook another expedition, which resulted in 
a coup in his capital. One wonders whether the hopes that he 
entertained of a victory over his rival in Esfahan, did not 
cause him to change his mind about the sale of his precious 
jewels, and caused him to call the deal off. 
He was certain that he would return to Shiraz victorious, as 
he asked Harford ]ones to remain in the city until he re-
turned. 1 This shows how self-confident he wa~, when he left 
his capital. Alas, he never saw it again, as long as he lived. 
The Zand prince had, however, taken the precaution of provid-
ing Harford ]ones (who was in Shiraz) with Farmans for the 
establishment of a factory on the island of Kharg, 2 lest his mil-
itary exploits proved futile. The letters were written prior to 
his departure, which clearly shows his foresight to the profit, 
which he anticipated would accrue to his treasury and his king-
dom as a whole, from the commerce with foreign firms, especi-
ally the British, who had by now become the sole European 
power in the Gulf. 
Lotf <Ali Khan was so deeply engrossed in his plan to make an 
attack on Esfahan, that he failed to see that the Kalantar, 
~aji Ebrahim, had organized a clique to overthrow his govern-
ment and replace it with a confederacy of local chiefs, with 
himself as the ruler of Shiraz. 3 Lotf cAli Khan made ample pre-
parations for his expedition. He had recruited more than twenty 
thousand men for that purpose and, as on the previous occas-
ion, had appointed the kalantar, ~aji Ebrahim, in charge of 
the civil administration of the capital, while two of his close 
1. D.K., p.clxxxii. 
2. Ibid., p.cl. 
3. H.P., Vol.2, p.180. 
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kinsmen were placed in charge of the fortifications and the 
royal household (Ark and ljar1mkhaneh). 1 Barkhordar Khan, a 
distinguished general, whose courage and warlike spirit had 
gained him the favour of his master, despite the fact that the 
minister, Mirza ~osein, found him weak 2 (probably due to some 
previous disagreement), was placed in charge of the citadel. 
While Lotf <Ali Khan was absent, the Kalantar and Barkhordar 
Khan had a clash over minor points of protocol on the previous 
expedition made by Lotf cAli Khan; Barkhordar Khan, being a 
member of the ruling family, expected due respect from the 
Kalantar and the latter was not inclined to accede. At all 
events, the general had informed the prince of the event and 
had accused Haji Ebrahim of treachery. This time the conflict 
was still in ·existence. 3 Sir John Malcolm positively attributes 
the discord to the proud-spirit of Barkhordar Khan, while the 
official historian is completely silent on this point. We can 
only give credance to the allegations made by Malcolm, if we 
judge Barkhordar Khan by the opinion expressed by the minis-
ter, Mirza Hose in, as mentioned above • . 
In any case, the royal seraglio was left to the charge of Mo~­
ammad <Ali Khan Zand Ishakaqasi bashi. Prior to the prince's 
departure, Harford ]ones, who had constant contact with Mirza 
Mohammad Hose in, the minister, and had a few audiences with 
Lot.f cAli Khin, observed that 
" the minister had become thoughtful & melancholy, 
often absenting himself from supping in public ..... 
Furthermore, he urged his guest to finish his business in the 
capital and leave it as soon as he could... This had perplexed 
1. H.P., Vol.2, p.180. 
2. D.K., p.cli. 
3. H.P., Vol.II, pp.180-1. 
4. D.K., p.cxl. 
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Harford Jones, as to why he had changed his manner. He was 
also aware of a change in the way Lotf cAli Khan treated 
his favourite tutor ( Laleh) and minister: "his majesty spoke 
but little to him". 1 It was after the coup had been executed 
that he discovered the cause of the minister's odd manner. Har-
ford J ones also noticed the secrecy, which surrounded his deal-
ings with the king's jeweller and the courtiers. This showed 
how little trust the king placed in his entourage. 
However, Lotf <Ali Khan, having finished his preparations, was 
ready to depart. "The summer was advancing, and with it the 
king's preparations for a campaign against the Kajars and Is-
fahan". 2 The Qajar army, with Baba Khan at its head, had 
taken up a strategic position and was stationed in the Gando-
man pastures, to protect the city of Esfahan from the attack 
of the Zand prince. The king left his capital on the 14th of 
August, 1791/14th Zel?ajjeh, 1205, while Baba Khan, on hearing 
of his departure, left his position at Gandoman and proceeded 
to Qomsheh, which had a citadel of some note. 
"Lootf Alee Khan halted within a short distance of 
the enemy, for the purpose of ascertaining whether 
it would be most advisable to attack Baba Khan, 
or to a void him, and proceed to his march to Is-
phanhan. "3 
It was in this place that the conspiracy of Haji and his assoc-
iates took place. The official historian asserts that the tribal 
warriors of Mafi and Nankoli nomads rushed towards the tent 
of Lotf <Ali Khan in an uproar, firing their guns in all direct-
ions. The intention of the conspirators was that the brother of 
of the Haji, (who was the commander of the infantry), should . 
capture the prince and put him to death... This was not 
1. D.K., p.cxl. 
2. Ibid., p.cxxxix. 
3. Waring, A Tour to Shiraz, p.291. 
4. D.K., p. cl. 
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effected, since everything did not go as smoothly as had been 
anticipated, partly because Lotf ~li Khan was alert and probab-
ly apprehensive of an event of that nature. It was also partly 
due to the confusion, which usually follows such incidents in 
a large camp. The EIC resident informs us of the event as 
follows: 
"Lutf Ali Khan having marched from Scherauz on the 
14th August with an army on an expedition against 
Isfahan, Hadjee Ibrahim Khan Beglarbegi of Fars 
who was left in Scherauz by Lutf Ali Khan rebelled 
on the 27th following; seized the city and confined 
Lutf Ali Khan's governor, in consequence of which 
event a commotion immediately took place in the 
army of so serious a nature as to force the Khan 
after making a feeble and fruitless attempt with 
a small remaining part of his army to intimidate 
Hadjee Ibrahim in to surrender to him of Scherauz, 
to seek safety in flight and with a few followers 
to claim the protection of Meer Ali Khan the govern-
or of Bundereeg. " 1 
This information seems to be confused. The best information 
that we have comes from Lotf cAli Khan himself, in an interview 
with Harford Jones, where he relates the events as follows: 
"the candles for the evening had scarcely been 
placed in my tent, before I heard a tumultous 
noise in the camp, which seemed to be gradually 
bearing towards my quarter. I was in the khelwat 
or private tent; and before any one could be 
aware, I was outside the Pardahs. " 2 
Lotf cAli Khan then relates that, on approaching the quarter 
from which the noise was coming, he met some of his loyal ad-
herents, who informed him that the mutineers had entered his 
tent and missed him. This is substantiated by the EIC resident 
who states: 
1. I.O.R., Bombay political and secret, Range E, Vol.5, 1792. 








"It is affirmed that the intentions of these conspirat-
ors who were in the camp r was 7 to assassinate 
Lutf Ali Khan, but that providentially he escaped 
the cruel fate intended him, by betaking himself 
timely to flight, and seeking an asylum with Meer 
Ali Khan at Bundereeg. " 1 
The Coup in Shiraz: 
We will give the account as stated by the prince himself later. 
First we will return to the city of Shiraz and try to establish 
the facts about the events taking place there. The most reli-
able source of our information is Harford Jones, who was actu-
ally in the capital at the time. He asserts that: 
"The king had left Shiraz about six days when an 
early morning I heard a noise of a multitude of 
people rushing along the streets; and very soon 
after my mehmandar, Hajy /Sic 7 Muhammad Aly, 
arrived and informed me that Hajy Ibrahim had 
seized Barkordar Khan, the governor of the fort-
ress, by orders, as he told the people, which he 
had received from the king. " 2 
The EIC resident, however, gives a more detailed account of 
the events. 
"Lutf Ali Khan had only left Sherauz a few days/ 
being advanced about half way to Ispahaun/ when 
the Hadjee Ibrahim the beglarbeg issued orders to 
have Barkhoudar Khan seized & confined pretend-
ing, having received intelligence from camp that 
a brother of Berkhoudar' s had committed some cap-
ital crime against the prince. This was only how-
ever to deceive the inhabitants , Berkhoudar Khan 
being therefore seized without any opposition, Had-
jee Ibrahim next gave orders for all the gates of 
the city to be secured giving out he had informat-
ion that Lutf Ali Khan was missing in camp & that 
the army was divided in three parties in fa vor of 
three Khans, who had set themselves up as compet-
itors for the government that such being the case 
he should not allow any one to enter the city until 
1 • .!..:. .Q.:_ .!!.:. , P I E I V • 5 , B u s h i r e 1 7 9 2 • 
2. D.K., p.cxiii. G. G. does not support this ~ccount and simply states that Haji 
Ebrahim had the kutval of the citadel (Barkhordar Khan) arrested and after fortifying 
the citadel {Qal'a) he informed his accomplices in the royal camp; p.344. 
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"it should appear which of the competitors would fin-
ally prevail." 1 
By securing the gates of the city, he firstly prevented any 
news from reaching the town, so that he could keep the people 
in ignorance, until he was well settled in his position. Also 
he prevented Lo:f cAli Khan 1 s friends from having communication 
with the camp. 
This plot seems to have worked to the complete satisfaction of 
the kalantar, as we are informed by Harford }ones that: 
"the mehmandar rhis host 7 had gone out to learn 
what he could -of what was passing; & when he 
returned he told me, 'the people are tolerably 
quiet, because as yet, they consider what has 
been done to have been done by the king 1 s ord-
er 1 ... 2 
~aji had insured his treacherous designs, by taking other mea-
sures. He had banished from the city, whoever was a potential 
threat to his rule. The EIC resident states that: 
"all those whom the beglarbeg had the smallest 
reason to suspect to be averse to his measures, he 
immediately turned out of Sherauz together with 
their families and in /articular those of the tribes 
termed as Lackerees sic 7, who are all attached 
to Lutf Ali Khan, himself-being of that tribe, of 
these alone the number amounts to ten or fifteen 
thousand. " 3 
This allegation is further substantiated by the accounts of Har-
ford Jones, which provide us with events within the capital. 
He relates: 
1. I.O.R., P/E/V.5, Bushire, 1792. 
2. D.K., p.cxlii. 

























"as the night closed in, I heard straggling shots 
in various parts of the city, & every now and 
then a thundering against the doors of my house 
with the bludgeon. This was replied to by the 
guard from the top of the house, sometimes by 
abuse, and sometimes by firing a musket in the 
air, to alarm the assailants. My mehmandar was 
a fine resolute old man, and a great humorist; 
and sometimes, on these occasions, went down him-
self to the door calling out: scoundrels, I tell 
you, the Fringee lives here, who has more fire 
arms in his house than you have hairs on your 
heads. Pena-ber khoda! if he should use them. 
When the morning came, it was known that some 
partial _instances of the plunder of private individ-
uals had taken place during the night; but that 
the greater part of the tumult we had heard had 
arisen from disarming and turning out of the city 
the few Lacks & Zands who had remained in it 
after the king's departure. " 1 
Apparently, Harford ]ones is mistaken as to the number of the 
Zands and Laks, who had been turned out of the city. We have 
information that the houses of ten thousand Laks, who inhabit-
ed Shiraz, were destroyed and they were actually seen by War-
ing in 1802. 2 
We now return to the king and relate the events, subsequent 
to the uproar in his camp. 
"My first idea was that we had suffered a night 
surprize from the Kajars & in this persuasion, pro-
ceeding on foot to that part where the noise of 
voices was loudest & of musketry the quickest, I 
found. myself in a crowd, in which I heard a voice 
calling out 'where is the king' this voice I soon 
recognised for that of Zal Khan rthe governor of 
Khesht 7 & I heard him say to a-person near 'the 
scoundrels have got in to the royal tent but they 
have missed their prize' , hearing this I said 
'what is the matter Zal Khan, are the Kajars 
come, is Mohammad the eunuch with them?' 'No 
please your majesty, Hajy Ibrahim has made him-
self master of Shiraz, the force under the command 
1. D.K., p.cxliii. 





"of his brother has mutinied & proceeded towards 
the royal tent to seize your Majesty & the camp 
has become a scene of plunder and confusion.' I 
then said 'let us try to get at our horses, let us 
draw aside a little out of the camp & wait there 
until morning breaks, when we shall distinguish 
friends from foes & so be better able to judge in 
what manner to act'. " 1 
In the darkness, Lotf cAli Khan and his small party fell in 
with some fellow, who tried to assassinate him, but the assass-
in was slain on the spot, which indicates that the conspirators 
were following the prince to kill him. The prince continued: 
"before we fell in with a small troop of horsemen, 
which, as we approached them, we heard talking 
of myself. One of them shortly after called out, 
'stop scoundrels! where is the king?' it was my 
master of the horse, and knowing his voice, I an-
swered, 'Ah, Haramzadeh! 2 here I am!' He immed-
iately threw himself at my feet; crying 'fly, fly! 
mount, mount! all is lost, except Keraun! /horse 7 
which he then brought forward. We then- mounted; 
and rode to a little distance from the camp wait-
ing there till the morning broke. The dawn en-
abled us to, discover that the army had dispersed; 
that several Feroshes were employed in packing up 
the royal tents, which I afterwards found much 
riddled with musket balls; and that there were 
stragglers, plundering where they could. "3 
Sir John Malcolm gives a totally different version of the events 
on that night. He maintains: 
"the moment the first shot was fired, loud shouts 
followed from every quarter of the camp, and bod-
ies of men began to move. The prince, equally 
astonished and enraged sent messenger after mess-
enger to enquire the cause of uproar. These at 
last returned & advised him to mount his horse & 
escape, as his own troops had become his enemies. 
1. D.K., p.clxxi. 
2. An expression co•monly used in Persia, although its meaning is not respectful. 































None of his principal officers would attend his sum-
mons: one chief alone and seventy men, continued 
with him. " 1 
Lotf cAli Khan does not indicate how many of his chiefs were in 
his party, but he affirms 
"I soon collected from 3 to 400 men about me; made 
with them a short march towards Shiraz; 2 and the 
next day I was joined by several corps of the 
army, and by La la & Mirza Bazurg. I then pro-
ceeded rapidly towards Shiraz; but on the way I 
was informed, by some fugitives, or rather exiles 
from the city, of Berkordar' s Jolly in visiting Hajy 
Ibrahim, by which egregious mistake he had gotten 
possession of the citadel as well as the city. I 
had been joined on the way by the camel guns and 
these I determined should announce to the citizens 
of Shiraz my arrival in its neighbourhood. I dare 
say you heard the report of them. "3 
The sentiments and the general attitude of the Shirazi populace 
have reached us through Harford Jones, who was present there. 
He asserts: 
"The anxiety of everybody to learn what had hap-
pened in the king's camp, when the news of Hajy 
Ibrahim's treachery reached it, became intense; 
and the best informed in the city soon appeared 
convinced, that though much tumult and confusion 
had taken place the king had escaped safe ..... 
The same source informs us of the reaction of the people in the 
city, when they heard of Lotf cAli Khan's arrival in the vicin-
ity of Shiraz. 
"I shall not easily forget the expression of joy 
1. H.P., p.182. (Ta•asp Khan Fylee). -- . 
2. G. G. supports part of this assertion, that Lotf cAli Khan was joinedby •any of 
troops who had been dispersed; p.344. T.Z., p.63. 
3. D.K., p.clxxiii. 
4. Ibid., p.cxliv. 
~. 
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"which ran through the city on hearing these guns; 
and yet there was no person left in it of sufficient 
consequence and courage to lead forth a band to 
seize the traitor. " 1 
Harford ]ones is right. There was indeed nobody who could mob-
ilize the citizens to make a major effort and overthrow the 
Haji. Moreover, Lo~f cAli Khan's expectations of receiving assist-
ance from within the city were baseless. In fact one cannot 
easily explain the hope he had of regaining his lost throne, 
while he himself, by taking all persons of military and civil 
rank on his expedition, had emptied it of consequential per-
sons. 2 
"I was for some time, in daily hopes that my 
friends within the walls would assist in opening 
me a way into the city; little knowing how care-
fully Hajy Ibrahim had contrived to deprive them 
of all means of doing so. "3 
The irony is that, once the government of ~aji was in a vulner-
able position, a lot could be done within the walls of the city. 
All Lotf cAli Khan's friends were outside it and, while the !faji 
had made his grip t~ghter by disarming and expelling the tri-
bal warriors from Shiraz, the influential adherents of Lotf c Ali 
Khan had returned to the city. 
Lotf cAli Khan encamped at a distance of one farsang from the 
city at Masjed Bardi and immediately laid siege to Shiraz... He 
had been joined by many of his chiefs, who had dispersed 
after the event of the mutiny, 5 but he was in no position to 
make a decisive attack on the city. Indeed, he himself admit-
ted that the siege had no major effect. 
1. D.K., p.cxliv. 
2. G.G., p.343. 
3. D.K., p.clxxiii. 
4. Ibid. G.G., p.344. 
5. G.G., p.345. T.Z., p.63. 
$ ., 
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"Although I began to straiten the city in provis-
ions, it was not to such extent as to produce a 
serious impression. " 1 
It was at this time that ~aji Ebrahim started writing letters 
to the chiefs in his party, threatening them with the usual men-
ace of putting pressure on their families and property in the 
city. Should they persist in serving Lotf cAli Khan, he would . 
inflict atrocities on them. At the same time, he promised them 
his bounty and kindness, should they desert Lotf cAli Khan and 
return to the city. 2 
Giti Goshay bitterly condemns these chiefs, whose cowardice and 
selfishness induced them to respond to the ~aji' s entreaty. 3 But 
Lotf cAli Khan was, on the contrary, understanding and com-
posed, when he related the events to Harford ]ones. 
"They brought these letters to me; and candidly 
said, as it did not appear we were likely to re-
gain the city at present, they could not think 9f 
subjecting their wives and children to the harsh 
& cruel treatment threatened by Hajy Ibrahim; at 
the same time declaring, that should an opportun-
ity offer, they would serve me as faithfully as 
ever: and La la and Mirza Bazurg refused to return 
into the city, until I absolutely forced them to 
leave me ..... 
Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh has another explanation for the chiefs leav-
their master. "They were all city dwellers and for the past 
thirty or forty years had acquired wealth & purchased property 
in the city". As the author puts it, "they had grown roots in 
the soil of the city". 5 At all events, Lo!f cAli Khan was desert-
ed after two days by almost all of his party. After much hesit-
1. D.K., p. clxxiii. 
2. G.G., pp.344-5. T.Z., p.64. 
3. G.G., p.345. 
4. D.K., pp.clxxiii-clxxiv. 
5. T.Z., p.77. 
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ation, the chiefs entered the city on the 4th of the month of 
Moharram 1206/3rd September, 1791. 1 
There remained with Lotf 'Ali Khan, about twelve of his serv-
ants and horsemen who had no home in the capital. 2 Of his 
military chiefs, only the governor of Khesht, Zal Khan, who 
was his faithful adherent, remained with him till the end, to-
gether with his uncle, Mohammad Khan Zand. 3 According to Tar-
e • -
ikh-e-Zandiyeh, Lotf Ali Khan arrived at the outskirts of Shir-
az on the 2nd of Moharram 1206/lst September, 1791. He was 
forced to leave his position on the 4th of that month, while the 
brothers of the Haji and the rest of the mutineers arrived at . 
Shiraz on the 5th... We have no way of assessing the truth of 
this information, except by the account given by the EIC resi-
dent in Bushehr, 
"the king arrived at that place rBandar Reeg 7 the 
lOth. Sept. accompanied only by -his second meerza 
& a few attendants, after undergoing infinite fat-
igue & running the most imminant danger of fall.-
ing in to the hands of his enemies who were every 
where in pursuit of him. " 5 
The most ingenious aspect of Haji' s ploy to secure his position . 
was the method he employed for the disarmament and expulsion 
of the tribal warriors from the city. Giti Goshay gives a de-
tailed account of the atrocities that the Haji committed towards . 
the citizens of Shiraz, but he is quiet about the method used. 
Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh states that the ~aji, fearing that the tribes 
might rise in revolt in favour of the prince, judging by the 
previous incident, which had resulted in the overthrow of Seid 
1. T.Z., p.64. 
2. Ibid., p. 65. 
3. G.G., p.345. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 1792. 
4. T.Z., p.65. 
5. I.O.R. P/E/75, 1792. 
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Morad Khan, decided to turn out of the city all the tribal ele-
ments.1 The author does not, however, elaborate as to how the 
measure was effected. The only source, which gives a full 
account of this event, is Malcolm in his history of Persia. The 
plan, as it is given by the above-mentioned source, was incred-
ibly well executed and astonishingly effective. To quote Mal-
colm, 
"He took his measure with a precaution & promptit-
ude which eluded all suspicion. Having given 
orders to secure the streets which communicated by 
a back road from the place of his residence to the 
gateway of the city, he sent notice to the military 
tribes to be ready at an appointed time, to receive 
a donation which he meant to give them. They ass-
embled as directed, and one hundred were admitted 
at a time into the interior court of his mansion. 
From the height of the walls which surrounded it, 
those who were without could know nothing of what 
was passing within. The first party admitted found 
themselves surrounded, but were told no injury 
was intended to them if they resigned their arms; 
which they did: and while these were given to cit-
izens, to increase the corps upon whom Hajee I bra-
him could depend, the unarmed soldiers were con-
ducted, by the back road before mentioned, beyond 
the gates of the town."2 
The account given by Malcolm throws light on two interesting 
points. Firstly, the Haji had actually promised the troops in . 
the party of the prince, that he would give donations to them 
if they deserted their master. In other words, he had bribed 
them to do so. This is supported by the assertions of Tarikh-
e-Zandiyeh, to the effect that Haji had bribed a large number 
of the citizens to gain their favour. For instance, he had giv-
en large sums of money to the musketeers in charge of the for-
tress. Any of the tribal warriors, who bowed to his rule, were 
given ample reward after having made sure of their fidelity. 3 
1. T.Z., p.67. 
2. H.P., Vol.2, p.188. 




Secondly, the Haji had taken up his residence in the palace or 
Divan Khaneh. This is asserted by Harford ]ones, who writes: 
"I found him surrounded with guards & officers, 
pretty much in the same style as the king, sitting 
on the same nummud, and in the same part of the 
Hall of Audience as the king, and affecting the 
same state. " 1 
This signifies the fact that the ambitious Haji wished to usurp 
the place of his master rather than replace him with another, 
a Qajar. 
The plans adopted by the Haji were extremely well-calculated, 
allowing for no-one to venture a conspiracy against him. For 
example, he gave over the houses and the property of the trib-
al elements, who had been expelled from the city, to the magis-
trates and superintendants of the districts surrounding the 
city. 2 This measure had a double purpose. Firstly, it would 
bring these local notables into the sphere of Haji' s control, 
should they decide to side with Lotf cAli Khan, and it would 
also gain their support for the Haji in response to his generos-. 
ity. 
~aji Ebrahim, then, set about mulctin~ and exacting money 
from the Zand nobles and, in this act, he went so far as to 
make many of them penny-less. Giti Goshay is probably the 
most appropriate source to depict his atrocities. 
"He extorted immense amount of precious stones, hor-
ses, bridles, & articles of luxury, to an extent 
that those who would be clad in the best silk 
dresses were in need of the coarsest clothing, 
those who slept on the finest satins were in need 
of a mat to lie on. "3 
1. D.K., p.cxlvi. 
2. G. G. , p. 34 7. 
3. Ibid. 
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At all events, Haji amassed great wealth which enabled him to 
arm and equip the notorious lutis (Alvat va Oubash 1 ), that is, 
the rabble in the city, as the city militia. This event requires 
particular emphasis, since one major aspect of our study is to 
prove the role these elements played in the city life of Persia 
at that time, and how they participated in every riot and up-
rising, which occurred in the cities. 
At this point, we return to the events which concern Lotf cAli 
Khan and his misfortunes. While Lotf cAli Khan was on his way 
to the coastal areas, Reza Qoli Kha·n- Kazeruni, cAli Qoli Khan's . 
brother and one of the major figures in the conspiracy, found 
out Lotf <Ali Khan's situation and, knowing that he had few ad-
herents, tried to halt his progress and even to capture him. 2 
This was, however, futile, as he escaped the attempt with mira-
culous courage. The account of the incident has reached us 
from Lotf 'Ali Khan himself: 
"When the camp broke up, my intention was to pro-
ceed to Bush ire, to pass a part of the winter 
there, and obtain what assistance I could from 
Shaikh Nassir. At each rahedaree rsic 7 myself and 
my servants had to fight through them, until we 
arrived in the plain of Kazeroon. Raza Kuli Khan, 
the governor, had pledged himself to Hajy Ibrahim 
either to capture or kill me; so that almost as 
soon as we were fairly got into the plain, we had 
a pretty smart affair with the Kazeroonees; & it 
would have been much more serious, had not Raza 
Kuli Khan been a famous coward. We were about 
20, they were about 4 to 500; however to their 
great astonishment, instead of flying along the 
direct road, out of the plain of Kazeroon, where 
an ambush had been placed, we took a course dir-
ect for the abrupt and precipitous mountains with 
the plain to the eastward & southward. When we 
came to the foot of these, we were rather appalled 
at seeing nothing but perpendicular precipices be-
fore us; & I said , aie Bacheehees (i.e. Aye child-
ren) we must turn round and fight it out. Before 
our enemies, however, came up with us, we 
1. G.G., p.347. 
2. Ibid., p.345. T.Z., pp.65-66. 
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"discovered the path of a shotter /Sic 7; & dismount-
ing, after stripping them of their -nummuds, left 
all the horses behind us at the bottom of the moun-
tain, except Keraun." 1 
Giti Goshay gives an exaggerated account of this incident. It 
states that the number of the Kazerunis, who were pursuing 
c -Lotf Ali Khan, was above a thousand musketeers and horsemen. 
The king assailed them and killed many of them, but their sup-
erior number forced him to take shelter in the mountains. In 
the meantime, the riflemen of Khesht arrived and rescued him, 2 
where as Lotf cAli Khan himself asserts that, 
"the Kazeroonees had not the courage to follow us 
on foot, & on horse back they had not the power: 
however, they took possession of 30 beautiful hor-
ses. After incredible fatigue, we got down into 
Dushtistan. Zal Khan, whilst I was encamped in 
the neighbourhood of Shirauz, had, by my desire, 
gone to his own government of Khest: as soon as 
he heard of my escape from the affray at Kazer-
oon, he sent men & horses to meet me; & with them 
I preceeded, where, as I told you before, I had 
hoped to find assistance. " 3 
The account given here bears evidence to the fact that Lotf cAli 
Khan had no information as to the involvement of the shaikh 
of Bushehr in the conspiracy. He was hopeful that the Shaikh, 
as he had done on a previous occasion, would assist him in 
his regaining the throne. The reason why the Shaikh turned 
away from Lo~f <Ali Khan is not known, although the EIC resi-
dent assures us that: 
"the Shaikh has done & is doing every thing in his 
power to thwart the Khan. It is conjectured he was 
privy to the conspiracy I having been at Sherauz 
just before the army marched and his conduct 
seems but too well to indicate the truth of such 
supposition - He publickly avows his allegiance to 
1. D.K., pp.clxxiv-v. T.Z., p.66. 
2. G.G., pp.345-6. 
3. D.K., p.clxxv. 
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"the usurper. '~Haji Ebrahim 7 1 
This statement completely dismisses what ] . Malcolm alleges in 
a private correspondence. Malcolm writes: 
"Lutf Ali Khan when his father was murdered sought 
Shaikh Nassir' s protection which was readily grant-
ed. The old man, however, died before he could 
fulfill his promises to the young prince. Leaving 
his govt. to his eldest son the present Shaikh 
Nasr, who following the intentions of his father 
marched immediately to Shirauz with Lutf Ali Khan 
whom in fact he seated on the throne, being soon 
disgusted with the violent proceedings of the 
prince he had so essentially served, which in one 
instance in particu~ar was highly insulting to him-
self he quited Shirauz & returned to Abushehr. " 2 
This allegation seems to be unfounded, as Malcolm tries despar-
ately to find a good excuse for Haji Ebrahim and his accom-
plices' conduct. However, it is t~ue that Lotf cAli Khan was 
placed on the throne by the assistance of Shaikh Naser, and his . 
downfall was the result of his failure to see that friends could 
turn into enemies. The resident of the company assures us that 
the Shaikh was in Shiraz before the king left it, therefore, 
there is no possibility of Lo~f cAli Khan's having insulted the 
Shaikh and not suspecting averse sentiments. That is exactly 
why he still hoped to find him hospitable and helpful. 
There is another point which is worth mentioning here, as it 
is curiously illogical and inexplicable: namely, that the warn-
ing about the conspiracy, which Mirza Mohammad Hosein gave 
to his master, was totally overlooked by Lotf.cAli Kha~. The min-
ister relates his endeavours to put Lotf cAii Khan on his guard 
in this manner: 
1. I.O.R., P/E/V.5, Bushire, June 1792. By then Aqa Moha11ad Khan had not appeared 
on the scene. 
2. Correspondence of J. Malcol1, B.L. add.13.707. 1800. 
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"I went to my knees to him, to seize Hajy Ibrahim 
without delay; but his high courage led him to 
slight my representation as well as the treachery. " 1 
The minister also informed Lotf cAli Khan of the involvement of . 
the Shaikh of Bushehr in the plot, that is, if he told him ex-
actly what he told Harford Jones: 
11 There has been for some time past a confederacy 
formed between Hajy Ibrahim, his brother2 & sever-
al chiefs of Dust is tan & germaseer /Sic 7, particul-
arly Raza Kuli Khan Kazeroonee & - shaikh Nassir; 
the general purport of which is, to get rid of the 
king & then form amongst themselves a federative 
government, to which the Khan of Kerman, & 
others, should be invited to accede. " 3 
The assertion of the minister is supported by Lotf cAli Khan him-
self, who asserts that, 
"before I marched towards Isfahan, Mirza Husain 
disclosed to me, in a manner I could not doubt, 
the designs of Hajy Ibrahim: he repeatedly begged 
of me to take measures for my own security: he 
pushed this so far, as to displease me: I neglect-
ed his advice; and at this moment the neglect of 
it has cost me the throne." .. 
He attributes the whole event to his ill fate, but the reality 
might be, that he did not think much of the advice he received 
from his minister, or else he did not think very much of the 
kalantar and his capacity. His self-confidence and the pride 
which he is believed to have had, to which even his court his-
torian5 alludes, prevented him from averting such a deplorable 
calamity. 
1. D.K., p.cli. 
2. Abdal-Rahim Khan. 
3. D.K., p.cl. 
4. Ibid., pp.clxvi-vii. 
5. G.G., p.327. 
I 
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However, it appears that Lotf cAli Khan was not hostile to the 
Shaikh of Bushehr, despite the fact that this Shaikh had done 
everything to harm him. He expressed his sentiments towards 
the Shaikh in conversation with Harford }ones, 
"the old cow at Bushire (i.e. Shaikh Naser) was 
very near falling the other day' into my hands: 
if he had, I should have done him no harm; nor 
could I have forgotten the important service he 
once rendered me: but I should have said to him, 
'Ai Ahmik! r sic 7 cannot you distinguish between 
the son of a-king- and the son of a Bekaul ?" /Sic 71 
Lotf cAli Khan treated the conspiracy too lightly; he regarded 
the conspirators with contempt, which was a feeling prevalent 
amongst the tribal element towards the city populace at the 
time and even much later, in the late 19th. century. This was 
his fatal mistake. 
As the plot and its motivations are worthy of further discussion 
we shall study the elements involved in a later chapter. 




LOTF cALl KHAN IN THE SOUTH 
In the previous section we left Lotf cAli Khan in the plain of 
Khesht, where he was joined by Mi; cAli Khan, a galant horse-
man and a faithful servant of his. 
za Mohammad Hose in, his minister, 
recruiting soldiers in the south. 
As we are informed by Mir-
e -Lotf Ali Khan had set about 
"As the king is now out of their power, & is coll-
ecting a force in the Dushtistan, Hajy Ibrahim has 
despatched persons to Aga Muhammad Khan, to 
assure him that he seized on Shiraz for the sole 
purpose of delivering it to him; and charged these 
persons with letters filled with lies & calumnies 
against his late noble & Royal master." 1 
This was indeed the case, as Haji had never anticipated Lo!f 
c Ali Khan's being able to resist the attacks on him by the 
Kazerunis. He had therefore decided that the only power to stop 
his gaining power would be the Qaj ars. Mirza Mohammad Hosein 
goes on to say: 
"thus the scoundrel, balked in his plan of mad am-
bition, will, unless the king finds means to pre-
vent it, deliver the wives and families of the in-
habitants of Shiraz into the hands of their bitter-
est enemies, Kaj ars. " 2 
The minister was, however, wrong in his predictions, as the 
Haji had no intention of handing Shiraz on to the Qajars, un-
less he was absolutely forced to do so, as it is rightly 
1. D.K., preliminary matters, p.cl. 
2. Ibid., p.cli. 
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observed by Harford }ones. 1 
Aqa Mohammad Khan was well aware of this fact. In an inter-
view which he had with the I:Iaji, when he had taken possess-
ion of Shiraz, he affirms that he had known the design of the 
traitor Haji all along. This interview has reached us through 
the author of Rouzat-al-Safa, who states that Haji Ebrahim had 
related to someone the a~thorJ knew that: '/... 
"one evening after having been dismissed from the 
court Aqa Mol).ammad Khan sent for me. I was great-
ly alarmed at the unexpected summons and on the 
way thither except for one of my old servants no-
one had remained with me. As I entered his hall 
of audience and calmed down, Aqa MoQ.ammad Khan 
addressed me & said, 'I have a question to ask 
you, to see whether I have been right or wrong 
in my opinion'. I said that whatever he wished to 
ask me would be answered with honesty and truth. 
The Eunuch asked, 'when you revolted against the 
Zand prince and your brother dispersed his troops, 
you refused to let him into the capital and forced 
him to proceed to the coast areas. He was deter-
mined to capture Shiraz & destroy you. You feared 
him and devised a means of engaging us both in 
a combat so that you would be safe in the city 
and would rule there without the interference of 
either of us. Is this true or not?' I said that it 
was true. " 2 
Although the source of this information was written at a much 
later date, yet there is every reason to give credence to it. 
Giti Goshay asserts that in the original scheme devised by ljaji 
and his accomplices, he intended to be independent of any gov-
ernment and rule in Fars. 3 This is supported by Harford }ones, 
who asserts that the I:Iaji would not let the Qajars into Shiraz 
unless he was forced to. Thus Malcolm is proved wrong in his 
assertion about the J:laji' s intentions. 
1. D.K., p.cli. 
2. Rozatal-Safa, Vol.9, no pagination. 
3. G.G., pp.343 and 352. 
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At any event, Lo!f cAli Khan stayed a short while in the small 
town of Khesht, where he received Harford }ones in a humble 
tent. 1 Lotf ~ li Khan, who was anxious to find out a bout the 
events in the capital and what his prospects were of regaining 
the throne, had a most interesting interview with Harford 
}ones. Lotf cAli Khan began the interview with an account of 
the events, which had occurred since he left the outskirts of 
Shiraz. 
"the day before yesterday I ascended to Khesht, 
after g_iving the Dushtistanees a good thrashing. 
Zal Khan and I are now collecting a force, where 
with to return to Shiraz; and Raza Kuly Khan has 
placed troops in the Teng-e-Turkoon 'but maash-
alla'! Here his majesty abruptly stopped; & I told 
him what had happened to us in the Teng-e-Turk-
oon, & also that I had not seen any troops at 
Kazeroon. "2 
This alleged absence of troops in the town of Kaze.run encour-
aged Lotf <Ali Khan to make an attack on that place. 
The Haji, in the meantime, had gathered troops in order to 
• c - -stop the progress of Lotf Ali Khan's forces towards Shiraz. He 
had placed Reza Qoli Khan-e-Shahsavan at the head of the 
force, . which consisted of 3000 men. 3 This force proceeded to-
wards the village of Boraz)an, a dependency of the district of 
Dashtestan. Shaikh Naser, the governor of Bushehr, who had 
informed the governme~t of Shiraz of Lo:f cAli Khan's arrival 
in the district of Khesht, had also collected a force of about 
4000 men. He had further fortified the town of Bushehr and was 
waiting for assistance from Shiraz.,. 
1. D.K., preliminary •atters, p.clxxvi. 
2. Ibid., p.clxxx. 
3. G.G., p.348. 
4. T.Z., p.68. 
--
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The Shaikh learnt of the advance of the army sent out from the 
capital and joined it, leaving his government to his deputy. 
Lotf 'Ali Khan had no more than 3000 men, which included the . 
tribes who had been expelled from Shiraz and had been settled . 
in the district around it under the supervision of the Zabe! of 
those areas. These tribal warriors, although disarmed and de-
prived of their means of resistance, had left their stations to 
join the army of the Zands. 1 One of the distinguished Zand gen-
erals, with his adherents numbering about seventy men, es-
caped from Shiraz and also joined Lo~f, cAli Khan. 2 This event 
is significant, in that it means that the notables of the Zand 
tribe had not been imprisoned; they were at large, but rather 
unable to take action against the Haji unless they risked their 
lives. 
Giti Gosh ay relates that Lotf cAli Khan, before setting off for 
his expedition, summoned his troops, who being aware of their 
small number and the greatness of the opposite forces were 
apprehensive of the outcome. In his attempt to boost their mor-
ale, he encouraged them in their endeavours, stating that suc-
cess did not always depend on the number of troops but, 
rather, on the zeal and courage of the men. 3 He set off for an 
engagement with the opposing army. Mir cAli Khan, who had 
joined him while halting at Khesht, was also in his company.,. 
The sources are at variance as to the place and time that the 
governor of Bandar-e-Rig joined Lotf c Ali Khan's party. Giti 
Goshay states that Lotf 'Ali Khan actually went as far as the 
port of Rig, where the governor set about serving his master. 5 
This is, however, refuted by the account given by the prince 
1. G.G., p.348. 
2. Ibid. 
3. T.Z., p.68. 
4. G.G., p.348. 
5. Ibid., p.346. 
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himself, who asserts that he "was soon joined by that brave 
fellow Mihr Aly Khan, from Bendereeg" . 1 This must have happen-
ed before Lo~f 'Ali Khan descended to the plain of Khesht, as 
in a previous interview he had asked Harford ]ones: 
"are you acquainted with Mihr Ali Khan Bender Ree-
gee? I said yes; I had known him for long; & that 
after I left his majesty, I designed to embark from 
Bender Reeg for Bussorah, as the khan had prom-
ised to let me have one of his dows for that pur-
pose. 'By God' (i.e. Wullah) said the king, 'he 
is a glorious suvar (horseman). It would have 
done your heart good to have seen him the other 
day, spitting on his spear, those pigs of fellows 
the Dushtistanees' • " 2 
Thus, the governor of Rig must have joined Lotf Ali Khan on 
his way down south. Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh appears to be mistaken 
in saying that Lotf cAli Khan actually went to Bushehr, but was . 
denied entry by the Shaikh. 3 The mistake must have been 
caused by Lotf cAli Khan's intention to go to that place, as he . 
related himself: 
"When the camp broke up, my intention was to pro-
ceed to Bus hire, to pass a part of the winter 
there, and obtain what assistance I could from 
Shaikh Nassir. " .. 
He was soon disillusioned about the prospect of the Shaikh 's 
giving him assistance. When he was assailed by the Kazerunis, 
he learnt that the Shaikh had pledged himself to the Haji. He 
states: 
"Shaikh Nassir, who had come ont to make me cap-
1. D.K., preliminary matters, p.clxxv. 
2. Ibid., p.clxx. 
3. T.Z., p.66. 
4. D.K., p.clxxiv. 
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"tive, was glad to escape with his life." 1 
The Battle of Kazerun: 
In late October 1791/Rabic I 1206, Lotf cAli Khan advanced to-
wards Kazerun, where a battle ensued between him and the 
forces of Shiraz and the Kazerunis. He fought with great resil-
ience and gallantry, especially when 200 of the tribal warriors 
of the cAbdolmaleki nomads defected from the army of the Shiraz-
is and joined him. He forced the the Shiraz army to disperse, 
with the soldiers taking the road to Shiraz. 2 Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh 
states that I:Iaji Ebrahim was not satisfied with the army, 
which had been sent out of Shiraz. Thus, he despatched anoth-
er body of infantry to reinforce the calvalry, at the head of 
which he placed two local chiefs, Ra 'is Qasem KhanKuhmarre' i 
and Lotf <Ali Khan Firuzabadi. His aim was to uproot the forces . 
of the Zand prince before he gained more power. 3 
It appears that the reinforcement was meant to assist the 
Shaikh of Bushehr. The a hove-mentioned source asserts that, be-
e -fore this force reached the port of Bushehr, Lotf Ali Khan came . 
out to meet it. As a result of a fierce battle, the tribal caval-
r 
ry joined the opposing army and Reza Qoli Khan Shahsavan 
fled to Kazerun, while the Shaikh of Bushehr took refuge in his 
own governorate. The chiefs, who were in charge of the infan-
try, also entered the town of Kazerun, where a great force was 
assembled. The news of the defeat greatly alarmed the Haji, 
who had not anticipated that Lotf cAli Khan would be able to . 
emerge victorious from such an unbalanced combat ... 
Haji Ebrahim summoned his associates to the palace. These the . 
1. D.K., pp.clxxv-clxxvi. 
2. G.G., p.349. T.Z., p.68. 
3. G.G., p.349. T.Z., p.69. 
4. G.G., p.350. 
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official historian calls the leaders of the lutis (Saran-e-Alvat). 
The ljaji presented them with the outcome of the battle, stating 
"when we attempted the coup we had planned for 
Lotf <Ali Khan to be put to death or else be forced 
to flee to India or Ottoman Turkey. But since all 
our predictions have proved wrong he is alive and 
determined to destroy us. What are we to do and 
how are we to get rid of him?" 1 
He then went on to say: 
"There is only one way that Lotf <Ali Khan can be 
eliminated from . the scene and that is with the 
assistance of the Qaj ar chief who is a most power-
ful man. " 2 
From the account given_ by Giti Goshay it appears that, even 
at this stage, Haji was hoping that, by sending presents to Aqa 
Mohammad Khan and giving the royal household and seraglio . 
to him, he could be left alone to rule Shiraz undisturbed. 3 His 
designs, however, proved naive, as the Qajar chief was after 
supreme power in the empire. 
The conspirators, namely: the associates of the Haji, terrified 
as they were, agreed to write to the Qajar chief. The Haji 
wrote a letter to Aqa Mo~ammad Khan, stating that the notables 
who had betrayed the Zand cause were all ready to obey his 
commands. He begged pardon for his past conduct and be-
seeched him not to demand hostages of the citizens of Shiraz, 
stating at the same time, that the city populace were prepared 
to pay any amount of tribute required of them. In the letter, 
he asked the Qaj ar chief to send a body of force to ward off 
the Zand prince... He despatched a messenger with 2000 of the 
1. G.G., p.352. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., pp.352-3. 
4. Ibid. 
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best horses bred in the Zand's herd. 
The envoy reached Aqa Mohammad Khan, when he was encamped 
at Khamseh. Although he was well aware that the gallant ex-
ploits of Lotf 'Ali Khan had forced the Haji to request assist-. . 
ance, Aqa Mohammad Khan issued decrees, to the effect that he . 
acknowledged the ~aji as the Beglarbegi of the province, and 
bestowed upon him the title of Khan. He despatched three of 
his trusted courtiers, at the same time, to take possession of 
the royal household and seraglio and transfer them to the pro-
vince of Mazandaran. 1 Baba Khan, the nephew of the Qajar 
chief, (later to become Fath cAli Shah), was commissioned to de-
ploy 4000 of his troops to advance towards Shiraz, under the 
command of Mo:~afa Khan Qajar. His orders were carried out by 
Baba Khan. Thus, the troops proceeded to Shiraz, but were or-
dered to halt at .Ahadeh until their services were required by 
the ~aji. 2 
There is great confusion in the sources, as to the order of the 
events~· For instance, Giti Gosh ay places the letter written to 
Aqa Mohammad Khan after the defeat suffered by the joint for-
ces of Shirazis. Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh, on the other hand, states 
that it was previous to that. Mirza Mo~ammad Hosein also 
states that the l}aji had written to the Qajar chief before Har-
ford Jones left Shiraz, which had taken place by the end of 
October 3 1791/ Safar 1206. 
At any event, the l}aji seems to have requested assistance on 
a few occasions. Lo~f cAli Khan, after having gained victory on 
that occasion, returned to the south and apparently went to the 
port of Rig, as we are informed by the EIC resident there, who 
states: 
1. T.M., Ms n.p. G.G., p.352-3. 
2. G.G., p.353. 
3. D.K., p.clii. 
I 
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"Lutf cAli Khan was soon joined at Bundereeg by a 
considerable number of his adherents and with the 
assistance of Meer Ali Khan was enabled to take 
the field in November & proceed towards Scherauz 
to chastize his turbulent and rebellious subjects, 
having first encountered a body of two to three 
thousand men in Dashtistaun, under Shaikh Nassir 
who had the temerity to think of preventing his 
progress up the mountains & completely routed the 
whole & disarmed the greater part. He left Meer 
Ali Khan & pushed on with his own men to Khisht, 
governed by Zal Khan who had encouraged him to 
advance without loss of time. " 1 
The resident seems to have mixed the order of the events, too, 
or perhaps, after all, Lotf cAli Khan had gone to Bandar Rig. 
The EIC resident further states: 
"From hence by this Khan's /Zal Khan 7 means he 
proceeded immediately to the important city of Kauz-
eroon, which he obtained possession of, & levied 
a large contribution from the inhabitants, in re-
venge for their disaffection to him. " 2 
The resident of the company in fact is the only source, who in-
forms us as to the strength of his troops: 
"Luft Ali Khan's army had by this time increased 
to a very respectable force, and he was enabled 
here to give battle to an army of four thousand 
men sent against him from Scherauz and to obtain 
a complete victory over them. "3 
As the resident informs us, Lotf cAli Khan on this occasion was 





"take several Khans prisoner, and amongst them 
Riza Kouli Khan the governor of Kauzeroon who was 
a principal actor in the former revolution and his 
son both of whom he deprived of their eyesight." .. 
I • 0. R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, lOth June, 1792. ------
I bid. -----
I bid. -----
I bid. ----- ~.:. ~.:. ' p • 3 5 4 • .!..:. ~.:. ' p p • 6 9 - 7 0 • 
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Re~a Qoli Khan, however, managed to escape the death penalty, 
which he deserved. We hear of him during the reign of Fath 
'Ali Shah, being still the governor of Kazerun and not altogeth-
er discontented. Sir John Malcolm, who was in Persia in 1800, 
states that: 
"Riza Kooli Khan, the governor of Kazeroon came to 
pay the Elchee (envoy) a visit. This old nobleman 
had a silk band over his eye-sockets, having had 
his eyes put out during the contest between the 
Zand and the Kajir families for the throne of Per-
sia. " 1 
Malcolm then relates the account given to him by the governor 
himself as 
1
" I had been too active a partisan 1 , said Riza 
Kooli Khan, 1 of the Kajir (sic) family, to expect 
much mercy when I fell into the hands of the ras-
cally tribe of Zand. I looked for death, and was 
rather surprised at the lenity which only condemn-
ed me to lose my eyes 1 • " 2 
The Qajars, however, rewarded him for his support in the con-
tentions and we learn· from him: 
"I was rewarded for my suffering in their cause. 
All my sons have been promoted, and I am the gov-
ernor of this town and province. Here I am in 
affluence, and enjoying a repose, to which men 
who can see are in this country perfect strang-
ers. "3 
He, unlike his close associate,\ HaJi Ebrahim, was not harassed 
...... 
by the very family he elevated to power, presumably due to 
the fact that he was in so remote a province that he did not 
come into close contact with the royal family. 
1. Malcol1, John, Sketches of Persia, Vol.!, p.90. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p.92. 
i ,, 
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After the decisive success in Kazerun, Lotf cAli Khan's prospects 
for an attack on the capital increased, his troops had more con-
fidence in him and in their own abilities to gain a decisive 
victory. The EIC resident is so optimistic as to state: 
"although we have not yet had the satisfaction to 
receive intelligence of that desirable event, we 
have reason to suppose that the Khan may already 
have regained possession of Scherauz, as he has 
had the good fortune to gain complete victories 
over such of his enemies as have dared to oppose 
him' in the field. " 1 
The capture of the city was highly probable as Lo~f cAli Khan 
had laid siege to the city. He stationed his troops in the vill-
age of Javim at first and then advanced to a place known as 
Masjed-e-Bardi in the vicinity of Shiraz. 2 The news of his ad-
vance terrified the Haji, who set about fortifying the citadel . 
as best he could. He appointed his close relations in charge 
of the gates and towers. He further serviced the canons in the 
citadel and placed them in strategic positions. 3 
In the course of the few days that Lotf cAli Khan was stationed . 
there, the tribal warriors, who had been expelled from the city 
and were wandering around in search of employment, joined his 
camp. The overwhelming number of these warriors compelled 
the prince to find a safe refuge for their families.,. He there 
fore chose the citadel of Zarqan for that purpose and ordered 
c 
his troops to lift up the siege and on early Rabi I I, 1206 pro-
ceeded there. 5 The inhabitants of Zarqan refused entry to him, 
so he took it by storm. He stayed there for some days, while 
he fortified it and then prepared to return to his former posit-
1. I.O.R. P/E/V.S, Bushire, 1972, pp.227-8. 
2. G.G., pp.354-5. 
3. Ibid., p.355. 
4. T. z. t p. 70. 






ion. Haji Ebrahim sent one of his confidential servants to . 
bring the Qajar army into the city. Mostafa Khan marched to-
wards the city and encamped on the outskirts. 1 
Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh relates the following event, which is not men-
tioned in other sources. When Lotf cAli Khan was moving to-
wards the citadel of Zarqan by night, the Haji despatched two . 
of his chiefs, Hadi Khan Brujerdi and Baqer Khan Gallehdari, 
to make a surprise attack on the Zand prince. 2 Lotf cAli Khan 
was informed of the plot and he assailed them. As a result of 
this, one of the chiefs, Hadi Khan, was killed and their army 
dispersed with many of them captured and the rest fled to 
Shiraz. 3 
Giti Goshay differs with the above-mentioned source, in that it 
states that the Haji sent the two chiefs to assist the Zarqani . 
people. While the citadel was taken by the Zand prince, they 
encamped at a nearby place, where they were attacked by Lotf 
<Ali Khan and dispersed ... 
Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh asserts that during this time, Lotf cAli Khan 
had acquired great fame for his courage and gallantry. He had 
reduced many districts to submission and had gained the supp-
ort of others, while his enemies had been set atremble at the 
mention of his name. 5 He returned to his former station and 
laid siege to the capital again. He blocked all the roads and 
prevented the city from receiving provisions. At this stage he 
sent a message to the Haji, urging him to abandon his rebell-. 
ious actions. If he did so, he would be pardoned. He stated 
that the innocent people were the ones who would suffer most 
1. T.Z., p.70. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., pp.70-l. 
4. G.G., p.356. 
5. T.Z., p.71. 
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because of the siege. The lives of so many would be saved, if 
he either agreed to obey his master, or else agreed to send the 
families and the household of the Zand nobles out of the city. 
If the ~aji complied with this request, Lo~f cAli Khan agreed to 
depart and seek residence in some other quarters. 1 Lotf cAli Khan 
also stated in his message: 
"my ancestors & father tried their best to adorn 
and beautify the city of Shiraz in the hope that 
the inhabitants would be grateful and repay their 
efforts by their allegiance but alas they were 
wrong in their expectations. " 2 
The ~aji remained deaf to these proposals, thus leaving no 
option except to continue the siege and capture of the city. 3 
This message is only mentioned by the official historian, but 
since he received his information from sources close to the 
prince, it might be true .. and considered authentic. 
Lotf cAli Khan had not only blocked the transportation of food 
and provisions. He had also routed the caravans laden with 
foodstuffs, which were on their way to the city. As a result of 
this measure, food became scarce in Shiraz, and the situation 
had been aggravated by the large numbers of the Qajar army, 
which had to be provided with food and fodder. 5 When a cara-
van was assailed by the Zand prince, the Qajar chief, Mostafa 
Khan Qajar, pursued the assailants and, subsequently, a battle 
took place, which lasted the whole day. The two armies were 
fighting fiercely and, at some points, they were even attacking 
each other with knives and daggers. 6 A great number of the 
1. G.G., p.357-8. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p.356. 
5. T.Z., p.71. 
6. Ibid., pp.71-2. 
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two parties fell to the ground until the Qaj ars left the battle-
field and fled to Shiraz. 
After the victory of his troops, Lotf cAli Khan returned to Zar-
-qan, presumably to store the booty he had gained, and again 
returned to the vicinity of Shiraz, to a place called Qasral-
• 
Dasht within one farsang of the city. 1 He fortified that village 
by erecting batteries and building a citadel round it. He often 
ventured to attack the neighbourhood of the city. While the be-
sieged troops came out to meet the foe, on each occasion cas-
ualties were inflicted on both sides. 2 Until this time, the ~aji 
had refrained from admitting the Qajar army into the city, but 
now his terror of the outcome of the siege, induced him to in-
vite the Qajars into Shiraz. 3 He even wrote again to the Qajar 
eunuch, Aqa Mohammad and reported the latest development. 
Aqa Mo~ammad, having received the news, despatched two of 
his chieftains to join in with the forces already in Shiraz and 
finish off the Zand prince.,. 
These chiefs set off for Shiraz at the beginning of the month 
of J amada I 1206/late January, 1792. They reached the city in a 
short while and stayed for a few days, before they prepared 
for a battle. 5 Giti Goshay informs us of a conspiracy having 
c -been arranged by Lo:f Ali Khan's supporters to let him into 
c -
the city. He relates that after the departure of Lo:f Ali Khan 
for Zarqan, he received a letter sent by the citizens of Shiraz, 
to the effect that 
"they had taken an oath to serve their king and 
1. T.Z., p.72. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. G.G., p.359. 
4. G.G., p.362. 
5. T.Z., p.73. 
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"should he approach a certain gate on a certain 
night they would admit him to the city. " 1 
Lotf cAli Khan was delighted at the news and with three hund-
red of his choicest men set off towards that gate. He soon dis-
covered that it was a ploy to kill him, as the troops inside 
attempted to shoot him. He immediately withdrew from the neigh-
bourhood of the city and returned to his position. 2 
Harford ]ones also remarks on a conspiracy, which had been 
formed, and by the events related in his account it seems to 
be the same one. He relates that: 
"A part of this plan was, that the king should with-
draw from his position in the vicinity of the city, 
in order that Hajy lbrahim might therefore become 
less vigilant, & the conspirators possess greater 
facility of putting their plans into execution. His 
majesty, therefore, retired from the position he 
occupied. But the knowledge Hajy lbrahim had now 
acquired of the temper & designs of the inhabit-
ants of Shiraz convinced him that the execution of 
his original scheme of a federative government was 
impracticable; & that his own safety depended on 
the early arrival of the Kajar, to whom he basely 
determined to deliver the city. "3 
This account seems to be supported by the one given by Tarikh-
e-Zandiyeh, which claims that: 
"during the residence of Lotf cAli Khan at Zarqan 
two or three times the citizens of Shiraz conspired 
to capture the city for his entry, some letters had 
also been exchanged between the prince and his 
supporters in which he had instructed them to take 
possession of the city, but on every occasion the 
plot was discovered and the traitors were seized 
and punished." .. 
1. G.G., p.359. 
2. Ibid., p.360. 
3. D.K., p.clxxxvii. 
4. T.Z., p.75. 
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Thus, it is quite possible that there was a genuine plot in fav-
our of the Zand prince, but it was discovered and the Ijaji re-
placed the followers of Lotf 'Ali Khan with his own supporters 
and they attempted to shoot him. 
Mostafa Khan Qajar, having learnt that there were only a few 
men in Lotf cAli Khan's party, pursued him on his way back 
and he feli in with Soltan cAli Khan Zand, who had been stat-
ioned at some distance. In the fierce battle which occurred, 
Lotf <Ali Khan, who was performing his prayer at some distance 
hastened to the battle field and surrounded the Qajar army. 
The troops tried to find a way out in great confusion, while 
many of them were slain on the spot. In this engagement, 
about 2000 men of the Qajars were captured, and twenty not-
ables in the army were taken and imprisoned but the soldiers 
were disarmed and freed. 1 
At this time, the troops of the Zand prince, according to the 
information given by the EIC resident, had increased to 12,000 
men. The above-mentioned source predicts that 
"something decisive must very shortly happen in fav-
our of Lutf Ali Khan, as notwithstanding Hadji Ib-
rahim has repeatedly urged Aga Mahomed Khan the 
Kedj ar (sic) to come and take possession of Sher-
auz offering to acknowledge him for sovereign, 
there are yet no accounts of his approach. It is 
even reported that Aga Mahomed Khan is dead; & 
it is very probably the case, as there is no 
accounting satisfactorily for his non appearance 
& inactivity unless some thing very particular had 
befallen him. It is well known that not long ago 
his health was in a very precarious state. "2 
Indeed this was the case, as the Qajar contender had suffered 
1. G.G., p.361. 
2. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, lOth June, 1972. 
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a serious stroke. He had lost his power of speech 1 and the 
courtiers were most anxious that he might not be able to re-
gain it. He was for some days unable to move, until he re-
covered. The letter sent by the EIC resident is dated June, 
1792, whereas the author of Tarikh-e-Mohammadi places the 
stroke on the 17th of the month of Rabic II 1206/14th November, 
1791. 2 This, however, can be attributed to the very slow sys-
tem of communication; the EIC resident often learnt the news 
at a much later time than the actual event. 
The EIC resident is right in stating that: 
"If the death of Aga Mahomed Khan should actually 
have happened, there can be little doubt entertain-
ed of the ultimate success of Lutf Ali Khan. Hadji 
Ibrahim is said to be continually labouring under 
the most dreadful apprehensions of assassination 
or treachery, and it is highly probable he will 
fall victim of one or other, as such numbers have 
done before him in similar situations. " 3 
The above-mentioned account indicates that the attempted con-
spiracies, alluded to by other sources, had taken place. How-
ever, none of the sources state the names of those involved, 
and how the plot was discovered, and these events, remain in 
darkness. Giti Gosh ay speaks of another plot, in which the 
tribal warriors of Mafi and Nankoli were involved. The Persian 
sources are at vari·anteon the order of these events. 
The EIC also fails to inform us about the battle, which took 
place between the joint Qajar Forces and the Zand prince. Giti 
Goshay and Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh give ample accounts of this ev-
ent. Giti Goshay relates that, as the two chiefs sent to rein-
force the army in Shiraz were approaching that city, the Zand 
tax collectors, who were dispersed in all directions, informed 
1. T.M., Msc. Tehran, n.p. 
2. Ibid. 
3. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, lOth June, 1792. 
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Lotf cAli Khan of their movements and, thus, he gathered his 
generals to consult as to what measures should be taken to 
halt the Qafar progress. 1 The Zand generals all believed that 
the Qajar army should be attacked en route, but Lotf cAli Khan 
did not accede to it, but reckoned it a sign of cowardice not 
to face his foe in direct combat; this his valour would not 
allow. 2 
At any event, the Qajars arrived in Shiraz and, a few days 
later, advanced to the battle field outside the city. The two 
armies met and, again, the Zand prince forced them to take 
shelter behind the walls of Shiraz. The Zand warriors followed 
them, and many of them were captured. One of their chiefs, 
Reza Qoli Khan Shahsavan, was made a prisoner too. 
The account given by Giti Gosh a I: is significant. He states that 
the Qajar army, who were desperately trying to enter the city, 
had crowded onto the drawbridge. The crowd was so great, 
that many of them fell into the ditch and filled it up to the 
ground level, a great number dying on that occasion. 3 
Lotf cAli Khan returned to his entrenchment, while his men gath-
ered a great number of horses with cover and bridles. After 
this disasterous defeat "no-one dared to peer out of the citad-
el, let alone venture to come out • .,,. On this battle, Tarikh-e-
Zandiyeh differs from Giti Goshay, in that at first the Zand 
army was nearly forced to flee towards their position and it 
was only when they discovered that the Qajars were busy plund-
ering what was left behind, that they returned and fought the 
disorderly foe and defeated them. 5 Giti Goshay does not admit 
1. G.G., p.362. 
2. ~bid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p.365. 
5. T.Z., pp.73-4. 
- 211 -
the first withdrawal and interprets the move to the side as a 
ploy to confuse the foe. 1 This event discouraged the Jiaji from 
trying a direct engagement with such an enemy that, despite 
being few in number, was successful in every instance. 
Haji ordered the Qajar chief, Mostafa Khan, to leave the city . 
and take up residence in Karbal, where he could intercept the 
- -carevans of provisions to the camp of the Zands. This move re-
sulted in Lotf cAli Khan's leaving his position to return to the 
citadel of Zarqan, which was much safer for his troops. 2 This 
move could, however, be attributed to the fact that food had 
become so scarce in the city, that the Haji could not afford to 
keep a large army there any longer. Whatever may have been 
the case, we have a reasonable explanation given to us by Giti 
Goshay, as to the cause of famine in the city. The court histor-
ian states that, for more than four years, the grain harvest 
had been damaged by locusts, and that, even before the war 
had broken out, there was not a single grain to be found in 
some areas. The grain, which had been stored in the state 
warehouses (Anbarha ye Divani), was limited. The Zand nobles, 
who had always relied on the generosity of Lotf cAli Khan for 
their provisions, were in great distress, as the Haji had sent 
his men to gather whatever could be found in other places as 
well. 3 
At any rate, as the siege lasted about four months, the poor 
were desperate. The Zands, and the other tribes in the service 
of the Zands, were famished. Thus, they were prepared to 
leave the city in search of food. The Haji expelled many of 
them from Shiraz, those, who joined the camp of Lo!f cAli Khan, 
putting a further burden on him. Mostafa Khan Qajar, finding 
his position in Karbal to be no effective threat to the Zand 
prince, again moved to the vicinity of Shiraz and established 
1. G.G., p.364. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p.366. 
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himself in the gardens around the city. 1 It was at this point 
that the second conspiracy was discovered. Thus, the malefact-
ors of the tribe of Mafi and N ankol i were banished from the 
city, to the district of Bai~a. As soon as they found themselves 
out of the city, however, they joined the Zand camp. 
At this stage, Haji Ebrahim again wrote to Aqa Mohammad Khan 
and reported the events to him. The Eunuch this time decided 
to come in person and meet his invincible foe in the field.2 He 
ordered the Haji to secure the city and prevent any attempt to 
betray Shiraz, until he could advance there. As it was nearing 
spring and Nouruz was on the way, Aqa Mo~ammad Khan began 
to recruit troops to set off for his expedition after the New 
Year festival. 3 
During this period Lotf <Ali Khan was stationed in the neighbour-
hood of Shiraz, as we are informed by the EIC resident: 
"after having in the months of Feb., March, April 
& May held his station at the head of an increas-
ing army in the vicinity of Sherauz during which 
period, his conduct uniformly able and heroic sec-
ured to his arms complete success in a variety of 
encounters. With the troops of Hadjee lbrahim Khan 
added and assisted by large bodies of cavalries 
belonging to Mahomed Cawn (sic) Kajar sent down 
from lsphahan to Sherauz, at different times by 
that prince ...... 
The account given above is fully supported by other sources, 
as to the heroic conduct of the Zand prince and his growing 
popularity, which had gathered a great number of adherents 
around him. Unfortunately, these men were of no military use 
to him, as they had no arms and ammunition, and the prince 
1. G.G., p.367. 
2. Ibid. 
3. T.M., Ms Tehran, no pagination. 
4. I.O.R., P/E/V.5, Bushire, 1792. 
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must have had a hard time keeping up such a large and, at 
the same time, useless army. He had, however, subdued a 
large area and he never seems to have had trouble in feeding 
his troops, whereas that was almost always the case during the 
civil strife in Persia. 
Aqa Mohammad Khan left his seat of government in mid May 
and arrived at Abraj, at a distance of 14 Farsangs from Shir-
az on the 14th Shavval 1206/6th June, 1792. 1 On his way there, 
he erected batteries at every place he stopped and fortified his 
station at each stage, which is significant, as it shows the 
dread he entertained of a surprise attack by his enemy. On his 
arrival at the above-mentioned place, he despatched one of his 
generals, Ebrahim Khan Damghani, with a battalion of Dam-
ghani musketeers: known and admired for their skills and gall-
antry, to secure the passes between Abraj and Ma'in. 2 
The Zand prince, having learnt of the advance of his foe, left 
his position at Zarqan on the 13th Shavval/6th June, and estab-
lished himself in Marvdasht. He left his treasures and the fam-
ilies of his warriors at a citadel called Rashmaijan, appoint-
ing a confidential servant to guard it. 3 He knew very well 
that he could not resist the superior numbers and well-armed 
army of the Qaj ars in an open field. Therefore, he agreed to 
the opinion expressed by his generals as to the advisability 
of an unexpected attack. Although the author of Giti Goshay 
states that the decision was not wise,.. it seems to have been 
the only avenue open to Lotf cAli Khan and, had he not been be-. 
trayed by a traitor, he would have gained a final victory over 
the Qajar chief. 
1. T. M.' Msc. 
2. G. G., p.369. T.M •• Msc. 
3. G. G., p.369. 
4. Ibid. 
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There is, however, confusion as to the number of the Qajar 
army. The EIC resident gives it as numbering about 50,000 1 , 
whereas Giti Goshay, who often exaggerates the greatness of 
the foe, comes up with the modest figure of 20,000. 2 At any 
rate, one may assume that the account of the EIC is more rel-
iable on that score. The EIC resident also provides us with the 
exact date that the Zand prince came upon his enemy: 
"on the 12th. June Lutf Ali Khan found himself 
under the necessity of coming to a general engage-
ment with Mahomed Cawn Kajar (sic). " 3 
But before the general engagement took place, Lotf cAli Khan de-. 
cided to attack the vanguards of the foe, who had been sent 
to secure the important passes near Persepolis ( Estakhr)... He 
covered the distance of fifteen farsangs 5 in the space of seven 
hours, which seems incredible to the reader, but the ability of 
Lotf cAli Khan for enduring fatigue has been remarked upon by 
all the historians, Persian as well as European. 
It was at midnight that he reached the Damghani vanguards of 
the Qajar army. They attempted to halt his advance, but they 
were completely defeated and their chief was captured and put 
.to death. 6 
Lotf <Ali Khan divided his troops into three divisions. He app-
ointed his two uncles at the head of two of them and he him-
self took charge of the third. He set off for the camp of the 
Qaj ars, without even stopping to rest. Reaching the enemy's 
1. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 1972. 
2. G.G., p.368. 
3. Op. ci t. As usual there is a difference of 4 days in the actual event and the 
d,ate recorded. 
4~ D.K., p.clxxviii. 
5. A farsang is 4 English miles. 
6. G.G., p.369. 
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camp, he sent forty of his best men to the camp, while he him-
self stayed to one side on alert. 1 The Zand 1 s troops entered 
the camp from the Ordu Bazar (camp market), while the Qajars 
were at supper. At the first assault, four thousand of them 
fled and the camp was thrown into confusion and panic. 2 As 
Harford J ones states: 
"opposition to the victor had now nearly ceased & 
Aga Muhammad Khan was re~orted to have fled: in 
an moment, Mirza Faty Aly approached his mas-
ter, and besaught him to rest on his arms until 
the day broke ..... 
It is, however, crucial to clarify why the advice of Abol Fath 
Khan Ardalan was accepted, and what the motives of this per-
son were for his treachery. All the European sources agree that 
it was malice and treachery, which induced the man to do such 
a thing. Harford ]ones asserts that he was a spy for the Qajar 
chief. 5 But curiously enough, the court historian attributes his 
actions to having been mistaken by the confusion and disorder 
in the Qajar camp. 6 This is significant, as the historian, ac-
cording to his own account, had joined the camp of the Qaj ars. 
The reason for his joining the Qajars is unknown. He was poss-
ibly forced to present himself at Aqa Mo~ammad 1 s encampment. 
Whatever the reason may have been, he appears to have been 
grossly mistaken, as even J. Malcolm, who decidedly takes the 
side of the Qajars in his account, states that this man was a 
traitor. 7 
Harford ]ones relates an event that is not supported by other 
sources. He writes as follows: 
1. G.G., pp.370-1. 
2. Ibid., p.371. 
3. The na•e is given wrongly; Abol Fath Khan Ardalan is correct. 
4. D.K., p. clxxxvii i. 
5. Ibid., p.cxc. 
6. G.G., p.371. 
7. H.P., Vol. II, p.191. 
--
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"the striking up of the Kajar banc:I. and their salutat-
ion of victory, which principally deceived the un-
fortunate king as to his real position, was in con-
sequence of a message conveyed to the Eunuch/Aqa 
Mohammad 7 to that effect, when the Mirza informed 
hirri the poisonous counsel which he had given his 
master, (Lotf cAli Khan) of resting on his arms un-
til morning, had been adopted. " 1 
The band was ordered to play the tune, which was the sign of 
the victory of one party over the other, in order to further de-
ceive Lotf cAli Khan. Although we have no other information on 
that score, it is highly probable that the device was employed 
to substantiate the allegations made by Abol Fath Khan, and 
that prevented Lotf cAli Khan from questioning him further. How-. 
ever, Harford Jones positively believes that Abol Fath Khan was . 
in communication with the Qajar chief. 2 The fate of Abol Fath 
Khan was as follows: After the event, he was taken to the pres-
ence of Aqa Mohammad Khan. He was mutilated by having his 
tongue cut as penalty for having said to Lotf cAli Khan that . 
the Qajar chief had fled. His eyes were also put out, as a fur-
ther mark of the Qajar 's gratitude. 3 
Sir John Malcolm believes that the king halted his progress, 
only when he was told that ''he would not lose the wealth, he 
had so nobly won, by permitting his followers to plunder the 
jewels & treasures of an empire"... But this does not seem to 
be a good enough reason for Lotf cAli Khan's abandoning his 
daring exploit unfinished. 
Harford Jones is the only source, who tries to find logic in the 
adoption of Abol Fath Khan's advice. He states: 
"the king's forces, not recovered from six and thir-
1. D.K., p.cxc. 
2. Ibid. He gives his name as Fath cAli Khan. 
3. Rozat al Safa, Vol. 9, n.p. 
4. H.P., Vol.II, p.l91. 
- 217 -
"ty hours of unceasing fatigue either of march or 
battle, and bearing proportion to the enemy as one 
to twenty, were in no condition to renew the att-
ack. " 1 
This is, of course, after the troops had taken to plunder and 
had dispersed in all directions, as we are informed by the 
author of Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh: 
"some of the common soldiers who had gathered 
great booty started to leave the camp and left the 
enemy unfinished. " 2 
Incidentally, we learn from the EIC resident that, although the 
Zand troops never reached the Qajar chief's pavilion, 3 the 
booty they gained was so great that: 
"Lutf Ali Khan's army however carried off their 
plunder unmolested, & as the value of the whole 
is said to be very great, this acquisition will be 
some recompense to the Khan for his disappoint-
ment.""' 
However, Lotf CAll. Kh-an was probably unable to gather his 
troops, once they had taken to plunder and were anxious to 
reach a place of safety. The EIC resident does not mention the 
traitor and his advice, but puts the blame solely on the sold-
iers of the Zand prince. He states: 
"it is unanimously acknowledged that nothing could 
have prevented Aga Mahomed Khan from falling in-
to Lutf Ali Khan's hands, had his men refrained 
from plundering & kept themselves collected. " 5 
1. D.K., p.clxxxix. 
2. T.Z., p.80. 
3· Although J. Malcolm asserts that "almost the whole of Aqa Mohammad Khan 1 s ar11y 
had dispersed & the assailants had arrived at the Royal quarters". H.P., Vol.II, 
p.190. 
4. I.O.R., P/E/V.5, Bushire, 27th July, 1792. 
5. Ibid. 
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Only the daybreak announced that the Eunuch had never left 
his camp and was in his pavilion at the far end of the encamp-
ment. The Public Crier, summoning the faithful to prayer, made 
it known that Lotf cAli Khan had made a fatal mistake and all 
he could do was to hurry out of the scene and save his life. 
Giti Goshay draws a very impressive picture of the event; this 
source states that: 
"when Aqa Mohammad Khan learnt of the presence 
of the Zand prince in the camp only with a thous-
and men in his party, he set off to challenge Lotf 
c Ali Khan to a battle. Lotf <Ali Khan was on his 
horse standing at the side ·of the camp no one dar-
ing to draw near him. The Qajar chief ventured 
to go as near as to the side of the camp, but 
stopped there. " 1 
Lotf cAli Khan left Abraj in great disappointment. He set off to-. 
wards Kerman with his remaining army. The Qajar chief stayed 
there a day and took back the things that his troops had stol-
en from each other and returned them 
they proceeded towards Shiraz. 
to the owners. 2 Then 
Harford Jones refutes the account given by Giti Goshay, as to 
the intentions of the Qajar chief to fight his enemy in person. 
He states that Aqa Mohammad Khan prevented his troops from 
following the Zand prince by saying "never attack a hungry 
lion, when he is inclined to remove from you. " 3 What he meant 
was that, at that moment, it would be more expedient to let 
the prince leave, since his camp was also in confusion; but we 
are assured by other sources that he sent troops to pursue the 
prince and capture him. The Qajar troops pursued the Zands 
for three farsangs, caught up with some soldiers, and put them 
to death, but they did not molest the prince himself... The EIC 
1. G.G., p.372. 
2. Ibid. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 27th July, 1792. 
3. D.K., p.clxxxix. 
4. T.Z., p.82. 
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resident informs us that: 
"the Khan it is said immediately proceeded to a fort 
in Kermaun called Sheher Baubek, which he fortun-
ately got possession of by strategem. In this fort 
which is extremely strong is deposited, the whole 
immense treasures of the late governor of the pro-
vince, a Seyid. " 1 
Giti Goshay is very brief in the events which befell the Zand 
prince after this disaster. This could be due to the fact that 
the author was in the service of the Qajars. He, however, only 
mentions that Lotf cAli Khan set off for Kerman and proceeded 
towards Khorasan, but why and how he fails to relate. 2 Tarikh-
e-Zandiyeh states that he established himself in Sirjan and was 
forced to leave his position, when the Qajar army advanced to 
that quarter. 3 From there he marched to Tabas, where he was 
received with kindness and sympathy. While on the way there, 
he suffered a great blow at the hand of a local chief, Moham-
mad Khan Ravari, who wanted to seize him and deliver him to 
the Qaj ars; Lo~f cAli Khan discovered his designs and left .. This 
was when he had been unable to capture the capital of the pro-
vince of Kerman, Gavashir. While he had laid siege on that 
town, he was forced to ask for assistance from the chief of 
Lar; but, since by now many of the districts had declared them-
selves loyal to the Qajars, he did not, therefore, dare to pro-
tect the Zand prince, for fear of the Qaj ars. 5 
Shaikh Naser and Coastal Expansions: 
• 
A detailed account of what took place at Shiraz, when the 
1. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 27th July, 1792. The Seyed was Abol Hasan Kohaki. 
2. G.G., p.377. 
3: T: Z. , p. 83. 
4. Ibid. 
5. T .K., p.351 
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Qajars entered it, will be given in another section. In this 
part, we may relate the events which occurred between the 
Shaikh of Bushehr and the close adherents of Lotf cAli Khan . . 
These events resulted in the death of Mir cAli Khan, the most 
worthy of his supporters. These accounts have only reached us 
through the EIC records and no other source mentions them. 
However, since it is essential to know the fate of these fig-
ures, we will relate them in detail here. 
It must be pointed out that the resident, Charles Watkins, is 
not very sure as to the veracity of the information he gathers. 
The reason as stated by him being: 
"The Shaikh being jealously attached to the usurper 
/Aqa Mohammad Khan 7, the people here (Bushehr) 
are afraid of propagating any intelligence which 
may tell? to the advantage of Lutf Ali Khan. " 1 
One of the attempts carried out by the Shaikh of Bushehr was 
to deprive Lotf cAli Khan of the territories which could be used 
as a safe refuge. As the EIC agent asserts, the Shaikh 
"has lately taken the field to endeavour to estab-
lish his authority in the province of Dashtistaun 
& the neighbouring parts. Meer Ali Khan not being 
in a situation at present to resist, & being in a 
very weak state of health, the consequence of a 
terrible wound received some time ago in an action 
with a neighbouring enemy of Lutf Ali Khan & un-
able to act in person in the field has been necess-
itated to deliver up Bundereeg at the requisition 
of the Shaikh, and to retire to his ancient govt. 
of Gena w a ( Gana v a) Me er Qun uos (?) the former 
governor of Bundereeg who was deprived of the 
government by Lutf Ali Khan has again been put 
in possession of it, in consequence by the Shaikh. 
Since this transaction an attack has been made on 
the island of Carrack ( Khark) which belongs to 
Meer Ali Khan, by a force of two or three hundred 
men from hence and Bundereeg, assisted by two or 
three armed boats at sea. The fort, which was con-
structed by the Dutch, being still very strong, & 
I.O.R. P/E/V.5 Bushire, lOth June, 1792. 
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"the person in command being a man of courage, 
there seems no great likelhood of its falling. Meer 
Ali Khan has been enabled to succour the besieged 
in spite of the enemy, so that there are men suff-
icient to defend the place against any attack of 
the besiegers, wholy unskilled in the act of con-
ducting a siege Shaikh Nassir himself has lately 
commenced an attack upon Khisht defended by a 
small fort & governed by Zal Khan. The place be-
ing strongly situated, and its governor a man of 
approved courage & firmly attached to Lutf Ali 
Khan, there is little expectation of the Shaikh' s 
success against it. " 1 
These events were taking place during the period that the 
Zand prince was encamped in Zarqan, while he had laid siege 
to the city of Shiraz; as in the same letter we learn that: 
"on the 3rd & the 4th ultimo (June) sudden intell-
igence being brought to Lutf Ali Khan at Zergoon 
(sic) of the near approach of Aga Mahomed Khan 
at the head of a very numerous army. " 2 
Mir cAli Khan apparently died of his wound, as we learn from 
the EIC resident that: 
"Shaikh Nassir returned from Khisht the 27th ultimo 
has since by the death of Meer Ali Khan obtained 
possession of the island of Carrack. "3 
The death of Mir 'Ali Khan must have been a serious blow to 
Lotf cAli Khan for various reasons. First, because of the bound-
less devotion and support, which Mir cAli Khan offered to the 
Zand cause. As it is asserted by Lotf cAli Khan himself, in his 
interview with Harford }ones: 
"I believe Mihr Ali Khan has given me even to his 
1. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, lOth June, 1792. 
2. Ibid., 27th July, 1972. 
3. Ibid. 
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"last horse & last Dinar and I should be glad to re-
turn his generosity one day or another." 1 
Apart from his generosity, Mir cAli Khan had the power and in-
fluence in his governorate to recruit soldiers and ward off the 
local chiefs opposing the Zands. His sudden death strengthened 
the position of other chiefs in the district, like the Shaikh of 
Bushehr, who even took possession of the port of Rig. This was 
the only place left for Lotf cAli Khan to establish himself, for 
the purpose of getting aid from the EIC and its agents, as it 
was proposed to him by Harford Jones. 2 
Incidentally, since Harford Jones claims that, for a long time, 
he had kept his communication with Lotf cAli Khan, it is prob-
able that he wanted to adopt the scheme proposed to him by 
Harford Jones, but circumstances and the change of tide did 
not allow it. 
However, it may be worth mentioning the plan here. It was to 
secure the port of Bushehr and fortify it, since it had only 
one opening to land, and three sides were surrounded by the 
sea. He suggested that: 
"it appears to me, the first aim of your majesty 
should be, to fix on some place to which, in case 
of defeat, you can retire with security; where ever-
ything for a future trial may be prepared; where 
stores & ammunition may be collected & placed in 
safety; and where a rallying-point may be formed 
for your friends and those who continue faithful. " 3 
Harford Jones continues: 
"As long as your Majesty continues to possess the 
passes from Kohtel Peer-e-Zun to Dowlaki, the 
Kajar can not easily approach that town. I am 
1. D.K., p.clxxv. 
2. Ibid., p.clxxviii. 
3. Ibid., p.clxxviii-clxxix. 
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"aware how essential it is to your interest that no 
time should be lost in punishing Raza Kuly Khan, 
& in obtaining possession of the passes of the Khot-
els of Dokhter and Peer-e-Zun; but that accomplish-
ed, I consider your Majesty will do better in re-
tracing your steps and taking possession of Bush-
ire, than proceeding in your present condition to-
wards Shiraz. " 1 
Lotf cAli Khan was not inclined to waste his energy and time 
in fighting local chiefs like the Shaikh of Bushehr. After listen-
ing to the plan with great interest, Lotf cAli Khan asked Har-. 
ford ]ones to take the valuable gems with him and sell them 
to raise money for his schemes. This was refused by Harford 
]ones, as he very rightly feared that, should anything happen 
to Lotf cAli Khan, he would be in trouble. ]ones suggested to 
Lotf 0Aii Khan to establish himself at Bushehr: 
• 
"I will attend your Majesty there, on your return 
from Kazeroon; & I will from thence accompany to 
India any person you may appoint, either to 
pledge or sell such part of these jewels as you 
may direct; for it is quite certain, in the present 
state of things, no Persian merchant will venture 
to have anything to do with them. " 2 
Lotf ~li Khan agreed to this and said: 
"at all events, I wish to get them out of Persia; 
for I cannot bear the idea of their becoming the 
property of the Kaj ars. "3 
Harford ]ones promised Lotf cAli Khan that he would join him in . 
Bushehr, and then proceed to India with an agent 
Lotf cAli Khan might appoint • 
• 
"I see no reason why, at the end of six months, I 
1. D.K., p.clxxxii-clxxxiii. 
2. Ibid., p.clxxxiii. 
3. Ibid., p.clxxxiv. 
that 
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"might not reJoln your majesty with such stores and 
ammunitions as you ma( direct your agent or my-
self to purchase there." 
The king appears to have been satisfied with the plan as he 
said: "Wallah (By God), you counsel well". 
"As soon as I have chastized Raza Kuly Khan, I 
will return to Bush ire; & I desire of you to join 
me there as soon as you possibly can. Lose no 
time now at Bunder Reeg; settle all your affairs 
as soon as you can. You may tell Mihr Aly, in con-
fidence, all that has passed between us in respect 
to Bush ire; & that I expect he will be ready to 
give me such assistance as I may require, in the 
execution of the project. " 2 
While this conversation was going on, Lotf cAli Khan's dinner 
was brought in. He bid Harford J ones to take part, so that he 
would be in some sort of moral bond to him. 
"after the meal was over, his Majesty said: 'My 
mind is much easier: yours is a rational scheme; 
and if I could get Lala rMirza Mohammad Hosein7 
and Mirza Bazaurg out of Shiraz, we ·shall still do 
well. Make all the haste you can to Bussorah: 
settle your affaires. " 3 
But why, when he had accepted the plan as a rational one and 
declared his readiness to execute it, he acted contrary to it 
is not known. Instead of returning from Kazerun to Bushehr, 
he hastened towards Shiraz and laid siege on the city. This, 
however, may have been caused by the unfavourable develop-
ments in the South, communicated to us by the EIC documents: 
that is, not only did he have no chance of capturing Bushehr, 
but he had lost Bandar Rig and its worthy governor, Mir cAli 
Khan ... 
1. D.K., p.clxxxiv. 
2. Ibid., p.clxxxv. 
3. Ibid. 
4. I.O.R. P/E/V.5 lOth June 1792. 
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The only other logical explanation for abandoning a rational 
scheme, which would certainly have enabled him to hold out 
for a few years until he could defeat his foe in the field, can 
be the victory that he gained over Reza Qoli Khan, the chief 
of Kazerun, and his fellow Farsi chiefs; that may have encour-
aged him to press on to Shiraz. 
Lotf cAli Khan was anxious to capture his capital, before the . 
Qajars laid their hands on it. He, therefore, hastened there 
and encamped at its outskirts; but during this period, there 
occurred events, which turned the course of his fortune, as 
given previously. 
These were the prime causes for his leaving Fars and setting 
off for Kerman, which will be related in due course. We now 
return to Shiraz and examine the events which took place 
there, when the Eunuch, Aqa Mohammad Khan, entered it. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SHIRAZ AND THE QAJARS 
Aq a Mohammad Khan, after his undeserved victory, marched 
towards Shiraz: "the traitor r~aji_7 met him at a distance pre-
senting him with the keys to the gates and the fortress" . 1 On 
arrival he committed the most atrocious crimes towards the fam-
ily of the Zands, and he put to death many of the nobles. We 
are not sure as the the number but Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh puts it 
at between ten and twelve senior Zand nobles. 2 
The resident of the factory at Bushehr, C. Watkins states: 
"Aga Mahomed Khan since his arrival at Sherauz 
has put to death or deprived of eyesight upward 
of twenty Khans of the first familJi ts in the place 
& it is said to be his intention to "t:·arry every per-
son under the govt. of any consequence with him 
to Tehraun the usual seat of his govt. The Famil-
ies of Lutf Ali Khan, of his predecessors & of Hod-
ji lbrahim have all been sent away from Sherauz 
in an ignominious manner already. "3 
We are not, however, informed of the fate of other conspirators 
and whether their families were sent away; but we learn from 
Sir John Malcolm that cAli Qoli Khan Kazeruni, who had been in 
the service of the Qajars for some time, had fled Shiraz when 
Lotf cAli Khan was still in possession of it. This event must 
' have happened when he executed Mirza Mehdi, accused of hav-
ing severed the ears of the lifeless head of jac far Khan, when 
1. D.K., p.clxxxix. 
2. T.Z., pp.82-3. 
3. I.O.R. P/E/V5, Bushire, 27th. July, 1792. 
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it was thrown down from the walls of the citadel by the assass-
ins. 1 
After the capture of Shiraz, Lotf cAli Khan punished the per-
petrators of the murder of his father by death and only cAli 
Qoli Khan was spared due to some political motives. Mirza 
Mehdi was also pardoned since the Kalantar, ~aji Ebrahim 
intervened on his behalf. The culprit had denied the accusation 
all along, "though many persons had been witnessed of its per-. 
petration". 2 Lotf 'Ali Khan had apparently said that he would 
have forgiven him, even if he had been guilty of such a foul 
act for the consideration he had for his mediators. 
"several months subsequent, when the prince was 
distributing honorary dresses, one was given to 
Meerza Mehdy. This circumstance was reported to 
the mother of Lootf Aly Khan, who sent for him, 
and asked, if it was not enough that he should be 
required to forgive the murderers of his father. 
'Is it necessary', she added, 'that you should de-
grade yourself by bestowing mark of regard & fav-
our upon a wretch who mutilated his remains'. "3 
Lotf cAli Khan, incensed by the reproach, sent for Mirza Mehdi and 
demanded of him "what that man deserved who could behave ill 
to his sovereign & benefactor. To be burnt alive, was the re-
ply. You are the man, said the prince"... In a rage Lotf 'Ali 
Khan ordered him to be burnt alive. 5 This event had terrified 
c Ali Qoli Khan about his own safety and, thus, he fled the 
1. The fate of Mirza Mehdi deserves especial notice, as he was allegedly the cause 
of the friction and distrust, which arose between the king and his Kalantar, Haji 
Ebrahi1. We have already mentioned that during the reign of Jacfar Khan, Mirza Mehdi 
was a Lashgar Nevis: that is, a secretary of the ar1y; but he was involved in some 
kind of e1bezzlement and received punishment according to Islamic laws and had his 
ears cut off (O.M.T., p.53). When Jacfar Khan's life was taken by the hands of Seid 
M orad Khan and--eui Qoli Khan, 11 when the head of Jaafar Khan was thrown from· the 
citadel, it had been exposed to a thousand indignities; and, according to popular 
ru11our, Meerza Mehdy had revenged hi11self by cutting off the ears" (H.P., Vol.II, 
pp.180-181. 
2. D.K., p.cxxii. 
4. H.P., Vol.II, p.181. 
3. H.P., Vol.II, p.181. 
5. Ibid. 
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city of Shiraz and joined Aqa Mohammad Khan. Haji Ebrahim, . 
presumably alarmed at the implications of this act and feeling 
responsible for the pardon granted to both of them, began to 
entertain apprehension and mistrust towards Lotf cAli Khan. If 
this was the main cause of his fears, then the story of the 
assistance he is supposed to have given to Seid Morad Khan 
(the chief assassin) to usurp power can be given credibility, 
especially since Malcolm asserts that the ~aji himself had said 
that "he had ceased to expecf anything but death" . 1 
At all events, the Kazeruni chief was not molested; but as for 
the Shaikh of Bushehr, he was not left unmolested. We have an 
account from the EIC resident, to the effect that 
"Aga Mahomed Khan has lately been very importun-
ate in his commend to the Shaikh to repair to 
Sherauz, the Shaikh it is apparent wishes to de-
cline going but it is not likely that Aga Mahomed 
Khan will admit of any excuse or evasion. "2 
Aqa Mohammad Khan's brutality did not stop there. He burst 
open the grave of Karim Khan, taking along with him the re-
mains of that magnanimous monarch, and transferring all the 
tribes partial to the cause of the Zands to the province of 
Mazandaran. He further ordered the marbles used in the hall 
of audience of the Zand palace to be dislodged and taken to 
his seat of government. According to Giti Goshay, he carried 
off whatever he could, from stones to mirrors.3 The resident of 
the factory informs us that: 
"Aga Mahomed Khan advanced to Sherauz, was ad-
mitted into. the city about the lOth of June and has 
since exercised the most refined cruelty on the fam-
ily of Lutf Ali Khan. All the males have been 
either put to death, casterated, or deprived of 
their eyes, & the principal of females thereof have 
1. H.P., Vol. II, p.182. 
2. I.O.R. P/E/V.5. Bushire, 27th July, 1792. 
3. G.G., p.373. 
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"been distributed amongst the troops of Aga Mahom-
ed Khan. " 1 
Incidentally, there seems to be a mistake in the date given by 
the EIC resident, as the battle at Giruj rAbr-aj_7 was reported 
on the 12th. June by the same source. Aqa Mohammad Khan can-. 
not possibly have entered the city two days before the battle. 
Tar1kh-e-Zandiyeh places it on the 18th Shavval 1206/ 9th June 
1792. 2 Therefore, the battle ~must have taken place on the 8th 
June, since it took the Qajars two days to arrive at the city. 
The sources are also at variance as to the date on which Aqa 
Mohammad Khan left the city of Shiraz. The EIC resident states 
that: 
"Aga Mahomed Khan has left Sherauz, as he had 
fixed on the 14th of this moon /August 7 for his de-
parture from thence. It is universally -thought that 
Lutf Ali Khan will return to the former station 
near Shirauz, as soon as the Cajar quits the place 
& there even seems some probability of his getting 
possession of the govt. once more. Aga Mahommed 
Khan seems to be in great dread of him. " 3 
Giti Goshay states that Aqa Mohammad Khan left Shiraz for the 
seat of his 
1792 ... 
government on the 15th Moharram 1207 I 3rd Sept. . 
But the author of Tar1kh-e-Zandiyeh asserts that the Qajar 
chief left Shiraz on the 11th MoQarram, which is the 30th of 
August. 5 
1.Bo•bay political & secret. Range E, Vol.5, p.713, 1792. 
2. T.Z., p.82; G.G., p.372. 
3. I.O.R. Bombay political ••• , op. cit., Bushire, 1792. 
4. G.G., p.372. 
5. T .z., p.84. There was always the difference of three or four days between the 
sources. It could stem from the fact that the chiefs usually quit the city but stayed 
at the outskirts for a few days. It was customary to do so. 
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Aqa Mo~ammad Khan stayed in Shiraz nearly three months and, 
when he left, he charged the ~aji with the civic affairs of the 
city, acting as the beglarbegi. He took with him two of his 
brothers and one of his sons by the name of Asadollah Khan, 
and departed for his capital, Tehran. 1 
He wintered in Tehran and it was during this time that he was 
informed of the plan devised by the Haji of escaping from Shir-. . 
az and taking refuge in India. The accounts of this incident 
have been given in a previous section. 2 
After the festival of Nouruz, he issued decrees to ~aji Ebrahim 
and other notables of Shiraz to present themselves at his en-
campment, which was due to arrive at the Aspas chaman on the 
29th Ramazan 1207/ 11th May 1793.3 ~aji Ebrahim and his assoc-
iates set off for his camp on the 23rd of the month and arrived 
on the 28th. 
On arrival, Aqa Mohammad Khan commissioned his generals to 
proceed to Shiraz and raze its citadel to the ground. It ap-
pears that he summoned the notables to his camp in order to 
carry out the destruction of the citadel and its fortifications 
without protest. In the course of the three months that he was 
in the Chaman of Qasre-Zard (Yellow Castle) , the work of des-
troying the fortifications of Shiraz was completed. 
The Qajar chief this time took one of Haji Ebrahim 's wives and 
his youngest son and sent them to live in Qazvin.,. This meas-
ure further supports the story related to us by the author of 
Giti Goshay about the intention of ~aji to attempt to escape. 
Aqa Mohammad Khan left the above-mentioned Chaman on the 
1. G.G., p.2. 
2. Ibid., pp.374-375. 
3. Ibid., p.376; T.Z., p.84. 
4. G.G., p.376. The wo1an was from Dashtestan and appears to be the sam, as had prob-
ably influenced the Haji to escape. 
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14th. Mobarram 12081 /22nd August 1793. 
The EIC resident is completely silent about these events. He 
does, however, provide us with information on what happened 
to the Zand prince, when he approached Kerman. He states 
that: 
"the inhabitants of Kerman as well are well inclined 
to Luft rsic 7 Ali Khan; & that the son of the late 
governor- has paid his submissions to him, as has 
likewise the governor of the province of Seis-
tan rsic 7. It is reported that Lutf Ali Khan has 
again collected an army of ten or twelve thousand 
men, & that it may be expected he will not remain 
inactive long. " 2 
His information is completely refuted by the account given by 
Tarikh-e-Kerman which, although written at a much later date, 
is a local history and, at the same time, is the only source 
which provides ample information regarding the province of 
Kerman. 
The city of Kerman (Gavashir) was divided between two factions 
on the question of admitting the Zand prince into the city. One 
- - c faction was headed by the Shaikhal-Eslam and Emam-Jom eh 
- c -Molla Abdollah, who urged the citizens to support the Zand 
prince; a number of the city notables were in agreement with 
him. 3 The most fierce of the Zand opponents in the city was a 
certain merchant, known as Aqa <.Ali Kermani. He was well dis-
posed to the Qajar chief and, apparently, while Aqa Mohammad 
Khan was a hostage in Shiraz during the lifetime of the Vakil, 
he had visited the Qajar Eunuch and was in friendly communic-
ations with him. In his opposition to the Zand cause, Aqa cAli 
enjoyed the support of the Sufi saints present in the city at 
1. G.G., p.377. T.Z., p.85. 
2. I.O.R., Bo1bay political ••• , op. cit., pp.577-8. Bushire, 27th July, 1792. 
3. T .K., p.350. 
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the time. These were the famous dervishes, Moshtaq cAli and Moz-
afar cAli Shah; the latter left the city in support of the Qaja~s 
later. 1 It appears that the ~ufi saints had made the acquaint-
ance of Aqa Mohammad Khan in Shiraz, as when Hac sum cAli 
Shah and his disciples were banished from Esfahan, Aqa Moham-
mad Khan was informed; he paid the expenses of their passage 
to Mashad. 2 At this period the ~ufi order of Nee matollahi had 
gained great power in the city of Kerman. We are informed that 
. - c -
the murder of their saint Moshtaq Ali Shah was partly due to 
this excessive power and partly because of his adverse senti-
ments towards the Zand house; whatever the cause, Molla cAb-
dollah, ordered the faithful congregation to stone him in the 
Grand mosque. 3 
However, the Beglarbegi of the province, who had refused to 
submit to the rule of the Zands in the year 1205/1790-1 and 
had caused great irritation to Lo!f cAli Khan, .. had died in the 
meantime ( 1206) and his nephew, Mirza Sadeq, had succeeded . 
him for a brief period. On the latter's death, we are not in-
formed as to who was in charge of Kerman. 5 However, the city 
notables were the decision-making body of the city and, being 
so divided amongst themselves, there was no chance of a peace-
ful entry on the part of the Zand prince. 
There is no information as to whether the prince laid seige to 
the city, as there is great confusion in the order of events. 
The author of Tar1kh-e-Kerman has not distinguished the two 
1. T .K., p.350. 
C C - I 
2. M a~u• Ali Shah, Taraeqal-Haqaeq. Tehran. 1339. Vol.III, p.173. 
3. T .K., p.349. 
4. As a 1atter of fact, he was dubious about admitting hi• into the town. He invited 
the city notables to a 1eeting to discuss the situation. Aqa cAli and his supporters 
argued that the Qajar had conquered all the areas in the north and centre, would 
defeat the Zands and soon capture Kerman too. Thus, it would be best to resist the 
Zand Khan since he had few adherents in his party; it would be easy to disperse his 
men. This was agreed upon and they resisted the attacks of the prince, who stayed 
about 20 days outside Gavashir and asked for assistance fro• the Afghani and Sistani 
chiefs, who did not effect substantial aid (T.K., p.343). 
5. T .K., p.353. 
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attempts made by the Zand prince to capture the seat of the 
province of Kerman. Giti Goshay gives th date of the first att-
empt on Ramazan of the year 1204/1789, which is when Lotf cAli 
Khan was on the throne. 1 
The second attempt seems to have taken place in the year 1206-
1207/1791-1792, although we cannot decide on the exact date. 
The author of Giti Goshay is _completely silent about this event; 
indeed there is a lapse of a few months in the events recorded 
by this work, caused presumably by the task of composition of 
Giti Goshay changing hands: that is, the history was now writ-
ten by another historian and not the original author. 
Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh states that: 
"when Aqa MoQ.ammad Khan was in the city of Shir-
az he was informed that Lotf CAli Khan had estab-
lished himself in the tow~ of Sirjan and was 
preparing for another battle. MoQ.ammad Vali Khan 
Qajar was appointed to make an attack on the 
prince and disperse his army. On their arrival to 
Sirjan, Lotf cAli Khan left his position for Kerman 
where he ·was again denied entry and his adher-
ents finding his fortune desparate, and seeing 
their own lives in jeopardy, deserted him. Lotf cAli 
Khan, having found his situation hopeless, ·hast-
ened towards Khorasan. " 2 
If this account is to be taken as authentic, the attempt to cap-
ture Kerman must have been a short while after the battle of 
Abraj, apparently some time in the summer of 1206-1207. 3 Aqa 
Mohammad Khan left Shiraz on the 11th Moharram 1207 .. /29th 
August, 1792; therefore, 
the course of the few 
1... G. G. , p • 3 2 6. 
2. T .z., p.83. 
these events must have happened in 
months that the Qajar chief was in 
3. The year 1207 started on the 19th August, 1792. 
4. T.Z., p.83. 
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Shiraz: that is, from lOth June to 29th August. During these 
three months, Lotf cAli Khan was unsuccessful in his attempt on 
Kerman and left for Khorasan, where he was received by the 
chief of Tabas, Amir Hasan Khan. He stayed there about fifty 
days and then, hearing of the destruction of the citadel of 
Shiraz, was encouraged to return to Fars and to try to take 
possession of his ea pi tal. 1 
Amir Hasan Khan provided him with about 300 men, with whom 
he set off towards the town of Yazd. However, the governor of 
Yazd, Taqi Khan, who was determined to resist his attack, gath-
ered an army composed of weavers, silk weavers and confection-
ers, and prepared to fight the Zand prince. 2 
Taqi Khan appointed his son, cAbdol rahim Khan, to confront 
the prince outside the town. The armies met near to the village 
of Ardakan, but before an engagement took place, the unwar-
like citizens of Yazd fled back to the town, even though their 
number was greatly superior to that of the Zands. Lotf cAli 
Khan gained a large amount of booty as a result of their 
flight. 3 
He further marched on the town of Abarquh, of which he took 
possession with ease. He placed his uncle, Na;rollah Khan, in 
charge there and pushed on for Ba van at to meet the army sent 
down by the Qajars on early R~bic I 1208 .. /early Oct. 1793. 
According to the account given in Tarikh-e-Mohammadi, the 
Qajar commander marched straight to the fort of Abarquh and 
the Zand commander of the fort came out to challenge him. But, 
due to the superior number and condition of the Qajar army, 
Nasrollah Khan was forced to take shelter behind the walls of 
1. G.G., pp.377-378. 
2. T.K., pp.351-2. 
3. Ibid., p.86. G.G., p.376. 
4. G.G., pp.378-9. T.Z., p.87-8. 
A 
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Mohammad Hosein Khan Qafar laid siege on the town, but in 
the meantime he was ordered to pursue the Zand prince and not 
to waste time on such a place, which was not of any conse-
quence.1 Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh informs us that in the middle of 
the month of Safar, Lotf 'Ali Khan captured the town of Abar-. 
quh. He established himself there, informing his supporters of 
his arrival. The tribal warriors, who had been wandering 
around inactive for some time now, hurried to join his service 
and, in the course of twenty days, he gathered a respectable 
force. 2 
At the beginning of the month of Rabic I, he set off for Bavan-
a t and from there he marched on Stab ban at and Qir, two small 
forts, which were seized almost unopposed. The village of Nair-
iz put up stiff resistance but eventually he managed to take 
it too. 3 After a stay of nearly ten days, he marched on the for-
tress of Darab. Its governor denied him entry and, therefore, 
he laid siege to it. 
He was at this stage informed of the approach of the Qajar 
army. He hastened to the fort of Roniz, fortified it and est ab-
lished his forces there. It appears that he left the fort of 
Darab without effecting a victory ... 
The Qajar force advanced to a place within one farsakh of the 
fort. The Zand prince had planned a night attack on the Qaj-
-ars but, unfortunately, one of his own men, whose name is 
given in Tarikh-e-Mohammadi as Faryadres Khan Zand, fled to 
- c -the Qajar camp and informed them of the plot. Lo!f Ali Khan, 
on his attack, found the enemy awake and prepared for a com-
bat. His troops were taken by surprise and had no alternative 
but to retreat back to the fort. At dawn the Qajar commander 
1. T.M.M.S, n.p. 
2. T.Z., pp.86-7. 
3. G.G., pp.378-9. 
4. T .z., p.88. 
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made a full scale attack on the fort and they were nearly de-
feated, when a batallion of Kurdish Baban warriors came to 
their assistance. As a result, the Zand forces were forced to 
retreat to their entrenchments, while many fell captive to the 
Qajars. 1 
The Khorasani soldiers, who had accompanied the Zand prince 
in all his expeditions, were now showing signs of disaffection 
and were inclined to return home. The prince also found it 
more expedient to leave his position. He therefore stayed the 
night there, but in the morning set off for Abarquh, where his 
forces joined him. He started his march back to Khorasan with 
only the Khorasani cavalry in his company and only a 
few of his close relations. The rest of his warriors having des-
erted him ~n route as they headed for Yazd or Esfahan. 2 / 
Lotf cAli Khan returned to Tab as, where the governor met him 
• 
outside the walls of the town with much attention and kind-
ness. 3 
During his stay at Tabas, the chief was apprehensive that his 
hospitality would put him at odds with the Qajar chief, who by 
now had conquered most of the empire except for the province 
of Khorasan. He therefore urged the prince to proceed to the 
dominion of Taimur Shah, the Afghan monarch, and get assis-
tance from him.,. He even alleged that, while the prince was 
engaged in his exploit in the south, the Afghan monarch had 
sent an envoy to Tabas for the express purpose of inviting the 
Zand prince to his kingdom. 5 Lotf <Ali Khan, convinced of 
1. T.M., n.p. 
2. T.Z., pp.84-90. G.G., p. 381. 
3. G.G., p.381. 
4. H.P., Vol. II, pp.194-5. 
5. G.G., p.381. T.Z., p.92. 
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the truth in his allegations, left Tabas to proceed to Afghanes-
tan, but on the way he heard of the death of Taimur Shah. He 
was in the district of Qa c in at this time, where its chief, Amir 
'Ali Khan, received him kindly at his court. 1 It was there that 
he received the invitation of the Sist~ni and Afghan chiefs of Sistan 
and Barn. Apparently he was also entreated to proceed to Ker-
man by the Shaikhal-Eslam2 of Kerman. The chiefs of the two 
districts, Mohammad Khan Afghan and J ahangir Khan Sistani, 
had promised to provide every assistance for the purpose of 
capturing the city of Kerman. They even went so far as to pro-
mise him to capture the whole kingdom. 3 
Before we relate the events, which happened at the approach 
of the Zand prince, we have to give a brief account of the 
Qajar' s policy to subdue all the southern provinces and secure 
these areas to its power. 
While Aqa Mohammad Khan was encamped in the Chaman Aspas, 
he commissioned his nephew, Baba Khan to advance to Kerman 
and seize it. He accordingly marched towards that quarter and 
on his approach to the city, some notables partial to the Qaj-
ars came out to meet him, whereas the rest of the notables wel-
comed him rather reluctantly. Baba Khan seized and imprisoned 
all the known advocates of the Zand cause... He further sent 
a message to the Hakem of Korran, Mohammad Re~a Khan, who 
for some time past had refused to acknowledge any of the con-
tending rivals and had not come up with the usual present 
(Pishkesh) to the Qajar camp. Mo~ammad Reza Khan, on the 
arrival of the messenger fled to the safety of the mountains. 5 
This account is, however, refuted by the author of Tarikh-e-
1. G.G., p.381. T.K., p.358. The of the chief in I. is given as Amir Hosein. name Qa 1n 
2. T.K., p.358 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p.354. 
5. T.M., Ms . Tehran, n.p • 
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Kerman, who asserts that the Qajars actually besieged the 
latter chief in his fort and it was after a few days, that the 
chief was seized and sent off to Tehran to be punished. His 
fort at Sirjan fell into the hands of the enemy with all his 
treasures that were supposed to be immense. 1 
Baba Khan despatched troops to subdue the turbulent chiefs of 
Sist an and Barn, which he evidently did not effect, as in a 
short while we hear of them inviting the Zand prince to their 
principalities. 2 
however, managed to establish their power in 
and gathered the tributes customary for a sup-
Baba Khan appointed a governor to the prov-
at the same time leaving a Qajar general to 
command the garrison stationed there. 
The Qajar army, 
some minor areas 
re me government. 
ince of Kerman, 
It was after Baba Khan left Kerman to join his uncle that the 
letters from the Shaikhal-Eslam of Gavashir and the chiefs of 
Sistan and Barn arrived in Qac in, where the Zand prince was 
entertained. He immediately set off for Sistan with three hund-
red calvalry in his company. 3 Before his arrival at Narmashir, 
the Afghan chiefs made their submission known to him by send-
ing presents and provisions with some troops to meet him out-
side their dependencies ... 
Lotf ~li Khan made his entry into the town of Narmashir with 
due ceremony. He was provided with 500 well-armed cavalrymen 
by the chief Mohammad Khan Afghan. He proceeded from thence 
to Barn, where Jahangir Khan Sistani received him outside the 
fort and also presented him with 500 well-armed cavalrymen. 5 Lo~f 
1. T.K., p.354. 
2. Ibid., p.357. 
3. T.M., Ms, n.p. 
4. G.G., p.382. T.Z., p.93. 
5. G.G., p.382. 
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c Ali Khan advanced towards Kerman without loss of time and, 
on a night in the mid Sha c ban 1207 /29th March, 1793, he pre-
pared for a siege. 
He devised a plan to capture the city with the least difficulty; 
c - -this was to send his uncle, Abdollah Khan, at the head of 
some troops to attack the city from one side, whereas he him-
self, with the greatest part of his troops, would assail the 
city from a different direction. 1 This scheme proved highly suc-
cessful, as the troops garrisoned there, being occupied with the 
defence of the city on one side, failed to watch the other gates 
and from there the Zand prince penetrated the fortress. Al-
though the Qaj ar garrison made a fierce resistance' the fort 
was taken by storm. 
The governor appointed by the Qajars, Mohammad Hosein Khan 
Qaragozlu, and the commander of the garrison fled to the Ark, 
which had a secret opening to the plains outside the city. 
They held out for only a day and at night fled with all 
haste, 2 in order to save their lives and inform the Qajars of 
the event. Lotf cAli Khan's uncle, cAbdollah Khan, followed them 
for a good distance without success, but took possession of 
their effects, which they had left behind. In the meantime his 
nephew, Lotf cAli Khan, had established himself in the govern-
ment palace and coins were· struck in his name. 3 
During the course of these events, Aqa Mohammad Khan was in 
Tehran, spending the spring in his capital (the festival of Nor-
ouz occurred on the 17th Sha c ban 1208/ 21st March, 1794). He 
received information on the developments and marched towards 
Kerman on Sunday, the 3rd of Shavval 1208/ 14th May, 1794 ... 
1. G.G., p.383. T.Z., p.93. 
2. G.G., p.383. T.K.,p.359. T.Z., p.93. 
3. Ibid. 
4. T.Z., p.95. T.M., Ms Tehran, n.p. 
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He had summoned Haji Ebrahim and notables of Shiraz to be . 
at his court in Tehran; but they had been detained halfway, 
due to the heavy rains and the floods which had blocked the 
roads. 1 They joined his camp near Qum, on his way to Kerman, 
on the 6th Sha vv al/ 17th May. Heading towards F ars, he en-
camped at Qa:re-Zard for three days and then proceeded to 
Kerman by way of Bavanat. 2 
Hosein Qoli Khan, a Qajar chieftain, had been sent ahead to . 
lay siege to the city. He arrived at the outskirts in the middle 
of Zelhajjeh. Lotf cAli Khan came out to meet him and during - . 
the engagement the Qajars were defeated and forced to retreat. 
Lotf 'Ali Khan returned to the city, preparing for a siege, 
which he suspected would follow shortly since the Qajar chief, 
Aqa Mohammad Khan, was on his way there. 3 
The latter arrived three days later and erected batteries on 
four sides of the fort, surrounding it with trenches and tow-
ers ... At this time, some coins of the Zand prince found their 
way to the camp of the Qajars and eventually reached the 
hands of Aqa Mohammad Khan. At the sight of this, his wrath . 
was aroused and he immediately sent messengers to Mazandaran 
to castrate the poor infant son of the Zand prince, who had 
been sent there. 5 
The events taking place in the city of Kerman have only reach-
ed us by the account given in Tarikh-e-Kerman. This source rel-
ates a peculiar story as to how the famine broke out there. 
Apparently the prince had been very harsh in his treatment of 
the notables, who were partial to the Qajar cause. 6 He confis-
1. T.Z., p.95. T.M., Ms • Tehran, n.p. G.G., p.385. 
2. Ibid. 
3. G.G., p.385. T.Z., p.95. 
4. Ibid. Op. cit., p.96. 
5. G. G., p.386. 
6. T.K., p.359. 
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cated the effects of Aqa cAli Kermani, the most influential of 
the merchants of Kerman, who had gone to the court of Aqa 
Mohammad Khan, when the city was delivered to Baba Khan. 
Lot.f cAli Khan seized and imprisoned his two sons, who were 
appointed to the government of two districts by the Qaj ars. 1 
Lo~f cAli Khan married one of the daughters of Aqa cAli and an-
other daughter was married off to his uncle, Nasrollah Khan. 2 . 
His other uncle, cAbdollah Khan,. was sent off to gather troops 
c for the Zands. He recruited men from Bardsir and Eqta , to-
gether with the chief of that town, who joined the Zand army. 3 
He levied troops to the neighbourhood of the city and a great 
many troops joined his standard, including the cAtaolUihi mus-
keteers, at the head of whom Morad cAli Khan Khorasani Sirjani 
was placed... It is significant to note that the cAtaollahi tribes, 
who were the devoted supporters of the ex-governor of Kerman, 
Seyed Abol Hasan Kohaki, totally changed their attitude to-
wards the Zands after the death of their Emam (religious lead-
er). Apparently, they were more opposed to the Qajars than the 
Zands, as is indicated in Tarikh-e-Mohammadi. 5 Tarikh-e-Ker-
man asserts that it was at the instigation of Aqa CAli Kermani 
that the Qajar force was taken to Kerman. 6 It is, however, sim-
plistic to give this as the only reason for Aqa Mohammad 
Khan's attack on Kerman, as he had spent much time and ener-
gy in putting himself on the throne of the kingdom. His only 
major rival was now involved in this combat, and he was prob-
ably hoping that this would be the final battle against his 
opponent. 




5. T.M., Ms • Tehran. n.p. 
6. T.K., p.360. 
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The above-mentioned source also asserts that although Lo:f cAli 
Khan had the time to harvest the grain and store it in the 
city, he failed to do so. 1 The famine, which subsequently broke 
out in the course of the siege, was a direct result of his lack 
of foresight. He punished whoever dared to mention the ap-
proach of the Qajars, presumably to prevent alarm. He cut the 
ears off a few Bazaris on this occasion. The populace did not, 
therefore, venture to gather in the grain and it was too late 
when the Qajars reached the city on the 16th Zelhajjeh 1208/ - . 
15th July, 1794. 2 The punishment of the Bazaris could have 
been attributed to Lo:f cAli Khan's fear of a general unrest, 
which was what the Bazaris were in a position to cause. 
The sources of the Qajar period assert that the Eunuch Aqa 
Mohammad, after ordering a siege, gathered about ten thousand . 
masons, carpenters and bricklayers to construct another citadel 
around the existing one, and to build towers opposite to the 
town's fortifications, between which he dug a wide ditch in 
order to prevent the escape of the Zand troops. Thus, the 
enemy would have to contend with the guards placed in the 
towers. 3 Contemporary sources do not support this account and 
one may view the ploy with a degree of caution ... 
The siege lasted more than four months and during this period, 
every day a group of the besieged came out of the city to 
fight the Qaj ar army. 5 The provisions had become scarce and 
the inhabitants were in great distress because of that. Further-
more the winter and the intense cold had aggravated the sit-
uation.' Lotf cAli Khan banished 10,000 of the populace to ease 
1. T.K., p.360. 
2. Ibid. 
3. T.M., Ms n.p. 
4. T.Z., p.96. G.G., p.386. 
5. Ibid. 
6. T.K., p.361. T.M., n.p. 
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the distress and the scarcity of food. These evacuees were: the 
clergy, wives and children of the more unwarlike citizens, and 
invalids.
1 
Among these was the Sufi Saint!' 1··.1ohamma<:l"Taqi Mozafar-
c Ali Shah, who came to the Qaj~r camp afte.r his banishment• and 
stayed with one of the followers of the Nee matollahi order, c Ali 
Khan Qarachorlu. 2 
What Lotf cAli Khan had not anticipated was that the Qajar 
chief would build houses for his troops and, therefore, that the 
winter would not affect him to the same extent as it would 
otherwise have done. 
Lotf cAli Khan positioned his generals in different quarters of 
the citadel. They were, however, newly recruited to his service. 
Tarikh-e-Kerman asserts that the Zand army started to communi-
cate with the Qafars. Qasem Khan Julbari betrayed his post, 
but as a result of a mistake the Qajar army did not enter the 
city; the traitor, who had fled to the camp of the Qajars, was 
captured and put to death. 3 The second attempt . · of betrayal 
was carried out by Najaf Qoli Khan Khorasani, who admitted 
a few thousand Qajars into the citadel ... Tarikh-e-Kerman attrib-
utes the act to the intense pressure on the soldiery for food 
and provisions. Apparentl)the people had been reduced to eating 
the seeds of dates, which they powdered to make bread. Saw-
dust was another material for .baking bread and this was after 
having gone through all the cats and dogs. 5 
Giti Gosh ay reverses the order of events and asserts that 
the first attempt to admit the Qajar troops into the citadel was 
carried out by Jubari soldiers, who allowed about 3, 000 infan-
1. T.K., p.361. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., pp.363-4. 
4. G.G., p.386. T.Z., p.96. 
5. T.K., p.362. T.Z., p.96. G.G., p.386. 
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try to penetrate the fortress. The prince was informed and 
rushed to the scene and with great difficulty forced the infan-
try to retreat. He regained all the positions lost to the 
enemy. 1 This time he appointed the Afshar chief, Mirza Khan, 
to be in charge of the position given over to the enemy; he 
was also given the property of the traitors who had attempted 
to betray the fortress. The latter ·was, however, recovered and 
put to death. 2 The second at~empt to surrender the citadel to 
the enemy was made by Najaf Qoli Khan and his troops of Jub-
ari and Mahani musketeers. 3 On the 29th Rabic I 1209/ 24th Oct. 
1794, between 10-12,000 enemy troops were admitted to the city. 
Ahmad Khan Savad Kuhi, a general of the Qajar army, took 
possession of one of the towers and the gallant effort of the 
Zand prince to push them back proved futile ... 
Lotf cAli Khan, with his close relations and ] ahangir Khan Sis-
t ani, rushed towards the gate of Sol~anieh. He captured it 
after three hours fighting and waited until dark to set off for 
a place of safety. He put back the drawbridge and fought his 
way through the dense Qajar wall of troops, managing to get 
away having killed and wounded numerous opponents. 5 In the 
confusion and darkness he lost his companions and set off for 
Sistan with only a few servants. He reached Barn after twenty-
four hours ride, having covered a distance of 40 farsakhs/ 400 
kilometres. He was welcomed by the chief, Mohammad Khan Sis-
tani, who was anxious to know what had become of his broth-
er, Jahangir Khan. The prince told him what had happened and 
assured him that he would arrive soon. 1 The chief accommod-
ated the prince at the gate of the citadel and his retinue were 
1. T.K., p.362. T.Z., p.96. G.G., p.386. 
2. T.Z., p.97. G.G., p.386. 
3. Ibid. 
4. T.Z., pp.97-8. G.G., p.387. 
5. Ibid. 
6. G.G., p.388. T.Z., pp.99-100. 
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lodged outside. Mohammad Khan was apprehensive that his bro-
ther had been captured by the Qajars. After three days there 
was still no sign of Jahangir Khan. This added to the suspic-
ion that he had been taken prisoner by the Qajars on his way 
out of Kerman. 1 
Lotf cAli Khan was warned of the suspicious conduct of his host 
but as usual he neglected t~e warning due to his excessive 
pride. Then, on the 5th of Rabic 11 1209/ 30th Oct. 1794, the 
Sistanis assailed the prince. 2 He mounted his horse, but the 
troops wounded the horse and he fell. The assailants sur-
rounded him and inflicted injuries on his arms and legs, none 
of them fatal. 3 Thus he was captured and sent off to Kerman. 
On the way he was met by the Qajar ~hief who ha~ been appointed 
to pursue him ... Jahangir Khan arrived while the prince was on 
his way to Kerman. He reprimanded Mohammad Khan, his bro-
ther, but to no avail. 5 
The events which 
was taken to the 
with dignity and 
blinded; he was 
and then sent off 
befell the prince are sad and melancholy. He 
presence of his bitter enemy, where he spoke 
truth. 6 The Eunuch ordered him first to be 
then subjected to the most cruel indignities 
to Tehran. 7 
Apparently the Qajar wanted to keep him alive but the ~aji 
Ebrahim was anxious to see him dead. He therefore incited the 
Qajar Eunuch to put him to death. Rozat al-~afa relates a 
1. G.G., p.389-390. 
2. Ibid., p.390. T.Z., pp.100-1. 
3. D.K., p. cxci. 
4. T.M., Ms n.p. 
5. G.G., pp.390-1. 
6. T.M., n.p. G.G., p.391. 
7. Ibid. 
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rather peculiar story that "Aqa Mohammad Khan bestowed on 
the prince a mark of honour while he was kept prisoner, and 
ordered him to be given one of his own robes. On seeing the 
Zand prince he was so displeased that he instantly ordered him 
to be slain. " 1 There is no accurate date for his murder, but 
it appears that he was killed in the month of Rabic I I 1209/0ct-
ober 1794·. This 
that the prince 
was at Shiraz. 2 
is totally insubstantial, since we are informed 
was p·ut to death while Aqa Mohammad · Khan 
1. 
) . ·-
He was buri~d in Tehran iri =··the shrine of Emamzadeh Zaid .. 
Thus ended: the-··career_ of the last prince of Jh~ Zands, who rul-
ed Persia for ... a:· period of more than· forty years. The country 
experienced·· .many · cruelties at the hands of Aqa Moha~mad 
Khan, whose atrocities .are: too horrible to. relate. 
Aqa Mohammad Khan ordered the inhabitants of Kerman to be 
massacred and a few thousand people were put to death instant-
ly, while the surviving wretches were given over as slaves to 
his troops. 3 Apparently he made the governor appointed to Ker-
man promise that the province would never flourish. Only the 
- - c houses of Aq a Ali 
ion of his past 
Kermani were spared the ravages in recognit-
services.· 12,000 people had taken refuge 
there. The crowd was so great that five people were suffocated 
as a result. It was the day after the city was captured that 
the Qajar chief permitted the refugees in the house of Aqa cAli 
to leave the city. He then ordered his troops to provide him 
with 20,000 eyes of the inhabitants ... 
This account appears exaggerated, as Sir John Malcolm puts the 
number of those who were blinded at about 7 ,000. Whatever the 
1· T.K., p.367. 
2. T.Z., p.99. 
3. Sykes, Percy: History of Persia, London, 1834, Vol.II, p.367. 
4. H.P., vol.ii, p.198. 
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case may be, the same author states that he saw many of these 
victims in Shiraz, when he was there in 1800. 
The primary Persian sources are brief and deficient on this 
question, presumably from dread of the fierce Qajar retribut-
ion. Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh relates some of the atrocities towards 
the Kermanis. 1 All those who had helped the Zand prince were 
killed. Mirza Khan Afshar, wi~h one hundred of his troops, was 
put to death and Najaf Qoli Khan Khorasani met the same fate, 
together with his men, although he had betrayed the Zands and 
admitted the Qajar army into the city. Only cAbdollah Khan, 
Lotf cAli Khan's uncle, was pardoned because he was married 
to the sister of Reza Qoli Khan Kazeruni, who intervened on 
his behalf; but apparently he was blinded. 2 
The inhabitants of Shahr-e-Babak were all exiled to remote 
areas. The citadel and all the beautiful buildings in Kerman 
were demolished. About 700 of the cAtaolfahi tribe were trans-
ferred to Ray, while the citadel of Shahr-e-Babak was razed 
to the ground. 3 
Aqa Mohammad Khan, after having committed these barbarities, 
left Kerman at the end of the month of Rabic I 1209/ September, 
1794. He arrived at Shiraz, where he stayed for three months 
and, according to Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh,.. it was during his stay 
there, that he decided to eliminate Lotf cAli Khan. He therefore 
appointed Mirza Mohammad Khan Qajar to kill him. 5 
1. T.Z., p.99. Tarikh-e-Sabeb Qerani, Msc. B.l. & Tehran, n.p. 
2. T.M., Ms Tehran, Malek library, n.p. 
3. Ibid., 
4. T.Z., p.lOl. 
5. Ibid. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Persian society at that time was very much class oriented. The 
main division was that of rulers and ruled. The rulers formed 
a small proportion of the population; in every major city there 
was only a handful of gov~rnment officials, like the Hakem 
(governor), Beglarbegi, Sardar (military general), a few offic-
e -
ial olama, tribal leaders and rich merchants. The ruled were 
composed of two major groups: The first was the middle class, 
who, as Rostam defines them, were half way between the rich 
and poor. 1 These were mainly traders, artisans, tribal warr-
iors, muleteers, lesser government officials, and Molias 
(clergy). These formed a minority in the society, since only in-
dustrial towns, like Yazd and Kashan, had a large community 
of artisans. In other cities and towns, such as Shiraz, which 
was mainly a market town, the shopkeeper population exceeded 
that of the artisans. Shiraz differed in many ways from the 
traditional towns of 18th century Persia. It contained a large 
population of tribal warriors, who had been settled there by 
the Vakil. Apparently, their number amounted to more than 
10,000. 2 A contemporary source asserts that 8,000 of them at-
tended the levee of the Vakil every day. 3 The muleteers of Shir-
az were another group, who had become numerous and extreme-
ly prosperous by the end of the 18th century, due to the lucrat-
ive trade traffic from Bushehr to the north. The transportation 
being completely reliant on pack animals, Sir Harford Jones met 
muleteers, who were richer than the merchants who employed 
them ... 
1. R. T. , p. 287. 
2. T.S., p.33. 
3. F.N., p.219. 
4. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.l04. 
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The second group were the lower classes, also composed of 
many different groups. The largest proportion was that of the 
peasants and tribes, either nomadic or sedentary. These two ele-
ments were mainly resident in rural areas, although there were 
some agriculturalists among the urban population, who tradition-
ally engaged in horticulture, in and around the cities and 
towns. 1 The urban lower classes were primarily engaged in the 
service industry. In the capital, Shiraz, a large number of 
people entered the great house as servants, retainers, enter-
tainers and guards. In other towns, they attached themselves 
to the houses of grandees and local magnates. 
Karim 
people 
Khan, according to 
should be engaged 
Rostam, believed that the ordinary 
in 
trade, business and the service 
four professions, agriculture, 
industry. 2 This accords exactly 
with what was actually the case. There is, however, no means 
of assessing the percentage of these four groups in the major 
cities and towns. It should be remembered that only a small 
proportion of the population was urbanised. Hambly maintains 
that, by the end of the 18th century, the urban population, in-
cluding Herat, did not exceed half a million. 3 
We will discuss the social classes in detail later. Here we will 
concentrate on a description of the general pattern and layout 
of the cities and towns in the period under discussion. 
Cities and Towns: 
The cities were those, which had grown up during the Middle 
Ages. Their growth lay primarily in their strategic or commer-
cial position. Only three cities were of religious significance: 
Mash ad, Qum and Arda bil; the former enjoying strategic impor-
1. Kuznetsona, Urban Industry, p.310. 
2. R.T., p.309. 
3. Ha1bly, Gavin, 11 An Introduction to the economic organization of Early Qajor Iran", 
Journal of Persian Studies, 1964, p.70. 
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tance as well. The rest were either trade emporia like Shiraz, 
which lay on the transit route and was a thriving centre, al-
though its industry had declined drastically. At one point, it 
boasted of having 500 weaving workshops, whereas in the per-
iod under study, the workshops did not exceed ten. 1 The man-
ufacturing centres such as Yazd and Kashan, lay out of the 
way of the main transit routes and, thus, did not suffer the 
ravages of military expeditions. Major market towns served to 
provide the neighbouring towns· with foodstuffs as well as manu-
factured products. 
The cities were generally walled, especially if they were locat-
ed in open plains. The plan of the city was almost uniform in 
most aret_ts. There was a great maidan in front of the citadel, 
usually the residence of the Hakem, Beglarbegi, cOlama, tribal 
leaders and landowners. 2 Further along there was the great Fri-
day Mosque, the Bazar adjoining the Mosque and the Caravan-
serai next to the Bazar. The city was built around the great 
maidan and divided into two quarters: that is, ljaydari and 
Ne cmati, and subdivided into wards (Mahalleh), often named 
~ 
after the class of inhabitants. 3 In Shiraz, three wards were 
allocated to the Lak tribes. One of the quarters was allocated 
to the Jews and known as Ma~alleh-e-Kalimiha. The eleven Mus-
lim wards were incorporated into two quarters, generally known 
as Haydari and Ne cmati khaneh... It appears that in the late 
• 
18th century, there was no class distinction within the area or 
the quarter in which a family resided. Both camps had rich as 
well as poor inhabitants. The city of Esfahan consisted of twen-
ty four wards, three being inhabited by the Lor tribes. These 
were also divided into ljaydari and Ne ~mati camps. 5 
1. Binning, Two year travels in Persia, Vol.I, p.287. 
c_ 
2. Tohfat-al Ala1, Msc. Edinburgh, n.p. 
3. Ibid. 
4. R.M.M., pp.48, 50. F.N., part II, p.22. 
5 • - ~:.. !.:. ' p • 2 5 4 • 
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The choice of the capital was almost always according to the 
whim of despotic rulers. Nader Shah singled out the city of 
Mashad for his capital due to its strategic significance for his 
Eastern conquests. He thus settled many of the tribes inside 
and around that city, in order to guard his new acquisition. 
Shiraz was chosen as capital by the Vakil, because of the sec-
urity and strength of its fortifications. Capper believes that 
Karim Khan being a usurper did not dare to reside in an open 
city like Esfahan without fortifications. I One is inclined to 
think that the Vakil chose Shiraz for his capital out of great 
liking for the city, but he may well have chosen it for secur-
ity reasons as well. He incorporated nineteen wards of the city 
into twelve and took great pains to beautify the city, so that 
it would be remembered by generations to come. 
The monarchs of the Zand house were very little disposed to 
make concessions towards the citizenry and there are no instan-
ces of a city being exempted from the payment of taxes. The 
reason was due primarily to the fact that they relied totally 
on the tribes for military support. Indeed, in a document the 
tribes were exempted from the payment of taxes for three 
years. 2 Cities provided a very small quota to the army. Thus 
their sole contribution to the treasury was their taxes. This, 
however, does not mean that the Zands disregarded the welfare 
of the city dwellers. On the ·contrary, the Zands used their ut-
most efforts to provide comfort and justice in the towns. Cars-
ten Niebuhr relates that Sadeq Khan, while governor of Shiraz, . 
punished a butcher severely for having sold stale meat. 3 
Again, Zaki Khan was so anxious to keep the artisan traders 
happy with his administration, that he took measures to secure 
their property, while they were sleeping in their houses with 
their shops open and unattended ... 
1. Capper, Ja1es, Observation on the passage to India, through Egypt, also by Vienna 
through Constantinople to Alleppo, London, 1790, p.236. 
2. Hajles Library, Tehran. 
3. Niebuhr, C., Travels, p.67. 
4. H. T. , p. 345. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE URBAN POPULATION 
As we have already mentioned, :the society was generally strati-
fied according to distinctions of class. The hierarchy was like 
a pyramid with the Shah at the top, his highranking officials 
immediately below, and the affluent families under them. The 
social structure was not, however, as rigid as it might ap-
pear. In fact, there was a great degree of flexibility in the 
composition of the ruling classes. It was not uncommon for a 
man of humble origin to acquire high position in the govern-
ment, nor was it difficult for him to amass wealth and become 
a member of the elite. On at least two occasions, Karim Khan 
and ~li Morad Khan are known to have appointed two men of 
humble background to the governorship of two major cities. Baq-
er Khan Khoraskani, a humble kadkhoda of his native village 
and apparently a Pahlavan, was charged with the governorship 
of the city of Esfahan. 1 In the city of Hamadan, a certain 
- c Mirza Ma ~urn was appointed as governor. He, too, was of a 
poor family and a menial servant of the government. 2 This 
was, however, contrary to the general policy of the Vakil, who 
uniformly commissioned local magnates to the governorship of 
provinces. 
Although humble men were able to climb the ladder of the gov-
ernmental hierarchy, the traditional nobility always regarded 
them with contempt and scorn. Mirza Mohammad Kalantar, who 
boasted of his noble descent, and asserted that his ancestors 
1. R. T., pp.57-8. He amassed such an im1ense wealth that he dug holes in his private 
garden and buried boxes of treasures and planted trees on top of them. These treas-
ures were, however, recovered by his successors. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.73. 
2. G.M., p.306. 
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for many generations had been distinguished scholars and dig-
nitaries, speaks of the governor of Shiraz, Taqi Khan, as the 
son of a Mirab (water warden) and attributes his greatness to 
the favours bestowed on him by Nader Shah. 1 He often calls the 
menial officers of the government, such as Daroughe, by the 
term Arazel2 (scum). This view was not limited only to the 
elite themselves, since the general public also regarded the 
traditional nobility with respec.t and admiration. Shaikh c Ali 
Hazin, a member of the Gilani landed gentry, was held in so 
much veneration, that he was asked by the general public to 
stay in their towns wherever he travelled. 3 
RULING CLASSES 
Government Officials: 
The Zand state apparatus as Perry suggests had remained very much 
the same as in the Safavid period ... The government administrat-
ive body functioned within the same framework, although it was 
not as elaborate as in the Safavid era. Tazkerat al-Moluk has 
provided us with the most comprehensive manual of the govern-
mental offices and their functions with the valuable commentary 
by Minorsky, which adds to the value of the work. 5 Here, we 
will merely state the differences, which appear to have occur-
red in the status and functions of the dignitaries of the Zand 
reign. 
At least two offices had undergone major changes; that of 
prime minister and the kalantar. Here we will study both in 
1. R.M.M., p.15. 
2. Ibid., p.27. 
3. T.H., pp.153-166. 
4. Perry, Karim Khan, p. 214. 
5. Tazkerat al-Moluk, ed. V. Minorsky, Gibb Memorial, 1943. 
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detail. Traditionally, the prime minister, who was honoured 
with the title of Ec temad al- Do'lleh or ~adr-e-A c zam, was plac-
ed at the top of the official hierarchy. He ratified the bills 
dealing with the accounts of the Divan; he endorsed the employ-
ment of all the government officials, and supervised the state 
machinery. There is, however, no comprehensive manual of the 
duties and sphere of power enjoyed by the prime minister at 
this time, and our knowledge is deficient. 
But from the remarks made here and there in the sources, one 
could assume that the position had lost much of its prominance. 
Furthermore, the office appears to be ill defined. For example, 
the entertainment of foreign guests and ambassadors appears 
to have been performed by the kalantar, rather than by the 
prime minister during the Vakil's reign. Whereas Lo~f cAli Khan 
appears to have placed this responsibility in the hands of his 
minister, Mirza Mohammad Hose in. Karim Khan, a verse to the 
pomp and paraphernalia of the monarchy, affirmed on many in-
stances that he was merely a Kadkhoda1 and, as such, vested 
his kalantar with vast power and ruled through him. In his 
tendency to dispense with the prime minister, he appears to 
have trodden the path of his predecessor, Nader Shah, who nev-
er appointed a prime minister. Thus, the Vakil's minister, 
Mirza J a c far Esfahani, did not enjoy the same influence and 
power as the Safavid ministers, although he was inclined to 
assume such a role. Hence, he is accused of vanity and con-
ceit. 2 
- c 
Mirza Ja far was a seyed of noble descent; he started his car-
eer in the daftar Khaneh of Nader Shah, as a sarreshtehdar of 
the army. During the short-lived rule of Azad Khan in Esfah-
-
an, he became the vakil of Esfahan, and then was promoted to 
1. Maftun, Abdol Razzaq, Tasliat al Abrar va Tajrobat al Ahrar, Tabriz, University 
Press, 1350, Vol.II, p.31. Negarestan-e-D~ra, p.159. 
2• Ibid. Vol.I, pp.l31-2. 
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the governorship of that city. After the victory of Karim Khan 
over his rivals, as he was advancing to the province of Azar-
bayjan, he appointed Mirza Jacfar as the Vazir of Divan. 1 
Apparently he accompanied the Vakil on his expeditions; on his 
return he was vested with the office of the first minister to the 
Vakil. There is no clear manual of the duties of the minister 
at this time. Mirza Ja cfar, however, appears to have presided 
in the divan khaneh every day. He attended the court levee re-
gularly, 2 but the Vakil did not consult him over matters of 
great political importance. 3 Mirza Jac far retained his post as 
long as the Vakil lived. Perry asserts that Mirza Mohammad Ho-
sein became the Vakil's minister for a short while. It is not 
known whether he was the minister to Abol Fath Khan on his 
two accessions to the throne. He is accused of having beenins-
trumental in the coup against the unfortunate son of the Vakil 
and Mirza Mohammad kalantar relates with pleasure that he 
was sent to hell for his ingratitude to his late master.,. Mirza 
Jac far died, or rather was killed, a year after the death of 
of Karim Khan. We cannot decide how he was killed, as Mirza 
Mohammad asserts. However, his property was confiscated by 
c Aii M orad Khan. 5 
Sadeq Khan retained his old minister, Mirza Mohammad Hose in, . 
who had accompanied him on his expedition to Ba~ra (1181/1767). 
1. zinat al-Tavarikh, Ms·. Tehran, n.p. 
2. TaTa, Vol.I, p.132. 
3. For instance, Kari1 Khan appointed Aqa Moha1mad Khan Qajar as governor of Damghan, 
when a rebellion had erupted there. He ha·d vested Aqa Moha1mad the Eunuch with a 
robe of honour and he was preparing to leave, when the ·minister arrived at the 
court. Mirza Jac far sarcastically re1arked, 110, you are going, when will I see you 
again?" On hearing the remark, Kari1 Khan i11ediately sensed the danger inherent 
in the appointment and cancelled it. Rouiat al-Safa, n.p • . 
4. R.M.M., p. 74. 








He appears to have placed more confidence in his minister, and 
thus less trust in the kalantar, which was greatly resented by 
the latter. 
The kalantar believed that Sadeq Khan was ill advised and . 
that, whatever calamity he suffered, was the direct result of 
l c -his minister's counsel. This is refuted by Lotf Ali Khan, who, 
in his interview with Harford ]ones, asserts that his grandfath-
er, ~adeq Khan, did not heed his minister's good advice. He 
deprived Abol Fat~ Khan of his rights and usurped the power, 
despite the protests of his minister. 2 This could not, however, 
have stemmed from lack of trust, but rather the obstinate dis-
position of ~adeq Khan. 3 Although we cannot assert with any 
degree of certainty that Mirza Mo~ammad ~osein was not respon-
sible for the devastating effects of the rule of Sadeq Khan, we . 
can assume that had he been responsible for mismanagement, 
c Ali Morad Khan would not have spared him. Mirza Mohammad 
Hose in was dismissed after the death of Sadeq Khan, because 
c Ali Morad Khan had a minister, Mirza Rabic Esfahani. 
Mirza Rabic appears to have been an astute man of a cunning 
and avaricious character. He was the major force behind the 
expulsion of the notables of Shiraz. The kalantar who appears 
to have suffered grave indignities and losses attributes the act 
to his own refusal to comply with the wishes of cAli Morad Khan 
to mulct the citizens of Shiraz. Apparently, Mirza Rabic had 
been willing to ally himself with the kalantar, but he rejected 
the proposal. Mirza Rabic had great influence on the mind of 
c Ali Morad Khan, but this did not prevent the latter from dis-
gracing his minister by flogging his son in the main square 
1. R.M.M., p.87. 
2. D.K., preliminary matters, p.clxix. 
3. Since we know that he loved his learned and distinguished minister. On at least 
one occasion, Sadeq Khan paid the debts of his minister, who had spent all his money 
on his valuable· library. D.K., p.clxix. 
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for an offence. Mirza Rabic had gathered such immense wealth 
that ~li Morad Khan's successor, Ja c far Khan, finding a good 
pretext did not hesitate to confiscate it. 1 The minister himself 
was disgraced and retired to the holy shrines in Ottoman Tur-
key. During his term of office, he systematically directed his 
efforts towards amassing wealth and in this respect antagonised 
men of integrity and honesty. His animosity towards the kalan-
tar of Shiraz continued, even when Mirza Mohammad was vir-
tually deprived of his office and was in exile in Esfahan 
(1196-1199). It appears that the kalantar of Esfahan was in 
league with the minister in his animosity towards Mirza Moham-
mad. 2 
At the death of cAli Morad Khan and the usurpation of power by 
- - -- c - - c Baqer Khan Khoraskani, J a far Khan held Mirza Rabi responsib-
le and reprimanded him for his inactivity, despite his influ-
ence among the troops. 3 This is significant, since it indicates 
that the minister had been in a position to stop the governor, 
Baqer Khan, if he had intervened, although the whole event 
was carried out by the tribal warriors and the civilians had 
no role in it. It would have probably been easy for the minis-
ter to effect a coup had he enjoyed the backing of other not-
ables, but he appears to have been isolated. 
Ja cfar Khan, having been away from Esfahan and Shiraz on 
military expeditions, was left with the dilemma of appointing 
a minister to carry out his administration. Accordingly, for the 
first time in the realm of the Zands, the ruler held a meeting 
to discuss the question with his courtiers. With the unanimous 
votes of the notables, Mirza Mohammad Hosein was elected as 
the minister. The office of Sadr was given to Mirza Baqer-e-
• 
Shafti of Gilan... The gesture was aimed at the reconciliation 
1. G. M., p.414. Apparently, there were about 50,000 Tomans worth of treasures recov-
ered. R.M.M., p.86. 
2 • R • M • H • , p • 84 • 
3. G.H., pp.414-5. 
4. Ibid. It seems that he was the same Mirza Baqer, who became one of the wealthiest 
and most powerful clergy in the 19th century. QesasalSolama, pp.l35-167. 
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of the numerous hostile factions in the Zand court. Ja c far 
Khan, a liberal and kind man, did not wish to impose his own 
wish on his court, but his choice, however, coincided with 
theirs. Whether Mirza Mohammad, the kalantar, was present at 
this meeting or not is not known. He never, however, became 
reconciled with Mirza Mohammad Hosein and presumably, that 
was one of the reasons for his decision to remain in Esfahan 
and to join the Qaj ar camp ( 1200). 1 The functions of the newly 
appointed minister was slightly different from the previous min-
isters. He totally overshadowed all other officials and managed 
the affairs with authority and competence. 
Mirza Mohammad Hosein conducted negotiation with foreign visit-
ors, entertained official guests, which was previously carried 
out by the kalantar of Shiraz. This could have been a prime 
cause for the resentment of ljaji Ebrahim, who felt that he was 
left out of the state affairs. Thus, he effected the coup to re-
gain the prominance that his predecessor, Mirza Mohammad, 
had enjoyed. 
Beglarbegis and Hakems: 
These offices had not changed in essence. Only their number 
had decreased due to the loss of the great part of the empire 
during the Zands' rule. During the Zand period, there were 
only eight beglarbegis, whereas in the time of the Safavids, 
their number had been thirteen. The Valis of four major prov-
inces had remained intact; these were the provinces of Arabis-
tan, Ardalan, Georgia and Lorestan. These were semi-independ-
ent and, after the death of the Vakil, only paid lip-service to 
the Zand sovereigns. Each major town had a ljakem, whose 
power was very similar to that of beglarbegi. Small principal-
ities had a ia bet, or a kalantar, although it was not uncom-
mon for a kadkhoda to rule over a district. 
1. R.M.M., pp.90-91. 
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Generally, the beglarbegis and the J:Iakems were appointed by 
the central government, unless a family of the chief of a tribe 
was the hereditary ruling elite over a province, in which case 
the central government only reaffirmed the governor in his 
charge, by sending him a robe of honour and decree. Allah 
Qoli Khan Zanganeh 's father had been appointed to the govern-
orship of Kermanshah by Nader Shah. Thus his son was placed 
in his position and despite his frequent disaffections to the 
Zands, remained in his charge. 1 Hedayat Khan, the governor 
of Gilan, was another example of these hereditary Hakems. He 
had been dismissed on several occasions and then reinstated in 
his charge. 2 
after his death. 
Often the son of a governor succeeded him 
When Na~ir Khan Lari died his two sons be-
came the joint governors of Lar. One of them was a hostage in 
the court for six months, while the other governed the prov-
ince. The other son, however, presented himself to the court 
for the second half of each year. 3 
It was only when a province was in constant rebellion that the 
Zands ventured to send a Zand noble to subdue it and act as 
governor. Astarabad was in constant tumult and, despite the 
Vakil's inclination to rule the province through the local nobil-
ity, he was forced to send his half-brother, Zaki Khan, to put 
an end to the unrest. Zaki Khan brought the area under con-
trol with the utmost cruelty towards the rebels and their famil-
ies... Kerman was another example of these chaotic and dis-
turbed areas. Eventually the Vakil had to appoint Nazar cAli . 
Khan as his general to subdue it. Having achieved his object-
ive, Nazar 'Ali Khan was instructed to leave Bastam Khan Zand 
as the governor and proceed to Shiraz. It was not, however, 
until two local chiefs were appointed to share the governorship 
1. G.M., p.306. R.T., p.450. 
2. G.M., p.283. 
3. Ibid., p. 447. 
4. G.G., pp.l09, 229-30, 294. R.T., pp.364-5. 
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that the unrest subsided. 1 But peace was restored, when a Ker-
mani notable, Seyed Abol Hasan, was charged with the office. 2 
The Zands were generally inclined to conform with the wishes 
- c -of the local notables. Karim Khan appointed M a sum Khan, a 
man of humble origin, to the governorship of Hamadan, at the 
request of the notables of that city, 3 who were opposed to the 
governor, Mo c men Khan. The former was reaffirmed in his 
charge by <Ali Morad Khan, until he openly rebelled against 
the Zands and was captured and put to the sword... The pro-
vince of Fars had a beglarbegi, only when the monarch was 
away. Karim Khan did not trust anyone except his own brother, 
Sadeq Khan, to hold this office. During his absence, Sadeq . . 
Khan was vested with absolute power. He punished culprits, 
sent tax collectors to various dependencies of the province. 5 
This right was particularly given to the governors and beglar-
begis, but even the closest re la ti ve of the Vakil could not de-
mand tax from a province, without authorization. There is an in-
stance to prove it. Shaikh cAli Khan, the Vakil's cousin, had 
sent tax collectors (Mohassels) to the districts captured by the . . . 
Vakil in A~arbayjan, of his own accord. This had greatly an-
noyed Karim Khan and he summoned him to his private quarter 
and deprived him of his eyesight. His wealth, which appears 
to have been great, was also confiscated. Later on, during the 
reign of cAli Morad Khan, when the capital was removed from 
Shiraz, a beglarbegi was appointed to the province of Fars, 
who was also a member of the Zand family. Seid Morad Khan 
c • -
held the office during the whole course of :Ali Morad Khan's 
reign. 1 
1. T.K., pp.329-30. 
2. Ibid., p.331. 
3. G. M., p.304. 
4. Ibid., p.309. 
5. R.M.M., pp.56-7. 
6. Ibid., pp.Sl-9. 
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It appears that, as in the ~afavid era, the beglarbegi had a 
number of ljakems under him. It is not known, whether he had 
the power to dismiss or replace them, but it is certain that the 
Hakem of minor towns were always appointed with the consent 
of the beglarbegi. Najaf Qoli Khan Donboli, the beglarbegi of 
Tabriz, was consulted about the appointment of his nephews to 
the governor ship of Khoi and its dependencies, and it was 
approved by him. 1 Apart from a few Hakem, the beglarbegi had 
a host of officers under him, such as Mostoufi, who looked 
after the public revenues, Kalantar, Kadkhoda, Darughe and 
• 
Zabe!· These were answerable to the beglarbegi on any point 
of mismanagement or excess, although on matters of great imp-
ortance, like a rebellion, the verdict was given by the mon-
arch himself. 
The officers such as kalantars, Zabets and Kadkhodas were al-• 
ways chosen from the local elite. It was not uncommon for a 
local family to retain an office for generations, unless a dras-
tic change in the government deprived them of their inherited 
position. Even then, there was a chance of their being rein-
stated to their previous position. 2 
Karim Khan was particularly reluctant to change the governors 
and beglarbegis. In the case of Haji Aqa Mohammad Renani, 
the governor of Esfahan, this unwillingness is apparent. ljaji 
Aqa Mohammad was a goldsmith (Zargar) in Esfahan, who help-. 
ed the vakil in his struggle against the rivals, by lending 
him 300 Tomans in cash. 3 After the vakil had established him-
self in power, he appointed the above mentioned artisan to the 
governorship of Esfahan. The governor, being an ignorant, un-
educated man, had no regard for art, culture, or even indus-
1. TaTa, Vol.II, p.41. During the Safavid era, it seems that the beglarbegis had 
the power to dismiss and replace the· ~akems independently of the central government 
{Rohrborn, K.M. Provinzen und Zentralgewalt Persiens. Tr. K. Djahandari, Tehran, 
1978, pp.36-8). 
2. G.M., p.283. Hedayat Khan is a good example of the case. 
3. !ava'~d ~1-~afavieh, p.l29. 
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try. He uniformly harassed the learned men, as well as the art-
isans and traders. His avarice was such that a number of men 
of literary distinction, together with the artisans and mer-
chants went to Shiraz to complain to the Vakil. The Vakil was 
not able to forget the aid, which the governor had offered him 
at a critical time, and turned a deaf ear to the representat-
ions of the Esfahani delegation. 1 The citizens of Esfahan, un-
able to challenge the power of the Vakil, endured the calamity 
with patience. Once Karim Khan was dead, they staged a fierce 
revolt against the governor, in which almost all classes of the 
populace were involved. They forced the governor to retire to 
the citadel of Tabrak and, for about fifteen days, the city was 
in turmoil. 2 Haji Aqa Mohammad, as might have been expected, 
was not toler~ted by 'Ali. Morad Khan, who dismissed him with 
much indignity. He was, however, restored to favour, but the 
old and frail J:Iaji requested to be permitted to retire to cAta-
bat. The extent of his wealth, as listed in Golshan-e-Morad, 
appears to be incredible. He bequeathed his vast property, con-
sisting of houses, baths, gardens and other landed property, 
- - c - -to religious institutions and made Aqa Mohammad Rafi Bidabadi . 
his Motevali and Vasi (executor). 3 Gratitude appears to have 
been partly the reason why the Vakil did not take measures 
against ~aji Aqa Mo~ammad, as in the case of another Hakem, 
that is, Taqi Khan Yazdi, the Vakil was prompt in dismissing 
him. The above mentioned, was governor before Karim Khan 
gained supreme power, and, in the contest between Azad Khan 
and Mohammad Hasan Khan Qajar against Karim Khan, Taqi 
Khan had been playing a double game, by shifting his alleg-
iance to one against the other. Karim Khan, on his expedition 
to Tehran in 1172/1758, stopped in Yazd in order to punish the 
cunning governor. Thus, he was seized and imprisoned, and 
his wealth, amounting to 12,000 Tomans, was confiscated. He 
1. laTa, Vol.II, p.271. 
2. G.G., pp.222-3. 
3. G.M., p.319. 
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was taken to Shiraz, but later was reinstated in his office. 
Taqi Khan, however, despite his outward religiosity, was dis-
honest and oppressive. The inhabitants of Yazd complained to 
the Vakil and he summoned Taqi Khan to Shiraz with his com-
plainants. In Shiraz, the case was referred to the Share Court; 
the inhabitants claimed that he had extorted 40,000 Tomans 
from them. They could only prove with evidence, 15,000 of that 
amount. The governor was forced to pay the amount and was 
also compelled to swear to God 8, 000 times, that he was innoc-
ent of the remainder. He was kept in Shah Cheraq for three 
days and three nights, and instead of food or water, swore to 
God that the Yazdis' claims were not true. 1 
It is appropriate here to study the sources of income and the 
causes of the governor's extortions. As is indicated in Tarikh-
e-Kerman, the governors were generally responsible for the coll-
ection of taxes and, after the deduction of their expenses, they 
would send the fixed government taxes to the capital. Thus, a 
governor had a free hand to collect extortionate taxes from the 
inhabitants of his principality, whereas he never paid more 
than the tax already fixed on that province. Except for the oc-
casional present ( pishkesh) at the new year festival, he pocket-
ed the rest. It was not uncommon for a local governor to re-
fuse payment of his taxes to the central government, especially 
when there were various competitors involved, in which case, 
he could easily get away with that. Taqi Khan Yazdi held the 
office of governor of Yazd for nearly forty years and, many 
times, abstained from payment of taxes. He even defeated 
] a c far Khan, who took his army against him. 2 
Often the governors and the beglarbegis had the audacity to 
make their own choice between the competitors for supreme 
power and, always, their choice was to serve their own inter-
1. G.G., pp.75-7. 
2. Ibid., pp.301-2. 
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ests. It was not, however, uncommon for them to make a wrong 
choice and to 
in which case 
was not easy 





a powerful master too difficult to handle, 
often had to renege on their choice. This 
in some instances, as the Shaikh of Bush-
c -
against Lo!f i\li Khan, was not too pleased 
about the pressure exerted on him by Aqa Mohammad Khan to 
proclaim his submission. He had, however, no choice except to 
concede. 1 
The governors and the beglarbegis were responsible for the pay-
ment of the troops garrisoned in their principality, and this 
furnished them with another source of income. Naja£ Qoli Khan 
Donboli had 700 riflemen (Jazayerchi) guarding his residence, 
plus a body of infantry. 2 Often the governors did not pay the 
army over a long period of time. ~eid Morad Khan, the beglar-
begi of Shiraz, did not pay the troops stationed there for three 
years and pocketed their salary. 3 At any rate, not all the cit-
ies had a garrison with a standing army. The town of Yazd 
did not have a garrison. Thus, the governor had to ask for 
assistance from neighbouring tribal chiefs, or else recruit 
troops from the unwarlike citizens, when the situation arose ... 
On at least two occasions, he recruited an army of the weavers 
and confectioners of Yazd. The result may easily be predicted. 
They fled at the first encounter with the enemy. 5 
When a tribal chief was the governor of a city or a province, 
he often dispensed with a standing army, as his followers look-
ed to him as their leader and served him, when required. It 
was not uncommon for a nontribal governor to command fealty 
of tribal warriors, due to religious conviction. Seyed A bol 
1. I.O.R. P/E/V.S, Bushire, 27th July, 1792. 
2. Tafa, Vol.Ir, p. 220. 
3. R.M.M., pp.88-9. 
4. G.G., p.301. T.K., p.326. G.M., p.293. 
5. T.K., p.351. 
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Has an Kohaki, the governor of Kerman and the leader of the 
Esma c ili community, was worshipped by his followers and the 
c Ataollahi warriors were so devoted to him, as to fight for his 
cause with zeal. 1 
Kalantar: 
The position of Kalantar deserves particular notice, as for the 
greater part of the Zand' s rule, the capital was virtually ad-
ministered by the kalantar and the office gained exceptional 
prominence. We will, therefore, study the career of the two men 
who held this office in the capital. Mirza Mohammad, the first . 
kalantar of Shiraz during the Vakil's rule, and Haji Ebrahim, . 
the kalantar of Shiraz in the reign of the last Zand, Lotf cAli 
Khan. 
Mirza Mohammad became the kalantar, when his uncle, Mirza 
Mohammad Hosein Sharifi, died in the month of Safar 1160/1747, 
while Karim Khan was still busy establishing his power in the 
empire. For a few years, Mirza Mohammad, had to accompany 
him on his expeditions. He was on many occasions accused of 
plotting against the Zand rule and, each time, the Vakil ignor-
ed the accusations and retained him as his kalantar. Although 
in some instances the Vakil was suspicious of his activities, 
he never carried it so far as to harm him. The kalantar was 
so confident of the Vakil's support, that he even ventured to 
disagree with and antagonise ~adeq Khan, during his term of 
office as the beglarbegi of Fars. 2 
Mirza Mohammad, a man of integrity and upright character, 
could not comply with the excessive demands of Sadeq Khan, 
the beglarbegi, who began to extort money from the inhabitants 
of Shiraz. He, therefore, stayed at home in protest, while 
1. T. K., p.342. 
2. R.M.M., pp.56-7. 
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Sadeq Khan was in office. The Vakil was informed of the dis-
cord and was very annoyed. After a few months, the Vakil sent 
Mirza Mohammad a robe of honour, with decrees declaring the 
kalantar independent in his office and messages of abuse to his 
brother, Sadeq Khan. The dispute did not end here, and the 
kalantar was harassed incessantly by the beglarbegi, who for-
bade people from associating with him. the quarrel was prolong-
ed for a few months; the kalantar became unable to function, 
left the city, and joined the camp of the Vakil in Tehran. Kar-
im Khan sent him back to resume his duties and, this time, the 
beglarbegi changed his attitude and treated him with consider-
ation and respect. On Karim Khan's return to his capital, Mir-
za Mohammad, depressed by his deafness, requested to be re-. 
lieved of his charge and to be allowed to retire to the holy 
shrines of Ottoman Turkey. He bequeathed his vast property to 
the vakil, but the latter did not yield to his request and order-
ed him to remain in his office. 1 
Mirza Mohammad' s zeal in defending the rights of his fellow 
Farsis gave a good pretext to his enemies to poison the mind 
of the Vakil against him. Thus, the Vakil took him along on 
his second expedition to A~arbayjan. On at least two occasions, 
he nearly lost his life, as he had interceded on behalf of the 
Farsis and the Vakil, incensed by his partiality towards his 
fellow Farsis, accused him of taking the side of whoever was 
opposed to his rule. 2 Indeed, many of those who were protected 
by the kalantar did not command his approval by their con-. 
duct. Although the Vakil's resentment at the excessive zeal of 
Mirza Mohammad remained all through his reign, he placed 
great trust in the kalantar and charged him with duties far 
beyond the official functions of a mere kalantar. Mirza Moham-
mad collected taxes, recruited troops, entertained foreign ambas-
1. R.M.M., pp.57-9. 
2. Ibid., pp.59--61, 62. 
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sadors 1 and, in short, his office overshadowed that of the min-
ister's. 
The reason for his unusual power and influence may be found 
in Mirza Mo~ammad' s three major attributes. First, he belonged 
to a respected family, whose ancestors were ranked amongst the 
notables of Shiraz. Secondly, he was an honest and trustworthy 
man and this he had proved to the vakil. Thirdly, he was com-
petent and this gave him enormous pride and prevented him 
from abuse of power or intrigues. Mirza Mohammad' s free hand 
in matters of administration was precisely what Haji Ebrahim 
wished to exercise and his level of power was that to which 
the Haji also aspired. But lacking the above-mentioned attrib-
• 
utes, J:Iaji Ebrahim never achieved the degree of prominence 
enjoyed by his predecessor. This led him to intrigues and con-
spiracy and resulted in the downfall of the Zands. 
Haji Ebrahim started off as a Pakar2 in a Haydari quarter of 
Shiraz. 3 His father, ljaji Hashem, was a trader and never went 
beyond the rank of a kadkhoda of the Haydari quarters in the 
city. His ancestors were known to have been Jews, who conver-
ted to Islam... Haji Hashem was deprived of his eyesight by 
order of Nader Shah for some irregularity in his accounts 
(1160/1747). 5 He died shortly 
came the beglarbegi of Fars, 
rank of kadkhoda of Haydari . 
road to his subsequent career 
prime minister to the Qajars. 
1. R. M. M. , p. 65. 
afterwards. When 
he elevated ~:~a: ji 
Khaneh' and this 
as the kalantar of 
Sadeq Khan be-. 
Ebrahim to the 
set him on the 
Shiraz and the 
2. Pakar has been variously given as a menial tax-gatherer, or a menial servant of 
c 
the govern11ent. Dehkhodr, A.A, loqhat Nameh, p.58. 
3. G.G., p.339. 
4. Ibid. 
5. F.N., p.190. 
6. G.G., p.339. 
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When Mirza Mohammad was taken to Esfahan against his will 
by 'Ali Morad Khan and, thus, deprived of his position, he en-
tered the service of Divankhaneh as a Mostoufi. Haji Ebrahim 
• 
was one of his Moharrers (clerks). He, thus, learnt about the 
workings of government 1 and gained the confidence of Mirza 
Mohammad. He also established links with the notables of Fars, 
such as Mirza }ani andc Ali Qoli Khan Kazeruni. 
Unlike Mirza Mohammad, ljaji Ebrahim was dishonest and avar-
icious, and gained much of his wealth through dishonest trans-
actions. Francklin, in 1786-87, states that the Kalantar of Shir-
az, who was also in charge of the custom house (Gomro k), ex-
torted money from the merchants and they complained about him 
bitterly. 2 This wealth was later utilised in promoting his per-
sonal ambitions. 
After the death of cAli Morad Khan and the accession c of Ja far 
Khan, the latter returned to Shiraz as his seat of government. 
Mirza Mohammad, who was totally disgusted with the proceed-
ings of the Zands, refused to accompany him and remained in 
Esfahan. ljaji Ebrahim was among those, who urged the kalan-
tar to return to Shiraz and resume his duties, but his efforts 
failed. 3 Thus, Jac far Khan dispensed with a kalantar for a 
while, probably in the hope that Mirza Mo~ammad would come 
back, but he was disappointed. Aqa Mo~ammad Khan refused to 
give permission to the Mirza to leave his camp. Mirza Moham-
c 
mad died in Esfahan in 1202.. and it was then, that Ja far 
Khan appointed Haji Ebrahim as the kalantar of Shiraz . . 
While Ja c far Khan was alive, his minister, Mirza Mohammad 
Hosein, was entrusted with great power. He managed the civil . 
1. G.G., p.342. 
2. OMTS, pp.149-50. 
3. R.M.M., pp.90-1. 
4. F. N., Part II, p.48. 
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administration, paid the army and acted as Mehmandar to the 
king. The official decrees written by the king were also accom-
panied by letters from the minister. ]ac far Khan was, however, 
murdered in 1201/1789, by the notables he had imprisoned and 
a modern source suggests that ~aji Ebrahim assisted Seid Morad 
Khan, the chief assassin to usurp the throne and ruled in his 
name. 1 This is not indicated in contemporary sources, but one 
cannot rule out the possibility of this event, as he did not op-
pose the usurpation and, furthermore, the Haji' s associates in 
the later episode of the coup against Lotf cAlf Khan, were exact-
ly those, who had survived punishment for the assassination 
of the late ]a c far Khan. The alleged discontent of ~aji had 
been occasioned by the punishment of an accomplice in the ass-
assination, Mirza Mehdi, by Lotf cAli Khan. 2 
c -Lotf Ali Khan, with the assistance of the influential notables, 
primarily Mirza Mohammad Hose in, managed to topple the usurp-. 
er, Seid Morad Khan, and assumed the reins in his hand. Mirza 
Mohammad Hosein still played a major role in the politics of 
the Zand realm. It was when he left Shiraz on a pilgrimage to 
Mecca, that the ~aji was offered a chance of direct intervent-
ion in the affairs of state. The return of the Minister removed 
the ~aji from the mainstream and relegated him to the back-
ground. He had, however, been able to establish links with the 
classes capable of exercising power in times of emergency, 
namely, the tribes and the notables. As kalantar, he had the 
shopkeepers and middle classes under his sway, but it appears 
that it was at this stage that he made contacts with the local 
magnates, such as the Shaikh of Bushehr, and the chiefs of the 
Nankoli and Mafi tribes. 
1. T .z., p.253. 
2. H.P., Vol.II, p.181. 
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Darughe: 
Among the local officials, the position of Darughe deserves 
particular notice. Although he was appointed by the govern-
ment, he is not mentioned by Rostam among seven officials ap-
pointed by the vakil. He appears to have been chosen from the 
lower rank of the inhabitants. His appointment was based on 
his ability to handle the tough job of the chief of police. Mir-
za Mohammad Kalantar Is account of numerous Darughes' who 
filled the position before the reign of the Vakil, certainly sup-
ports the assumption that they often set about harassing and 
mulcting people, instead of protecting their property and lives. 
Mirza Mo~ammad uniformly calls them Alvat and Ara~el, which 
substantiates the assumption. 1 The duties and proceedings of 
the Darughe are given in Tazkerat al-Moluk and the reader is 
referred to that source. 2 It is noteworthy that the office was 
subject to scrutiny by higher authorities and, whenever a weak 
governor and kalantar was in charge, the Darughe had a free 
had to exercise excesses. 3 
Karim Khan had taken care to appoint honest and virtuous men 
as the Darughe in his capital and other major cities. Francklin 
assures us that during the whole reign of the Vakil, there was 
not one riot in the city of Shiraz which produced bloodshed, .. 
whereas the same source asserts that, in the reign of Jac far 
Khan, civil riots were common and even small boys were fond 
of running to them to have a share in the fighting. 5 By the 
early 19th century, the office had been further degraded, since 
the Darughe of Shiraz in 1802 was in the habit of taking 
bribes and the shopkeepers had to furnish him with whatever 
1. R.M.M., pp.27, 42. 
2. Tazkerat al-Moluk, p.90. It appears that in the Safavid time, the lesser ijakems 
were called Darughe. These were appointed by beglarbegi (Rohrborn, K.M., Provinzen 
und Zentralgewalt Persien, p.38). 
3. R.M.M., pp.41-2. 




he needed so as to secure his favour and protection. 1 
The Darughe has a large establishment under his superv1s1on. 
There were riflemen (Tofangchi) and Tabin, who acted as night 
guards and policemen to maintain peace and order in the city. 
He also had a body of horsemen, who would ride through the 
city to perform their duties day and night. The shopkeepers 
paid a small amount for the upkeep of the establishment. 2 
Again, in the early 19th century, we learn that the Mir Shab, 
the head of the night guards was in league with the burglars 
and made sure that crime was outside the area under his pro-
tection, but should anyone steal anything within his jurisdict-
ion, he knew where to look for them. 3 If the Darughe recovered 
a criminal, the shopkeepers had to pay a nominal sum for his 
services. But should be fail to recover the lost property, he 
was entitled to pay the value of the lost property ... 
In the period under study, the Darughe was responsible for the 
prevention of crimes and violations of the law, and for the 
maintenance of public morale. He appears to have been charged 
with the task of preventing prostitution, although he did not 
attempt to stop the practice of fornication, which was accepted 
and widespread. Indeed, the Darughe had the right to fine 
people who frequented brothels. At least in 1802, we have evid-
ence of the Darughe exercising his power to fine an Armenian 
for this offence. 5 
It appears that the Ordu Bazar had a Darughe, who supervised 
the activities of the traders who accompanied the army, 15 but 
1 • .!..:.~.:. ' p • 6 s, 7 0. 




6. R.M.M., p. 19. 
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whether he had the same power to inflict punishment on the cul-
prits or not, is not known. 
The Darughe acted as the judge for minor offences, such as 
theft, violation of the peace, drinking alcoholic beverages and 
so on; thus his sphere of influence was further extended. 1 He 
could give the verdict on the offence and carry out the punish-
ment on the spot. 2 Often the culprits resorted to bribery and, 
thus, escaped their punishment. It appears that the fines, 
which the Darughe and his men recovered from offenders, were 
given direct to him and he could pocket the money, as his 
legal income. It appears that, if anyone was not satisfied with 
- -. c the verdict of the Darughe, he could apply to the Qazi of Shar, 
who was generally a molla. But often the application to the 
Share court proved expensive and lengthy and, as asserted by 
Harford Jones, futile unless the offender had a supporter in 
high places, who could promote his claims. 3 
The Merchants: 
In the early 19th century, Malcolm found the merchants a num-
erous and affluent class... These were for the most part the sur-
vivors of the Zand era. Harford Jones met all his old merchant 
friends in Bushehr in 1807. 5 Although they had no organised 
corporations, such as guilds, they had close ties with one 
another; they gathered in an assembly to discuss their prob-
lems and jealously guarded their interests. They appointed 
their own clerks to attend to their financial transactions. The 
better classes of merchants had a room in the main caravansar-
ai, 6 which generally belonged to the monarch. In Shiraz, the 
1. Kinnier,J.H., Georgraphical, p.31. 
2. T .S., p p.67-70. 
3. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.408. 
4. H.P., Vol.II, p.582. 
5. T.S., p.51. Brydges, op. cit., p.428. 
6. T.S., p.51. D.K., preliminary matters, p.429. 
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best caravansarai belonged to the vakil and his successors. 1 
There the merchants exhibited their merchandise, fixed the 
prices, made bargains and picked up news. 2 They spent most 
of their time there, whereas the poorer merchants actually resid-
ed in a caravansarai, for at least the duration of their resi-
ence in a town. They paid a sum of money for the rent of the 
room to the government, but they were not taxed on it. 3 
The only contribution, which was officially fixed for the mer-
chants, was the Rahdari (toll tax); that is, any merchandise, 
which landed on the Gulf coast or, indeed, on the northern 
shores and was conveyed to the inner parts of the empire, was 
liable to a nominal sum, according to the load of merchandise 
and not the value. There were about nine toll taxes from Bush-
ehr to Shiraz and, at every station, the caravans were stopped 
and taxed. Waring, in 1802, asserts that, although the amount 
of rahdari was trifling, the merchants, who wished to convey 
their goods to the northern parts of the kingdom, often paid 
as much as 30 percent rahdari.. and this discouraged them from 
nationwide trade. 
The goods entering and departing from the cities were also lia-
ble to custom duties (Gomrok); Francklin asserts that in Shiraz 
the kalantar, or an officer of his establishment, was present 





"an apartment in the grand caravanserai, where him-
self or his assistant resides, who is called the 
GoomRook (sic), or custom master, and is always 
present on the arrival of the caravan. All goods 
are opened here, even to the meanest article, and 
T.S., p.Sl. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol. I, p.428. 
T. s.' p.Sl. D.K., preli1inary matters, p.429. 
H.P., Vol. II, pp.476-7. 
T.S., pp.79-80. 
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"a duty is exacted upon everything foreign." 1 
The merchants, who traded in home produce, were exempt from 
payment of this tax. It is, however, curious that when Harford 
]ones was leaving Shiraz, together with a merchant from Bush-
ehr, the Rahdars attempted to search his merchandise, despite 
his having obtained a passport from ~aji Ebrahim, which was 
meant to exempt him from such procedures. But as the markets 
of the empire were opening to European commodities, there were 
few merchants, who were strictly limited to internal trade. 
Those merchants, who engaged in external trade, often travell-
ed to the countries, with which they had commercial dealings. 
Many had agents in those countries to transact their business 
for them. 2 In general, the merchants were intelligent, speculat-
ive and enterprising, and the majority of them were educated. 3 
A typical merchant of the 18th and 19th century was Mirza 
/- Nabi. He was the son of a bankrupt merchant of Bushehr. He 
started his career as a Mirza (secretary) to Harford ] ones. 
With the little salary that he earned, he supported his mother 
and his infant brothers and sisters. He, however, through his 
intelligence and amiable character, soon gained the favour and 
respect of the EIC agents in Ba~ra. He soon became the agent 
of his brother-in-law, ~aji Khalil, a rich merchant of Bushehr. 
He thus gathered a small capital sum, with which he started 
his own business. In 1791 he had become so wealthy that he 
involved in a joint enterprise with the residents of the EIC 
and the Portuguese merchants... He was, however, ruined when 
he attempted to utilize his wealth to gain social status and 
acceptance by the establishment. 
1. O.M.T., pp.149-50. 
2. T.S., p.77. 
3. H.P., Vol.II, p.582. 
4. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Transaction of His Majesty's Mission to Persia (London 






The merchants, despite their nominal contribution to the treas-
ury, were often mulcted and denuded of their wealth by the 
government, especially in times of general unrest. But the 
Zands generally cherished and protected the merchants and 
c - -
only Ali M orad Khan is known to have extorted money from the 
inhabitants of Shiraz and Esfahan, mainly from the artisans 
and merchants. 1 Even he, however, was anxious to revive 
trade and encourage the merchants to carry on their traffic. 
The competition of various contenders for power, however, made 
the roads impassible and the traffic of merchandise hazardous. 
Thus, very few merchants ventured to risk and convey their 
goods to distant areas. 
Merchants were subject to confiscation of their wealth by rulers 
c -and/or contenders for power. Lotf Ali Khan, on his arrival in 
the city of Gavashir, confiscated. the immense wealth of Aqa cAli 
Kermani, who had supported the Qajars and had advised the 
governor of Kerman to deny entry to the Zand prince. He was, 
however, given back his effects, when Lotf cAli Khan was cap-
tured by the Qaj ars. 2 
The existance of tribal settlements along the transit routes 
made the transportation of goods even more unsafe. Nomads of-
ten resorted to plundering the caravans passing through their 
area. Even Sir John Malcolm 's retinue was plundered in Kurdis-
tan and, with great effort, he managed to recover the stolen 
goods. 3 
Despite all these hazards, which were involved in trade, it 
was the merchants who were the least affected by civil unrest. 
Sir John Malcolm observes that generally the merchants were 
the most prosperous classes ... The evidence for this, as we 
1. R.T., p.437. R.M.M., p.79. 
2. T.K., pp.366-7. 
3. Sketches ,of . Persia, Vol.II, pp.268-71. 
4. H.P., Vol.II, p.430. 
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have mentioned before, is that the merchants of the southern 
coast in the 19th century were almost all the survivors of the 
Zand era. Their ability to adapt to different situations, and 
the flexibility of their trading patterns, made them able to 
cope with the difficulties involved in their commercial activit-
ies. Waring, in 1802, affirms that many of the merchants had 
changed their line of business and had resorted to the ship-
building industry, which they hired out to navigators. 1 They 
carefully avoided exciting the jealousy of the government offic-
ials and their fellow merchants. They hardly ever contested the 
power of the government and, if they did, it was in support 
- - c -of another feudal warlord, as in the case of Aqa :Ali Kermani. He 
opposed the Zands, but as a result of his attachment to the 
Qajars. Although when government oppression went beyond a tol-
erable level, merchants were prepared to take to armed strug-
gle. During the reign of Nader Shah, two merchants by the 
name of ~aji Safar Qoli and ~aji Kousar in Hezar J ari b of Maz-
daran, led a strong rebellion. They even attacked the army 
sent to quell the revolt, and in a fierce battle were defeated. 
The 6,000 rebels were mostly killed and the merchants were cap-
tured. This, however, was uncommon in the Zand era. 2 
Merchants often lived frugally, despite their enormous wealth. 
In 1791, Sir Harford Jones ·noticed that a wealthy jeweller of 
Lotf <Ali Khan's drank his coffee in an ordinary cup and 
smoked a clay Qalyan, whereas he entertained his guest with 
a golden cup and a Qalyan mounted with jewels. Their houses 
were often large and luxurious, but nothing of that affluence 
could be detected from the exterior, as they carefully hid their 
wealth behind a plain and somewhat mean frontage. 3 They kept 
good relations with the government, in order to escape harass-
ment. Haji Ebrahim Bushehri, the mehmandar to Harford Jones, . 
1. T.S., pp.77-8. 
- c- - - -2. Mohammad Ka~em, Alam Araye Naderi, Vol.III, p.73. 
3. D.K., preliminary matters, pp.cxxxiii-iv. 
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visited ~aji Ebrahim Kalantar to obtain a passport for his jour-
ney, despite his great dislike for that man. 1 
Buckingham, in the early 19th century, relates an interesting 
instance of the fears and also the risk, which the merchants 
were compelled to take in order to protect their goods. 
"During our stay here ( Bushehr) the governor was 
engaged in a war with some villages on the plain 
behind the town and was much in want of lead for 
musket balls; this want instead of increasing the 
demand for, and consequently the price of the art-
icle as it would naturally have done under any 
well regulated government, had actually the effect 
of stopping the supplies of this metal which was 
laid in expressly for the place. A vessel laying 
in the roads had on board hundred slabs of lead, 
supplied at Bombay for Bush ire, but the owner of 
them fearing that if they were landed the govern-
ment's agents would seize it for their master's use 
on the condition of long payment described, request-
ed the captain not to land it here and paid addit-
ional freight to carry it to Bossorah where the un-
certain market was better than the ruinous one 
here. " 2 
Government oppression was not the only malady inflicting trade 
and the merchants. The outbreak of epidemics often prevented 
the car a vans from travel ling to and from the affected areas. 
In Tazkerreh Shushtar, we learn that, on the eruption of chol-
era in Basra, all the car a vans of merchandise were refused ad-
• 
mission to the town of Shushtar and kept outside the walls for 
a long period, until the danger of the disease spreading in 
Shushtar was completely removed. 3 In 1798, almost all the mer-
chants in Ba~ra had fled on account of the plague. This great-
ly hampered trade and sometimes ruined the merchants. 
1. D.K., preli1inary matters, pp.cxxxiii-iv. 
2. Buckingham, Travels in Assyria,Vol.II ,p118The Shaikh took the 11erchandise he liked 
and paid for them in lieu o-f tax and custom. 
3. Tazkerreh Shushtar, Msc., Edinburgh, n.p. 
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The merchants, being affluent and prosperous, had obligations 
towards their fellow citizens. They were expected to carry out 
construction schemes and contribute to the upkeep of religious 
establishments. Maftun refers to a merchant in Esfahan, whose 
capital exceeded 100,000 Tomans. Being a miser, however, he 
stayed aloof from his co-religionists and associated with the 
Jews and the Zoroastrians. 1 These expectations of the public 
were added to the demands for contribution of the government 
for major construction plans such as dams, mosques, etc. Many 
of the merchants, however, employed their wealth in these pur-
suits voluntarily. ~aji Aqa Mo~ammad Renani, the governor of 
Esfahan and also a merchant, built many buildings of public 
utility in Esfahan, such as Caravanserais, Baths and Bazars. 2 
The richest merchants ranked among the higher strata of the 
society. Thus, they associated with the top-ranking officials 
and even the royal family. Often they established close links 
with high society by way of marriages. Karim Khan married the 
daughter of a rich merchant of Esfahan. These links were bene-
ficial to their trade and protected them from the oppression of 
the government. On the other hand, the government looked to 
the merchants for economic support in times of war. Top-rank-
ing officials sought the merchants' company and entertained 
them in their houses. Harford J ones found the merchants enter-
tained by Mirza Mohammad Hose in, the prime minister of Lotf 
c Ali Khan, more pleasant than any other class present at his 
banquets. 3 
Here we will study the reasons why Persian merchants never 
reached the point of becoming capitalists in the Western sense 
of the word. Despite their wealth and power to do so, they 
never attempted to change the existing relations of production. 
1. Negarestan-e-Dara, p.l63. 
2. G.M., p.319. 
3. D.K., preliminary 1atters, p.cxlviii. H.P., Vol.II, p.583. 
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As we will study later,. the artisans were totally dependent 
on the merchant to circulate their goods. Thus the merchants 
were able to bring the artisan under their direct control. By 
this measure, they could gain control of their production and 
the market, thus increasing their economic power. They would, 
therefore, be in a position to compete successfully with the for-
eign economic threat, which by the late 18th century, had be-
come acute. This would have brought about a change, which 
occurred in Western Europe. In the interpretation put forward 
by Maurice Dob b in order to explain how the bourgeois revolut-
ion happened, there are two ways in which merchants may be-
come industrial capitalists. The first is that the producer, i.e. 
the artisan, becomes the merchant; this is a really revolution-
ary way. Alternatively, the merchant gets possession of the dir-
ect means of production. This way serves historically as a 
mode of transition, an instance of which can be found in 17th 
century England, where the clothier brings the weaver under 
the former's control. The clothier sells wool to the weaver and 
buys the weaver's products from him. 1 This method, although 
it was unable to overthrow the old mode of production, enabled 
the clothier to manipulate the existing system to his advan-
tage. This system, in comparison to the first way, in which 
the artisan becomes a capitalist, is only a half way transform-
ation of feudalism. If the artisans were to become capitalists, 
they would come into conflict with the class of merchants. The 
interpretation by Dobb is primarily aimed at identifying the 
revolutionary way in which the small producer, e.g. artisans 
practising outside the guild system in the precinct of the towns 
during the Tudor era, become capitalists. The beginning of the 
17th century witnessed the advent of 
"an important shift in the centre of gravity: the ris-
ing predominance of a class of merchants-employers 
from the ranks of the craftsmen. " 2 
1. Dobb, Maurice, Studies in the Development of Capitalism {London, 1946), p.130. 
2. Marx, K. Capital, Vol.III, p.393. 
- 280 -
In applying these two patterns to the merchant class of late 
18th and early 19th century Persia, we find that, despite what 
we have stated before: that is, the ability of the merchant to 
control the artisans and the market, they failed to speculate 
on this direct control; instead they were absorbed more and 
more in the sale of foreign goods, which were brought into the 
merket in great amounts. Thus, we can state that none of the 
patterns of development discussed by Dobb actually took place 
in Persia. Furthermore, the merchants, instead of mobilising 
their capital in the attainment of political power and bringing 
a bout a change in the mode of production, allied themselves to 
the semi-feudal ruling families and even attempted to become 
part of the establishment. 1 There is no evidence of the revolut-
ionary way having been realized either: that is, a craftsman 
becoming a merchant and, thus, competing with the merchant, 
who did not control production in a direct manner. The case 
of ~aji Aqa Mo~ammad Renani, the artisan of Esfahan, who be-
came a merchant, was an exception to the general rule. 2 Had 
the craftsmen attempted to take their products directly to the 
market, they would have overcome the lack of liquid capital, 
which was their initial disadvantage. Since the artisans were 
directly involved in the process of production, it was in their 
interest to reduce the cost of production by improving their 
techniques. They would, therefore, be in a position to pose a 
threat to the merchants, by competing with them for control of 
the market. 3 The artisans of Persia, who had not achieved this 
degree of awareness, continued to be dependent on the mer-
chants for the circulation of their goods and, thus, had to 
appease the former class. A merchant's decision on the via bil-
ity of a commodity, decided the fortune of the artisans: that 
is to say, when a merchant refused to buy and transport mer-
chandise, the artisan was either forced to go bankrupt, or else 
1. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, pp.34-5. 
2. G.G., p.ll2. 
3. Dobb, M., Studies in the Development of Capitalism, p.l35. 
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limit his production according to the local market for his 
goods. That is why most of the artisans were part time cultivat-
ors and opened their shops a few days a week. 1 Their aim in 
engaging in other activities was to subsidize their income and 
avoid bankruptcy. Niebuhr, in the mid 18th century, remarks 
on the excellence of the glass manufactured in Shiraz, 2 but 
another European traveller, in the mid 19th century, asserts 
that the commodity had ceased to maintain its excellent qual-
ity. 3 This was due solely to the preference of the merchant for 
trading in European glass, and the artisans, unable to compete 
with the foreign product, had closed their workshops. There 
were other instances to prove this point: namely, the Shawl 
industry in Kerman did not flourish, because Indian shawls of 
better quality monopolised the market in the 19th century. 
Shopkeepers: 
These were commonly known as Ahl-e-Kasb, or Kasabeh. They 
sold foodstuffs, hardware, fuel, textiles and other commodities. 
They, like the artisans, had a shop in the Bazar, where they 
displayed their goods and sold them. They were also organised 
in guilds (A~naf) and had their own elders or naqib. The 
only difference between the artisans and the shopkeepers, as 
far as the guild system was concerned, was that they did not 
have the religious ceremony of initiation into the craft. As we 
will see in the section on the guilds, this ritual involved sol-
emn commitment to the craft, and bound the mastercraftsmen to 
strict moral principles... The guilds of the shopkeepers served 
only as a convenient means for the government to collect taxes 
and deal with the traders in a uniform body. They were also 
compelled to abide by the rules set by the government, in 
l.Kuznetsova, Urban Industry, p,310. 
2. Niebuhr, C., Travels, p.70. 
3. Binning, Two years travels in Persia, Vol.I, p.288. 
4.Massignon, "Guilds", Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, p.215. 
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respect to prices and the weight and quality of their goods. 1 
The organisation of the guilds of shopkeepers was much the 
same as the artisans. They had to pay a certain amount of tax 
every year, which was allocated at the beginning of each 
year. Their naqi bs were directly responsible to the Kalantar, 
who kept the document of tax allocation ('.[umar) for the regul-
ar payment of their quota (Bonicheh). 2 The Kasabeh, like the 
artisans, were the clients of the major merchants (Sod agar) 
and bought their goods through them, often on credit. 3 They 
paid an annual rent for their shops in the bazar, which gener-
ally belonged to the monarch or his relations... In a document 
in existence, the rent of the Qai~arieh, or the textile bazar, 
in Shiraz is given as forty Tomans. 5 
For foodstuffs, the cities had to rely heavily on the villages 
in the neighbouring districts. Because of inadequate means of 
transportation, provisions were seldom carried to and from dis-
tant provinces. Hence, there existed a close re la tionshi p be-
tween the town and the rural areas. The army was often provid-
ed with prov1s1ons from other provinces, while it was on the 
c -march. Ja far Khan, in his attack on the town of Yazd, ord-
ered the governors of Kerman and the neighbouring districts to 
send provisions to his camp, fearing that the province of Fars 
could not meet the heavy demand.' 
The Kasabeh generally had wage labourers (Ajir, Ruzmozd) to 
work for them. They could dismiss them at pleasure and with-
out previous notice. As they were not members of the guilds, 
1. T.S., pp.67-8. 
2. For ~he detailed proceedings of tax collection, the reader is referred to Tazker-
at al-Moluk, which provides .a111ple . infor11ation on the s.ubject. Tazkerat al-Moluk, 
pp.80-81. 
3. Wills, C.J., The Land of the Lion and the Sun (London, 1883), p.189. 
4. I.O.R., Private Correspondence of J. Malcolm, Notes for a memorandum on the rev-
enu~Persia, ·1810. 
5. Majles Library, Tehran. 
6. G.G., p.301. 
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they did not enjoy the security and protection offered to the 
Asnaf. They were paid reasonably well, as is indicated by Res-
tarn. 1 The general practice was to employ very young children, 
between the ages of twelve and fifteen, 2 for that purpose and 
often the Kas eb 's own children worked in their shops. Haji . 
Hashem, the father of ~aji Ebrahim, was a petty trader (Baq-
al) in the Bazar and his son also started off in the Bazar. In-
cidentally, none of the ~aji' s brothers were Bazaris; indeed 
two of them had entered the army and gained the rank of infan-
try commanders. 3 It was not uncommon for the sons of Kasebs 
to aspire to higher status in society. The sons of ~aji Me~ am-
mad 'Ali cAllaf (forage chandler), after having gained great 
c -wealth through plundering ] a far Khan's treasures, entered the 
service of the Qaj ars and became ministers and governors in 
the Qajar period ... 
The shopkeepers, unlike the artisans, did not suffer the hard-
ships and distress caused by the civil strife and sieges, or at 
least not those of them who dealt with foodstuffs. The vakil 
made it a rule to stock a great amount of provisions in the 
government granaries, 5 in order to prevent famine and shortage 
of food. This practice, however, fell into disuse and, as the 
kalantar of Shiraz clearly indicates, during the siege of Shir-
az by CAli Morad Khan' only the shopkeepers provided the pub-
lic with provisions. 6 This gave a good opportunity to the chand-
lers to hoard provisions and sell them at violent profit in 
times of war. Especially since price controls were not vigorous-
ly exercised, many of the shopkeepers could derive great bene-
fit when a siege occurred. Indeed, the prices given by Mirza 
1. .!!.:1..:.• p.309. He gives their average pay as 300 Dinars, that is one third of a 
To•an. 
2. Kuznetsova, ~rban Industry, p.316. 
3. G.M., p.261 & 345. 
4. R.T., p.448. 
5. Ibid., p.421 •. 
6. R.M.M., pp.78-9. 
- 284 -
Mol}ammad, as compared to the fixed prices of the reign of the 
Vakil, are grossly exorbitant. 1 Although after five months of 
siege the shops were forced to close, one may assume that they 
had made great profits while they were open. 
A class of Kasabeh were the pedlars (Dourehgard); these formed 
the link between the city and the neighbouring villages and 
hamlets. They often traded their goods in exchange for food-
stuffs such as eggs, dairy products, fruits and vegetables. 
Their business was a lucrative one. Due to poor transportation, 
many villages were completely cut off from the towns 2 and only 
a few pedlars provided them with their necessities. The tribal 
areas were also under the sway of pedlars, who also traded 
in kind, rather than cash. 
The pedlars, not having a fixed shop in the bazar, could foll-
ow their own fortunes. They often joined the army and sold 
their goods to the soldiers in the ordu Bazar. 3 These were of-
ten extensive and profitable, especially when there was scare-
ity of food and provisions in the camp. Furthermore, the ped-
lars could not be taxed, as they did not belong to the guilds 
and the government had no means of locating them. It is true 
that in a chaotic state of affairs they often ran the risk of 
being plundered in the ordu Bazar or, indeed, on the roads, 
but by not paying the rent on a fixed shop together with the 
tax exemption, they were compensated for the inconveniences in-
vel ved in their trade. 
During this period, there appears to have existed another class 
of traders: namely, the brokers (Dallal). These were often en-
gaged in the sale of art articles, antiques, manuscripts of 
great value, property and land. The landlord of Francklin was 
1. R.M.M., p.79. 
2~ Kinnier,., J.M., A Geographical Memoir on the Persian Empire {London, 1813), p.43. 
3. R.M.M., p.60. 
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a Dallal, who offered Harford }ones a good bargain of an old 
Qoran, known to have been written by one of the Emams of the 
Shi cite sect. 1 Brokers received a commission and often made 
enormous profit on the purchase of such items by the mer-
chants. There is no evidence to prove that the brokers had 
fixed shops and paid tax to the government. 
There is, however, mention of the pawn brokers ( Semsar) being 
respectable members of the community and that one of them 
even became a kadkhoda of the Haydari quarters in the city 
of Shiraz. 2 Mirza Mohammad Kalantar, however, relates rather 
sarcastically that, during the reign of Nader Shah, even the 
c - -Semsars were listed among the A yan va Tojjar to meet the de-
mand for 375,000 Tomans in emergency taxes. 3 It appears that 
Semsars were Muslims and often affluent, despite the fact that 
it was contrary to, and in violation of, the laws of Islam, as 
it involved a form of usury. At least the Semsar Kadkhoda of 
Shira:l: was a certain Haji Hashem ... . 
Incidentally, usury appears to have been practised in various 
forms by the Kasabeh. There were money lenders in the Bazar, 
who charged their clients exorbitant rates. Also the currency 
broker (~arraf), who deducted a commission for his services. 
The bills of exchange (Barats) were another form of gaining 
easy profit, 5 and this was often carried out by the mer-
chants. This was especially detrimental to merchants engaged 
in foreign trade; often the merchants shipped their goods with-
out receiving full payment. Instead, they received a Barat, to 
be remitted at a specified date in the future. 6 At times, when 
the creditor would not honour his debt, the merchant was corn-
1. D.K., preliminary matters, p.clviii. 
2. R • M. M. , p • 48. 
3. Ibid., pp.22, 26. 
4. I.O.R. G/29/21, Report on the Co1merce of Persia, 1791. 
5. Ibid. G/29/23, Bagdad, 20th Nov. 1800. 
6. T .s., p.a. 
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pelled to sell the Bar at at a discount to a debt collector. 
However, the area of the Bazar contained many other vendors 
of small items, such as religious trinkets, beads, prayer rugs, 
candles and other items of little value. These petty traders 
were generally stationed at the entrance of the Bazar and near 
to the great Mosque, which was situated next to the Bazar. 1 
A crowd of porters carrying merchandise to and fro and messen-
gers, refreshment sellers completed the picture in the Bazars. 
Artisans 
As the heading indicates, these were two distinct groups with 
different characters and often conflicting interests. The artis-
ans were commonly known as Pishehvar or Ahl-e-Herfat. They 
were highly skilled craftsmen, working to order from the custom-
er. They often had a workshop in the main Bazar and made 
their products and sold them in the same place. They were free 
in that they worked for their own benefit and following their 
own ini tia ti ves. They were, however, organised in guilds 
(A~naf) and had to abide by the rules set by the guilds in 
respect to the price of their commodities, the quality of mater-
ial and workmanship. 2 We will study the A~naf in detail later. 
Here we would like to mention that artisans normally started 
off as an apprentice in the workshop of their father, or of an-
other artisan. After the completion of their training, they were 
initiated as mastercraftsmen into the guilds. Seldom, a crafts-
man ventured to change his profession, as it was considered 
a disrespect to the skill, which their fathers had practised. 3 
Often the quarters of the Bazar were named after the artisans 
practising in them, such as Mesgaran, Kasehgaran, .. etc. They 
1. I.O.R., G/29/23, Bagdad, 20th Nov. 1800. 
2. T.M., pp.76-7. 
3. Kuznetsov.a, Urban Industry, pp.315-16. 
4. T.S., p.32. Kinnier, op. cit., p.62. 
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paid rent for their shops. Apparently, there were two kinds of 
rents collected from their shops: If the shop belonged to the 
Shah, which was often the case, the rent was paid at a rate 
considered to be proportionate to the gains derived from the 
shops. If the shop belonged to an individual, the artisans and 
shopkeepers paid twenty percent of their annual profit. 1 
It is not known, whether there was a group of craftsmen work-
ing exclusively for the court at this period, as was the case 
in the Sa fa vid times. There is, however, mention in a document 
belonging to the Vakil's time, of a farrier providing horse 
shoes for the court, 2 and also a jeweller, who worked exclusive-
ly for Lotf cAli Khan. 3 The practice was that these craftsmen, 
known as Darbasteh, worked in the workshops belonging to the 
court and were provided with food, lodging and clothing. 
Almost all the masters had apprentices, who entered their serv-
ice about the age of twelve to fifteen. When they had completed 
their training, they were admitted to the relevant Senf, with 
a ceremony which has been thoroughly investigated by Massig-
non... The mastercraftsmen or Ostadan had a Naqib, who super-
vised their activities and their morals. Disputes arising be-
tween the ostadan were always taken to the naqib, who adjudi-
cated and carried out the penalty on the spot. The A~naf did 
not have a naqib at all times. In fact, the only mention of the 
ostadan-e-Bazar in the Ruznameh of Mirza Mohammad, bears 
evidence to the fact that, during the interregnum after the ass-
assination of Nader Shah, the mastercraftsmen took matters into 
their own hands. It could, however, have been the case only 
in Shiraz, as the information on this matter is insufficient. 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile mentioning an instance, in which 
1. H.P., Vol.II, p.477. 
2. Majles Library, Tehran. 
3. D.K., preliminary •atters, p.cxxvi. 
4. Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, pp. 214-16. See under Shadd, Encyclopedia of 
Islam. Vol.S-Z, p.245. 
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a dispute had arisen between the kalantar and the ostadan-e-
Bazar. Apparently, cAli Mardan Khan Bakhtiari, after having 
captured Shiraz, had set about extorting money from the inhab-
itants. Mirza Mohammad, acting on behalf of his uncle, then 
the kalantar, unable to meet the demands had collected the sum 
of 750 Tomans from the craftsmen of the Bazar, which he had 
paid to the latter chief. In the meantime, Mirza Mohammad Hos-
ein, the kalantar, had resigned as a protest at the extortions 
of the Bakhtiaris, and the Darughe of the city had taken his 
place. 'Ali Mardan Khan left Shiraz, after having inflicted enor-
mous damage on its inhabitants. It was then that the ostadan-
e-Bazar demanded their money back. They had allied themselves 
to the darughe and the governor, and had coerced Mirza Moham-
mad into restoring the sum in question. Mirza Mohammad be-
lieved that the money was demanded of the inhabitants and 
not of his uncle, and that the above-mentioned officials had a 
hand in the dispute, aiming at disgracing Mirza Mohammad and 
his uncle, Mirza Mohammad Hosein. 1 Whether the allegation 
was true or not we cannot decide. Nevertheless, it is the only 
instance in which the ostadan acted independently and without 
the medium of their head, the naqib. 
Karim Khan appointed a naqib for all the cities. Such officers 
were paid by the government. 2 The kalantar was directly resp-
onsible for the payment of Bonicheh (quota) of the artisans, 
which was fixed at the beginning of each year. The Vakil was 
inclined to control the prices of the commodities and every year 
price lists were prepared and acted upon. 3 The ostadan could 
not exceed the prices fixed by the government, or violate the 
standard weight, and should anyone risk such offences, he 
would be severly punished ... 
1. R.M.M., pp.44-46. 
2. R.T., p.307. 
3. Ibid., p.310. 
4. T.S., p.69. 
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The artisans were the clients of the merchants, in that they 
supplied the latter with their products and the merchants trans-
ported them to other provinces and abroad to neighbouring coun-
tries. 1 Thus, they were anxious to keep their good relations 
with the merchants and had a vested interest in maintaining 
law and order in their immediate surroundings, as well as the 
kingdom in general. That is why, in times of unrest, the artis-
ans formed the core of the city militia and defended the rights 
and honour of their fellow citizens. During the contest between 
the Afshar successors of Nader Shah, Ebrahim Mirza appointed 
a certain Mehdi Khan as governor of Tabriz. He set about op-
pressing the inhabitants and they, unable to tolerate his cruel-
ty, decided to assassinate him. A few of the Lutis attacked his 
residence and killed him. His brother, who was the governor 
of Orumieh, brought his army to Tabriz in order to subdue the 
populace. The inhabitants asked for assistance from the neigh-
bouring chiefs and, with 6,000 artisans (Ahl-e-herfat) and some 
peasants, prepared to repel the enemy. The chiefs of the local 
principalities fled at the first encounter and the infantry of 
artisans were completely massacred; about 5,000 of them lost 
their lives. 2 
The artisans, motivated by self-interest, were often divided in 
their support for a party or its adversary, as they deemed ex-
pedient. When Taqi Khan Dorrani, a charcoal seller, staged a 
rebellion and captured the city of Kerman, he totally relied on 
the skill of two artisans, who provided him with guns and am-
unitions. Qoli Tafangsaz (Gunsmith) made guns with such high 
power velocity, that Taqi Khan shot the Zand general, sent to 
besiege the city, at a distance of 1500 feet. Molla Qoli Baru~­
kub (Gunpowder miller), also provided him with the best gun-
powder. Both craftsmen were hansomely rewarded. On the other 
hand, the weaver population of the city, whose interest was to 
1. Floor, W., "The Merchant (Tujjar) in Qajar Iran", ZDMG.126.1976, p.119. 
2. laTa, pp.490-93. 
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see the roads safe and trade undisturbed, conspired to admit 
the Zand army into the city. Thus, J amal Shalbaf, their elder, 
with the assistance of other Kasabeh, betrayed one of the gates 
to the Zands and Taqi Khan was captured and sent to Shiraz. 1 
In times of general unrest, when the oppression of the govern-
ment was beyond tolerance, the artisans closed their shops and 
even emigrated to other areas. For instance, when Ebrahim Mir-
za Afshar captured A~arbayjan, many of the artisans left the 
province and sought refuge in other quarters. 2 cAli Mardan 
Khan Bakhtiari' s cruelty also forced the artisans of Shiraz to 
leave the city with their families. 3 
The artisan traders formed a large proportion of the urban pop-
ulation in big cities. In small industrial towns, such as Yazd 
and Kashan, they constitued a majority. Hence, they bore the 
brunt of heavy taxes in times of civil war and internal unrest. 
All the European sources assert that the fixed taxes or Boni-
cheh of the artisans were light and by no means excessive, dur-
ing the life time of the Vakil. The situation, however, changed 
drastically after his death. Many of the Zand territories con-
stantly changed hands between the various competitors. J a c far 
Khan gained possession of Esfahan three times and lost it to 
the ,Qajars... On each occasion, the victor inflicted great dam-
age to trade and industry, by demanding heavy fines and im-
posts. This was also the case in Shiraz. cAli Morad Khan, after 
besieging Shiraz for nine months, demanded 40,000 Tomans from 
the natives of Shiraz and this was after nine months of siege, 
which had reduced the inhabitants to serious distress. After 
five months of the siege, the Bazar was completely bare, 5 no 
1. T.K., p.327. 
2. laTa, p.488. 
3. R.M.M., p.43. 
4. G.G., pp.256-310. 
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caravan entered the city and none left. Artisans suffered more 
than the others, since trade was at a standstill and nobody 
had the money to purchase their commodities. 
Their miseries, however, did not end here. After the fall of the 
city, and despite strict orders by cAli Morad Khan, the soldiery 
plundered the city. 1 The Bazar was always the prime target of 
looters. As a matter of fact, the majority of the soldiers joined 
the army in the hope of gaining booty and, thus, did not hes-
itate to purs:ue their goal when they had the chance. 2 A victor-
ious army was not, however, the sole menace of the artisans. 
The Lutis also took every opportunity to plunder the Bazar. 
For instance, when the Zand forces garrisoned in the city of 
Kerman were surprised by Taqi Dorrani and took the road to 
Shiraz, the Lu~is looted the houses of the inhabitants and the 
Bazar. This was after the confiscation and extortions, which 
the populace had suffered by Taqi Khan's government. 3 
Even after the death of the Vakil, once the Zand administration 
was established in the city, the princes of that family took 
great pains to protect and cherish the Bazaris. Zaki Khan, des-
pite his monstrous cruelties towards the Zand nobles, was anx-
ious to provide safety and security to the Bazaris. Apparently, 
his zeal in this matter was such that the shops were left open 
at night and unattended and remained intact ... cAli Morad Khan 
is also known to have punished and dismissed his Baban Kurd 
troops, because they had harassed the Bazaris. 5 The police 
force established in Shiraz and elsewhere was mainly to guard 
the Bazars and private property, but often it was used as a 
means to mulct and harass the Bazaris. The police was the act-
1. O.M.T., p.133. 
2. Kinnier, Geographical, pp.32, 34. 
3. T.K., pp.236-237. 
4. M.T., p.345. 
5. G. M., p.392. 
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ing arm of the government to coerce the artisans and traders 
into contributing large sums of money for the decoration and 
illumination of the Bazar and for public entertainment. Franck-
lin, in 1786-7, witnessed the great illumination and fireworks, 
provided by the Bazaris to mark the occasion of the second son 
of Ja c far Khan undergoing the operation of circumcision. At 
least in the early Qajar era, the Darughe of Shiraz was known 
to accept bribes and presents and was furnished with every-
thing he needed by the Bazaris, so as to secure his favour 
and protection. But the Darughe could impose fines on the Baz-
aris, either for violating the laws or according to his own 
whims. 
Guilds (Asnaf): 
As mentioned in the section on artisans and craftsmen, such 
groups were organised into Asnaf. Islamic guilds have been 
thoroughly investigated by scholars. Suffice it to say that not 
all the guilds had a leader (naqib) at all times. Indeed, in 
the only instance, in which the artisans are directly mentioned 
by Mirza Mohammad, the kalantar of Fars during the interreg-
num after the death of Nader Shah, they seem to be acting in-
dependent of a naqib. 1 
Karim Khan appointed a naqib in Shiraz and elsewhere in the 
Empire. 2 For the duties and the sphere of power enjoyed by the 
naqib, the reader is referred to Tazkerat al-Moluk. 3 There is 
no information as to the number of the guilds in the various 
cities of Persia in the 18th century. Tazkerreh Shushtar gives 
a list of a bout eighty-four professions. Except for those en-
gaged in entertainment such as Motrebs, Qavvals, Mollas and 
beggars, the rest must have been organised into asnaf ... Major 
1. R.M.M., p.46. For a detailed study of the guilds, see Massignon, Encyclopedia 
of ~ Sciences, Encyclopedia of Islam, Lewis Bernard, "Islamic Guilds in the Mid-
dle Ages", J.C.A.S., 27, 1940, part IV. 
2. R.T., p.307. 
3. Tazkerat al-Moluk, ed. V. Minorsky (London, 1943), pp.S0-81. 
4. Tazkerrah-Shushtar, Abdollah Shushtiari (Calcutta, 1934), pp.104-7. 
5. T.S., p.47. 
6. Ouseley, W., Travels, Vol.II, p.92. 
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cities like Shiraz, Esfahan and Tabriz naturally boasted many 
more guilds. For example, Shiraz had a few bazars besides that 
of the Vakil, which were large and handsome, 1 and each one of 
them must have been occupied by artisans practising various 
crafts. The tendency was that each city provided for its own 
consumption and relied on its artisans for the commodities in 
demand locally. Waring, in 1802, remarks that the city of Shir-
az exported a few swords and a nominal amount of wine to the 
northern provinces of the Empire. 2 The textile products of the 
cities of Yazd and Kashan, however, were transported all over 
the empire. The city of Kashan was especially famous for its 
copper ware. Sir William Ouseley, in the early 19th century, 
remarks that his retinue waited to reach Kashan to purchase 
their kitchen utensils, which were celebrated for their excell-
ent workmanship and reasonable price. 3 
The guilds were, to a large extent, independent in their intern-
al affairs, in that they appointed their own leaders; they de-
cided on the suitability of apprentices for the initiation into 
the craft, according to their skills. They allocated the taxes 
on each craftsman with respect to their earnings, and so on. 
The government cherished the guild system as a convenient 
means for tax collecting purposes~ At times even, the govern-
ment received loans from the Asnaf on credit (Mosa c deh). In-. 
deed, the guilds, despite their independence, never achieved 
a power comparable with that enjoyed by the guilds in Western 
Europe. Many factors contributed to the political impotence, 
which characterises the guilds in Persia in the 18th century. 
Firstly, it is significant that the guilds' leaders were directly 
answerable to the kalantar, who by this time was no longer re-
presenting the public but was, rather, an official with a 
strong police force under his control. 5 Apparently, in the late 
1. T .S., p.32. 
2. Ibid., p.47. 
3. Ouseley, W., Travels, Vol.II, (Calcutta, 1924), p.92. 
4. R.M.M., p.19. 
5. T.S., pp.67-70. 
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18th century, the middle classes, i.e. artisans and shopkeep-
ers, were closely watched by the police and nothing could es-
cape the surveillance network established by the Zands in their 
dominion. 1 This, in effect, prevented the artisans from any act 
which would prejudice the security of the government. This was 
precisely why ~aji Ebrahim, the Kalantar, and not any other 
civilian, could venture a coup, because he had the assistance 
of the city militia and the police force at his disposal. The 
city militia was composed, for the most part, of shopkeepers, 2 
but it is significant that they could not effect any political 
move without the sanction of the kalantar. The shopkeepers, 
who were members of the guilds, were active participants in 
the urban disturbances after the death of the vakil but, even 
on those occasions, they allied themselves with the local offic-
ials, such as kadkhodas and Babas. 3 This evidence clearly in-
dicates that the asnaf were of no consequence' as far as polit-
ical change was concerned, and that they were used, or at 
least manipulated, by government officials. Their aim in sup-
porting the officials was primarily financial, and it did not 
go beyond immediate advantage to involve long-term political 
motives. 
On the other hand, the guild system and its ethic restricted 
the activities of guild members. The well to do and respectable 
artisan would never endanger his reputation and good name, 
in order to protest against oppression. The only form of protest 
was the closure of the shops and to take refuge in a sanc-
tuary. As Waring observes, artisans worked according to their 
reputation;.. this reputation was not only a result of skill and 
mastery of their craft, but also of honesty and integrity, 
which gained the respect and confidence of the general public. 
1. T.S.' p.64. 
2. H.P., Vol. II, p.l85. 
3. G.G., pp.222-3. 
4. T.S., p.47. 
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For instance, if an artisan refused to accept his bonicheh 
(Quota), he was, first and foremost, reprimanded by his col-
leagues, who had to bear the burden of his share. Such con-
duct, in effect, antagonised his fellow artisans and the public 
at large. Again, if he decided to sell his products at a higher 
price and contrary to the rules of the guild, he ran the risk 
of being punished by his guild 1 and being regarded as avaric-
ious and a dishonest man in the eyes of the citizens. 
In this sense, the guild system not only did not offer protect-
ion and privilege to its members, but it also restricted their 
freedom and hindered their aspirations. This is exactly why we 
have no· mention of the craftsmen's involvement in political act-
ivities and lawless acts. Well-respected artisans were expected 
to defend the honour of their fellow citizens in times of unrest 
and chaos. We have evidence of at least four famous Lutis be-
ing well-known artisans, but these were men of good character, 
who protected the weak and aided the poor. 2 It is sufficient 
to note that only men of good name could be initiated into the 
crafts and, unless a craftsman had proved his honesty, he 
would not be admitted to the guild for which he had been train-
ed. 
The position of the shopkeepers (Kasebs) was to a large extent 
different. Although they were members of guilds and had to 
abide by the rules imposed on them, they had no fear of reject-
ion by the craft guilds. As long as they had the capital to set 
up their business, there was no impediment in their way. It 
is obvious that the well-established traders did not wish to jeo-
pardise their positions as respected members of the community. 
Thus, they, too, were inclined to abide by the laws and rules 
of the guilds. There were, however, minor shopkeepers who had 
no such fears, and many traders had wage labourers ( Ruzmozd) 
1. Kuznetsova, Urban Industry, p.315. 
2. R. T., p.411. 
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and message boys, who entered the service of the bazaris, in 
order to escape unemployment. It appears that, in this period, 
there was a flow of villagers to the cities and especially to 
the metropolis. Karim Khan employed 12,000 unskilled wage lab-
ourers in his construction schemes, only to assist them in earn-
ing a livelihood. 1 This indicates that the population of the cit-
ies had increased and, since most of the emigrants were un-
employed, they sought jobs either as soldiers/retainers, or else 
in the bazar. 
Another negative 
and traders was 
guilds prevented 
impact of the guild system on the artisans 
that by imposing restrictions on prices, the 
unrestricted accumulation of wealth. We have 
no evidence of an artisan having amassed wealth, unless he en-
tered the government service like Haji Aqa Mohammad Renani, . . 
the goldsmith, who became the governor of Esfahan and, thus, 
accumulated great riches. 2 In such cases, the artisan naturally 
abandoned his craft and became a merchant, as the above-men-
tioned artisan did. This, however, did not apply to shopkeep-
ers, who engaged in the sale of foodstuffs. These traders took 
every opportunity to promote their interests and the government 
often turned a blind eye to their activities. When a famine 
broke out, almost always the practice of hoarding was the ord-
er of the day. The government, unable to fight it, went so far 
as to legalise the theft of food, in order to ease the distress 
of the poverty-striken citizens. 3 In that sense, the artisans 
had conflicting interests with the shopkeepers. Tazkerreh-Shush-
tar draws an impressive picture of the despair, to which the 
artisans were reduced, when a famine occurred in the city of 
Shushtar,.. whereas the CAllafs (grain chandlers) were amassing 
wealth by hoarding and selling provisions at violent profits. /.-
1. O.M. T, p.122. 
2. G.M., p.319. TaTa, Vol.II, p.217. 
3. Tazkerreh- -Shushtar, p.l08. 
4. Ibid., p.109. 
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The poor infrastructure created another major obstacle to the 
accumulation of wealth. The insecurity of roads and the poor 
condition of transportation limited the flow of commodities and, 
thus, closed the market to handicrafts. The artisans had to 
sell their goods locally with a few exceptional purchases for 
exportation. There were, however, other causes for the limited 
circulation of goods, primarily the toll tax system, which dis-
couraged the merchants from engaging in nationwide trade. War-
ing, in 1802, asserts that there were many Toll stations on the 
transit road from Shiraz to Bushehr. At every Rahdari, the mer-
chants had to pay a nominal tax, but often these trifling 
amounts at numerous stations amounted to thirty percent of the 
value of the merchandise. 1 That was probably why only a few 
caravans entered Shiraz and departed from it with goods. The 
internal unrest and frequent revolts created another obstacle 
in the transportation of goods. Often the rebels confiscated the 
goods of the merchants, thus leaving them with nothing, with 
which to carry on their business. Aqa Mo~ammad Khan, in his 
attempt to gain power, confiscated the merchandise of a mer-
chant car a van. 2 Esmac il Khan Zand pursued this course of act-
ion over a long time and thus gained great riches. 3 
The despotic nature of the government was yet another cause 
of stagnation and lack of incentive in the artisan craftsmen 
community. Besides the constant oppression of the government, 
it also discouraged the artisans from achieving perfection in 
their crafts. The case of the gunsmith, alluded to by Waring, 
bears evidence to this fact... The artisan felt that he achieved 
nothing by excellent craftsmanship and that, on the contrary, 
he was exploited by the government. Officials ordered them to 
produce goods without payment, or else they were paid much 
1. T.S., pp.79-80. 
2. Fava 1ed al-Safavieh, B.L. Ms., p.l46. 
3. Ibid., p.l38. G.G., p.279. 
4. T.S., p.32. 
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less than they deserved. Thus, the artisans made no effort to 
maximise their output, improve their skill and perfect their pro-
ducts. 
A major factor in the political impotence of the artisans' 
guilds was their division over conflicting interest. While it was 
beneficial for a gunsmith to provide for the diverse armies 
fighting each other, it was disastrous for other classes of arti-
sans to be caught in internal warfare. Such disunity was not, 
however, exclusively due to conflicting self-interest. There were 
other factors at work, such as the factional rivalry between 
the Haydari and Nee mati factions in almost all the towns and • 
cities in the empire. It is well known that the affiliation of 
an individual to one or other of the factions was only decided 
by his residence in a ward, which belonged to one of the fact-
ions. 1 It did not matter what guild he belonged to, and what 
craft he practised, but where his house was located in the div-
ision of quarters. Thus, members of the same guilds could be 
bitter enemies, because of their factional affiliations. Although 
we have no evidence of factional strifes amongst the Bazaris 
in the period under study, we have examples of such events 
taking place in the 19th century. Colonel Shiel, in 1835, ass-
erts that the bazar of Sarab, which mostly belonged to the J:Iay-
daris was plundered by the other faction, the Nee matis. 2 There 
also existed ideological and religious differences among the art-
isans and the bazaris in general. Traditionally the bazar had. 
close ties with the clergy and provided the Mojtaheds with an 
enormous amount of money as their Zakat, Sahm-e-Emam; and 
so on. There were also artisans, who were devoted to Sufi saints 
and frequented Khanqahs, rather than the mosques. These natur-
ally had conflicts with the orthodox bazari community. The art-
sans with Sufi affiliations were those talented and educated 
craftsmen, who took pride in earning their livelihood by their 
1. Shiel, Lady L., Glimpses of life and manners in Persia {London, 1856). p.323. 
2. Ibid., p. 325. 
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skills. The renowned 18th century poet, cAsheq-e-Esfahani, was 
a tailor in the bazar of Esfahan. He lived in poverty, but re-
fused to accept help from his friends. 1 There are numerous art-
isans, who were poets and men of learning, working in various 
branches of manufacturing and trade. 2 
We should now speak of the most prominent obstacle, with 
which the guilds were faced in acquiring political power. This 
was a new phenomenon, characterising the reign of the Zands. 
Karim Khan, in his attempt to form a standing army within his 
capital and all the major cities, transferred a great number 
of the tribes to the city of Shiraz and Esfahan. One source 
asserts that he settled about 90,000 tribal elements in and 
around the city of Shiraz. 3 It is easily imaginable that such 
a change in the composition of the population necessarily affect-
ed the balance of power within the city. The artisans, who pre-
viously were in charge of maintaining order and peace in their 
town in times of unrest, were no longer able to exercise this 
right. They were also deprived of their right to make decisions 
when their town and property were at stake. Almost always the 
tribes decided the course of events, when Shiraz was under 
siege by various armies. The tribes betrayed the city and ad-
mitted the enemy at their pleasure... On the other hand, when 
a rebellion erupted in the city of Kerman, as previously men-
tioned, the artisans and shopkeepers decided on the course of 
action and admitted the Zand army into the city. 5 This clearly 
indicates the degree to which the power of the bazar had dimin-
ished in Shiraz. The need for self-assertion was precisely the 
reason, which induced the kasabeh to support ~aji Ebrahim in 
his coup against the Zands. His main objective was to banish 
1. Shiel, op. cit., p.229. 
2. Ibid. Negarestan-e-Dara, pp.l98, 229, 237, etc. 
3. M. T., p.342. 
4. G.G., p.243. 
5. T.K., p.328. 
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the tribes from the city and free the city from their grip. The 
scheme was executed in the bazar and by the bazaris. 1 A ppar-
ently, the tribes had been admitted into the swordsmiths 1 quar-
ter and disarmed and banished outside the walls of the city. 
As we have discussed previously, the guilds never formed a co-
herent and united body, which could effect a political change. 
Indeed, the only instance of their participation in a political 
change, was the case of ~aji Ebrahim 1 s coup. One may ask 
what effect the change of one dynasty for another would have 
on the artisans and traders. This is, indeed, a perplexing dil-
emma, with which we are faced. The artisans and traders had 
two very good reasons for their support of the ~aji 1 s coup: one 
was their need for self-determination, which they had been tot-
ally denied by the tribes; and secondly, the fact that the pro-
tection and concessions, which the Zands offered to foreign 
trade at the expense of home produce, had made the bazaris 
c -unable to compete with growing foreign imports. Ja far Khan 
appears to have been the only Zand ruler, who was aware and 
apprehensive of the discontent occasioned by the flow of foreign 
goods. Thus, although he exempted foreign imports for payment 
of toll tax, at the same time he put a sanction on the exportat-
ion of Kermani wool, which was the main commodity in demand 
by the EIC. 2 With this measure, he aimed at the protection of 
home industry, i.e. shawl weaving, which was one of the few 
products which had a nationwide market. 
Now we will investigate whether the artisans and traders 
achieved their objectives. Although they managed to expel the 
tribes out of the city, and for the time being took control of 
affairs, the Qajars had no intention of making concessions to-
wards the city dwellers of Shiraz. Indeed, they transferred 
some tribes from Mazandaran into the city and these elements 
1. F.N., p.235. 













caused great discontent in the later stages of the 19th cent-
ury. 
1 
Furthermore, by shifting the capital from Shiraz to Teh-
ran, the former lost its position as the centre for commercial 
transactions and, thus, occupied a secondary position in that 
sphere. The flow of foreign goods increased drastically. The 
market was opened to European guns and ammunition and, thus, 
destroyed traditional gun manufacturing, which had flourished 
for a long period of time. By the mid-19th century, the remot-
est towns of the empire were stocked with foreign, and especi-
ally English, textiles and fabrics. 2 
Haydari and Necmati Factions: 
It was originally intended to discuss in this work the history 
and the origin of the ljaydari and Ne c mati factions, who cont-
inued their animosity until the late 19th, and even the early 
20th, centuries. As an article on this topic had been written 
recently, 3 it suffices to make a few points clear. First of all, 
the author of this article, Mir J a c fari, believes that the error 
made by the majority of the 19th century Persian scholars in 
the identity of the patron of the Haydari order, has come about 
by the fact that they have based their opinion on the informat-
ion given in Habib al-siar. The author, Mir Kwand, asserts 
that the patron- of the Haydaris was Qo!b al-din ljaydar 
Zava 'i,.. whereas our modern author maintains that the ljay-
daris were the followers of Soltan Mir Haydar Tuni, who died . . 
in 830/1426. He was born in Baku, and for most of his life r~ 
sided in Tabriz, where he gathered a great following and set 
up a cloister for his morids. He also built cloisters ( Takiyyeh) 
in other towns and cities which he visited. Mir Jac fari argues 
that Sol tan Mir ljaydar and Shah Nee matollah Vali were contem-
1. F.N., p.296. 
2. Abbot, "Geographical 11otes taken during a journey in Persia in 1849 & 1850, Geog-
raphical Journal, Vol.25 , 1855. p.9. 
3. Mir Ja cfari, The Haydari-Nicmati conflict in Iran, I.S., Vol.XII, Nos.3-4. 1979, 
pp.135-162. 
4. Mir Kwand, Habib al-Siar, Tehran. 1333, Vol.2, p.332. 
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poraries , that the influence and power of the Sunni mystic, 
Ne cmatollah, was challenged by the Shic a Mir l:laydar, and, .. 
thus, the origins of the f r i .ctions goes back as far as the 8th 
century /14th A. D. 
Firstly, there is no reason to believe that the followers of the 
earlier Shaikh tiaydar were not called Haydaris; indeed, there 
is every possibility that they were. J.P. Brown, in the late 
19th century, came across the followers of Qotb al-din Haydar 
Zave 'i in Anatolia. He does not even mention the sect of Hay-
dari, whose patron was Mir Haydar Tuni. He gives inform-,. 
ation of their outfits and paraphernalia, whereas he makes no 
mention of Haydaris, who followed Mir ~aydar, despite the fact 
that Mir Haydar Tuni lived nearly two centuries later than 
Qotb al-din Haydar. There is, however, no explanation for his . . 
omission, unless the order had totally vanished, at least in 
Anatolia. 
We have no evidence to prove the pure conjecture of our modern 
scholar, that the fights started in the lifetime of the two 
a hove-mentioned Sufis, and not afterwards. The only evidence 
of the Haydaris as early as the 14th century is an undated 
-
letter written to Sol1an Bayazid, the governor of ~masieh, by 
Uzun ~asan, the King of the Aqquyunlu, in which the king in-
forms the Ottoman Shahzadeh, that he has taken possession of 
many of the interior areas of Persia and has restored peace 
and tranquility in his dominion by putting turbulent elements 
in their place. He mentions the Qalandari and Haydari sects. 1 . 
We have evidence that Mir Haydar was from the Qalandari 
order and that he had close ties with the Shic a Qaraqoyunlu 
kings, Qara Yusef and Qara Eskandar. Apparently Qara Eskand-
ar had great faith in him and there is an anecdote, which men-
tions the great magical power of this sufi, which added to the 
1. Tacizade Celebi Monseat, ed. by N.Lugal and A. Arzi, Istanbul, 1956, p.28. 
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reverence and faith of Qara Eskandar towards him. 1 
Although these reasons could well have been the causes of the 
animosity of the Sunni Aq qoyunlu king towards the Shicite Hay-
• 
dari Sufi s, there is no evidence that the conflicts between the 
ljayda~is and Nee matis started as early as the Aq qoyunlu per-
iod. The first mention of the strife in European sources is in 
1575, the 51st year of the rule of Shah Tahmasb I, by a Venet-. 
ian envoy to his court, Vincentio D 'Alessandri. He asserts that / 
the city of Tabriz, 
"is divided into two factions, one called Nausitai 
(sic), and the other Himicaivartu (sic), which com-
prehend the nine municipal districts, five in one 
and four in the other, and all the citizens about 
twelve thousand in number. These factions have al-
ways been at emnity, and slaughtered each other 
every day, nor could the king or any others put 
a stop to it, as the hatred between them had last-
ed more than thirty years. " 2 
Thus Alessandri places the beginning of the conflicts at about 
1540-45, that is in the reign of Shah Tahmas b I. Chardin, how-
• 
ever, after mentioning the fights of the two factions, states 
that the factions, which divided all the cities in Persia, came 
into being in the fifteenth century. 3 But none of these sources 
go as far back as the 14tJ:l century. The first Persian source 
to mention the fights 




unnamed history, written by Moll a 
- c -astrologer of Shah Abbas I. He 
"on sunday the 19th of the month of Rabic I of the 
year 1003/1594 the Shah arrived in Qazvin his cap-
ital, in which he ordered the Haydari and Nee mati 
fights to take place. On Tuesday, in the great 
square, Maidan-e-Sa c dat, the fight was again 
1. Rozat al-Janat va Janat al-Janan, p.13. 
2. Travels of Venetians in Persia, Narrative of the most noble Vincentio D'alessandri 
Hakloyt Society, London, 1863, p.224. 
3. Chardin, Travels, part.3, p.84. 
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"held. The Haydaris gained complete victory over 
their opponent. " 1 
None of these primary sources provide us with an accurate date 
of the beginning of the factional strife. It would, however, be 
safe to assume that it started some time between early and mid-
16th century. 
There is, however, another perplexing question, concerning the 
way in which it came to be believed that Shaikh Haydar Safavi 
was the patron of the Haydaris, which Mir J a c fari has not at-
• 
tempted to clarify; how Krusinski, who provides the most accur-
ate and detailed account of the frays, was mistaken on this 
point. 2 The answer may lie in the attempt made by Shah cAbbas 
to falsify the truth and replace Mir Sol tan Hayda r Tuni by his . . 
ancestor Shaikh Haydar. He took a few effective measures to-
• 
wards this end. First, he demolished the cloister where Sol tan 
Mir Haydar was buried in Tabriz and accused his followers of 
corruption and heresy. 3 Thus, he discouraged the public from 
supporting the Sufi Saint and contributed to the obscurity of 
his name. Secondly, he introduced the strife into other towns 
and cities, which were not acquainted with the strife, by trans-
planting colonies of non-Persian minorities, whose lifestyle and 
habits were at -variance with the original inhabitants. Mir 
J a c fari dismisses the information by Krusinski as utterly un-
founded, whereas there is evidence to support his assertions. 
Mir cAbdol Latif Shushtiari in Tohfat alC:.Alam, decidedly affirms . 
that the factions were introduced to Shushtar, during the reign 
of Shah cAbbas and, furthermore, he asserts that Shah cAbbas 
garrisoned Gherkes ( Circassian ) soldiers in the citadel, who were 
known as Qezel Bash. These were eventually assimilated into 
the fabric of the city and resided the Karkar quarter of the 
1. Monajje1 Yazdi, Tarikh, Msc., Edinburgh, n.p. 
2. Krusinski, The history of revolutions. pp.91-2. 
3. Enb Karbala'i Hafiz Hosein, . Rozat al -Janan va Jannat al-Janan, Tehran, 1344, 
p.596. 
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city, which was the Haydari Khaneh. 1 
One may ask why Shah cAbbas wished to introduce these fights 
into other cities. The reason is given by Krusinski, who ass-
erts that he wanted to keep up the spirit of internal differ-
ences and discord in his kingdom, so as to secure stability for 
his government. There is every reason to believe that, by the 't 
mass conversion to Sht cism of the original inhabitants of Per- L/ 
sia, there was no cause for religious difference. Furthermore, 
the Nee matollahi Sufis had become Shic a and there was no fur-. 
ther cause for conflict among the supporters of the two Sufi 
sects either. Thus, by bringing in groups of different ethnic 
origin, he kept alive the civil strife, which was ultimately to 
his benefit. 
The fact that these fights were apparently patronised by Shah 
c - -Abbas, indicates that they were not spontaneous and the Shah 
must have had a vested interest in encouraging them. Almost 
all the sources assert that the fights were carried out by the 
permission of the government, and the "Grand Provost", as 
Char din calls the kalantar of Esfahan, was present at the 
fights. 2 
There is, however, one source, which contradicts Krusinski 
and, thus, casts doubts on our theory. Kaempfer, who travel led 
to Persia in 1683-1685, asserts that there were Haydari Sufis . . 
in the city of Esfahan, and that they were the bitterest enem-
ies of the Nee matollahis and it was in their support, that the 
whole country was divided into two camps of ~aydari and 
Ne cmati. Despite his description of the origin of the Necmatoll-
ahi sect and their patron, he fails to provide us with any in-
formation on the Haydaris. He states that he cannot go into a 
• 
long story; was it not because there was confusion about the 
1. Tohfat al CUa1, Ms Edinburgh, n.p. 
2. Chardin, Travels, part.3, p.84. 
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identity of the Haydari 's patron and he was not sure of the 
point in question. He does, however affirm that the animosity 
manifested itself in sport like competitions, that it was after the 
competition and betting that the fights erupted, and that it 
was through the intervention of the darughe that the fights 
ended. 1 
There is, however, another source which supports our view. 
This work is a unique source for the beliefs and practices of 
the Safa vid supporters. It was written in the 19th century and 
a manuscript copy of it is in existence in the Melli Library in 
Tehran. Enqelab-e-Eslam, this source asserts that the Haydaris 
who were to be found in Anatolia in the author's time, were 
Shi ea extremists, who carried their hatred of the Sunnis to ex-
cess; they wore a turban with seven slits, had a bag hanging 
down from their waistband and carried a cane. He further as-
serts that in their beliefs they were identical to the 1 alalis, 
who were Shic a and opposed to the rule of the Sunni Turks. 2 
- - - c During the reign of Shah Tahmasb and Shah Abbas I, two large 
groups of these 1 alali people took refuge in Persia and · were 
settled · in Qazvin and Esfahan. eA lam Ara corroborates this 
account and also provides us with additional information on 
their identity. It affirms that 1alali is the general appellation 
for anyone who is opposed to the Ottomans, 3 or rather as Enqel-
ab-e-Eslam puts it, the followers of the house of the Safavids 
were known as 1alali or Haydari in Anatolia. 
This clarifies the assertion of the author of Enqelab-e-Eslam 
that the people he saw were the same as the Haydaris, that is 
the supporters of the principles of Shaikh Haydar the Safavid. 
1. Kea1pfer, Engelbert, A1oentatiu1 exoticaru1, tr. by K. Jahandari, Tehran, Anj oman-
e Asar Melli, 1350. p.138. 
2. Moha11ad c Aref Arzruni, Tar.ikh-e-Enqelab-e-Esla•, M se. Melli Library Tehran, 
no.1634 (1307). 
3. Eskandar beg Monshi, cAla1 Ara yecAbbasi, tr. E. Yarshater, Boulder, 1978, Vol.II 
pp.960-73. 
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The account given in Enqelab-e-Eslam in respect to Shaikh Hay-
dar' s views is consistent with the assertion of the author of 
c Alam Araye Amini, a source contemporary with Shaikh Haydar . 
and greatly hostile to him because of his heretical ideas. 1 
There is also evidence that the J alalis were still in existence 
in the later 19th century in Esfahan, Tara'qe affirms that, 
when 'Ali Morad Khan left Esfahan in disorder, the J alali dar-
vishes were going round the city and blowing their horns in 
joy that cAli Morad Khan had departed the city. 2 cAli Morad 
Khan, however, returned to Esfahan and remembering their be-
haviour, he determined to banish all the Sufi orders from his 
capital. His main goal was to undermine the influence of the 
c -
Sufis in general, and especially of the Ne matollahis, who were 
in league with Ja c far Khan, his half-brother and potential 
rival, and Aqa Mohammad Khan Qajar, his deadly enemy. There-. 
fore, we might assume the ljaydaris, who were described by 
Kaempfer, could have been the Jalalis, that is, the· followers 
of Shaikh ljaydar Sa fa vid. 3 
Another question does, however, arise: If the J alalis were still 
in Esfahan in the late 18th century, how could Krusinski have 
failed to remark on their existence?.. The fact that· Krusin-
ski travelled· and stayed· in Persia during· the reign .of· the last 
Safavid, Sh~h · Soltan Hosein, who,; under the influence of the . . 
clergy, had set about annihilating the Sufis, (many of whom 
were killed and the rest fled Esfahan), could be the reason 
why Krusinski fails to mention anything about the Sufis. An-
other explanation is that, after the fall of the Sa fa vids and 
during the reign of Karim Khan, the Sufis, who had fled to . 
India, came back to Persia and expanded their sphere of act-
1. Konji, cAla1 Araye Amini, ed. by V. Minorsky. Under the title, Persia in 1478-
- h 1490, p.67. 2. Tara 1eq, Te ran, p.13. 
3. Ibid., Vol.III, p.173. 
4. Krusinski, The History of Revolutions in Persia, p.91-98. 
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ivity. Krusinski asserts that the fights, which he saw, were 
triggered off by the discord and differences of the inhabitants 
as a whole, rather than out of support for one group of Sufis, 
as opposed to the other. What is more striking is that he men-
tions different names for the factions: namely, Pelenk and Fel-
enk. This could, hence, come about by the prohibition of fact-
ional strife by Shah Sol tan Hosein. As a matter of fact, on his . . 
accession to the throne, Molla Mohammad Baqer Mojlesi had 
asked him to place a ban on the conflicts and this had been 
acceded to . The ban had not, however, succeeded in putting 
an end to the practice, and the fights continued under a diff-
erent pretext. The inhabitants of the cities, who were divided 
into factions like some other countries, namely Italy, on the 
grounds of political differences, continued to fight each other 
at intervals. This is endorsed by the account given by Han-
way, who gives the same names with slight variations, Feleuk 
and Peleuk. 1 His account of their fights and animositf corrobor- 'J 1 
ates the accounts given by Chardin and Krusinski. 2 
During the whole course of the late 18th century, however, 
there is not a single source referring to Haydaris and Nee mat-
is under their original name, and even Francklin, who stayed 
in Shiraz for _..9:. long time, does not refer to these factions at 
all. This leads one to assume that the practice had fallen into 
disuse. He does, however, remark on the ferocity of manners 
which: 
"introduced a strife, peculiar to the lower classes 
of inhabitants of Shiraz. When two people begin 
fighting, it always raises a great crowd, who gen-
erally separately take the part of one or the other 
in the contest, and the whole presently becomes a 
tumult and confusion, until the arrival of the Dar-
oga, or the judge of the police, who puts an end 
to the fray. These riots are very frequent, and 
even the boys are fond of running to them, in 
1. Hanway, Jonas, Travels, Vol.II, p.104. 
2. Chardin, Travels. Part.3, p.84. Krusinski, pp.91-3. 
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"order to have a share in the contention." 1 
These fights were clearly different from those, which took place 
in the Sa fa vid era. It may, however, be assumed that the two 
people, who started the fights, were members of the two fact-
ions and that their supporters were drawn into the fights to 
show their spirit of solidarity. 
After the fall of the Safa vids and the invasion of the Afghans, 
the spirit of division and discord appears to have totally van-
ished, or at least in those areas, where the public was faced 
with a fiercer enemy than the opposite faction: namely, the 
Afghans, who, after sacking Esfahan, attempted to reduce other 
towns into submission. In almost every town and village, they 
were confronted with stiff resistance. In the town of Qazvin, 
after the Afghans had established themselves in the govern-
ment, the general populace resolved to surprise them and the 
unsuspecting Afghans were surprised by an attack; after some 
hours of fierce battle, four thousand Afghans were slain. In 
Lar, Khwansar and many other townships, the same proceedings 
were carried out. Hazin, who travelled to all these areas after 
the fall of Esfahan, remarks on the gallantry and courage 
shown by the g_eneral public (c a va m va Sakaneh) .2 The situat-
ion of the western provinces was rather worse than the central 
parts. The Ottomans had attacked and captured cities and 
towns further into the country. In almost all the towns, which 
the Ottoman Turks attacked and established themselves, the gen-
eral public, in unity and uniformity, set about fighting them. 
~azin speaks of the spirit with which the citizens of LarKhwan-
sar' Qazvin' etc. ' took up arms in those areas and fought the 
Afghans until they all fell. In Hamadan and Tabriz, the populace 
barricaded the towns and, for many days, held out against the 
Ottomans; eventually they were overpowered by superior num-
bers and arms and all were killed, with only a few people 
1. OMTS, p.67. 
2 • Z • H • , p • 44 • 
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surviving. 1 
We have evidence that, before the Vakil came to power, the 
Haydari and Nee mati factions still pursued their usual hostil-
ity, because of their differences, which led them to endanger 
their own safety and urban security as a whole. Although the 
source of our information was written in the 19th century, 
there is no particular reason to doubt its authenticity. Mir 
c Abdol Latif Shushtiari in Tohfat al- cAlam asserts that, when . 
c Ali Mardan Khan Bakhtiari was competing for supreme power, 
he attempted to capture the town of Shush tar. The Mar~shi Sad-
at, who were the prominent inhabitants of the Ijaydari Khaneh, 
allied themselves to the Bakhtiaris and admitted them through 
the gate of Karkar, which was in their charge into the city. 
The notables of the Nee mati Khaneh, whose leader was Asadol-
lah Khan, the grandson of Seyed ~adeq, the Kalantar, set 
about defending their wards against the army of the Bakhtiaris 
and their allies, the ljaydaris. The Haydaris directed the army 
to the roofs of the Nee mati houses, the inhabitants of which, 
fought gallantly, slaying many of them, and forcing the remain-
ing troops to retreat. It is noteworthy that, an Akhund of the 
Ne cmati Khaneh, Haji cAbd al-Razzaq, fought for many hours in 
0 
defence of his. house. He was eventually overpowered by the 
enemy and deprived of his eyesight. 2 · 
As we approach the reign of Karim Khan, there is no mention 




excellent police and management there was 
single tumult or riot productive of blood-
Clearly, the Vakil discouraged urban riots and factional strife, 
1. Z.H., p.l41. 
c-
~ • Tohfat al- Alam, Ms Edinburgh, n.p. 
3 .• O.M. T.p.l22. 
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by means of close and constant surveillance of the urban com-
munity. At his death, however, there are numerous instances 
of riots and disturbances in various areas. Esfahan exper-
ienced serious civil unrest at least three times, in two of which 
Sufi darvishes were involved. Still the sources carefully avoid-
ed mentioning ljaydari and Nee mati factions, despite the fact 
that the two camps existed in the major· cities. It is only in 
the 19th century, that the fights are again mentioned directly 
as the factional strife between Jfaydari and Necmati camps. Mal-
colm, in 1800, was faced with the same phenomenon as Hanway 
described in the city of Qazvin. He writes: 
"The division of the chief cities into wards, with 
the names of Hyderee and Neamuttee which one auth-
or, has described to the policy of Shah A bass the 
great, still exists, and continues to excite equal 
animosity to what it did at former periods. There 
is at all times a jealousy between these parties; 
but during the three last days of Mohurrum they 
attack each other with violence. The object for 
which they contend appears to be merely the hon-
our of triumph. " 1 
It is curious that Francklin, who visited Shiraz about two dec-
ades before Malcolm, remarks on the skirmishes between the 
bands of yo~gsters, each representing the army of Yazid and 
the adherents of Em am Hose in, under their respective banners, 
which were usually of different colours. He also asserts that 
real battles took place, in which many people lost their lives. 
"During these various processions much injury is of-
ten sustained, as the Persians are all frantic even 
to enthusiasm, and they believe uniformly that the 
souls of those slain during the Mohurrum will in-
fallibly go that instant into paradise; this, added 
to their frenzy, which for the time it lasts is such 
I never saw exceeded by any people, makes them 
despise and even court death." 




does not, however, 
elements involved in 
quent fights. Was it because 
even once refer to Ne c m a ti and 
the processions and the subse-
no-one wished to speak of them, 
or was there a conspiracy to conceal the real cause of the ev-
ent.? We will never know. The fights, however, continued until 
the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury, when the political parties and their differences took the 




The tribes formed a major social force in 18th century Persia. 
All the European sources of the early 19th century, believe rL 
that the nomadic population was equal to the sedentary ones. " 
Some even suspect that it exceeded the latter. There were four 
c 
major ethnic groupings: Persian, Arab, Baluchi and Turkish. 
The western part of the country was completely dominated by 
tribes of original Iranian stock: namely, Bakhtiari, Lors 
(Faili) Kurds and a nameless group known as Lak. What exact-
ly was the origin of the latter is not known. Lady Shiel ob-
serves that: 
"the Leks are from the class of genuine Persian 
blood, such as the Loors, Bekhtiarees, &c. To them 
might be added the Koords, as members of the Per-
sian family. " 1 
Thus, accocling to her assertion, the Lak were not distinct 
from the Kurds or indeed the Lors. They themselves, however, 
did not share this view, as Lord Curzon, in assessing the orig-
in of the Lors states: 
"they appear to belong to the same ethnical group 
as the Kurds, their neighbours on the north; nor 
does their language, which is a dialect of Per-
sian, differ materially from the Kurdish tongue. 
On the other hand, they themselves consider it an 
insult to be confounded with the Kurds whom they 
call Leks. " 2 
1. Shiel, L., Glimpses on the life and manners in Persia {London, 1856), p.394. 




It can, however, be safely assumed that the tribes of Lor, 
Kurd and Lak were all of the same origin: namely, the Aryan 
stock which preceded cArabs, Turks and Tartars in the land. 1 
The cArab tribes inhabited the south western areas, i.e. Khuzes-
tan, the coastal areas of the Gulf as far as Bushehr, and the 
ports beyond. The Turks were spread in many parts. First of 
all, a great portion of the tribes of Turkish origin resided in 
A~arbayjan, as far south as the borders of Mazandaran and 
Gilan. There were other Turkish tribes in the south, such 
i 
as Qashqa' i, which was one of the most populous and powerful 
of these tribes. In Khorasan and the central plateau, Qazvin, 
Khamseh, etc., Turkish tribes predominated over other ethnic 
groups. The Baluchis were traditionally confined to the south 
east, which is now known as Baluchistan, although some of 
these nomads were transferred at various times to the northern 
provinces. 
The province of Astarabad and the area towards the northern 
borders were overrun by another branch of Turkish tribes, 
namely the Turkmans, who were the traditional neighbours of 
the Qa jars in those parts. 
There were, however, great overlappings in this arrangement; 
for instance, there were a great number of cAr ab tribes in Khor-
asan, with Turkish and Kurdish tribes, who had been trans.fer-
red there at different times. 
The tribes were not all in a nomadic state. Indeed, a great 
part of them had been sedentarised in towns and villages and 
differed in no way from the sedentary population, except in 
their internal organization, which was identical to other 
tribes; that is, they paid allegiance to their tribal leader, 
paid him his dues and fought with him when the situation 
1. Curzon, N., op. cit., Vol.II, p.274. 
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arose. Many of them cultivated the land, as Rawlinson remarks 
of the Mokri tribe in northern Kurdestan. 1 It appears, how-
ever, that the tribes in the south of that province retained 
their nomadic state as late as the 1830's. Rich observes: 
"I had today confirmed by several of the best auth-
orities what I had long suspected, that the peasan-
try in Koordistan are a totally different race from 
the tribes, who seldom cultivate the soil, while on 
the other hand the peasants are never soldiers. " 2 
The tribes in a nomadic state migrated to cold and warm reg-
ions according to the season. Sometimes they covered hundreds 
of miles in their search for pasture. They often travel led along 
the well-defined routes which were known as Ilrah. They were 
also given pasture on their entering into the country. For in-
stance, when 3000 of the Turkmans of the Sa yen Khani clan 
came to Esfahan to pay their allegiance to cAli Morad Khan, 
they were given Yurt (pasture) in Astarabad. 3 Territorial dis-
putes were common among the tribes and it led to full scale 
wars at times. Powerful tribes, like the Qashqa'is, were in a 
position to choose their pasture and the central government did 
not interfere in their choice.~ 
../ 
Tribal Organisation: 
The tribes ( Ilat) were divided into Tavac ef (clans) and further 
subdivided into Tirrehs (shafts). It was not uncommon for 
tribes of different origin to form a confederacy. The leader of 
the tribe was, however, always from the main tirrehs and the 
leadership seldom shifted from one family to another. 5 It was 
1. Rawlinson, H.C., 11 A Journey to Tab.r>1z 11 , !~G-.S· ., Vol.X, pp.34-5. 
2. Rich, C.J., Narrative of a residence in Koordistan , . _ , Vol.!, p.88. 
3. G.M., p.394. 
4. Oberling, Pierre, op. cit., p.60. Shiel, L., op. cit. pp.398-99. 
5. H.P., Vol.II, p.570. 
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not, however, uncommon for a ruling tirreh to be completely 
ruined and, thus, the leadership was shifted to another. Usual-
ly the leader was appointed by the consent of the elders ( Rish-
safids) of the tribes and the eldest son often succeeded him in 
his position. 1 The leader was expected to enjoy physical 
strength, excellent horsemanship and peerless marksmanship. 
The ability to adjudicate over the intertribal disputes and the 
power of establishing good relations with other tribes, were 
also of great importance. The central government rarely ven-
tured to interfere in tribal affairs. Only when a chief was ex-
ceptionally unruly or old did the government step in and 
change the line of succession, or else replace the leader of a 
tribe. 2 The chief of a tribe enjoyed undisputed power within 
his own tribe. He was followed by his tribes-
men in his military expeditions and obeyed without question. 3 
He collected taxes from his tribe and received presents on spec-
ial occasions such as Nouruz and so on. The tribes paid a nom-
inal amount of tax to the government. According to a document 
of the Zand era, an item of tax is given as Chupanbegi, that 
is, the tax levied on the use of pasture.,. Petroshevski believes 
that this due was identical to Maraci va Mavashi, levied on 
the tribes in the time of the Aqqoyunlu (but in our documents 
they are .mentioned as separate items). There is also a remark 
made about this tax by the kalantar, Mirza Mohammad, who 
asserts that he intended to farm the Chupanbegi of the live-
stock for the amount of 12,000 Tomans. 5 This, however, appears 
to be the livestock belonging to the Zand tribe. The amount of 
this tax is not known to us. but, judging by the kalantar' s 
account, it must have been lucrative. 
1. Kinnier, op. cit., p.45. 
2. H.P., Vol.II, p.570. 
3. rbia., p.6o5. 
4. Majles Library, uncatalogued documents, Tehran. 
5. R.M.M., p.69. See Petroshevski, Monasebat-e-Arii va. Tr. Keshavarz, Tehran. 1348. 
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Another kind of tax levied on the tribes was Yasaqkesh. This 
appears to have been a quota levied on foreigners in the Safav-
id time. It is mentioned in cAlam Aray-e 'A.bassi as such. 1 
The tax levied on the lands belonging to the tribal chiefs or 
the tribal members was known as Esm va Rasm. The Tyul and 
Khalesseh were exempted from payment of this due. Sir John Mal-
colm speaks of a tax levied on the families of the tribes accor-
ding to their wealth and the number of their livestock. This 
was collected by the chief or by those, whom he deputed to ex-
ercise his authority. 2 
Despite the numerous taxes that the tribes paid to the state, 
they contributed very little to the treasury; firstly, because 
the amount of taxes were small and, secondly, on account of 
the fact that, the tribes being powerful, the government had 
no means of coercing them into submission. The government, 
however, kept the leader of a tribe, or his children, as host-
ages at court in order to secure their good behaviour. 3 But 
often this did not prove effective. Almost all the Zand rulers 
after the death of the Vakil had to take measures against the 
unruly tribes. Sadeq Khan sent his son, ] a c far, to Kohgiluyeh . 
to plunder the tribes resident in those areas. Again ] a c far 
Khan had to resort to the same means with the Ka c b tribe ... A 
part of the tribal contribution to the state treasury was in the 
form of military support. That is, every family provided at 
least one mounted, armed soldier. Sometimes one family provided 
more than one. The poor tribesmen, who had not the means to 
do so, often shared the expenses with other families and paid 
a share towards it. 5 
c - - c -1. Alaa Araye Abbasi, Vol.1 , P·139· 
2. H.P., Vol.II, p.458. 
3. Kinnier, op. cit., p.129. 
4. G.G., p.299. 
5. H.P., Vol.II, p.496. 
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Immediately after the chief or the leader of a tribe were the 
kalantars of different clans, who were appointed by the chief. 
These had different names, according to the tribes. For in-
stance' the kalantars of Qashq a I i were called Kaikha. 1 After 
the kalantars were the kadkhodas. These officials collected tax-
es on behalf of their chief and settled disputes of minor conse-
quence. They retained part of the taxes as commission for their 
services. A kalantar could be promoted to the rank of a Khan, 
if he offered his master a significant service. 
Tribal economy, land use, animal husbandry and handicrafts: 
The land was not the major source of revenue for the tribe. 
Therefore, they made very little effort to cultivate it. The 
major investment of the tribal communities was in their flocks, 
although some of them, who were in a semi-nomadic state, till-
ed the land and engaged in agricultural activities. 2 For in-
stance, a major branch of the Turkmans were mainly agricultur-
alists. It appears that even nomads tilled the soil, during 
their stay in a region and left a few tribesmen to reap the 
harvest. 
As stated- before, the tribes were given arable lands by the 
h f f 1 E 
c. 
government. It was always in t e orm o tyu or qta 1n prev-
ious centuries. During the period under discussion, these 
grants were known as Yurt. Kinnier, in the early 19th century, 
remarks that the lands: 
"granted first for a temporary purpose, is now from 
long and undisputed possession considered as the 
property of the different chiefs. " 3 
1. Oberling, Pierre, Qashqa 1i Nomads of Fars, p.23. 
2. H.P., Vol.II, p.ll9 "footnotes". 
3. Kinnier, J.M., op. cit., p.44. 
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Indeed, it appears that sometimes these grants were extensive 
and covered a great area of fertile lands. 
The government could, however, confiscate the lands allotted 
to the tribes. Nader Shah, after he transplanted many of the 
southern and western tribes into his newly acquired territories 
in Khorasan, confiscated their property. These were, however, 
reclaimed in the reign of the Vakil. There is a document in the 
possession of t/h Qashqa 'i ruling family, in which the chiefs 
of that tribe requested the Vakil to return their hereditary terr-
itories. The Vakil complied with the request and re-allocated 
a vast area, covering many villages, to the Qashqa 'i chiefs. 1 
The tribal leaders had hereditary rights to these lands and 
could dispose of them at their pleasure. Some of the tribal 
chiefs leased their lands to the cultivators, or else allocated 
it to the members of their tribes. It often happened that the 
powerful tribes conquered lands by force, be it the property 
of a sedentary individual or a weaker tribal leader. The gov-
ernment seldom interfered in such disputes and, keeping the 
cause of dispute alive, benefited from the division of the tribal 
chiefs. 2 
~I 
Animal lrtlsbandry'"' was the major activity in the tribal economy~ 
Their flocks consisted of various kinds: mainly sheep, goats, 
cows and pack animals. Depending on the area of the tribal 
residence, camels were also used for transportation. The adopt-
ion of diverse herding was a measure of insurance against dis-
ease, famine and so on, as no disease would damage different 
animals in the same way and the kind of pasture, which suited 
one type of animal could secure the food for other kinds as 
well. 
1. Oberling, Pierre, The Qashqa 1i no1ads, pp.37-8. 




The tribes basically lived on their own products. They ate their own 
meat, milk and other dairy products, provided clothes and foot-
ware1 themselves and stood in need of the sedentary population 
for only a few items: i.e. tobacco, sugar, cloth and harware, 
etc. They bartered their surplus with the sedentary population 
and had to keep good relations with their neighbouring vill-
ages. Large tribes such as Bakhtiari and Qashqa' is provided 
major cities with mutton and their dairy products. 2 Not all the 
tribal families owned cattle. Indeed, many of the poor nomads 
did not have livestock at all. The largest herd belonged to the 
chief and his immediate family. They employed shepherds from 
outside or else expected their followers to tend their flocks. 
Carsten Niebuhr remarks on a Chupan working for a Turkish 
chief and he asserts that the payment of the shepherd was 
often in the form of livestock, rather than cash payment. 3 
Among the Turkmans, the war captives and slaves were respons-
ible for the flocks of their captors ... 
Another major factor in the tribal economy was their manufact-
ure of various items. They produced carpets, horse covers, 
tents, etc. Women were the major labour force in the tribal 
economy. 5 Children also contributed a great deal to the various 
activitie's involved in the tribal lifestyle. Men generally attend-
ed to matters of greater importance, such as preparation for 
emigration, wars, exchange of goods, etc. 
The time of rest for the tribes was in the winter, when they 
were stationary and their flocks were not in need of constant 
attention. This was the time for other activities such as carpet 
weaving and industry. 
1. Kinnier, J.M., op. cit., p.45. 
2. H.P., Vol.II, p.605. 
3. Ibid. Niebuhr, C., op. cit., p.57. 
4. H.P., Vol.II, pp.l27-8. 
5. Niebuhr, C., op. cit., p.57. 
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Although, as stated before, the tribes contributed little to the 
treasury of the central government and were out of the way of 
oppression, as they resorted to the safety of the mountains 
when there was threat to their interests, they were extremely 
poor and lived in abject conditions. Abbott, in his geographical 
memoires observes: 
"The tribes in these parts (Fars) appear to be gen-
erally composed in great part of very poor famil-
ies, they pay so little attention to agriculture that 
after their own immediate wants are supplied, 
produce derived from their flocks and herds, the 
remaining over will not keep them out of poverty. " 1 
Their poverty was, however, one of the main causes of their 
predatory incursions into the cities and villages. If famine 
broke out as a result of drought, the tribes were the first to 
suffer from the miseries which followed. Their livestock died 
and they had no means of subsistence. 
Forcible transplantation of the tribes often hindered their herd-
ing and damaged their economy. The Zand had suffered the in-
conveniences of this practice, but they resorted to this measure 
in order to subdue the turbulent tribes. cAli Morad Khan trans-
ferred About 3-4,000 of the Lors belonging to the various tribes 
from Kohgiluyeh to cEraq-e~Ajam. He even ventured to demand 
a written pledge that they would not leave their new abode. 
They were sea ttered, however, in the northern parts of their 
original residence in Malayer, Brujerd, Nahavand, Silakhor2, 
which did not :iiffer greatly in respect to the climate and natur-
al resources from Kohgiluyeh. Tribes were often transferred to 
areas with a totally different natural aspect from their own 
residence, in which case they could not adapt to the new en-
vironment and often their population and herds diminished dras-
tically. 
1. Abbott Georgraphical Journal, p. 170-1. 
2. G.M., p.372. 
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The Zand Tribe: 
The Zand tribe had very limited resources, human and mater-
ial, even before it suffered its disastrous transplantation in 
1145/1732 to the province of Khorasan, by which their number 
diminished to about 30-40 households. 1 They earned their liveli-
hood by robbery and raiding the neighbouring villages and 
towns. 2 This indicates that they had not sufficient material 
resources, such as flocks and livestock, on which they could 
subsist. However, when they returned from Darreh Gaz into 
their original homeland near Malayer ( 1160/1747), they had 
very little hope of survival. Hence, when an enterprising and 
shrewd chief like Karim Khan set himself up to gain political 
power, the tribe hailed his successors with joy. All the war-
riors unanimously accepted his supremacy and fought for him 
with great zeal and courage. 3 As we will relate in the section 
on women, even the tribal women assisted him in many perilous 
situations. 
With miraculous perseverance, Karim Khan established his rule 
over the greater part of the empire and, for the space of near-
ly fourteen years, enjoyed undisputed power... However, his 
tribe and those allied to him took their residence in the city 
of Shiraz, leading a life of affluence and comfort. 5 The major-
ity of them acquired landed property within and outside the 
city.' Whether they were given allotted property from the Kha:-
seh or Divani lands, is not known. But it is certain that their . 
houses were built and given to them by Karim Khan, 7 whereas 
1. M.T., p.147. 
2. G.G., p.4. M.T., p.451. 
3. G.G., p.7. 
4. R.M.M., p.65. 
5. T.Z., p.77. 
6. Ibid. 
7. R.T., p.339. 
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the great men, such as Shaikh cAli Khan and Nazar cAli Khan, 
built Arks for themselves, not much inferior to the royal Ark. 1 
During this time, they were totally divorced from their habitual 
nomadic life, although we know that they kept large herds of 
horses and other livestock, and engaged in agriculture as 
well. 2 The urban lifestyle affected their nomadic taste to an 
extent that "they would not sleep even on satin and silk bed-
ding. " 3 In short, the Zands, having become the higher echelon 
of the society, enjoyed all the luxury and comfort that they 
had never dreamt of. Thus, self-interest and personal advan-
tage superseded feelings of tribal hegemony and unity. 
In the meantime, many of the old generation had died and 
there emerged a new generation, who had no experience of no-
madic life. It was precisely this generation, who ruined the 
Zand house, as they had not experienced the poverty of nomad-
ic life. Karim Khan, during his whole rule, was faced with 
only one revolt by a member of his own tribe, that of his half-
brother, Zaki Khan;.. whereas, in the space of sixteen years 
that his successors survived, every one of them had to deal 
with at least one. All the Zand rulers after the death of the 
Vakil, were put to death or else assassinated by the Zands 
themse]Nes. 5 In most cases of Zand versus Zand, the rebels 
were among the most powerful or rich tribal chiefs. cAli Morad 
Khan, before he became king, held court and at Nouruz be-
stowed more robes of honour to his entourage and military gen-
erals' than Sadeq Khan could afford in Shiraz. The key to . 
every political unrest was power and money. Power was re-
quired to incite fear in those who had the means to contest it 
1. G.G., p.155. G.M., p.266. 
2. R.T., p.406. 
3. G.G., p.347. 
4. Ibid. 
5. R.M.M., p. 75, 81, etc. 
6. G. M., p.393. 
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and money to buy off the 
will be observed in the 
services of the mercenary tribes. As 













amazing with what ease an army 
Khan Khoraskani, the governor of 
6,000 men around his standard by 
Zolfaqar Khan Khamseh gave his 
soldiers one Tom an each to assist him in his military exploits. 2 
It has often been a 
not nom in ate one of 
in the fact that he 
their inability to 
matter of speculation, why 
his sons as his successor. 
had a thorough knowledge 
assert their right to the 
Karim Khan 
The reason 
of his sons 
throne. He 
knew the nobles of his tribe. Qaffari' s observation that: 
"the Vakil was so depressed after the death of his 
c -favourite son, Abdol Rahim Khan that he only 





bears evidence to the hopelessness of his situation. The Kalan-
tar also remarks on his change of temperament: 
"he had become mean and cruel to the extent that 
he did not hesitate to kill a few people for the 
~lightest irregularity in the accounts of the 
Divan ..... 
Karim Khan could foresee what was going to happen, but he 
could not prevent it. 
The issue of the succession polarized the court and the Zand 
nobles around two centres of power while the Vakil was ill; 
one was that of a respected elder of the tribe, Nazar cAli Khan, 
1. R.M.M., p.84. 
2. G.M., p.413. 
3. Ibid. 
4. R.M.M., p.68. 
- 325 -
and the other was that of Zaki Khan. Zaki Khan was in an ab-
solute minority against his rivals in number of supporters and 
popularity. 1 Whether the division had been noticed by the ail-
ing Vakil or not, is not known to us. He did, however, make 
a faint gesture to place his sons under the protection of his 
full brother, ~adeq Khan. 2 Apparently, the latter was opposed 
to Zaki Khan and favoured the rival faction. 3 It is striking 
how a weak rival could take advantage of a tactical mistake 
and annihilate almost all of his opponents with great facility. 
A blood feud had already divided the Zand tribe into two hos-
tile camps... The death of the Vakil unleashed the hostility, 
which only his power kept in check. In the initial phases of 
the intertribal stuggles, more than twenty-three Zand military 
generals lost their lives, their possessions were confiscated, a 
a great part of the treasury was spent on buying the tribal 
warriors of other tribes. 5 These, in effect, reduced the power 
of the Zands in warfare potential and drained the financial 
capacity of the treasury. Zaki Khan did not live to enjoy his 
success. Thus, Sadeq Khan, in his turn, purged and murdered . 
whoever had assisted Zaki Khan in his pursuit of power. 6 One 
after the other, rulers came and went and with them the for-
tune of one party, as against another one, rose and fell. Sad-
eq Kltan was killed together with his sons at the accession of 
<Ali Morad Khan, who even murdered the very ones who brought 
him to power. 7 
Although this series of murders and assassinations appears tot-
ally senseless to the reader of the history of this period, an 
1. G.G., pp.216-7. 
2. D.K., preli1inary 1atters, p.cxiv. 
3. M.T., p.342. I.O.R. G/29/18 asserts that Abol Fatb Khan was confined for 24 hours 
when his uncle was at the gates of the city, and D. K. states that Sadeq Khan was 
the guardian of the Vakil's sons. 
4. G.G., p.217. 
5. R.M.M., pp.71-2. 
6. T.Z., pp.12-13. 
7. G.M., p. 
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observant historian can detect the logic behind it all. In an 
absolutist state like that of Persia, where the power of the 
ruler was primarily based on force of arms and terrorization, 
there was no stability unless force was exercised. The monarch 
had no guarantee of the fidelity of his closest of kins, so he 
kept his potential rivals under close and constant control. The 
princes were in perpetual dread in case their activities incited 
suspicion in the mind of the despot. The least punishment for 
entertaining rebellious intentions was deprivation of eyesight; 
the severest was execution. That was the reason why the rebels 
concealed their intentions until they had left the capital, out-
side the sphere of the monarchs' power. cAli Morad Khan is an 
example of a rebellious prince. He managed to get away from 
Shiraz by instigating Abol Fath Khan to send him on a military 
expedition; as soon as he reached Tehran, he declared himself 
opposed to his uncle, Zaki Khan, and set himself up as the 
supporter of Abol Fath Khan's cause. 1 But, in his turn, he not 
only cast aside that prince, he also deprived him of his eye-
sight. cAli Morad Khan is a perfect example of an oriental des-
pot, in that he even killed the very ones who brought him to 
power. Akbar Khan had rendered him invaluable services, 
while he was fighting Sadeq Khan and especially during the 
siege 1 of Shiraz. 2 Thus, when cAli Morad Khan established him-
self in Esfahan, he gradually became more and more suspicious 
of Akbar Khan, since a large number of tribes had gathered 
around him and, even while attending the court, they were in 
his company. 3 This act greatly aroused the jealousy of cAli Mer-
ad Khan and, eventually, resulted in the execution of one of 
the most courageous, gallant and able soldiers of the Zand 
house, Akbar Khan ... One might think that a weak and incompet-
ant prince would be spared, but this was not the case; since 
1. G.G., pp.222-4. 
2. G.M., p.372. 
3. Ibid. 
4. T.Z., p.20. R.M.M., p.76. 
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Mohammad cAli Khan, the second son of the Vakil, was the best 
example of an inoffensive character, but this did not save him; 
he also was blinded. Even if the princes had no pretention to 
the rule of the monarch, time and again they were used by the 
courtiers to promote their own causes. Shaikh V a is Khan, the 
eldest son of cAli Morad Khan, an affable prince, joined Jac far 
Khan the moment he learnt of his father's death, in order to 
c prevent any hostile action on the part of ] a far Khan. 1 For a 
long time he lived in Shiraz in peace, until a few courtiers 
c -conspired to topple ] a far Khan, while he was away, and set 
the young prince on the throne. Whether the prince was actu-
ally involved in the plot is not known, but it cost him his 
eyes 
ever 
when the conspiracy was discovered. 2 
mild and amiable like Jac far Khan, was 
The despot, how-
compelled to take 
drastic measures in order to secure his life and throne. There 
was absolutely no guarantee for any stability in his kingdom, 
c -unless he was firm and ruthless in his policy. ] a far Khan, 
having a mild and moderate disposition, 3 failed to see the sim-
ple logic behind the game of power. Moderation could be inter-
preted as weakness and would encourage the opponents to 
strike a blow. Seid Morad Khan had once disputed ] a c far 
Khan's rule and was pardoned. But, when he conspired against 
the .£and ruler for a second time, ] a c far Khan arrested him 
and confiscated his vast wealth... Although it was expected by 
almost every one that the ruler would deprive Seid Morad of 
his eyesight, 5 it did not happen. The result was the brutal 
assassination of ] a c far Khan by the hands of his prisoners, 
Seid Morad Khan and his brothers . . 
The most interesting phase of the Zand rule is the last years 
1. M.H.P., Vol.II, p.294. 
2. Ibid. 
3. OMTS, p.348. 
4. Ibid., p.345. 
5. Ibid. 
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of that dynasty after the murder of J a c far Khan and the reign 
of his son and successor, Lotf cAli Khan. We have already in-
dicated that, in the period after the death of the Vakil, much 
energy, money and lives were lost in useless internal wars, 
which could otherwise have been directed against the only mor-
tal enemy of the Zand house, the Qajars. What prevented the 
Zand nobles ~ see~·\he necessity for unity and solidarity or, / 
rather, disregard the need, has already been made clear. In-
deed, as observed by the EIC resident, the only means of sur-
vival was unity against the common enemy; 1 instead, they 
ruined their chances by endless disputes and wars. It was not 
the power of their rival, which ended the Zand rule, but sheer 
self-indulgence, avarice and thirst for power, which brought 
about revolutions and counter-revolutions, successively and with-
out any interval of peace, resulting in their downfall. 
What makes Lotf ~li Khan's reign interesting, is that he was . 
the inheritor of more than a decade of internecine wars; when 
he ascended the throne, there was not a single noble left in 
the Zand tribe, who could contest him; neither was there any 
to assist him in his difficult task of putting right numerous 
probl,rms, which the Zand house was faced with, except his two 
uncles. First of all, many of the provinces traditionally tribut-
ary to the government at Shiraz, were now refusing to pay the 
usual dues. 2 Thus, the young prince had to carry his arms in-
to those territories; one of these provinces was Kerman. It has 
often been wondered by the contemporary chroniclers, as well 
as modern historians, why Lotf cAli Khan attempted to subdue 
Kerman with such unusual persistence. He has even been accus-
ed of being obstinate and proud of not accepting the terms of-
fered to him, while he had besieged Kerman. Some fanciful 
writers have even attributed his conduct to his desire for self-
assertion, 3 whereas none of these superficial outlooks appears 
1. I.O.R. G/29/21. Bussora, 26th May, 1779. 
2. T.Z., pp.52-3. 
3. Danesh, s., Ebrahim-e-Kalantar, Tehran 1348, p.72. 
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to clarify his intentions. The reality was that LotfcAli 
Khan was desperately in need of cash to carry out his struggle 
against the Qajars. By then the treasury was empty, especially 
after his father was assassinated and a large part of the treas-
ures had been given over to the tribes to quieten them. 1 Thus, 
Lotf cAli Khan had to find some means to raise cash; as he him-
self observed, the jewels in his possession were of no use to 
him unless they were sold; that is exactly why he invited Sir 
Harford ]ones to Shiraz to examine and value this jewelry. 2 
The main reason behind the expedition towards Kerman was the 
immense wealth, which the governor, the Esmac ili Em am, had 
gathered in his stronghold, Shahr-e-Babak. 3 Seyed Abol Has an 
Kohaki was appointed the governor of Kerman by the order of 
the late Vakil. While Karim Khan was alive the governor paid 
his tribute regularly... Even when ~adeq Khan fled to Kerman, 
for fear of falling into the hands of Zaki Khan, he was welcom-
ed and entertained by the governor. 5 On ~adeq Khan's access-
ion to the throne, he sent all the hostages from Kerman and its 
dependencies, who had been kept in Shiraz, back to their resp-
ective homes and his son, 'Ali Naqi Khan was admitted to the 
6 c -city and entertained. It was, however, when Ja far Khan ass-
ume~ the reins, that the governor changed course. 7 Apparently, 
it ·was purely due to internal policies, that is, the religio-
economic power struggle within the capital city of Kerman, Gav-
ashir. This issue will be dealt with in another chapter; 8 suff-
ice it to mention that the governor resolved to resist the Zand 
attack on Kerman. He, however, was forced to send out some 
1. G.M., p.458. 
2. D.K., preli1inary 1atters, p.cxxv. 
3. T.K., p.333. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., pp.334, 335. 
6. G.G., p. 241. 
7. T.K., p.333. 
8. See Chapter on Lotf cAli Khan, p.193. 
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of the notables, together with the Shaikh al-Eslam, to entreat 
Lo~f <Ali Khan to lift the siege in exchange for 20,000 Tomans 
cash. 1 The offer was not enough. Seyed Abol Hasan received 
20,000 Tomans every year from his followers in India; 2 besides, 
he had not paid his arrears for a few successive years. Thus, 
the prince did not accede to the offer and the siege contin-
ued. 3 However, the intense cold compelled the Zand prince to 
quit Kerman and return to Shiraz... From then on, he became 
bitter and impatient. Many historians, i.e. Ebn cAbdol Karim 
and Malcolm, have noticed the change of temperament in Lotf 
'Ali Khan after his failure in Kerman. 5 The reality was that, 
without an enormous amount of money, he could never fight his 
foe, who by then had gained possession of the more prosperous 
and rich territories of the empire and could afford the expense 
of long-term warfare. Whereas the Zand prince had no means 
of raising cash, except for bringing back the territories tradi-
tionally tributary to the government at Shiraz. Another source 
of income would have been the trade with the EIC in the south; 
he tried very hard to encourage the company to expand their 
activities in the Gulf and even offered them the use of Khark 
island, which previously contained the Dutch establishment. 1 
His 1minister, Mirza Mo~ammad ~osein, specifically visited Basra 
to carry on negotiation with the agents of the company there. 
He readily complied with the request of the EIC agents to place 
the factory in Bushehr on a different footing from what it had 
been hitherto. 7 
None of these measures proved an immediate remedy for his 
1. G.G., pp.326-7. 
2. T.K., p.333. 
3. G.G., p.327. 
4. Ibid. T.Z., p.56. 
5. T.Z., p.60. H.P., Vol.II, p. 178 and 180. 
6. I.O.R., Report on the commerce of Arabia and Persia. G/29/21. 1790. 
7. I.O.R. G/29/21. 
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despara te predicament; thus, he again resorted to armed strug-
gle. He made preparation for an expedition to Esfahan, once 
a rich and prosperous city. He was certain of his victory; so 
much so, that he invited Sir Harford Jones, then in Shiraz, to 
stay until he returned. 1 But this time the Zand 's rule was con-
tested, not by a tribal chief, but by a kadkhoda of the Hay-
dari quarters of the city. ~aji Ebrahim, as a wealthy merchant 
and the kalantar, knew perfectly well that, once the territorial 
expansion was stopped, the attention of the prince would turn 
to the citizens of Shiraz and, more so, to the merchant classes, 
for money. They would be mulcted and denuded of their wealth 
in order to provide for the warfare expeditions. This was pre-
cisely what the ~aji tried to prevent, by staging his coup. 
Most historians appear to be mistaken, in stating that the kal-
antar, Haji Ebrahim, wished to replace the Zands with the . 
Qajars, so that ·the empire would be in peace. 2 The ~aji had 
no intention of doing so, as he openly confessed to the Qajar 
chief, Aq a Mohammad Khan. 3 The idea was to form a confeder-. 
acy of local governors in the south, and not to submit to any 
overlord... The idea, in itself, was progressive and would have 
worked was there not a formidable claimant for the universal 
po~er in the empire. ~aji had witnessed so many coups in the 
government and, by then, he knew all the keywords in the pol-
itics. His .scheme was, even by today's standards, so well cal-
culated, that had it not been for the incredible prowess of the 
Zand prince, Lotf cAli Khan, who, despite adverse conditions, 
beat the ~aji' s forces many times, 5 the ~aji would have suc-
ceeded in his plans with facility. Apparently, the scheme was 
not purely ~aji' s; he had the assistance of many of the most 
1. D.K., preli1inary 1atters, p.cxl. 
2. H.P., Vol.II, p.l83. Skteches fro1 Persia, Vol. II, p.l53. 
3. R.S., Vol.9., n.p. 
4. D.K., p.cl. G.G., p.343. 
5. G.G., pp.346-56. 
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experienced bureaucrats, i.e. Mirza ]ani Fasa'i; shrewd mer-
chants like the Shaikh of Bushehr; 1 local governors and mag-
nates, like 'Ali Qoli Khan of Kazerun; etc. Shaikh Naser of Bush-
ehr had combined the position of a ruler with that of a busi-
nessman; he had gathered enormous wealth by his active contri-
bution in commerce. 2 This, in effect, had brought him into con-
stant conflict with the EIC agents, and brought about disputes 
with the government at Shiraz. 3 His son, Shaikh Nasr, was not 
so much involved in the commercial transaction, yet he had in-
herited his father's vast fortune,.. and was inclined to retain 
and add to it. Hence, he had secretly allied himself to the 
~aji and his accomplices, in dispensing with the monarchy and 
establishing a federative government, by which they would not 
pay tribute or dues to anyone. 5 ~aji Ebrahim and his assoc-
iates must have necessarily been encouraged to execute their 
plot by the failure, which Lotf cAli Khan suffered in reducing 
the citadel of Kerman. Since, the citadel of Shiraz was much 
stronger and the ~aji had arranged for the expulsion of the 
tribes, resident in the city, so as to remove the threat from 
Previous to the execution of his 
plan, he organised a city militia, mainly composed of Lutis 
and/ shopkeepers, under his brother's supervision. 1 These were 
armed and clad with the amunition and treasures confiscated 
from the tribes, the Zand nobles and the general populace, who 
were opposed to the coup. 7 The historical events, which en-
sued, have been related in the proper section and here it suf-
fices to say that what lay behind all these events, was primar-
ily the need for money on the part of the Zand prince, and the 
within the capital, Shiraz. 
1. F.N., part !I, p.30. 
2. I.O.R. G/29/21. 
3. I.O.R., Report on the co1merce of Arabia and Persia. 
4. Tarikh-e-Bushehr, p. 72. 
5. D.K., p.cl. G.G. 
6. H.P., Vol.!!, p.188. T.Z., p. 62. 
7. G.G., p.347. 
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resistance of the merchant class to part with their money. ~aji 
Ebrahim, as the representative of the bourgeoisie and an active 
contributor in the political economy of the state, executed a 
plan, which marks the advent of a new era in the history of 
Persia: the emergence of the citizens of the major cities, as 
against the tribal rule, which had totally monopolized the 
arena for many centuries. 1 Why the bourgeoisie failed to be-
come independent in its true sense has already been dealt with 
in the chapter on urban society. 2 
The Tribes and the Zand Dynasty: 
The tribes, as they relate to the Zand dynasty, form three 
major categories: 
1. The tribes who were traditionally allied to the Zand 
house, such as the Lak, Lor and Kurdish tribes of the 
Zagros foothills, i.e. namely, Kalhor, Mafi, Zanganeh, 
Bajlan, and so on. 
2. The non-allied tribes, who assisted the Zand house occas-
ionally and on request from the Zand sovereigns, such 
f as Qaraguzlu, Mokri, Qashqa'i, etc. These tribes were 
different from the first category, in that they retained 
their independence on all occasions, paid tribute and did 
not interfere with the politics of the central government. 
3. The third group were hostile and rival tribes, who, by 
the nature of the claim they had to the throne, were 
never allied, or even participant, in Zand military exped-
itions. In this category, the Qajars were the champions, 
although, on a few occasions, the Qajar chiefs (i.e. Aqa 
Mohammad Khan's brothers, Reza Qoli, Morteza Qoli and . 
Mostafa Qoli Khan) joined the camp of the Zand and ac-
tually entered into their service. But in all the instances 
1. See general histories of Persia from the advent of the fifth century to the nine-
teenth century. 
2. See Chapter 7, pp. 278ff. 
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the alliance did not last long and they turned their back 
on the Zands. 
We will now examine the character and role of each group in 
the context of the Zand suzerainty 
1. Tribes allied to the Zands: 
As stated in the previous section on the Zand tribe, this was 
a very small tribe with very limited human resources. Indeed, 
when they returned from Khorasan on the assassination of their 
oppressor, Nader Shah (1160/1747), they numbered only forty 
households. 1 Thus Karim Khan, although he enjoyed the support 
of all the Zand warriors, had to rely heavily on the other 
tribes for military support. Hence, he gathered a number of 
tribes under his standard and they formed the core of his 
army. When he eventually established his supremacy all over 
the country, he returned to Shiraz and brought along with him 
the tribes, who had fought on his side. 
We learn that he ordered his brother, Sadeq Khan, to build . 
10-fO,OOO houses in Shiraz for the tribal warriors in his com-
pany. 2 Waring, in 1802, saw these houses in ruin after the 
ravages of the Qajars. 3 By settling these tribes in the city of 
Shiraz, Karim Khan first and foremost secured a standing army 
within the city, which could be mobilized at short notice. Fur-
thermore, by establishing a sedentary life for these tribes, he 
made them dependent on himself. These measures proved highly 
profitable as long as he lived, but once he was no more, there 
was no guarantee of their loyalty, or even the participation of 
these tribes in any of the Zand military affairs. 
1. T.Z., p.l47. 
2. R.T., p.339. 
3. T .S., p.33. 
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Indeed, the tribes acted quite contrary to that. Immediately 
after the death of the Vakil, they threw their support behind 
Zaki Khan and enabled him to murder twenty-three of the ab-
lest military generals of the Zand house. In fact, all of these 
men were by all accounts compared to the mythological warriors 
of ancient Persia, like Rostam, etc. 1 The Mafi tribes even act-
ed as the instrument in Zaki Khan's hands and murdered these 
Zand noblemen for him. Zaki Khan was not satisfied by the 
killing of all these men. He also confiscated all their effects 
and, in order to retain the support of the tribal warriors, he 
distributed large sums of money amongst them. 2 
When cAli Morad Khan declared himself opposed to the rule of 
his uncle, Zaki Khan, he distributed more money to gather an 
army. 3 Apparently, Zaki Khan spent 100,000 Tomans on mobilis-
ing 20,000 men.,. That meant five Tomans to each man. Consider-
ing that a family could live on two Tomans for a year, 5 it is 
easy to form an opinion of the greed and avarice of the tribal 
warriors, which had been sharpened by these generous donat-
ions and had made them aware of the value of their support. 
Thy same tribe (Mafi), who assassinated the Zand nobles, also 
assassinated Zaki Khan once they sensed danger to their own 
interests. It would appear that the Rishsefid of the Mafi tribe, 
Khan cAli Khan, had rendered too great a service to Zaki Khan 
to be overlooked, but at the same time, the Zand chief was 
apprehensive of men, who could exercise such power. Zaki Khan 
had entertained suspicious feelings towards Khan cAli Khan Mafi 
for some time and was awaiting a chance to eliminate him. 5 
1. T.Z., p.7. R.T., p.425. G.M., p.418.G.G., p.218. 
2. G.M., p.216. G.G., p.219. R.M.M., pp.71-2. 
3. R.T., p. 
4. R.M.M., p.71. 
5. R.T., p.436. 
6. G. M. , p. 244. 
- 336 -
This was, however, prevented by the assassination of Zaki 
Khan. The Mafi chief acted diplomatically: he, who had assist-
ed the Zand chief, Zaki Khan, to usurp the throne and cast 
aside the rightful heir (Abol Fath Khan, the eldest son of the . 
Vakil), rushed the the tent of the same Abol Fath Khan and in-
formed him of the assassination; 1 and by this act, he secured 
more favour and financial gain for himself and his tribesmen. 
The support of the Lak and Kurdish tribes, resident in Shiraz, 
for Abol Fat~ Khan, did not last very long. They soon became 
dissatisfied with affairs, since Sadeq Khan had entered the . 
arena and the young king and his uncle appeared to be at 
odds. It is significant to observe that when ~adeq Khan was 
told not to attend the court, some of the courtiers tried their 
best to mediate between the two factions. Azad Khan Afghan 
was appointed to negotiate with ~adeq Khan and convince him 
of the detrimental implications of their dispute. 2 ~adeq Khan, 
however, refused to comply with the wishes of the courtiers and 
stated that, so long as Abol FatJ; Khan did not obey the usage 
of the realm and regarded his uncle with contempt, he would 
not attend the court. 3 The tribes staged a demonstration in pro-
test to the mild and peaceful disposition of the king and gath-
er'd in the great Maid an and demanded that the king allow 
them to bring Sadeq Khan by force, and even eliminate him . 
and his sons should it be necessary... Abol Fath Khan knew 
well what they were after. As Gha:fari suggests, these tribes 
were only anxious to stir troubles and every day found another 
cause for disturbance. 5 However, Abol Fath Khan was aware of 
their intentions, that is a political instability, which in effect 
enhanced their gains. Thus, he refrained from giving them 
leave to molest his uncle or his family. The tribes, therefore, 
1. T.S., p.267. 
2. R.M.M., pp.73-4. 
3. G.M., p.267. 
4. Ibid., p.268. R.M.M., pp.74-5. 
5. Ibid. 
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abused the king and the protest was nearly turned into a riot, 
when the king was conducted inside and the tribes dispersed. 1 
The incident did not end here, as the tribal warriors gathered 
around ~adeq Khan and instigated him to depose his nephew. 2 
A coup followed, which was carried by the tribes: Sadeq Khan . 
arrived at the gates of the royal residence; he was admitted; 
the tribal warriors in his party arrested and imprisoned Abol 
Fat~ Khan and his younger brothers; and, thus, ~adeq Khan 
ascended to the throne. 3 
These events are sufficient to indicate the crucial and detri-
mental effect of tribal interference. The representative of the 
traditional sedentary population: that is, the kalantar, Mirza 
Mohammad, together with a few of his colleagues, tried very 
hard to prevent many of these disastrous events, but in vain. ~t 
The tribes appeared to be well in control of the situation. Mir-
za Mohammad laments bitterly of the tribes and the futile ef-
forts which he made. Now let us examine why the tribes, who 
were the major element in the Zand victory, had become its 
worse enemy. 
11) fact, Ghafari is the only historian, who remarks on the 
change of attitude which had appeared in the tribes. He states 
that the warriors, who had never turned their back to the bat-
tlefield, had become like Gorgin Milad. 5 What was the cause 
of this change, is the essence of the unrest and turbulence of 
the tribes. The main reason for the change can be cited as the 
fact that, for nearly fourteen years, Karim Khan did not quit 
his capital and his army was leading a life of idleness and 
leisure. In his attempt to capture the town of Ba~ra, almost 
1. G.M., p.269. 
2. R.M.M., p.73. T.Z., p.12. 
3. R.M.M., p.73. G. G., p.233. T.Z., p .12. 
4. R.M.M., p.73. 
5. G.M., p.418. 
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all of the troops were of the c Arab and Afghan tribes, 1 rather 
than the Laks and Kurds and Lors. It is no wonder that, when 
the Persian governor of Ba~ra was killed in a war with some 
c Arab tribes of Ba~ra, and ~adeq Khan was again sent to quell 
the revolt, he had only 2000 men with him and the reinforce-
ment, that he was daily expecting, never arrived. 2 As is 
affirmed by the EIC resident, "the commands of the Vakil are 
but poorly obeyed". 3 The men with ~adeq Khan were mostly non-
residents of the city of Shiraz and this saved him from falling 
into the hands of his mortal enemy, Zaki Khan. Zaki Khan had 
sent letters to the adherents of ~adeq Khan that, should they 
remain loyal to him, their families and wives would be given 
over to the lust of the muleteers... This measure was effective, 
as the menial servants of the camp of Sadeq Khan deserted him . 
in order to rescue their families, but only to the number of 
700. He had upwards of 1300 troops with him, when he fled to-
wards Kerman, and managed even to defeat the army sent out 
of the city to capture him. 5 
In short, the residence in the city and the urban life style 
had greatly diminished the warlike qualities of the tribes. 
)'hus, they had become inclined to demand more and more re-
ward for the minimum effort. Furthermore, they had lost a 
great deal of their independence, since they had been resident 
in the capital. All European sources have commented on the ex-
cellence of the police force in Shiraz. 6 The function of the pol-
ice was primarily to secure the safety of the gates to the city 
and to control the activities of the citizens, rather than civic 
administration of Shiraz. We learn from Francklin that he was 
1. I.O.R. G/29/18. Bushire, 1780. T.Z. states that soldiers were of the Sistani tribes 
2. I.O.R. G/29/18, Bushire, 1780. 
(p.6). 
3. Ibid. 
4. M. T., p.345. 
5. Op. cit. T.Z., p.9. G.G., p.221. G.M., p.257-8. 
6. O.M.T.S., pp.52-3. T.S., p.67. 
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stopped every day on his leaving the gates of the city, until 
he obtained a permission from the government, which enabled 
him to leave the city anytime he wished. The above-mentioned 
source also asserts that the guards were under four khans, 
and should any one abnoxious to the government leave the 
place, the head of the guards was answerable for it. 1 These 
restrictions had limited the freedom of the tribal warriors to 
the degree where they were only allowed to quit Shiraz in the 
company of the sovereign or a military chieftain and, strictly 
speaking, on government military expeditions. Thus, they were 
deprived of entering the service of the highest bidder in the 
arena and were forced to accept the terms offered to them in 
Shiraz. Hence, it was in their interest to foment strife and com-
petition among the Zand chiefs. This, however, did not mean 
that they would serve their sovereign with loyalty and fidelity. 
On the contrary, the moment the army quited the city and they 
found a good chance of deserting their commander, they did not 
c -hesitate to do so. Ja far Khan was deserted by part of his 
army on every occasion that he ventured to regain his lost terr-
itories. 2 It was not uncommon for the tribes to join the opposed 
faction in exchange for a share of booty. Another major ob-
_.stacle for the tribe to fight with resilience and devotion to 
their master, was the fact that, over a period of thirty years, 
the tribes resident in the city of Shiraz had become, as Tarikh-
e-Zandiyeh calls them, Khaneh Shahri: that is, city dwellers. 3 
They had bought property and had gained roots in the urban 
life style. Thus when, for example, they went outside the city 
and the government, or whosoever in the city, threatened them 
that their property and families would be confiscated, or given 
over as captives, they had no option except to desert their 
commanders and enter the town ... Almost all of the Zand rulers 
1. O.M. T.S., p.53. 
2. G.G., pp.252-315. 
3. T.Z., p.77. 
4. G.G., pp.215-395. 
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had to resort to this measure at some stage. Zaki Khan wrote 
letters to the adherents of ~adeq Khan and ordered them to des-
ert him. 1 Sadeq Khan, in his turn, sent decrees to the chiefs 
in the service of cAli Morad Khan to that effect. 2 Seid Morad 
Khan tried the same trick on Lotf cAli Khan and Haji Ebrahim 
also deprived Lotf cAli Khan of his supporters . by similar 
means~ 
In the chapter on urban society and its interrelation with the 
nomadic and sedentary tribal population, we examined the re-
sentment and hatred, with which the traditional citizens of 
Shiraz regarded these tribes, and how ~aji Ebrahim, as the 
champion of the bourgeois middle classes, staged his coup to 
assert the power of the citizens, as against the tribes. Here, 
suffice it to mention that ~aji Ebrahim, after coercing the trib-
al warriors to enter the city, disarmed them and expelled up-
ward of 12,000 from Shiraz.,. The expulsion had many advan-
tages for the weak and precarious rule of ~aji Ebrahim. First, 
it secured him from threat, or a coup staged by the tribes; 
and further, by confiscation of the tribal property, he accumul-
ated great wealth in cash and kind. 5 To quote Tarikh-e-Giti 
1 Goshay: 
"The treasures which he appropriated were so great 
that it is beyond imagination to conceive. " 6 
The ~aji, in the execution of his bold scheme, needed an en or-
Lotf CAll. mous amount of money. The treasury was empty, as 
Khan's predecessors had lavishly spent it on either their milit-
ary exploits or else had distributed it amongst the tribes. 7 For 
1. T. Z. , p. 9. G. M. , p. 260-61. 
2. G.M., p.292. 
3. G.G., p.344. T.Z., pp.64-5. 
4. T.Z., pp.60-67. H. p., Vol. II, pp.187-8. 
5. G.G., p.347. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. G.M., p.458. ·. • 
I 
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instance, when ] a c far Khan was assassinated, Seid Morad Khan 
and his accomplices gave up the great part of the royal treas-
ures, in order to quieten the tribes. 1 The expulsion of the 
tribal warriors had another advantage, as remarked on by Sir 
John Malcolm. The ~aji added to the military capacity of the 
city militia 2 as the arms and amunition of 12,000 men fell into 
his hands. However, it appears that the tribes, who had been 
amassing wealth for over thirty years, could not take any of 
it along with them, as the ~aji, knowing their avarice for 
money, declared his wish to give them a donation, and ordered 
them to gather in the centre of the town. 3 This ploy was effect-
ive and the tribes fell into his trap and were banished from 
the city, without any of their belongings; instead, the money 
that they had hoarded for so long, was used against them and 
their interests. These tribes gathered round Lotf cAli Khan at 
different times, as Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh asserts, finding their 
only means of recovering their lost property in aiding the Zand 
c -prince,.. although we have evidence of Lotf Ali Khan's army 
having reached 12,000 men; 5 but he apparently never had 
enough men to an amount comparable with the Qajar force, and 
always had to rely on his courage and military genius. 
2. The non-allied tribes: 
The second category of the tribes were those, who had retained 
their independence from the government at Shiraz, residing 
in their habitual territories. These had invariably one or sever-
al hostages in the court at Shiraz, for the regular payment of 
their tribute and the good conduct of the tribesmen. The best 
example of these was the Qashqa'i, a large and powerful, 
1. H.P., Vol.II, p.188. G.G., p.347. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. T.Z., p.77. 
5. I.O.R. G/29/18, Bushire, 1792. 
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Turkish tribe whose chief, Esma c il Khan, was a permanent re-
sident at Shiraz, and he had become a close and trusted com-
panion to Karim Khan. 1 His status as a hostage did not de-
prive him of gaining and exercising power. Indeed, he was the 
main cause of Zaki Khan's massacre of the Zand Nobles. 2 The 
situation came about when Zaki Khan was preparing to meet 
the nobles Nazar cAli Khan, Kabb cAli Khan, etc., who had 
taken refuge in the citadel and had only come out on the con-
dition that Zaki Khan met them on neutral ground. 3 As he was 
leaving to attend the meeting, Esmac il Khan warned him, that 
each of these men was a great military general; thus, attend-
ing the meeting alone would be inexpedient, in case they 
attempted to kill him. Zaki Khan immediately changed his 
course and refused to go. He did, however, send one of the 
lesser Zand Khans, . Mohammad Hosein Khan Hezareh, to meet Naz-. 
ar cAli Khan and his supporters.,. This act was considered as 
a great insult to the Zand elders and, as Nazar cAli Khan was 
leaving to make preparation for a military engagement, he was 
assaulted by the Mafi soldiers who killed them all. 5 Esmac il 
Khan appears to have taken the side of Zaki Khan from the 
start. Whether this was due to some previous arrangement or 
1 
not, is not known. It is, however, evident that he enjoyed 
great favour with Zaki Khan and set about extorting and mulct-
ing the Shiraz non-tribal population. 6 He ventured to challenge 
the power of the kalantar, Mirza Mo~ammad, but failed in his 







"On the occasion of the payment of special levy ( pish-
kesh) of Shiraz and its dependencies, Esma c il 
G.M., p.218. 
Ibid. 






"Khan found a good pretext to manifest his hostility 
towards me. During the lifetime of the Vakil there 
had been a number of disputes between us and, on 
every occasion he had not succeeded. When Zaki 
Khan came into power he sent Ijaji Ebrahim to me 
and asked to be given a share of the Pishkesh. 
I had never given him a farthing and I was not 
prepared to do so now. " 1 
result was that the Qashqa 1 i chief went to Zaki Khan 
accused the kalantar of being in league with ~adeq Khan, 




greatly annoyed Zaki Khan and it was with much difficulty, 
that the kalantar convinced him of his innocence. 3 The Qash-
qa 1 i chief was also responsible for instigating Zaki Khan to 
kill his nephew, cAli Morad Khan; for this act he paid with his 
life, as cAli Morad Khan ordered him to be put to death ... 
The tribal chief resorted to intrigues and slander once he was 
divorced from his habitual surroundings and deprived of his 
military power. The moment he returned to his tribe or his foll-
owers, he did not miss a chance to promote his cause through 
military actions. A good example of these chiefs are the sons 
c - - - -
1 of Fat~ Ali Khan Afshar. Jahangir Khan and Mo~ammad Rashid 
Khan were released from Shiraz, when Karim Khan was fatally 
ill. Thus, he had sent them to Esfahan to gather their follow-
ers and return to .A~arbayjan, the original abode of their 
tribe. 5 On their arrival at the city of Esfahan, the news of 
the Vakil 1 s death reached them. Their fellow tribesmen persuad-
ed them to rebel and capture Esfahan. They allied themselves 
to some other tribal elements and, together with some of the off-
icials and the Lutis of the city, staged a revolt. 1 The govern-
1. R.M.M., p.70. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., pp.70-1. 
4. G.M.p.266. R.M.M., p.71. 
5. G.G., p.222. T.Z., p.7. G.M. p.255. 
6. Ibid. 
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or of the city retired to the citadel in the vicinity of Esfahan, 
and was besieged for the space of fifteen days. 1 The revolt 
was only quelled when a large detachment arrived from Shiraz. 
The two Afshar chiefs were executed with some of their allies, 
while the rioters of the city were imprisoned and fined heav-
ily. 2 The non-allied tribes to the house of the Zands would 
L .-/"" 
readily grasp any opportunity, which rele9ved them from the 
payment of their dues. Khosro Khan, the Vali of Ardalan, had 
refrained from payment of his arrears, since the death of the 
Vakil. 3 cAli Morad Kh~n, being a great administrator as well 
as a military commander, coerced him to take refuge in his 
stable by sending an army against him and, thus, brought him 
into submission... At the death of 'Ali Morad Khan, the Ardalan 
chief again refused to honour his obligation. This time Jac far 
Khan carried his arm into the latter's territory. At first, Khos-
ro Khan sent an envoy to the camp of the Zand ruler and prom-
ised to pay his arrears and provide the Zand army with 
troops. J a c far Khan, however, demanded that he attend the 
court in person. Khosro Khan resolved to fight the Zands and, 
indeed, defeated them on the battlefield with much disgrace. 5 
The case of Ban·i. Ka c b shaikh was very much the same, except 
1 that he was not able to defeat the Zands; thus, he declared 
his submission, but only after his cattle had been raided and 
many livestock were captured by the Zand troops. 6 It was not 
uncommon for the ruler to resort to raiding expeditions, as a 
punitive measure against the disobedient tribes and, presum-
ably, when he was not inclined to enter into a serious warfare 
with a rebellious vassel. 
1. G.G., p.223. 
2. Ibid. Khatun abadi, Vaqayecal-Senin Zail, Tehran, 1352, p.578 
3. G.M., p.388. 
4. Ibid., p.389. 
5. G.G., p.287. G.M., p.427-9f •• Z., p.33. 
r G 2 6. T .M., Ms · .. n.p. ~~ p. 99. 
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Some of the powerful tribes though, such as the Bakhtiaris, 
often formed a large part of the Zand army, especially cAli Mor-
ad Khan's army. But they were never directly attached to the 
ea use of the Zands. They were, however, strongly opposed to 
the Qajars and, on one occasion, met Aqa Mohammad Khan in 
the battlefield and inflicted great losses on his army. Unfortun-
ately, they were defeated, but managed to retreat in good 
order. 1 Their flocks were plundered by the Qajars and 80,000 
livestock captured. 2 These predatory incursions greatly reduced 
the tribes, whose major source of revenue came from their live-
stock. Indeed, the tribes were constantly on the alert to avoid 
such events. Sir John Malcolm rightly observes: 
"It is the usage of these tribes unless when very 
strong, to pitch their tents in the vicinity of a 
range of mountains, that their flocks and families 
may be in reach of a place of security on the 
occurrence of danger. " 3 
Some of the Western tribes, such as Qarago zlu, threw their sup-
port behind the Qajars, from the start of Aqa Mo~ammad Khan's 
struggle for power. Their chief was appointed governor of Hama-
dan... Whether the tribe of Qaragozlu was partial to the Qajars 
1 or whether they decided it was a better bet to support the 
fresh and unexploited Qajar power, is not known. One thing 
was certain: that they were opposed to the Zand government at 
Shiraz. The Qaraguzlu chief, Mohammad Hosein Khan, even all-
• c . -
ied himself to a Zand rebel, Esma il Khan, solely to oppose 
]a cfar Khan. 5 The alliance did not last very long, as Esmac il 
Khan was deserted by his ally and left to defend himself as 
best he could.' 
1. I.O.R. P/D/72, Bushire, 1789. 
2. T.M., Ms .n.p. 
3. H.P., Vol. II, p.596. 
4. G.G., p.282. 
5. Ibid., p.293. 
6. Ibid., p.303. 
- 346 -
The Turkish, Kurdish and cArab tribes resident in the provinces 
of A~arbayjan and Khorasan, had very little contact with the 
Zands. Although A~arbayjan was tributary to the Zands until 
the death of cAli Morad Khan, the tribal chiefs were so much 
engaged in their own internal wars, that they had no time or 
energy to interfere with Zand politics. Indeed, they were so 
weakened by their feuds that Aqa Mohammad Khan subdued them 
almost without effort. 1 The cArab tribes of Khorasan, such as 
Shaibani, Mishmast, Khozaimeh, etc., also were busy fighting 
with their neighbours. Amir Mohammad Khan Tabasi of the Shai-
bani tribe was, however, an ambitious chief, who, on at least 
two occasions, challenged the Zand ruler. He assisted Taqi 
Khan, the governor of the town of Yazd, in his effort to repel 
c -the Zand army. He managed to defeat ] a far Khan, apparently 
due to his access to modern amunition, compared to that of the 
Zand army. 2 He also sent a detachment to aid another cAr ab 
chief of the CXmeri tribe, in his effort to capture Esfahan. This 
expedition was futile, as the joint cArab forces were defeated 
by the Zand general, cAli Qoli Khan Kazeruni, and fell into his 
hands. Amir Mohammad Khan never directly opposed the Zands; 
he did, however .capture Mashad and many of the surrqunding 
1 
townships. His death curtailed his ambitious plans for acquir-
ing a vast territory. 3 His brother and successor, Amir Has an 
Khan, did not pursue his schemes and even, unlike his broth-
er, received and entertained the last Zand prince with much 
kindness in adversity. He even provided him with cavalry in 
the pursuit of regaining his domain ... 
Afghan and Baluchi tribes in the East and Southern parts of 
the kingdom, remained on all occasions faithful to the Zand 
cause. Mohammad cAzam Khan, the chief of Narmashir, Khabi~, 
1. G.G., p.334. 
2. G.M., p. 445. 
3. H.P., Vol. II, p. 222. 
4. G.G., p.378. T.Z., p.86. H.P., Vol.II, p. 193 and 221. 
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who had come to the court of Shiraz, during the reign of the 
Vakil and had been appointed the governor of Narmashir, had 
expanded his territories and captured more townships. He was 
of great assistance to Lotf cAli Khan; his son and successor 
also assisted the Zand prince. 1 Mohammad Hose in Khan Sistani, . 
the chief of Barn, was another of the Zand supporters, despite 
the general hostility towards the Zands, which prevailed in the 
province of Kerman and its dependencies. His sons fought with 
the last Zand with gallantry and resilience. But they also be-
trayed him to the Qajars and brought about the final fall of 
the Zands. 2 Incidentally, the sons of Mohammad Hosein Khan 
were, after a while, removed from their principality and even 
were deprived of their eyesight. 3 The sons of A c zam Khan, how-
ever, retained their government for a longer period, until Ebra-
him Khan Zahiral-Dolleh was appointed as the governor of the 
• 
provinces of Kerman and Bal uchestan and, eventually, the rule 
of the Afghans in those parts was terminated.. ( 1216/1800). 
As rightly mentioned by Sir John Malcolm, many of the tribes 
were still fluctuating between the Zand and the Qajar dynast-
ies, even as late as the battle at Abraj and, had Lo~f~ cAli 
1 Khan gained a decisive victory over the Qajar Eunuch on that 
occasion, he might still have had the chance to regain his 
domain. 5 
The tribal elements though, saw their interest in fomenting 
internecine wars and political instability, as each of the riv-
als had to turn to them for military support. Thus, pouring a 
great amount of money into their pockets, as Sir John Malcolm 
rightly observes: 
1. G.G., pp.381-2. T.K., p.358. 
2. G.G., p.390. T.z.,pp.100-101. 
3. Ibid., p.395. 
4. T.K., p.373. 
5. H.P., Vol.II, p.191. 
/ 
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"though the efforts to obtain the crown had been 
limited to the descendants of that prince, ( Karim 
Khan) and their enemy, Aq a Mahomed Khan, the 
necessity which each pretender had in his turn ex-
perienced for the support of the chiefs of tribes, 
had elevated that class into a consequence much 
beyond what they had ever before possessed. " 1 
Still, they would have preferred milder, or rather weaker over-
lord like the Zands, to the fierce and powerful Qaj ar chief, 
that was the essence of the fluctuation of the tribal support be-
tween the contestants. The tribal chief changed his master as 
it suited him. 
The third group of tribes: 
The third category of tribes, who interacted with the Zands 
were those hostile to them. The most prominent tribe of this 
group was the Qajar, a numerous and powerful tribe settled in 
Astarabad. We will discuss this tribe, itself, with its internal 
feuds and rivalries and then proceed to investigate their inter-
action with other racial and linguistic tribal groups. 
The origin and history of this tribe has been studied by a num-
ber of contemporary, as well as modern scholars. 2 The major 
branch of this tribe, which had been settled in Astarabad dur-
ing the Safavid- rule; was split into two divisions, Ashaqehbash . 
and Yokharibash. 3 These were further split into subdivisions 
commonly known as tirreh. The ruling tirre~ of Yokharibash was 
named Davalu, which signified their pastoral habits and the 
type of their herd... The ruling tirreh of Ashaqehbash was Qov-
anlu or Qoyunlu. There was at all times great rivalry between 
these two tirrehs, and this had resulted in the failure of the 
1. H.P., Vol.II, p.204. 
2. See Tarikh-e-Mohammadi. 
3. R.S., Vol.9, n.p. H.P., Vol.II, p.127. 
4. Ibid. Dava is a camel. 
/ 
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three Ashaqehbash pretenders to lay their hands on the crown 
of Persia. Fath cAli Khan, Mohammad Hasan Khan and his son, 
Hosein Qoli Khan, were all thwarted by the jealousies and host-
ilities of their domestic rivals and had been eventually murd-
ered. 
The Blood feuds had been in existence for many years and 
neither side were prepared to see the other's success. Moham-
mad Has an Khan, in his struggle against Karim Khan, had 
been deserted by the rival tribe in the most critical stages of 
his struggle. 1 When he had besieged Shiraz in 1171/1757, the 
Yokharibash chiefs, fearful of his success and the subsequent 
harassment, which they could easily expect after he established 
himself in power, started to show signs of disaffection. Finding 
a good pretext: namely, the shortage of food and provisions, 
they deserted Mohammad Has an Khan outside the gates of Shiraz, . . 
while he blockaded the city and there was every possibility of 
his success. 2 He was, however, forced to escape with his life 
and with only fourteen attendants, headed for Mazandaran. 
There he contrived to eliminate all his major tribal rivals, by 
inviting 
them all. 
the Yokharibash chiefs to a meeting and massacring 
But he did not live long to reap his success over 
since he was killed by order of the son of a murdered them, 
chief, while his horse was stuck in the mud in the forests of 
Mazandaran. 3 
His son, Hosein Qoli Khan, also in pursuit of power, estab-. 
lished himself at Astarabad and avenged the murderers of his 
father. Again he was killed by Turkmans, who were hired to 
assassinate him by the rival tribe... These events made a major 
impact on the success of Aqa Mohammad Khan, since, when he 
1. G.G., p.66. 
2. R.S., Vol.9, n.p. 
3. G.G., p.87. R.S., n.p. 
4. R.S., n.p. 
/ 
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started his career, there was no person of any consequence to 
challenge his power, at least in the Yokharibash branch of 
Qajars. But he was faced with another dilemma. 
When Aqa Mohammad Khan effected his escape from Shiraz and 
returned to Mazandaran, he was by no means welcomed by his 
own brothers. Reza Qoli Khan, his younger brother, had also 
escaped from Qazvin after hearing the news of the Vakil's 
death, and intended to set himself up as a competitor for sup-
reme power 1 and could not accept Aqa Mohammad Khan's claims 
to his father's inheritance. Aqa Mohammad Khan was also res-. 
ented and despised by his other half brothers, Morteza Qoli 
and Mostafa Qoli Khan, born of legally married Qajar ladies. 2 
Whereas his brothers born of concubines accepted his supremacy 
without question. 
In the initial stages of Aqa Mohammad Khan's struggle, he 
could hardly rely on his own tribe. Indeed, his initial allies 
were Kurdish tribes of minor importance, to whom he had allied 
himself on his way to Mazandaran. 3 He managed to raid a cara-
van carrying treasures to Shiraz, and also confiscated the Khaz-
aneh deposited in the province of Mazandaran.,. By his fin a ne-
ial gains, he could recruit more troops and pursue his object-
ives. He wisely secured the citadel at Astarabad, where he 
could retire in time of emergency. The major setback in his 
career was his conflict with his brothers on various occasions. 
They deserted him, defeated him and even ea ptured and impris-
oned him. In one instance, he nearly lost his life at the hands 
of his own brothers. 5 It took him some years to overcome his 
kinsmen and, by murdering one and blinding the second, term-
1. R.S., n.p. 
2. Ibid. 
3. T.M.Ms. n.p. 
4. Fava'ed al-SafaY.ieh, p.146. 
5. T .M. Ms.. n.p. 
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inated their careers. Reza Qoli Khan, the third of his rivals, 
after having joined cAli .Morad Khan, defected from his service 
and allied himself to ~adeq Khan, the latter's adversary. He 
eventually took refuge in Russia and died there. 1 
We will now proceed to the study of the interaction of the Qaj-
ars with the other tribal groups. As previously mentioned, .Aqa 
Mohammad Khan made alliances with some of the Kurdish tribes, 
who had been settled in Esfahan and Ray by the Vakil, such 
as Inanlu, Eslamlu and Modanlu. He then proceeded to Mazan-
daran and spent the first years of his career in establishing 
his power in the provinces of Mazandaran and Gilan. It was 
c - -only during the rule of Ali Morad Khan, that he left the north-
ern provinces and captured Qazvin and Hamadan and, even 
then, he avoided a confrontation with the Zands. The defeat of 
the Zand army in Mazandaran encouraged him to make direct 
assaults on the Zand dynasty's domain, and he pursued this 
course until he ascended the throne2 in 1209/1794. 
The Qajar tribe lost much of its importance in the political 
arena after the death of Mohammad Hasan Khan in 1171/1757. 
1 They led a quiet life in their settlements and had very little 
contact with the outside world. There is no reference to the Qaj-
ar warriors' participation in the wars and, thus' they had no 
chance of having contact with the other tribes. The Turkmans, 
however, were the traditional neighbours of the Qajars and had 
always assisted the tribal chiefs in times of trouble. Mo~ammad 
Has an Khan was offered asylum, when he fled the punishment 
he deserved in rebelling against Nader Shah. 3 He stayed among 
the Turkmans as long as Nader Shah lived. It was after Nad-
er' s assassination that the Qajar chief resumed the pursuit of 
his claim to the throne of Persia ... Again, when he was killed, 
1. M.S., p.19. 
2. Ibid., pp.14-23. 
3. H.P., Vol.II, p.127. See also Hanway, Jonas, Transactions of the ••• , Vol.!, p.202. 
4. H.P., Vol.II, p.128. 
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the Turkmans gave protection to his wives and children and 
they were kept until Aqa Mo~ammad Khan, his eldest son, decid-
ed to give himself up to the Zands. Then he was kept as host-
age in Shiraz and his mother and brothers in Qazvin. 1 
Despite all this, the Turkmans never formed 
the Qajars. Their alliances were temporary 
They mostly, and primarily, were concerned 
an alliance with 
and spontaneous. 
with their own 
gain, rather than participation in dynastic struggles. It is 
true that the defeat sustained by the large army of cAli Morad 
Khan in Mazandaran was largely due to the raids and tactics 
of the Turkmans, 2 but there is no evidence that they were act-
ually in league with the Qaj ars. They were, however, so out 
of the way of the central plateau, that they could not afford 
to take part in dynastic wars, unless they occurred in the vic-
inity of their areas. Aqa Mo~ammad Khan, however, benefited 
from their tactics and managed to establish himself in an un-
disputed position in the northern provinces. 
The major Kurdish tribes, such as Ardalan tribes, Mokri and 
so on, preferred to retain their independence and none of them 
/ventured to challenge or, indeed, form an alliance with the 
Qajars. Indeed, it was by force of arms that Aqa Mo~ammad 
Khan managed to establish his power in Kurdistan. 3 The Lor 
tribes showed partiality to the Zand cause at all times and the 
tribe of Mafi challenged the Qajar chief to a battle and even 
defeated him with great losses. The Bakhtiaris also did not fav-
our him and, although they were defeated by him, they inflict-
ed great losses on his army too ... 
The Turkish speaking tribes consisted of many diverse groups. 
1. R.S., n.p. 
2. G.M., pp.407-8. G.G., p.250. 
3. G.G., p.293. T.M., n.p. M.S., p. 
4. I.O •. R. P/E/72, Bushire, 12th Sept. 1785. 
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The ones in the south, such as the Qashqa' i, carefully stayed 
out of the way of the Qajar and Zand contest. On one occasion, 
when the Qajars intended to plunder their livestock, they retir-
ed to the safety of the mountains 1 and never came into contact 
with the Qajars. But the Turkish tribes of A~arhayjan were in 
a totally different position. They were so divided among them-
selves and busy with their internal fights, that they had no 
time to take part in other conflicts. 2 That was why Aqa Moham-
mad managed to subdue them all without exhausting his treas-
ures, and they submitted to his supreme rule without dispute. 
Some of the major tribes of Azarhayj an: namely, Donboli, had 
T 
a long-standing friendship with the Qajars. Najaf Qoli Khan 
Donboli was appointed beglarbegi of Tabriz by Mohammad Hasan 
Khan Qajar and was also appointed as tutor to the young Aqa 
Mohammad Khan. 3 The Turkish tribes of Zanjan and Qazvin, 
such as Zayerlu Afshar, Afshar Khamseh and so on, entered into 
alliance with the Qajars in the initial stages of the struggle 
c -for supremacy. :Ali Khan Khamseh once or twice joined forces 
with Aqa Mohammad Khan, but for a short time and, immediate-. 
ly after the Qajar defeat, deserted him and went his way ... 
/ The Afghan, Baluchi and cArab tribes of the south remained loy-
al to the house of Zand and even invited and supported Lotf 
c Ali Khan at a time when even his kinsmen had turned away 
from him. 5 Thus they were hostile to the Qajars. 
It appears, however, that Aqa Mohammad Khan was able to en-
joy the support, or rather to buy the services, of many of the 
tribal groups, once he had reconciled his own tribe to his 
cause. 
1. G.G., p.306. 
2~ TaTa, Vol:II, p.250. G.G., p.334. 
3. -TaTa, Vol.I, p~85~ 
4. T.Z., p.30. G.G., p.275. 
5. T.K., p.358. M.S., p.22. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE RURAL AREAS 
Persia, like most Middle Eastern countries, does not benefit 
from a major river passing through it. There are, however, a 
few rivers which provide irrigation in the large basin of the 
central and south western plains, such as the Zayandehrud 
and Karun. Along the banks of these rivers lie the most flour-
ishing cultivations and the most prosperous villages. The vast 
tracks of barren land in the east and south east cannot pro-
vide food for either beast or human beings. The mountainous 
areas, however, provide ample pasturage for livestock breed-
ing. A few areas are cultivated as Daym (dry cultivation). 
This system relies totally on the rainfall and often the crop is 
destroyed as a result of a drought. On the whole, as Sir Har-
ford ]ones observed in 1807-11, one third of the empire was un-
cultivated and probably uncultivable. 1 Lack of water and 
/ forest were the two major deficiencies of the country's natural 
environment. 
The villages were generally built along the banks of the rivers 
or rivulets in the central plateau. The mountainous areas were 
generally dependent on springs. Along the periphery of the des-
erts, the agriculture was solely reliant on the subterranean 
water canals (Qanat). This form of irrigation involved great 
effort, as its construction was a lengthy and complex process. 
The means of agricultural production were primitive and back-
ward and the peasants used the same instruments as their fore-
fathers had done a thousand years before them. There is no 
1. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.!, p.429. 
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explanation as to why these means never improved. Various 
scholars have attempted to establish why there was this lack 
of incentive in such a venture. 1 But one cannot state with any 
degree of certainty, that their interpretations are valid. There 
is, however, one point which is certain and that is the fact, 
that the peasantry did not own the land and that the vast 
tracts of land belonged to the government and the major land-
owners. The peasant either tilled the land on a share-cropping 
basis, with the Divan or the landowner, and, as long as the 
harvest provided him with his basic needs, he did not make an 
effort to increase production. 2 Alternatively the peasant rented 
the land for ninety-nine years, which lease was renewable by 
paying the fine of a year's rent. The heavy taxes on the land 
c . 
and the agricultural instruments discouraged the Ra iya t from 
purchasing land and improving his means of production. For 
instance, a watermill was liable to a heavy tax, which was 
the upkeep of one soldier for a year with his clothes and 
arms. 3 
There is, however, evidence of a Rac iyat-e-Jokar (barley culti-
vator) in a village of Fars, having owned land. He had be-
1 come so wealthy that he ventured to enter the political arena ... 
But these cases are isolated and uncommon. It is, however, ob-
vious that, after the land confiscations carried out by Nader 
Shah, private landownership increased. Mirza Mo~ammad indic-
ates that, during the Estifa of the Amlak-e-Divani, instances 
of embezzlement occurred. 5 Lambton also, without citing her 
source of information, states that many of the Ouq af landhold-
ers, fearing to lose their land, did not come up with the docu-
ments pertaining to the state of their land. Therefore, private 
1. Petroshevski, Keshavarzi va monasebat-e-Arzi dar Iran, tr. Keshavarz. Tehran, 
1334; & Arunova, Ashrafian, Doulat-e-Nader Shah Afshar, tr. Hamid Amin, Tehran, J~48~ 
2. M.H.P., Vol.l, p. 77. 
3. H.P., Vol.II, p.496. 
4. R.M.M., pp.48-9. 
5. Ibid., p.15. 
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individuals registered these properties in their own names. 1 
This assertion is, however, supported by Tazkerreh Shush tar, 
which clearly states that many Ouqaf had been usurped by the 
people and, of a vast Vaqf which the Safavid kings had alloc-
• 
ated to the Mosque and Madreseh in Shushtar, only a few rem-
nants of the original estate had survived. 2 It is, however, 
doubtful that ordinary people, or rather peasants, had taken 
possession of these lands. It is likely that the notables and 
men with the means to bribe officials, or the clergy, had taken 
possession of the Ouqaf. 3 
Mirza Mohammad Kalantar of Shiraz was able to purchase a 
great number of villages wholly or in part, during the reign 
of the Vakil. This indicates that land was free for purchase 
in the market. Furthermore, according to Rostam, the price of 
property was cheap. That is, a Jarib of uncultivated land was 
2,500 Dinars, whereas a Jarib of an orchard was one Toman~ 
There can be no explanation for this, except that the availab-
ility of land in the market had decreased in price. There 
arises another question as to how this had happened. Malcolm 
asserts that, during the two revolutions subsequent to the fall 
/ of the Safa vids, and especially after the assassination of Nader 
shah, 
"almost all the principal families of Persia have 
perished and their estates fallen into the possess-
ion of the crown. "5 
This leads one to the assumption that the government was sell-
ing the lands in its possession, but unfortunately there is no 
1. La•bton, Landlord and Peasants, p.130. 
2. Tazkerreh Shushtar, Vol.III, p.llO. 
3. Kinnier, op. cit., p.31. 
4. R.T., pp.316-17. See the Table of Coins, Appendix 
5. H.P., Vol.II, p.471. 
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evidence to support this, although neither is there any particu-
lar reason to refute this possibility. In some official documents 
which have survived from the Zand period, there are indicat-
ions that the lands, which were previously confiscated 
. 
(Zabti . 
Divan), were taxed according to previous assessments. These 
include many villages and hamlets (Mazrac eh) and watermills 
(Tahuneh). In another document, numerous villages were trans-
ferred to the Divan (Enteqa:Ii Divan) by a certain Aqa cAli Ak-
bar, son of ~aji Mehdi. Among these villages, a number are 
marked as having been Khalesseh previously. This supports our 
assumption that the Khale;;eh had been sold and then transfer-
red back to the government1 (1192). 
At any rate, landownership remained very much the same as in 
previous eras, that is, mainly in the hands of the ruling and 
upper middle classes. When Mirza Mohammad Kalantar was in 
debt, he sold part of a village to Moll a Mandegar, the Kalan-
tar of the town of Kavar. 2 Almost all government officials ap-
pear to have invested part of their wealth in landed property: 
the members of the royal family, as well as the governors and 
kalantars belonging to the local nobility. Shaikh cAli Khan 
1 Zand had a vast estate (Amlak va Jehat) in the provinces of 
Fars and ~raq, the revenue of which amounted to sixty Tomans 
a day. His property was, however, confiscated by the Vakil as 
a punishment for his excessive pride. Molla Mandegar, the kal-
antar of Kavar, appears to have been the major landowner in 
his principality. His revenue was so great that the Vakil asked 
him whether he had found treasures; Moll a Mandegar presented 
Karim Khan with the products of his property the next day and 
stated that his land and his cultivation were the treasures he 
had found. 3 The government was inclined to make concessions 
towards the major landowners; Mirza Mohammad' s property was 
1. Majles Library, uncatalogued documents of the Zand period. 
2. R.M.M., p.57. 
3. F.N., part II, p.262. 
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exempted from payment of dues for two years ( 1196-1198). 1 
c Olama and Sadat were another major group of landowners. 
Many of the Sadat had retained their property during and after 
the reign of Nader Shah, which had all been given to them as 
cEqtac during the Safavid era. Nader Shah is also known to 
have given ~q ta c to a seyed. 2 Although some families, like 
Hazin Lahiji, had totally lost their hereditary estate, during 
the turbulent time of the Afghan invasion. 3 As mentioned be-
fore, Aqa Mohammad Bidabadi, the renowned moll a of Esfahan, 
owned land which he cultivated himself and gave part of his 
revenues to the needy.~ 
The merchants were particularly interested in acquiring landed 
property, as an investment against the uncertainty of their com-
mercial activities. Aqa ':Ali Kermani bought property in the dis-
trict of Eqta c . His property within the city of Gavashir was 
so extensive that, when the city fell into the hands of the Qaj-
ars, 12,000 people took refuge there. 5 As indicated previously, 
the artisans and shopkeepers formed a small proportion of the 
proprietors, who engaged in horticulture around the cities and 
1 towns, in order to subsidize their income. 
1 These often had 
small fields, which were taxed heavily, on account of the pro-
fitability of the produce and the ample need for regular irrigat-
ion. 
As Harford ]ones rightly observes, there was no-one in Persia, 
who lived on the revenue or rent of his landed property. The 
1. R.M.M., p.81. 
2. Hanway, Vol.!, p.314. Eqtac was a form of service land-holding. 
3. Z.H., p.12. 
4. R.T., p.406-7. G.M., p.222. 
5. T.K., pp.366-7. 
6. Kuznetsova, op. cit., p.310. 
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majority of landowners attached themselves to the government 
for obtaining protection 1 and that was in cases, when they 
were not already in official positions. This protection was not, 
however, solely against the oppression of the government, but 
there were other factors which induced the landowners to seek 
subsidiary income. Among the most important of these factors 
was the turbulent state of affairs, which made all productive 
activities risky and unsettled. The landowners had to contend 
with various competitors, who were always in need of cash and 
provisions. 2 Sometimes they were reduced to despair, Mirza Hos-
ein Saheb Ekhtiar Fars could not afford to provide cAli Mar.dan 
• • 
Khan Bakhtiari with the grain demanded of him, on account of 
his Rac iyats' flight to the mountains en masse. He was then 
forced to pay the price of the grain instead. This was, how-
ever, more difficult as he had no income. 3 Many families, as 
Malcolm observes, were totally ruined as a result of these pro-
ceedings. 
It was not only the landlord who suffered these hardships. The 
peasants were beaten, tortured and burnt to give away their 
grains. When the oppression was unbearable, they retired to 
1 the safety of the mountains and their fields and plantations 
were destroyed... Locusts, drought and epidemics were other mal-
adies, which hampered agriculture. During the reign of Lo!fcAli 
Khan, the crops in the province of Fars were ruined by locusts 
for five successive years. As a result of this event, famine 
broke out and many people lost their lives. 5 Buckingham, in 
the early 19th century, witnessed the great distress of the peo-
ple in Fars on account of drought. 
1. H.P., Vol.!, p.498. 
2. I.O.R. l/P & S/9, Box 18, 1810. 
3 • R • M • M • , p • 44 • 
4. Niebuhr, Travels, p.48. Kinnier, op. cit., pp.37, 43. 
5. G.G., pp.365-6. 
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"The want of rain had been so universally felt over 
the country that men were tempted to acts of des-
paration to supply the cravings of hunger. " 1 
In these circumstances, raids and highway robbery were com-
mon occurrences. The tribes attacked and plundered the car a-
-
vans laden with grain, and cities were in distress for food. 
The landowner, who was generally a resident of the city, 
fleeced his peasant for his last grain and, after all this, the 
peasants suffered more than anyone. The conditions of the peas-
ants were no better in times of peace. During the long and rel-
atively tranquil reign of the Qajars. Ferrier remarks that: 
"the most unfortunate portion of the Persian populat-
ion namely the labouring classes, are always the 
most ill treated and their complaints never reach 
the foot of the throne until they have been so 
transformed and falsified as to draw upon them 
fresh persecutions instead of procuring the justice 
they seek; finding it impossible to obtain this, 
they take the matter into their own hands, when 
opportunity offers and the thousand miseries which 
they bear in silence become at length so unsupport-
able that many a bloody episode is the result." 
1 
Indeed, this was the case during the period under study. cAli 
Mardan Khan Bakhtiari, in his struggle against Karim Khan, 
captured Shiraz and sent his Mohassels to the various districts 
of the province. In all the villages, the peasants set about 
fighting his men and defeated and turned them all out. 3 This 
was not, however, without the gravest outrages committed 
against the peasants. In 1177, a peasant, Taqi Khan Dorani, 
rebelled against the oppression of Khoda Morad Khan Zand, the 
governor of Kerman. He not only killed the governor, but est ab-
lished himself as the new governor. His fellow villagers joined 
his standard and, in no time, he formed an army of 1000 peas-
1. Buckingham, Travels, Vol.!, p.435. 
2. Ferrier, J.P., Caravan journey and wanderings ••• , p.16. 
3. R.M.M., p.43. 
• 
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ants. He held out against the Zand army for more than a year. 
Eventually, he was betrayed by the citizens to the Zand army 
and was subsequently put to the sword. 1 
The peasants' revolts were, however, doomed to failure, as 
they were by no means organized and had no political aim in 
mind. What they wanted was to free themselves from the yoke 
of oppressive regimes. It would have been possible if they re-
mained in their own village and refused to obey the central 
government. As Mirza Mohammad Kalantar remarks, there were 
villagers "who were not in the habit of paying Divani dues" 
and the government had no control over them. 2 But the ambit-
ious project, such as that of Taqi Khan, put the villagers ag-
ainst the · citizens as well as the central ·government · and the 
dual battle was hard to.: deal with ." 3 
. ; ] 
Perhaps it would be· appropriate·,· here to give a short, account 
of the interaction of ·village and town ·and their relationship 
with the tribes. 
The towns and villages in Persia were never so distinctly div-
ided as they were in Western Europe, where the dissident artis-
an could take refuge in the villages, when he left his guild 
and workshop in the town. Thus, he could pursue his craft 
without the interference of the guild and the oppression of the 
town officials. On the other hand, the hard pressed villager, or 
rather peasant, fled to towns to relieve himself from the cruel-
ty of his master. He sought employment and often settled in 
town permanently. There are, however, isolated cases in Persia 
of craftsmen taking their residence in the village, such as the 
potter encountered in the village Savanat (E~tahbanat) by Sir 
William Ouseley in the early 19th century... But these craftsmen 
were few and far between. Again, the villager in Persia re-
1. T.K., pp.322-29. 
2. R.M.M., p.20. District of Sinigan in Fars. 
3. Dobb, Maurice, "From feudalism to capitalism", in Transition from Feudalism to 
Capitalism, ed. N. 1-Jilton, 1978, p.168. 
4. Ouseley, Sir William, Travels into various countries of the East particularly 
Persia, London 1818, Vol.II, p.165. 
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sorted to the town, when he lost all his belongings as a result 
of civil wars, but instead of seeking employment in towns, he 
often turned to banditry or else joined the army, which was 
much the same. 1 
Furthermore, the towns and villages of Western Europe devel-
oped independent of each other. The towns by increasing indus-
trial production, dragged the villages behind them and this con-
tributed to the improvement of village production. The town was 
a market for the surplus of the villages. 2 In Persia, the cities 
and the towns were totally dependent on the villages in their 
economic lives. Except for a few towns such as Esfahan, which 
could provide part of its food consumption in the fields and or-
chards around the city; the rest of the towns had to import 
every item of food from the villages. That is precisely why the 
famines were so common in Persia. Civil War, locusts, drought 
and other causes, which affected the village, necessarily affect-
ed the towns. This dependence did not, however, contribute to 
their unity and solidarity, but made them resentful towards 
each other. If the town dweller sensed a threat to his interest 
from the villager, he did not hesitate to ally himself with the 
oppressive government in order to ward off the villagers, as 
is indicated in the example mentioned above. 
The villagers regarded the town with apprehension, since they 
associated it with the government and oppression. All the Eur-
opean travellers of the 18th century assert that the whole popul-
ation of the villagers fled at the sight of a party coming from 
the town. Hanway, early in the century, affirms that, where-
ver he went, the villagers had fled from their houses, taking 
him and his retinue for "soldiers or robbers which were very 
much the same. "3 The other form of showing their resentment 
towards the townspeople was by fortifying their village and re-
1. Niebuhr, p.55. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Hanway, Vol.I, p.236. 
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fusing to admit the intruders to their village. Again, Hanway 
provides us with an example of such an occasion. 
"We arrived at a village, the houses of which were 
built with stones and made so defensible, that we 
could not procure any entrance, till we prepared 
to take a house by scaling the walls. " 1 
However, the attitude of the villagers towards the tribes was 
much more hostile. Although the tribes were the clients of the 
villagers for their necessities and, at the same time, sold their 
surplus dairy products, ea ttle, and handicrafts to the villages, 
relations were anything but friendly. The tribes looked at the 
villagers with contempt, as they were tied down to their houses 
and, thus, subject to the drudgery of the state, whereas the 
house of a nomad was his tent and he could move on at any 
time he pleased and free himself from oppression. But this did 
not cultivate sympathy for the peasant; on the contrary, the 
nomad did not miss the chance to add to the miseries of the 
peasants. Mirza Mo~ammad Kalantar gives an account of how 
the tribes, who had been transferred to the northern provinces 
by Nader Shah, completely ruined all the villages on their way 
back to their original abode. 2 The frequent incursions of the 
Turkman tribes into the central areas, as far afield as Es-
fahan and Kashan serves as a further example to prove the 
point. Sir John Malcolm asserts that not only the villages near 
the two cities mentioned above were plundered, but that all the 
inhabitants were taken captive and sold at a ransom. 3 It is 
not surprising, therefore, to find that almost all the villages 
in the central plateau and open plains were fortified with a 
Qalc a (citadel), where the inhabitants took refuge in time of 
crisis. 
1. Hanway, Vol.!, p.236. 
2. R.M.M., p.32. 
3. Malcolm, J. Sketches of Persia, pp.14-15. 
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Thus, as Berar in the early 20th century observes, there were 
different wars between various elements in Persian society 1 and 
the dynamics of the whole explains the numerous revolutions 
and counter-revolutions, which afflicted the empire of Persia 
throughout successive centuries. 
Taxation System: 
In this section we study yet another war between the peasan-
try and the state, which was by far the most destructive of 
all: that is, the state trying to exploit the peasant and the 
peasant's refusal to yield. In the early 19th century, Sir John 
Malcolm reckoned the tax on the land to constitute two thirds 
of the whole revenue gathered into the state treasury. 2 Kin-
nier a few years later, also asserts that the revenues did not 
exceed three million sterling and that two thirds was collected 
from the land. 3 Although Harford ]ones appears to disagree 
with both sources and places the taxes at a much smaller 
amount, on the grounds that the accurate amount of taxes could 
not be ascertained, as the tax system was deficient and the re-
cords were unreliable ... It is, however, worth studying the meth-
od of tax collection and also the sources of the taxes on land. 
Again, as Malcolm observes, after the confiscation of the Ouqaf 
by Nader Shah, the crown land greatly increased. The arrange-
ment was that, if the peasant or, indeed, the tenant provided 
the seeds, then the cultivator had to pay one third of the crop 
to the state, but, should the seed be provided by the govern-
ment, the peasant had to give one half, and often two thirds, 
of the crop to the state. 5 Malcolm remarks on the arrangement 
in a different form. When the crop is being measured by the 
1. Berar, Enqelabat-e-Iran, tr. z. Dehshiri. Tehran, 1355, p.83. 
2. I.O.R. L/P&S/9. Box 18. Notes on a memorandum on the revenues of Persia. 1810. 
3. Kinnier, J.M. Geographical ••• , p.47. 
4. Mission to Persia, Vol.!, p.404. 
5. I.O.R., L/P&S/9 Box lB. 1810. 
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government official, presumably after the harvest, if the seed 
is supplied by the government, it is returned, and ten percent 
of the whole is next put aside for the reapers and threshers; 
after which the crop that remains is equally divided between 
the cultivator and the king. Lands that are the property of in-
dividuals pay according to their situation, in respect to water: 
When that is certain and obtained from a stream, they pay 
twenty percent of their produce, after deducting seed and the 
allowance, stated before, for reapers and threshers. 1 The rest 
of Malcolm' s account is consistent with I .0. R. records. He fur-
ther asserts, that the duty on estates is generally farmed by 
the owners, 2 which prevents trouble and vexatious interference 
by subordinate officers of the revenue, with the landowner. This 
point is contested by Harford }ones, who asserts that estates 
like these (privately owned) are generally farmed to the royal 
collector of the district, in which they happen to be situated 
or managed for the proprietor by an agent on the spot. 3 This 
latter account is also indicated by Lambton. 
This was at least the case in the province of Fars. The amount 
of taxes were not, however, so clear cut. There were many 
loopholes, which enabled officials to extort greater sums than 
their dues. Mirza Mohammad Kalantar rented a village belong-
ing to the crown, during the reign of Nader Shah. He had 
appointed a Mobasher to manage affairs on his behalf. The gov-
ernor, Taqi Khan, being hostile to Mirza Mo~ammad, demanded 
a lump sum of him on various pretexts. These are termed by 
Mirza as Mobadelle Berenj va Shaltuk, Mo:_ale~e Gandom va Jo, 
va tafavot Bazr for the hire of crown land (mahal-e-Divani) ... 
Although he does not clarify the ways in which these taxes 
were exacted, they were certainly not the usual amount of 
1. H.P., Vol.II, p.471. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Brydges, Mission, Vol.I, p.405. 
4. R.M.M., pp.12-13. 
- 366.-
taxes expected by Mirza Mohammad. The terms mean that the 
rice was to be exchanged for paddy. The crop of wheat and 
barley was to be divided by three, probably one share going 
to the government official, whereas the Kalantar had provided 
the seed and, thus, the government had no right to demand one 
third of the grain. The difference between the price of the 
seed, which the tenant had provided, would also go to the gov-
ernor; apparently the seed provided by the government was 
priced at a higher rate. The Mobasher, who had acted as the 
middleman, washed his hands of the business and Mirza Moham-
mad, as the entrepeneur, had to meet the demand. 1 
Besides the shares, which the government appropriated as its 
ownership rights, it levied taxes on the produce of the peasant 
or the tenant, who cultivated the crown lands. There is, how-
ever, no information available on that point. In a document in 
existance from the Zand era, this tax is termed al Malojehat 
va Motevajehat, which was exacted from all the lands, Arbabi 
or Rac iyati, and even Ouqaf; but it does not apply to Khaless-.. 
eh and tyul. Private lands were liable to very high taxation, 
if they were watered without labour being involved: that is, 
irrigation . by rivers or springs. These paid twenty percent of 
their produce. The land irrigated by Qanat was liable to fifteen 
percent of the crop. 2 The dry cultivation, Daym, which relied 
completely on rainfall, paid ten percent. I.O.R. records attrib-
ute the relatively low percentage to the fact that the crop was 
scanty, and Malcolm also indicates this too; but the actual 
fact was that, often the crop was totally ruined by untimely 
rain, or else drought, which was more often the case. The har-
vest was, at times, abundant if there was no scarcity of 
water. 3 These arrangements were, however, relevant to grain 
cultivation, or rather as it was termed, Shatvi. The Saifi gen-
1. R.M.M., p.13. 
2. I.O.R. L/P&S/9 Box 18. 1810. 
3. Kinnier, op. cit., p.54. 
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erally referred to cotton, rice and fruits such as melons. The 
peasant was often unable to furnish the seed as well as the 
labour, but, if he provided the seed, he would receive two 
thirds of the crop and the other share went to the proprietor 
of the land. If the latter furnished the seed, he would be en-
titled to two thirds of the crop. He also had to pay government 
dues as well. 1 As indicated above, private landownership was 
discouraged by heavy taxation. Only if the owner had the 
means to construct Qanats, could he pay a smaller amount of 
tax to the government. Again Mirza Mo~ammad, who owned many 
villages, informs us that he undertook the task of constructing 
a few Qanats for his vast property and, thus, reaped great 
profits from his land. 2 The Raciyat, who could not do so and 
had to water his land by the rivers, paid as much as seventy 
percent of his crop in dues and shares. That is why, as Mal-
colm indicates, the government encouraged the peasants to culti-
vate waste land, as it involved a smaller amount of capital, 
which the Ra c iyat could afford and paid less tax on his prod-
uce. 3 The arrangement of taxation varied greatly according to 
various provinces, according to the climate and the type of 
crop produced. In areas, which were largely fruit producing, 
such as the environs of Esfahan, the peasant paid tax on a 
number of trees he had in his orchard. Malcolm provides us 
with information on that point. He asserts that he gathered his 
information from an intelligent native of Shiraz. The following 
are the taxes on vineyards and fruit trees: 
"Vineyard, Faryab or certain water 
(i.e. river, etc. ) 
Vineyard, Bukhs, or uncertain water (Daym) 
Apple, peach, pear &c. 
6 Dinars per tree 
5 Dinars per tree 
20 Dinars per tree 
Walnuts 100 Dinars per tree ..... 
1. R.M.M., pp.66-7. 
2. I.O.R. L/P&S/9 Box 18. 1810. 
~· H.P., Vol.II, p.475. 
4. Ibid. 
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It is interesting to note that the tax decreased by the amount 
of labour and water involved in cultivation. Vineyards, which 
required regular attention and irrigation, paid less tax, where-
as walnuts, which did not need labour and water, paid the 
highest amount. 
Ab bott, in the mid 19th century, asserts that the palm trees 
were taxed according to their bearing. This information, al-
though relevant to a much later period, is significant in that 
the author asserts that: 
"The people appear to have neglected the cultivation 
of this valuable tree (palm) for some time past at 
Darab. It is affirmed that 50 years since ( 1807) 
the number of date trees was 100,000 of which only 
30,000 remain. " 1 
Since we have given the taxes on land, we might speak of 
other kinds of taxes, which were collected from the peasants. 
The Ra c iyat had to provide the provisions for the army, if 
they halted at their village or a stage nearby. Often the peas-
ant concealed his gr~in and, in such cases, the military chiefs 
did not hesitate to use force in order to obtain provisions. 
I This was ruinous to the villagers, as we have mentioned be-
fore. Amir Gun eh Khan Afshar, on his expedition to the coast 
of the Gulf, burnt the houses of the villages and took them 
along as captives. He, however, found the concealed grain in 
the holes dug underneath the huts and appropriated them. 2 
The Ra c iyat had to contribute to the upkeep of rider post (Asb-
e-Chapari) and also the expenses of the passersby (Kharj-e-
Moteradeddin). In a document of the Zand era, the peasants of 
the Khalesseh and Tyul are entitled to be given a receipt of 
1. Abbott Notes taken on a journey from Shiraz to Fassa and Darab, Geog. Journal. 
Vol.27, 1857, pp.158-9. 
2. Niebuhr, Travels, p.48. 
- 369 -
their contributions, 1 but whether it was deducted from their 
overall taxes is not known. 
Again, 
which 
there is another item mentioned in these 
is termed Vojuh-e-Mara ci va Mavashi, that 
documents, 
is, the tax 
allocated to livestock. This item appears to have been applied 
to the peasants of the Amlak-e-Arbabi va Rac iyat~, 2 although 
Minor sky believes it to be only limited to the tribes. 3 Chopan-
begi is also allocated to the peasants as well as the tribes, 
which is again paid per head on the livestock. 
It is not known whether Bigari (forced labour) was still in 
use. In the mid 18th century, peasants were expected to per-
form bigari, as is indicated by Hanway: 
"the peasants were not only obliged to labour but 
to furnish materials. Many were compelled to leave 
the cultivation of their rice and silk, which is 
familiar to them, in order to take this laborious 
and ungrateful employment." 1 
This task alluded to, was shipbuilding in the northern prov-
inces, undertaken by Nader Shah. 
The contribution of the peasantry to the maintenance of the 
army was that each family provided one armed and mounted 
soldier, since the majority of the peasants were unwarlike and 
furthermore, they needed the labour force for their agricultural 
activities. They often paid the money for the upkeep of a sold-
ier and he was then recruited from the tribal warriors. In the 
documents of the Zand era, there is mention of a sum, which 
was collected on Cherik (local contigent) and Yasaqkesh. This 
had been suspended for three years, but was due to resume 
after a lapse of three years. The villages, as well as towns 
1. Hanway, transactions ••• , Vol.l, p.162. 
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and cities, generally had a militia, whose duty was to protect 
their homes in time of emergency. The expenses of this force 
were allocated to the peasants' households in equal shares. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE POSITION OF THE CLERGY 
IN 18th CENTURY PERSIAN SOCIETY 
We have already indicated that the government apparatus of 
the Zand realm consisted of three major departments: adminis-
trative and financial, military, and religious. We have dealt 
with the other groups already. Here we will study the clergy 
as government functionaries and as a class in general. 
The highest ranking religious position was that of Sadr-al-
mamalek. Karim Khan dispensed with the office of Mollabashi 
and, as was often the case in the Safa vid era, he amalgamated 
the offices of Sadr-al-Kha~~eh and Sadr-al-mamalek. For the 
duties and the power of Sadr, the reader is referred to Tazker-
at-al-moluk. 1 Mirza Moha~mad cAli Sadr was appointed to this 
post by Nader Shah and, apparently, he continued to serve the 
Zands. He followed the Vakil on his military expeditions and 
attended him at court. There is evidence that on the Vakil's 
expedition against the Bani Kac b and Shaikh Salman, their 
chief, the latter sent an emissary to the ~adr, requesting him 
to intercede on his behalf to prevent Karim Khan from further 
hostile operations. The Sadr presented the case to the Vakil 
and Karim Khan accepted the terms offered by Shaikh Salman. 
Thus, he withdrew his army and returned to his capital. 2 
There is no evidence as to whether Mirza Mohammad <Ali held 
his office after the death of ·the Vakil. It appears that his son 
was a favourite of <Ali Morad Khan and was sent to the cAtabat 
to carry out the construction of a mosque and repair the holy 
1. Tazkerat-al-Moluk, pp.2-4. 
2. G.G., pp.l34-5. 
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shrines. 1 ] a c far Khan, however, appointed a new Sadr for his 
administration. Mirza Baqer Shafti of Gilan was unanimously 
chosen to fill the post. 2 Apparently the Sadr had deputies 
(Nayeb) to perform his duties in other towns and cities. There 
is mention of a certain Mirza Mohsen Navab Sadr in Yazd, who 
. c . -
was sent out of the town to present Ja far Khan with a token 
of submission on behalf of Taqi Khan, the governor. 3 The Sadr 
was responsible for the appointment of all religious functionar-
ies in the Safavid time. It is not, however, known whether he 
still enjoyed the same power in the Zand period. It appears 
that his position was purely administrative, as it is indicated 
by the sources that it was the Shaikh-al Eslam and the Qazi, 
who performed the judicial and ecclesiastical duties relevant 
to the public. 
The Shaikh-al Eslam was probably the most powerful of the Cler-
gy, in respect to his influence on the people. Generally the pos-
ition was hereditary, as was the case of the Shaikal- Eslam of 
Shiraz, Mohammad Baqer Tamami.,. The position was generally . 
filled by the most learned of the Clergy (Mojtahed), who led 
the public prayer in the grand Mosque and performed public 
ceremonies. He preached in the grand Mosque, settled disputes 
I . 
and attended official functions. Francklin asserts that the posit-
ion was comparable to that of the Mofti in Ottoman Turkey. But 
the Shaikh al-Eslam was strictly forbidden to interfere in poli-
tics and had no power compared to his counterpart in Turkey. 5 
The Emam ]omc eh or Jamac at was generally chosen by the con-
gregation over which he preached. He led the Friday prayer 
and taught religious students. They were almost always chosen 
1. G.M., p.394. 
2. Ibid., p.417. 
3. Ibid., p.444. 
4. F.N., part II, p.28. 
5. O.M.T.S., p.53. 
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from the renowned families of Sadat. During the whole course 
of the 18th century, the Emam ]omc ehs of Shush tar were chosen 
from one family, that is, the decendants of Seyed Ne cm a tollah 
Shushtari • 1 The smaller mosque usually had a Pishnamaz, who 
performed the same duties. They also led the prayer three 
times every day: in the morning, in the afternoon and in the 
evenings. 2 
The Safavids often appointed one person in charge of several 
c -positions. Seyed Ne matollah Shushtari was the Shaikh al-
Es lam, Emam ]om ceh, Qazi and Nayeb-al Sadr of Shushtar. He 
also was the Motevalli of the holy shrines in the town. 3 His 
son inherited all these positions after his father's death. The 
Zands, however, were inclined to allocate each position to a 
different person and, thus, prevent the clergy from gaining un-
limited power. Despite these measures, we have evidence of pow-
- c -erful clergy. The Emam ]om eh of Shiraz appears to have been 
a very powerful man and he even ventured to check the activ-
ities of the notables of Fars. Mirza Mohammad Kermani, a res-
pectable citizan of Shiraz, was strongly reprimanded for having 
invited the lutis and musicians to a banquet in his house. In 
a note that he wrote to Shaikh cAbdol Nabi, the Emam ]omc eh, 
1 he denied the charge and stated that the banquet took place 
by the order of the Vakil, with the usual guests. His fear of 
- c the Emam ]om eh was so great, that he could not wait until 
the following morning to acquit himself. Instead he wrote the 
very night that he received the note.,. 
There is a _curious incident, which shows that the vakil was 
not altogether · pleased with his Emam ]om ceh, or rather, did 
not support him when his prestige was at stake. A certain 
c-l. Tohfat~al- Ala1, Ms Edinburgh. 
2. H.P., Vol.II, p.472. 
c- M 3. Tohfat-al~ Alam. s. 
4. R.M.M., pp.ll4-5. 
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Molla Reza Tabrizi, a highly learned and, at the same time, 
ambitious member of the clergy, came to Shiraz. In a short 
while, he attracted the attention of the citizens and many learn-
ed men attended his teaching circle and visited him regularly. 
The moll a, not content with popularity, sought position. Accord-
ingly, he incited the Khans and Amirs of A~arbayjan, and even 
.A~arbayj ani artisans and traders in the Bazar, to assist him. 
They gathered one day in great number, took the molla to 
the grand mosque, and spread his prayer rug in front of the 
alter. He usurped the position of Shaikh cAbdol Nabi for a 
while, whose supporters retired from the mosque, when faced 
with force majeur. 1 Karim Khan, despite the fact that he foll-
owed the shaikh in his prayer and, apparently, held the 
shaikh in great respect, did nothing to restore his post and 
his prestige. It was only ·when molla Re~a requested to be 
- c appointed the judge of the army (Qazi :Asgar), that shaikh 
c Abdol Nabi returned to his office. 2 The Vakil's refusal to inter-
fere in the affair may be attributed to his love of peace and 
his regard for the wishes of the public. There is no informat-
ion available to us about Shaikh cAb dol Nabi 's affiliation to 
Osuli or Akhbari factions. It could well have been the cause 
of the dispute. There is, however, evidence that Molla Re;a, 
despite being a student of Mirza Mohammad Baqer Behbehani, 
was an Akhbari. However, the descendants of Shaikh cAbdol 
Nabi held the position of Emam Jomc eh well into the 19th cen-
tury, and that alone indicates that the position was heredit-
ary, not by law, but by usage (cOr f). 3 
There is great confusion as to the duties of the Emam Jomc eh 
and the Shaikh al-Eslam. It appears that both of them perform-
ed the same duties; that is, settling disputes, preaching in the 
1. TaTa, Vol.!, pp.186-7. 
2. Ibid., p.188. 
3. F.N., part II, p.61. 
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mosque, teaching and leading the congregation in the religious 
rituals. There is, however, one function for which the shaikh 
was responsible. He supervised the morals of the general public 
(Amr-e-be Mac ruf va Nahyi az Monkar). 1 The shaikh also rati-
fied title deeds and sanctioned business transactions. During 
the whole course of the Zand rule, there is no evidence of the 
top-ranking clergy disputing the rule of the Zands or, indeed, 
disagreeing with them. The clergy officials supported the Zands 
all along and, even when the power of the Zands had been 
greatly reduced and many of their adherents had turned away 
from them, the Emam ]omc eh of Kerman invited Lotf <Ali Khan 
to Kerman and fought for his cause. 2 This does not mean that 
the clergy as a whole supported the Zands; indeed one may 
find the roots of the emergence of the 07uli school of thought 
directly connected with the political situation of the country. 
This will be discussed in detail later. 
The position of the Qazi was very much the same as in the Saf-
a vid period. He presided over the daily session of the Mahkam-
eh, or the court of civil law, and settled disputes of a matri-
monial nature, such as divorces and custody of children, and 
also took charge of the estates, belonging to orphan children, 
unclaimed estates and the inheritance of deceased persons with-
out legatee. A great amount of revenue came into the hands of 
the Qazi by way of making transactions on behalf of their in-
fant clients. 
The position of Qazi cAsgar was that which existed in the ~afa­
vid epoch. It had, however, lost much of its importance in the 
later stages of the Safa vid rule. Indeed, as the author of Ta~-
-. c kerat al-Moluk asserts, the duties of the Qazi Asgar had been 
limited to pursuing the claims of the soldiers- for their salaries 
in the reign of Shah Soltan Hosein. The office was revived and 
• 
1. Tazkerat al-Moluk, p.5. 
2. T .K., p.358. 
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given much importance in the reign of the Vakil. He appointed 
Molla Re~a Tabrizi, a forceful and ambitious molla, to the 
post; he executed his duties with vigour and resilience. Appar-
ently he used to flog the highest-ranking Amirs of the tribe of 
Zand, as well as other tribes, in the same way as commoners, 
if they ventured to show a lack of respect to the court or to 
abuse their opponents • 1 He dealt with the legal disputes of the 
military classes as far as the Share was concerned. 
After the death of the Vakil, the molla resolved to leave his 
country and reside in the holy shrines of Ottoman Turkey, and 
c -proceeded to that quarter during the rule of J a far Khan. Thus 
another molla was appointed to his charge. This person, Shaikh 
Mohammad cArab, a Mojtahed, was deputed on a peace mission 
by. J a c far Khan. cAli Qoli Khan Kazeruni' s defection alarmed the 
ruler so intensely that he sent his Qa~i cAsgar to appease c Ali 
Qoli Khan. 2 It appears that he achieved his objective. It was, 
however, customary for the Mojtaheds, irrespective of their offic-
ial rank, to act as mediators in wars and disputes. Their de-
gree of learning and popularity among the people were the crit-
eria by which they were selected for such deputations. 
Here we will discuss the clergy as a social group. It is per-
haps wrong to categorize them as a class, since they are not 
an economically homogeneous stratum. They can, however, be 
categorized by their common interests and their common occup-
ation. As indicated above, there was great diversity in the soc-
ial status of the clergy. They ranged from members of the well-
established landed gentry to the lowest and poorest of the 
moll'as, reading the Qoran in the cemeteries. The social stand-
ing of a member of the clergy had a decisive effect on his car-
eer. Often members of wealthy families, who had become mollas, 
spent all their lives in pursuit of knowledge and learning, and 
1. laTa, Vol.I, p.l88. 
2. G.M., p.440. 
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their affluence made them independent of the state. Thus, they 
taught religious students and even assisted the needy from 
their own resources. Aqa Mohammad Bidabadi was a good exam-
ple of this kind of clergy. He owned land and cultivated it. 1 
His revenues enabled him to donate a great amount of riches 
as alms. 2 The general public even believed that he turned cop-
per into gold by his knowledge of Alchemy. 3 These popular 
myths, however, surrounded people who enjoyed the veneration 
of the public. 
It was not uncommon for the members of the opulent religious 
class to be reduced to want by force of circumstances. Seyed 
<.A.bdollah Shushtari, the descendant of the renowned clergy, Seyed 
Nee matollah Shushtari, was left destitute at the death of his 
father ... These high class clergy were not numerous. Indeed, 
the majority of the moll as came from poor families. A great 
many of them were sons of shopkeepers and artisans or villag-
ers. 5 Among them, many were in constant want and half-
starved, since the allowances of the students were below subsis-
tence level, hardly sufficient to keep body and soul together. 
In the late 18th century, their situation worsened, as the allow-
ance was totally cut and the religious students had to work for 
their living. Many were teaching children for a nominal pay 
·and some were reduced to begging. It was not until a molla 
attained a reputation for his learning and good character, that 
the people trusted him and charged him with the management 
of their religious donations. This entailed various functions, 
such as performing, on behalf of a person, the prayers which 
had been allowed to lapse, or the pilgrimage to Mecca, which 
a deceased individual had failed to perform, and so on. Only 
1. R. T. , p. 407. 
2. G.M., p.222. 
3. R.T., pp.406, 408. 
c-4. Tohfat-al- Ala1, Ms n.~. 
5. Tazkerreh Shushtar, pp.53, 125, 127, etc. 
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the great Mojtaheds were given charge of Ouqaf, the adminis-
tration of charitable foundations, and also the distribution of 
funds allocated to the share of the Emam (Sahm-e-Emam) and 
other donations. 
Some of the middle ranking clergy sought position in the house-
hold of grandees as tutor to their children and lived comfort-
ably under their patronage. Molla Samic Mazandarani was a 
good example of these clergy. He had sized up all the noble 
youths and among them had chosen Fazl cAli Beg, the son of 
Najaf Qoli Khan Donboli, the Beglarbegi of Tabriz. He gathered 
great wealth in the service of the Beglarbegi and was, thus, 
enabled to retire to the holy shrines of cEraq-e- cArab. 1 Some 
clergy travelled around and benefited from the generosity of 
the local magnates. Moll a Reza Tabrizi, the Vakil's Qazi cAsg-
ar, after his resignation from that post, spent some time in the 
court of the Pasha of Bagdad; then he travelled to Shushi and 
sought protection from Ebrahim Khan Javanshir, its governor. 2 
At all events, the situation of the clergy was insecure and 
their means of livelihood solely depended on occasional charity 
and donations. The clergy had no means of coercing the public 
into payment of ~akat, and so on. Thus, by seeking employ-
ment, such as performing religious rituals, which again was 
occasional, they supplemented their income. 
It was against this background that the new school of thought 
emerged. There were also other factors, which contributed to 
the formation of these ideas, which we will study in a later 
section in some detail. 
1. TaTa, Vol.!, p.284. 
2. Ibid., p.292. 
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The emergence of the Osuli School: 
• 
Before we discuss the ideas and teachings of this school of 
thought, we should study the contributing factors, which result-
ed in its formation. The Shic a clergy suffered two major blows 
in the course of the 18th century. Firstly, the invasion by the 
Sunni Afghans, which put the position of Shic a belief in ser-
ious jeopardy; and secondly, the emergence of Nader Shah and 
his drastic measures against the clergy and the Shic a faith in 
general. 
The disastrous defeat of the ~afavids by the motfly Afghan / 
army, was largely blamed on the clergy. The general public 
saw it as a direct result of Shah Sol tan Hosein 's involvement . 
with religious matters and his neglect of the affairs of state. 
This view is clearly expressed by Rostam, a commoner, who 
writes as follows: 
"the hypocrites with airs of piety and ass-like ascet-
ics gained influence in the King's mind and diver-
ted him from the path of rulership to perversion, 
he became beguiled and indoctrinated by their 
vain and useless tales and was ruined as a res-
ult."1 
The fall of Esfahan ( 1722/1135) and the subsequent ravages of 
the Afghans were also the direct result of the intrigues and 
discord in the court and the mollas had a major part in the 
affair. 2 
The faint attempt by some clergy to resist the expansion of the 
Afghan rule was futile and disapproved of by the public. When 
Shaikh Mehdi Nasabeh, the Shaikh al-Eslam of Shiraz, led an 
army of thugs against the governor sent by Mahmud Qalza'i, 
1. R.T., p.98. 
2. Lockhart, L., The fall of the Safavie Dynasty, Cambridge, 1958, p.155. 
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his action brought about fresh disasters on the people. The 
city of Shiraz was besieged for nine months and many of the 
inhabitants lost their lives and property. Thus, when the 
Shaikh was executed no resistance was offered. 1 During the 
reign of the Afghans, the clergy had to fight a dual battle. 
On the one hand, they had to survive the pressure of the 
Sunni Afghans, who were their deadly enemies. On the other 
hand, they had to face the public, who had become totally dis-
illusioned with the clergy. One might say that the clergy were 
discredited and rejected by the weary nation, who had suffered 
such great calamaties. 
It was against this general background of discontent and re-
sentment that Nader could venture his direct attack on the 
Shic a faith and its advocates. He openly expressed his wish to 
replace the Shic a doctrine with the Sunni faith and, when the 
Molla Bashi privately reprimanded him for his usurpation of 
power, he executed him. 2 It is significant to note that Seyed 
c Abdollah Shushtari, a member of one of the well-known clergy 
families, read a Khotbe with much eloquence at the inaugural 
speech at Moqan, and thus contributed to, and sanctified, the 
official coronation of the usurper. 3 Nader's attack on the instit-
ution of religion was further carried out by the confiscation of 
· the Ouqaf and Soyurghals, thus depriving the clergy of their 
independence and means of livelihood. Seyed cAbdollah Shushtari 
remarks on the abject condition of the clergy by the end of 
Nader' s rule. "The mollas had scattered around in search of 
food..... This he attributes to their failure to appreciate the 
affluence and comfort they had enjoyed in the Safavid era. 
Furthermore, Nader took measures to undermine the grip of the 
1. R.M.M., p.3. 
2. Lockhart, Nader Shah, London, 1938, p.99. 
c-3. Tohfat-al- Alam, n.p. 
4. Tazkerreh Shushtar, p.107. 
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mollas over the general public, by forbidding the practice of 
Shic a mourning rituals. Apparently, when Nader was in India, 
he arranged for the marriage of his son to the daughter of Moh-. 
ammad Shah, the Grand Mogol. The negotiations about the 
amount of presents given to the bride were undertaken on the 
tenth day of Mo~arram, c Ashura and the soldiers were strictly 
forbidden to mourn and to recite Nohe. The soldiers, who were . 
camped far away from the royal tent and ventured to carry out 
Rozehkhani, were severely punished. The marriage took place 
on the night of cAshura and no-one dared to protest. 1 
By recruiting and garrisoning Sunni soldiers, such as Afghans 
and Ozbaks, in the major towns, Nader kept the threat on the 
Shic a population ever present. Mirza Mohammad Kalantar, who 
had uttered words of abuse against the. second Khalif cOmar, 
feared for his life, should the Afghans discover him or Nader 
be informed of the blasphemy. 2 
The reign of Nader (1148-1160), although short and unsettled, 
made a drastic impact on society and certainly left the Shic a 
doctrine shaken. In the interregnum after his assassination, 
the clergy had very little chance of revival, although many 
tried to regain their previous status, but with little success. 
The traditional holders of Ouqaf attempted to regain their 
losses. Mirza Mohammad Hosein Sharifi Saheb Ekhtiar managed 
to get back his Ouqaf property from Shahrokh Mirza, 3 but it 
is not known whether many were as fortunate as he was. Seyed 
c Abdollah Shushtari remarks on the Ouqaf property, which had 
been usurped by people. He writes that during the great famine 
which occurred in the town of Shush tar, old documents (Asnads) 
were sold according to which great landed property had been 
donated to religious foundations ... But by the author's time, 
1. Reia Zadeh Shafaq, Nader Shah Aznaier Khavar Shenasan, Tehran, 1339, p.237. 
2. R.M.M., pp.24-5. 
3. Ibid., p.40. Minorsky believes that past endowments were restored to their prev-
ious owners bycAdil Shah. (Tazkerat al-Moluk, commentary, p.148). 
c-
4. Tohfat-al- Alam, n.p. 
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very little of the original Ouqaf had remained intact. He also 
observes, with regret, that the time had passed for kings to 
donate Ouqaf to the clergy and to provide for their livelihood 
and socia 1 status. 
Karim Khan's policy towards religion and the clergy was any-
thing but complimentary. Although he built schools and clois-
ters for the clergy and the Sufis, and allocated funds for their 
mainenance, he was not prepared to make unnecessary concess-
ions to them. He declared that he had no money to give to the 
tollab and that everyone should work for his living. 1 Although 
he appointed a Sadr al-Mamalek, whose duty was to supervise 
the allocation of the Ouq af to the clergy, there is no evidence 
that such proceedings were carried out. It is, however, interest-
ing to note that official documents, exisiting in the Majles Lib-
rary in Tehran, listing provincial taxes, there is a certain 
amount of money allocated to Sahm-e-Emam. This must definitely 
have been distributed to the mollas, 2 but it is not known to 
what class of them and how. 
Maftun, a hostage in Shiraz, makes valuable observations re-
garding the character of the Vakil and his attitudes. He states 
that Karim Khan, being a hedonist, advocated pleasure to old 
and young and despised and snubbed those who pursued learn-
ing. 3 There are two good examples to prove his allegations. 
The first episode illustrates the fact that the Vakil never at-
tached any importance to the discontent of the clergy with his 
administration. The governor of Esfahan, ~aji Aqa Mo~ammad 
Renani, was by all accounts a cruel and greedy man, who an-
tagonised every one from the lowest of the inhabitants to the 
higher ranking clergy of the time. His avarice was such, that 
Aqa Mohammad Rafic Bidabadi, the most prominent and revered 
1. R.T., p.309. 
2. Majles Library, Msc. 
3. TaTa, Vol.II, p.l79. 
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member of the clergy, had on few occasions sent messages of 
abuse to him and warned him against the outcome of his acts. 
The governor, being a favourite of the vakil's, did not attempt 
to modify his behaviour. The mol la, incensed and offended by 
his neglect, left the town with a party of his adherents in pro-
test. The vakil knew about the discontent of the populace and 
especially of the moll a, but he took no measure to remedy the 
situation. Aqa Mo~ammad Renani continued to be the governor, 
despite frequent complaints of the inhabitants. 1 Strangely 
enough, the governor, after being disgraced by cAli Morad 
Khan, asked to retire to the cAtabat. On his departure, he made 
the above-mentioned mol la his executor for his vast property, 
which had a turnover of 8,000 Tomans a year and probably, by 
this benevolent act, made peace with the clergy. 2 
The second instance shows Karim Khan's lack of concern and 
total disregard for the clergy and their credibility. The situat-
ion had come about like this. A shepherd, working for a local 
magnate of Dekhharqan near Tabriz, wished to visit the cAta-
bat. Being destitute and unable to perform the pilgrimage, one 
day after performing his prayer in the Mo;ala, he picked up 
a few pebbles, placed them in front of the alter and wished 
they were gold, so that he could make the journey with their 
aid. He dreamt of a few holy personages, who opened the doors 
to paradise for him, and poured the fruits of Eden into his 
lap. He related the dream to his friends and, in no time, it 
got around the village and many people rushed to see him and 
benefit from his divine blessing. His clothes were all torn and 
kept as sacred and, everyday, more people came to visit him 
from all over the province. 3 The Bazaris and lutis also gather-
ed round him and, in no time, they fabricated stories about 
his divine inspiration and his power to heal maladies of all 
1. TaTa, Vol.!, pp.270-1. 
2. G.M., p.319. 
3. TaTa, Vol.!, pp.196-7. 
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sorts. If a blind man came to be cured with his magic power 
and dared to say that he was still blind the followers of the 
shaikh molested him and forced him to assert the healing power 
of the old shepherd. Soon the shaikh even believed in his heal-
ing hands and visitors were pouring from distant areas, like 
Daghestan, Darband, Kordestan, Ganje and ~raq-e- cAjam to see 
him and enjoy his blessings. Even his ignorant brothers were 
believed to have been favoured by divine spirit and, thus, the 
visitors came to their audience as well. 1 Soon the shaikh and 
his brothers gathered great wealth and, had they been more in-
telligent, they could have acquired political power too. 
The shaikh, who had grudges against the secretary of the Share 
court, Molla Sac id, instigated his followers to harass the molla 
and he was forced to flee the town and solicit the pardon of 
the shaikh. Another Molla, Akhund Ebrahim, a distinguished 
Faqih had expressed his doubts about the shaikh, although in 
private; but the followers of the shaikh had been informed. 
Thus, they rushed on him and, with great difficulty, he man-
aged to escape with his life. Hence forth he kept quiet and re-
pented of his remarks. 2 
The dispute between the clergy and the followers of the shaikh 
gained greater proportions, so that the Beglarbegi of Tabriz, 
Najaf Qoli Khan, had to intervene. He invited the shaikh into 
his palace and, with due respect, housed him in a quarter of 
his establishment and, thus, kept him under close watch. 3 The 
affair reached the ears of the Vakil and he suspected the Beg-
larbegi of being the mastermind of the plot, in order to further 
his influence and power... However, after having been assured 
of his innocence, he left the Beglarbegi to deal with the false 
1. TaTa, p.198-200. 
2. Ibid., p.203. 
3. Ibid., p.202. 
4. Ibid., p.200. 
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shaikh, as best he could. 
Evidently, the Vakil was solely concerned with the political im-
plications of the event, rather than the threat, which such pro-
ceedings would pose to the clergy and their status. One may 
argue that, while Karim Khan adopted very harsh measures ag-
ainst the Nee matollahi Darvishes, why did he treat the incident 
of Shaikh Qasem so lightly? The reason lay primarily in the 
type of following, which each respective group had gathered. 
The Ne cmatollahis had attracted the highest ranking members 
of the society, who were potentially capable of challenging the 
power of the Zands, whereas the followers of the Shepherd 
Shaikh were almost all from the lower class: from those who 
are called by Maftun, with so much contempt, "ahl-e-Suq va 
c - 1 avam". This was the key to the contradiction, which one may 
find in the Vakil's attitude towards the Sufis, 2 although the 
view generally held by the historians was that Karim Khan 
reacted to the Sufi influence in Shiraz under pressure from the 
clergy, who warned him that the true faith was in danger. But 
this could have only been used as a good pretext for the Vakil 
to justify his action. Giti Goshay is the only source, which 
refers to the political implications of the Sufis' influence 
on the notables. He clealy states that cAlf Morad Khan was 
apprehensive that a ~ufi saint might be used as a link between 
Jac far Khan and the notables of Fars, and that was why he of-
fered insults to the saint, Mac sum cAli Shah, and his disciples . 
and banished them from the city of Esfahan. 3 The contribution 
of the mollas in this affair cannot, however, be denied. They 
for their part, sensed a serious threat to their remaining cred-
ibility and defended their own interests with zeal. 
1. laTa, Vol.!, pp.196-7. 
- c c - c - -. 2. Kari1 Khan banished Ma sum Ali Shah Ne matollahi from Shiraz 1n 1192. The Dar-
vish, with his disciples, "retired to a village near Esfahan, at the accession of 
cAli Morad Khan to ·the throne; he was banished from Esfahan with great indignities. 
3. G. G., p.245. 
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To sum up the general situation of the clergy, one might say 
that they were poverty-striken, despised and neglected. Further-
more, they lived in a society with many paradoxical practices 
which they either had to accept or reject. Either way, they did 
not gain what they sought: that is, power and influence over 
the society, of which they considered themselves to be moral 
custodians. By accepting the practices, which they deemed vile 
and immoral, they were accused of being compromising and, by 
rejecting them, they antagonised the state and alienated the 
public. 
Still there are numerous instances of the compromise and even 
immorality of the clergy. Maftun relates an amusing story of 
his teacher, a moll a who could not resist the temptations of the 
beautiful courtisans, who even entered the school and kissed 
and cuddled the students. He married one of them (Mote a) and 
totally left his teaching circle. 1 
Here we will study the life and career of Molla Mohammad Baq-
er Beh behani, the chief protagonist of the Osuli school of 
thought. 
Molla Mohammad Baqer (1176-1205) was born in Esfahan into a 
clerical family. He was the grandson of Molla Mo~ammad Taqi 
Majlesi and the nephew of Moll a Mo~ammad Baqer Majlesi. He 
began his education under his father, Molla Mo~ammad Akmal, 
himself a member of the clergy, whose career is rather ob-
scure. 2 Molla Mohammad Baqer left his home town at an early . 
age; he went to Hamadan to study and then retired to Beh be-
ban, a major stronghold of the Akhbaris. 3 There is no evidence 
that he acquired any distinction in that city. Golshan-e-Morad 
states that, when Karim Khan besieged the town of Behbehan, 
1. TaTa, Vol.II, p.182. 
2. Davani, cAli, Vabid Behbehani, Qum, n.d., pp.128-9. 
3. G.M., p.221. 
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the moll a, together with other clergy, came out of the city to 
ask pardon for the past conduct of the inhabitants. 1 The Vakil 
lifted the siege and retired to his capital. A modern biograph-
er of the molla, cAli Davani, whose work is full of tiresome 
flattery, claims that Mo~ammad Baqer was actually summoned 
to the town of Beh behan to replace a member of the clergy, 
who had died and happened to be his relation. The same auth-
or states that two wards of the town, Qanavat and Behbehan, 
which were traditionally hostile to each other as a result of 
l}aydari and Nee mati factional strife, fought over him. Each of 
the wards wanted him to preach in their mosque. 2 The molla 
delighted with the rivalry, married the daughters of both Kad-
khodas of the opposing wards, and benefited from their hospit-
ality and hatred for each other. He stayed about two years in 
Behbehan, but left that town, after he discovered that the con-
gregation attending his sermons were gathered by order of the 
kadkhoda of Behbehan, Khajeh cAziz. He was greatly disappoint-
ed and left the town quietly for the cAtabat. 3 
It appears that he formed his ideas, while he was in Behbe-
han. As mentioned before, the Akh baris had full control of the 
place and the in ha bi tants were followers of Shaikh Yusef Bah-
raini, the prominent Akhbari mol la ... Davani states that, in Beh-
behan, the molla started his opposition to the Akhbaris, but 
the author of Qesas al-c Olama is silent on this point. After a 
short stay in Karbala, he found his financial conditions severe-
ly restricted. He therefore resolved to leave and seek his for-
tune elsewhere. It was then that he conveniently dreamt of his 
holy ancestors, who beseeched him to stay. This must have 
greatly helped him to establish his position amongst the faith-
ful.5 
1. G.M., p.221. 
2. Davani, op. cit., pp.140-1. 
c - c . 
3. Tonekaboni, Moham1ad, Qesas al- Olama, Tehran, Elm1eh, n.d., p.199. 
4. Davani, op. cit., p. 140. 
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Shaikh Yusef Bahreini commanded the largest attendance of 
tollab in the cAtabat, and had a great following. Molla Moham-
mad Baqer was at first 
Akh baris. He, therefore, 
apprehensive of the influence of the 
taught secretly in remote basements, 
but, after a while, apparently after he had gathered some foll-
owers, he began to teach o:ul (principles) openly and even ven-
tured to forbid the tollab of Shaikh Yusef to attend their teach-. 
er's circle. 1 Mol la Mohammad Baq er, from then on, directed his . 
efforts towards fighting the Akhbaris and, although Shaikh Yus-
ef had the power and means of disposing of an impudent new-
comer, he bore with his antagonist with great tolerance and re-
fused to fight him. There is no reason given in the sources 
for the resigned attitude of the Akhbaris towards him. It ap-
pears that, by blundering rhetoric, Moll a Mohammad Baqer 
harangued his audience and disarmed his opponents. His argu-
ments with the Akhbaris, as given by his biographer, are hol-
low and polemical. 2 
Molla Mohammad Baqer lived a long life and died in 1205/1793~ 
He had two sons, who were also mollas: Aqa Mohammad cAli Beh-. 
behani, his eldest son, became a powerful and weal thy moll a; 
his animosity towards the Sufis was proverbial and he was 
known as Sufikosh.. (Sufi slayer). It appears that H. Algar has 
-.- . c 
confused Aqa Mohammad Ali with his father, as he asserts that . 
Molla Mohammad Baqer had a party of executioners in attend-. 
ance to carry out his orders. This was definitely Aqa Moham-
mad cAli, who was by all accounts the most violent and fierce 
of the mollas in the early 19th century. The second son of the 
molla, shaikh cAbdol Hosein, never achieved distinction among . 
the clergy~ 
c -1. Qesas al- Ola•a, p.201. 
2. Davani, op. cit., pp.148-152. 
3. H. Algar gives the date of Molla Mohammad Baqer 1s death as 1208/1803. First of 
all 1208 corresponds to 1973 and not 1803; and secondly, the date given is wrong. 
c 
4. Qesas al- Olama, p.199. 
5. Algar, H., Religion and the State, Berkeley, 1969, pp.35-6. 
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Mol la Mohammad Baqer produced many students, who 
official clergy of the Qaj ar era. His most prominent 
Seyed Mehdi Bahr al- cOlum, Shaikh Jac far Najafi, 
became the 
tollab were 
• - c 
Mirza Abol-
qasem Qomi, Mirza Mohammad Mehdi Shahrestani, Molla Mehdi . 
Naraqi and Haji Mohammad Ebrahim Kalbasi. His sons and sons-. 
in-law were also educated by him. 1 
The major points of difference between Osuli and Akhbari 
schools: 
A thorough study of both schools is not within the scope of 
this work. We will merely point out the major differences, 
which are relevant to our argument. Such differences have been 
given in various sources, 
eighty-four; among these, 
as numbering between twenty-six and 
however, there are five issues, 
which are of major importance to the status of the clergy in 
society and are the basis for the overall influence of the pos-
ition of Mojtahed. 2 
1. The Osuli school believes that the sources of religious prin-
ciples are four: that is, the Qoran, Sunnat, c Aql and Ejma~ 
whereas the Akh baris maintain that only the holy book and 
the Sunnat are the basis of Islamic principles. 
2. According to the o;uli school, the faithful should not fol-
low a dead Mojtahed in his Ahkam and res ala t; the Akh-
baris, however, believe that truth does not change by the 
death of a theologian. 
3. The Osuli school maintains that Ejtehad is essential to soc-
iety, Vajeb.~~e- cAini. To Akhbari theologians, this is un-
lawful (Ha ram) and should be dismissed as such. 
1. Op. cit., p.202. 
2. For a thorough study of the legal points in the dispute of the two schools the 
reader is referred to the article written by Scarcia, 11 Intorno alle controversie 
tra Ahbari e Ussu·li presso gli I11mamitidi Persia", R.S.O. XXXIII, 1958, 212, n.1. 
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4. 07uli theology is based on the idea that no-one except a 
Mojtahed is capable, or indeed qualified, to issue a Fetwa 
(Ruling), since the ordinary individual cannot comprehend 
the Had is. The Mojtahed must, therefore, be learned in six-
teen sciences, 1 so that he can judge on any point of un-
certainty for the general public. The Akhbari doctrine is 
in total contrast to this view. They maintain that for the 
guidance of the Omma, only the Akhbar of Ahl-e-Bait is 
sufficient. 
5. According to Osuli belief, where there is no access to %1m . 
(knowledge), the mere conjecture of the Mojtahed is suffi-
cient, since it is based on scientific reasoning and also 
Ayat va Akhbar of the Ahl-e-Bait can be qualified ascElm. 
The Akhbaris disagree with this point categorically, and 
hold that the conjecture of the Mojtahed is only as good 
as that of anyone else and, in all points of uncertainty, 
one must attempt to achieve 'Elm. 
It was precisely by indoctrinating these principles into the 
minds of the people, that the clergy asserted their position as 
indispensable to the community. They had the privilege of inter-
fering in every aspect of life in the community, and ventured 
to intervene in political affairs. A moll a went as far as declar-
ing war on the Russian infidels. 2 Mollas coerced the public in-
to paying enormous amounts of money to them as Khoms va 
Zakat. 3 Some of them acquired so much wealth, that the Qajar 
monarch, Fath 'Ali Khan, looked to them for financial support; .. 
although Sir Harford Jones, in the early 19th century, affirms 
that the mollas are proverbial jokes and, even in street puppet 
1. These sciences are as follows: Loghat (Language); ~arf (Grammar); Nebv (Syntax); 
Kalam (Oration); Manteq (Logic); Osul (Principles); Tarsir (Exegesis); Haai~ (Tradit-
ion); Rejal (Biography); Macani \Se•antics); Bayan (Rhetoric); Badic. (Eloquence); 
Hai'at (Astronomy); Teb (Medicine); Riaiiyat (Mathematics); Hendeseh (Arithmetic); 
Davani, op. cit., p.,8. 
c -
2. Qesas al- Olama, pp.128-9. 
3. Ibid., pp.148--9. 
4. Ibid., pp.141, 142, 149. 
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shows, the mollas were the target of ridicule. 1 But the reality 
was that the Mojtahed was becoming more and more prominent 
in his role as the guide of the community, and, despite Har-
ford ]ones' assertion that the king could chop off the head of 
the molla Bashi and no-one would think anything about it, 2 no 
king ever dared to offer the slightest insult, or indeed punish-
ment, for the perfidy of the mollas. These is an instance, 
which clearly illustrates the point. A molla of the town of Yazd 
had incited the public into turning their governor out of the 
town. The molla was taken to the presence of Fath cAli Shah . 
and he asked him about the incident. The molla admitted that 
he had been the cause of the uproar. The Shah, in his efforts 
to hold other people responsible for the event and, thus, to re-
lease the moll a without further trouble, tried his best to per-
suade the mol la to state that he was not responsible. He was, 
however, adamant and refused to put the blame on anyone else. 
The Shah, apprehensive of the consequences of flogging a 
moll a, eventually appealed to his minister to intercede and 
freed the moll a. 3 
The position of the local governors was even more significant. 
Am in al Doulleh, the governor of Esfahan, was so terrified of 
Shaikh J a c far N aj afi, an o;uli clergy, that he readily complied 
with any demands that he made, in order to avert the molla' s 
wrath... It is evident that the clergy not only achieved the 
status, that they enjoyed in the ~afavid period, but that they 
surpassed it, and late 18th century developments certainly 
mark a turning point in the religious influence and the posit-
ion of the clergy. 
1. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.406. 
2. Ibid. 
3 e ~ . .2§~r a·l otarn.a_Pp1Q1-2 I 
4. Ibid., pp.1'92-3. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE POSITION O~WOMEN IN LATE 18th CENTURY IRAN 
Introduction: 
Women in Iran, as in most Muslim societies, had a rather ambi-
guous position. Society, being hierarchical and distinctly divid-
ed into classes, women had differing status according to their 
class. In the lower classes, as the masses of the people are 
commonly termed, the women had the status of a labour unit. 
Assisting their parents, while only an infant, and participation 
in the household affairs was their expected duty. The upper 
classes, however, viewed women as mere objects of luxury and 
pleasure. The women in the royal seraglio and the grandees' 
private apartments (Anderun) had a life of absolute idleness 
and leisure. Their duties were only to see to the management 
of the house and to order the servants about. They often had 
their musicians and dancers to entertain their guests. It was 
not uncommon for the Lutis to enter the royal household and 
the grandees' harims. The class distinction was not as rigid 
as it might appear. In fact, it was much more flex-
ible than Western Europe and it has to be mentioned that peo-
ple of humble origin could rise up the social ladder easily. 
As mentioned above, Iranian society in the 18th century was 
class oriented. The pyramid was formed in this manner: The 
royal family were at the top of the pyramid; then came the gov-
ernment officials of high rank, like ministers, governors, milit-
ary generals, top-ranking cOla m a like the Qa~i, Shaikh al-Eslam 
and wealthy merchants. After the two highest echelons, at a 
lower level came the lesser government officials, such as the 
district governors, kadkhodas, traders, artisans and minor 
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clergy. Below all these were the masses of commoners, who were 
of various professions and descriptions. This was the situation 
in the urban communities. 
Among the rural popu.Jation of villagers and peasants, there 
was very little evidence of class distinction. Except for a few 
families, like those of the kadkhoda and Mobasher (superintend-
ent), the peasants lived in very much the same conditions: 
that is, in abject poverty. The tribal communities were slight-
ly different, in that the chiefs and their families generally 
lived in the metropolis, either as hostages or else for the sake 
of the luxury of urban life. They lived in grand style and 
mixed with the most affluent strata of society. The tribal 
chiefs attended the royal court regularly, established links 
with the urban upper classes by way of marriages, and some-
times even married into the royal family. Their women ranked 
among the top citizens and enjoyed a life of extravagance, 
whereas the ordinary tribesmen had limited resources and lived 
frugally. 
( 1) We begin our study by observing the manners and usages 
of the royal family and household. 
In the royal seraglio there were three different categories of 
inmates. The legally-married wives, who were generally of the 
highest rank; and secondly, the concubines, who were admitted 
to the seraglio for the pleasure of the monarch and his sons. 
These women were almost always liable to be sent back to their 
families or given over to royal favourites. The third group 
were the slaves, who had been either purchased or else taken 
as prisoners in war. Sometimes the ha rim of the monarch was 
so extensive and crowded, that it was difficult to mobilize it 
in time of emergency. Jac far Khan, while leaving Esfahan in 
great haste, left behind his mother, his daughter and twenty-
three of his concubines (Jarriyehs). 1 Although he had made 
1. R. M. M. , p. 88. 
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ample preparation to transfer all his household, there were 
so many, that he had to return to Esfahan to take them all. 1 
It was the practice that, after the death of a monarch, his 
harim, together with ~his treasures, were appropriated by his 
successor. 1t often happened that the women of the harim had / 
/ 
no connection whatever with the new monarch. It was not uncom-
mon for the king to distribute his concubines to other grandees 
or his kinsmen to keep. Also, the legally-married ladies were 
often given to their kinsmen to keep. Karim Khan's daughter 
was married to cAli Morad Khan and, after his death, she was 
given to Lotf 'Ali Khan by his father. 2 In most cases, the youn-. 
gest wife of a monarch was married to the new sovereign, al-
though it was not uncommon to send back a lady of rank to 
her family. Hedayat Khan, the governor of Gilan, gave his 
daughter to cAli Morad Khan in marriage. The death of 'Ali Mer-
ad Khan en route to Esfahan, occasioned a great tumult in the 
army and the unfortunate bride was saved from being dishon-
oured by the soldiery by her personal guards. Ferrieres Sauve-
beouf relates the event in this manner: 
"cinquante Georgiens formerent une barriere autout 
de la fille du prince du Guiland qui s 'eta it mise 
sous leur sauve-garde. "3 
She was subsequently returned to her parents ... 
In some cases, the mother and daughters of the deceased or de-
throned king, were treated with respect, but they were often 
given over to the lowest classes of the people. 5 Despite the 
1. R.M.M., p.96. 
2. G.M., p.220. 
3. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.293. 
4. G.M., p.440. 
5. Fava 1ed al-Safa~ieh, Ms B.L. (add.16.698), p.150. 
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practice of exchanging women like objects, there was a special 
respect accorded to older women. Akbar Khan, the son of Zaki 
Khan, was greatly disliked by Abol Fath Khan, who had made . 
up his mind to eliminate him. Akbar Khan, however, had resort-
ed to a trick in or de~ to protect his life. Every time he attend-
ed the court, he was in the company of Sadeq Khan's second 
wife, the mother of cAli M orad Khan and ] a c far Khan. This can 
be attributed to the mild and gentle character of Abol Fath 
Khan, who refrained from aggression, out of respect for the 
presence of a woman. 1 The presence of the same lady did not, 
c -however, prevent ] a far Khan's assassins from murdering him, 
while his mother was at his bedside. 2 
Respect for one's mother was almost universal. All classes, 
from the king to the lowest individual, revered their mother. 
It was in reward for the sincere and genuine love of a mother 
for her children, that she enjoyed consideration and respect. 
Lotf cAli Khan, when reprimanded by his mother for having be-
stowed a mark of honour on those, who had heaped insults on 
the dead body of Jac far Khan, burnt the culprit, Mirza Mehdi, 
alive in a fit of rage and indignation. 3 
The royal ha rim was infested with intrigues and rivalries. In 
• 
their attempts not to be mere objects, women were forced to 
enter into the political arena. It was not only for the favour 
of their husbands and masters, that they resorted to intrigues. 
Often the political supremacy of their sons and kinsmen, in-
duced them to take part in the fierce str1:1ggles in the court. 
In almost all of the political upheavals, women played a decis-
ive role. The events subsequent to the death of the Vakil occas-
ioned great opportunity for the women to involve themselves in 
politics. Even before Karim Khan died, the court was polarized 
1. G.M., p.267. 
2. Ibid., p.450. 
3. H.P., Vol.II, p.181. 
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around two centres of power. One was that of Abol Fath Khan, 
the eldest son of the Vakil, with his adherents, such as Nazar 
c Ali Khan. The other was that of Mohammad cAli Khan, the sec-
ond son, and his supporter and father-in-law, Zaki Khan. Each 
party were constant]_~ informed of the latest developments in 
J:larim, where the ailing Vakil was dying. Two women of his 
royal harim were the agents of the rival parties. Immediately 
after the Vakil died, they were ready to take action against 
each other and in favour of their candidates. 1 On another oc-
.casion, Aqa Mo~ammad Khan was also rescued by a lady in the 
royal ~a rim: that is, his aunt. He was informed of the grave 
condition of Karim Khan and escaped before falling into the 
hands of his successors. 2 
Passing information was not the only way that women particip-
ated in politics. They also actively took part in the conspirac-
ies against the government. The late Vakil's wife and mother 
of Abdol Rahim Khan, was used by Zaki Khan to bring her fath-
er out of the citadel. This led to his murder. Whether the 
lady knew what was going to happen is not known; it is like-
ly that she did- not. Either. 'Way, ·it certainly shows her lack 
of both· judgement and maturity, that she placed trust in a mon-
ster and helped him to kill her own kin. Jac far Khan confis-
cated the wealth and harim of Seid M0rad Khan, an ambitious . 
and avaricious Zand chief. 3 He was advised by his minister to 
turn out of the royal ha rim, all the women belonging to the 
latter... J a c far Khan, however, failed to see the inherent dan-
ger of keeping the women of an enemy in the house. The result 
was that these ladies poisoned Jac far Khan and paved the way 
for ?eid Morad and his accomplices to murde·r him, when he 
was much reduced in strength. 5 
1. G.M., p.215. Fava 1ed al-Safavieh, Ms p. 146. 
2. Haqa'eq al-Akhbar, Tehran, 1334, p.7. Malcolm states that she was his sister (op. 
cit., Vol.II, p.157). 
3. R.M.M., p.81. 
4. D.K., preliminary matters, p.clxix. 
5. G.M., p.450. 
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Stealing valuable items for the competitors for power was also 
carried out by women of the royal ha rim. Sir Harford ]ones 
Brydges brought a valuable diamond for Fath cAli Shah, which 
was originally stolen from Karim Khan 1 s treasures and found 
its way to England. 
·~ 
Monarchs, or those who usurped their power, had to rely on 
the loyalty of their wives, but it was not uncommon for them 
to be betrayed in their trust. It is amazing how women could 
forget, or indeed forgive, the destroyer of their families. c Ali 
Morad Khan killed all the sons of Sadeq Khan, who were of mat-. 
ure age. He, however, married his son to a daughter of the 
latter. 1 How he could rely on her loyalty is inexplicable. 
Again, Lotf <Ali Khan, after confiscating all the wealth of Aqa 
c Ali, the influential merchant of Kerman, married one of his 
daughters and gave another of his daughters to his uncle in 
marriage. 2 
In regard to women 1 s education, the royal household did not 
differ greatly from the anderuns of the grandees. Women were 
often taught to read and write and, especially, reading the 
Quran was the focus of much attention. This did not, however, 
mean that they learnt Arabic, but, rather, they would read it 
with the aid of a translation and commentary, as is the case 
in most non~Arab countries today. It was not uncommon for a 
princess to be learned and highly educated. One of Karim 
Khan 1 s daughters was a lady of great talent; she wrote an ex-
cellent hand and also wrote poetry. 
On the question of the ownership of landed property by the 
royal princesses, it appears that they inherited their father 1 s 
or their bus band 1 s fortune. There is, however, no evidence to 
1. Brydges, Mission, Vol. 11, pr;>.13-14 • 
2. G.M., p.397. 
3. T .K., p.359. 
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prove that they were given property as Tyul, as was practised 
in the Qajar period. Fat~ cAli Shah gave the city of Qum to his 
mother as her tyul. 1 The brides of the royal harim, if they 
were of high rank, brought a great amount of wealth with 
them. Hedayat Khan~ s daughter, on joining her husband, c Ali 
Morad Khan, brought an immense amount of valuables with 
20,000 Tomans cash as a present ( pishkesh) to her spouse~ The 
law of inheritance, like all other Muslim countries, was pract-
ised, although in an unsettled state, which characterizes this 
period of history, it seldom happened that a monarch died in 
his bed and his wealth was actually transferred to his off-
pring. Almost always, the sons of a deceased monarch, if they 
escaped execution, were imprisoned or kept in the court and 
closely watched. In this respect, women were in a better posit-
ion; ·they were never executed and, almost always, were kept 
in the harim· and eventually married to their kinsmen. Joseph 
Am in, however, asserts that cAli Morad Khan executed the women 
belonging to ~adeq Khan, and even his own mother. Whether 
this is true or not, is not proved by substantial evidence. But 
as mentioned before, women were occasionally married to the 
lower classes, as a sign of disrespect. Aqa Mohammad Khan, . 
when he became the master of Shiraz, gave a daughter of the 
Vakil to a muleteer, in retaliation for an insult, which that 
lady had offered to his sister, while he was captive in Shiraz. 3 
It is surprising that the Zand women totally abandoned the 
tribal spirit, for which they were known. When Karim Khan was 
struggling for power, his women.folk often participated in the 
warfare. In one instance, the Zand women not only freed their 
captive menfolk, but also provided them with arms and ammun-
ition to fight their enemy... The reason could easily be, that 
the contemporaries of the Vakil had all died and the new gener-
ation had no experience of the hardship involved in tribal 
1. Sketches of Persia, Vol.II, p.33. 
2. G.M., p.398. Fava'ed al-Safavieh, Ms. 129 • 
• 
3. R.S., Vol.9, n.p. ~aqa'eq al-Akhbar Naseri gives his name as Baba FaiP.l (op. cit. 
p.9-).-
4. M.T., pp.281-2. 
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life; being completely cut off from that way of life and used 
to the comfort of the urban lifestyle. 
The children born to Zand ladies, or other ladies of noble des-
cent, were always tr;eated with more respect and, at the same 
time, dread, whereas the commoners were treated with less re-
gard. An example illustrating this, is the case of a young 
man, who appeared in the year 1191/1777 at the court of the 
Vakil and claimed that he was Karim Khan's son. Although 
there was no hard evidence to endorse the allegation, the Vakil 
accepted him as his son and treated him as such. The young 
man, ~ale~ Khan, brought his mother to the court and lived in 
the court, as long as the Vakil lived. After the death of the 
latter, Saleh Khan was still kept in the court, along with the 
other so~s ;f the Vakil. It was, however, cAli Morad Khan, who 
deprived Karim Khan's sons of their eyesight, and only Saleh . . 
Khan was permitted to be left unmolested. 1 Although this was 
a blessing for a child of humble birth, it could also deprive 
one of his claim to the throne. The only explanation for Saleh . . 
Khan's freedom, was that he could not lay any claim to his 
father's throne, like the other three sons of the Vakil could. 
At any rate, there is no evidence for a woman ever being pun-
ished for a crime concerning the king or his relations, even, 
as mentioned in the case of Jac far Khan, where the crime was 
apparent. 
As to how the ladies of the harim passed their time, we have 
• 
no information. Judging by the numerous intrigues and plots 
carried out by them, one is inclined to think that they had no 
other occupation. The monarch, and all the Zand nobles, al-
ways carried part of their harim with them, when at camp. 
Francklin, in 1787, describes the female quarter of the camp 
of J a c far Khan. 2 Whenever the ladies were in the camp, or in 
1. G.M., p.389. 
2. O.M.T., p.79. 
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the palace, they were constantly and closely guarded by eun-
uchs and soldiers. Cars ten Niebuhr, who visited Persia during 
the reign of the Vakil, states that no woman was allowed to 
leave the city after the sunset, for fear of political prisoners 
attempting to flee in;~· women's guise. Although this could be one 
of the reasons for their permanent seclusion, the prime cause 




precaution, to get 
the French envoy managed, 
c - -a glimpse of Ali Morad Khan's 
ha rim, while they were passing his windows. He describes them 
as follows: 
"elles etoient a cheval, ay ants des bottes de maro-
quin noir proportionees a la grosseur de leurs 
pilliers artificiels; chacune avoit une petite veste 
de drap d'or avec un manteau d'e'carlate; leur fig-
ures n 'etoient pas voilEfes d' apres le soin qu' avoi-
ent pris les Eunuques de faire fermer les bout-
iques' & de chasser a coups de massues les 
hommes qui se trouvoient dans les rues ou ces 
dames. devoient passer; & quoi que,. ce fut un spect-
acle plaisant de voir tout un serai qui sembloit 
etre a francetrier' car il y en avoit soixant dix 
A ;" ;" / 
si la mode leur eut ete donnee de Londres comme 
de Chiras. " 1 
There are, however, a few paintings in existence of the royal 
harim ladies, at which Carsten Niebuhr was astonished, since 
they were nearly naked. One painting is taken of the famous 
mistress of the Vakil, Shakh-e-Nabat. This girl was a prostit-
ute. The picture was probably painted from the live model, 
which indicates that the Zands were not all that jealous of ord-
inary women in their ha rim being seen by others. The women 
were, however, covered· in a huge cloth, while outside the ha r-
im, which Ferrieres Sauvebeouf found, not without reason biz-
arre. 2 
1. M.H.P., Vol.!, p.60. 
2. Ibid. 
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The ha rim, as mentioned before, was a community of various 
classes. The monarch married different women for different reas-
ons and motives. Karim Khan married the daughter of a weal-
thy merchant of Esfahani origin, 1 apparently to establish 
friendly relations wtih that class of citizen. Again, he married 
Mo~ammad Has an Khan Qajar' s sister, after the death of the 
latter. 2 This lady enjoyed great respect in the harim. Karim 
Khan was not scrupulous as to the religion of his wives. He 
married a Jewess, by whom he had his second son, Mohammad 
c Ali Khan. His legal wives were all of a socially well-estab-
lished background. There were, however, women of humble orig-
in, who found their way into the royal seraglio. Shakh-e-
Nabat, a prostitute of uncommon beauty, was so beloved of the 
Vakil that, when she was taken ill, Karim Khan forced all his 
wives to gather by her bedside and walk round it so that her 
illness would be transferred to them and his mistress would be 
saved. 3 It was, apparently, a superstitious belief that the evil 
could be removed by this practice. How this woman entered the 
Vakil's I} a rim is not known, but we know for certain that she 
was a singer/dancer, attending with a band of musicians the 
banquets given at the houses of the grandees ... 
The female slaves had a totally different status from that of 
the legal wives or concubines. They were either presented to 
the ruler, or taken as captives in war. Joseph Amin, in his 
biography, states that Karim Khan demanded Heraclius (Erkle~ 
the prince of Georgia, to provide him with twelve beautiful 
Georgian virgins, not above twelve years of age. This was on 
top of demanding hostages, like the widow of Erkle' s eldest 
son, his heir Gorgin Khan and his son-in-law, Prince David. 5 
1. G.M., p.220. 
2. R.S., Vol.9, n.p. 
3. TaTa, Vol.II, pp.56-8. 
4. R.T., p.340. 
5. L.A.J.A., p.209. 
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Am in speaks with distaste of the Georgian nobles, who competed 
with each other to send their daughters into the royal lJarim. 
According to Chardin, during ~afavid times, the parents of the 
ladies sent to the harim received some kind of salary, as long 
as they remained there. 1 Whether this was the practice at the 
time of the Zands is not known, but one may safely assume 
that the nobles wished to present their daughters or relations 
to the Zand court for the financial gains, that they could der-
ive from it. Almost always, the most beautiful slaves were mar-
ried to the monarch. The rest acted as servants to the great 
ladies: that is, the legal wives of the ruler. The female slaves 
were often married to their own kind: that is, male slaves. 
Those who turned Muslim were married to their lord, as lawful 
wives. 
Female hostages formed another category of the royal harim res-
idents. They were mainly the daughters and wives of tribal 
chiefs, local governors and unruly vassals. Karim Khan kept 
a large number of these ladies in his harim. If they were 
widowed, they were married to the monarch and, when they 
were married, they were kept as security for the good conduct 
of their kins. Mohammad Hose in Khan Sistani had a wife and 
one of his sons in Shiraz. They were sent back, when ~adeq 
Khan assumed power. 2 
Women of the upper strata in late 18th century Persian society: 
As previously mentioned, the upper classes formed a small per-
centage of the inhabitants of the country, who immediately 
came below the royal family. This echelon covered a wide 
range of high ranking government officials: namely, Vazirs 
(ministers), Sardars (military generals), Hakems (governors), 
Beglarbegis, weal thy merchants and influential clergy. These 
1. Chardin, Travels, part.!, p.205. 
2. T.K., p.336. 
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people often had a great establishment, very little inferior to 
the royal household, with many attendants and servants. They 
often married several wives, in order to ally themselves with 
other influential families. Some, however, married one wife 
and, as a result, .zwere highly respected in the society. Mirza 
Mohammad Kalantar of Fars married one legal wife, but he had 
slaves in his house. 1 He also had connections with prostitutes 
and, as a result of that association, contracted a disease, 
which resulted, he believed, in the loss of his hearing. 2 Mirza 
Mo~ammad ~osein, the minister to many of the Zand rulers, 
also had one wife. 
It appears that the merchant class were more inclined to marry 
several wives. This was, however, caused by the nature of 
their affluent life. The great merchants travelled extensively 
and, in each of the places they stayed, they established a 
home. Haji Khalil, a rich merchant of Bushehr, married a Turk-. 
ish woman in Basra. As he had large concerns in Basra, he of-
ten travel led and stayed there. The women of this class had 
more security in respect to their inheritance and status. 
With the death or fall of a monarch, his wives and daughters 
were subjected to all sorts of indignities. This was, however, 
true of the families of high-ranking officials too. Baqer Khan 
Khoraskani, who rebelled against the Zands and sided with Aqa 
Mohammad Khan Qajar, was not only executed for his treason, 
but his family were sent away to Shiraz, as captives. 3 Apart 
from such cases, the women could inherit legally from their 
fathers' and husbands' estates. Mirza Mohammad, the kalantar . 
of Fars, even left his vast landed estate to his cousin, the 
daughter of Mirza Mohammad Hosein Saheb Ekhtiar, despite hav-
1. R.M.M., p.94. 
2. Ibid., p.59. 
3. G. G. , p. 27 4. 
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ing four surviving infants. 1 He, however, left a will, in which 
he requested her to protect his children. 2 Although women could 
not take charge of their wealth independently, and there was 
always a man to manage the affairs of her property. They 
could assert their .;ights at times. Haji Khalil, a Bushehr mer-. 
chant, died in India in an affray between the India Sepoys 
and his attendants, when he was on a mission to the govern-
ment in India on behalf of Fath cAli Shah. Mirza Nabi, his 
his nephew became the guardian of his children. The de-
ceased's second wife in Basra, however, applied to the Turkish 
' 
government to protect her interests. It was not until Mirza 
Nabi married this lady, that the dispute was settled. 3 
The Mollas generally sided with the women in any legal dis-
pute, not for their love for justice, but rather for their own 
interests. The majority of women, being secluded in the harim 
and uneducated, were more inclined to practice religious rit-
uals and donate money to the clergy. Thus, the moll as exer-
cised greater influence on them, than on the male section of 
the community. Sir John Malcolm was assured by an Indian gen-
tleman, Jac far cAli Khan, who had married and settled in Per-
sia, that: 
"there is nothing, I can assure you sir, that these 
Moollahs like better than advocating the cause of 
our ladies ..... 
The women of this class had their rank and family as a form 
of security. Their relations protected their rights, if the hus-
band was of an unruly disposition. Their interference often 
1. Six of his children had died in his lifetime. 
2. R.M.M., p.94. 
3. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.!, p.37. 
4. Sketches of Persia, Vol.II, pp.48-9. 
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drove the men to despair. This was, however, a great asset in 
a society, where the rights of female population were at the 
mercy of the male population, who often did not need an excuse 
to violate it at their pleasure. 
As the disadvantages of the Islamic legal system for women are 
not within the scope of our study, we may now proceed to the 
si tu a tion of women in the middle and lower classes of the sed-
entary population. The women in the middle classes were very 
little more than slaves, as Francklin saw them in 1787. 1 They 
stayed at home attending to the housework and rearing child-
ren. They left the house twice or three times each year to visit 
their parents and close relations. 2 Whether they were allowed 
to attend the religious functions or not, is not known. Franck-
lin gives a detailed description of Rozehkhani and other rit-
uals performed during the month of Mo~arram, 3 but he fails to 
inform us as to whet her the women were present in the mos-
ques. Malcolm asserts that women were forbidden from attending 
the mosque ·and were advised to offer their prayers at home ... 
It could have been only a practice particular to the rule of 
the Qajars, but his view contradicts the accounts given by 
c -Qesas al- Olama, which asserts that almost all the congregation 
attending the sermons given by Shaikh Ja cfar Najafi in the 
great mosque, were female1 There was, indeed, a long-stand-
ing tradition, which is kept even today, that women congreg-
ated at the mosques for mourning and other rituals. The first 
mention of it is by Ebn Battuta, who visited Persia in the 8th 
century. He relates that: 
1. O.M. T., p.66. 
2. Ibid., p.lOO. 
3. H.P., Vol.II, p.333. 
c -4. Qesas al- Olama, p.l85. 
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"one of their strange customs is that they gather 
in the principal mosque every Monday, Thursday 
& Friday to listen to the preacher; some times one 
or two thousand of them (women) carrying fans in 
their hands with which they fan themselves on ac-
count of great heat, I have never seen in any 
land an astembly of women in such great number. " 1 
Again, during the rule of the ~afavids, the Shic a were known 
to have gathered with their women in the Takkiyas and perform 
religious rituals. This is asserted by the Turkish authorities, 
who were keeping an eye on the Shic a population resident in 
CEraq and Anatoli. 2 
The women of the middle classes appear to be less scrupulous, 
or rather less controlled in respect. to their Hajab or veil. 
Francklin, who lived in the house of a Seyed, found the women 
communicative and free in their manners. 3 Their husbands and 
relations did not prevent them from speaking to an infidel (as 
the Christians were termed), and thex appeared without a veil 
in his presence; whereas no Muslim fellow countryman was 
allowed to see them. Education of the women in the middle clas-
ses was often carried out by their menfolk, especially among 
the religious classes. It was not uncommon for any women to 
reach the highest degree of learning. Mohammad Baqer Behbe-
hani, known as V a hid, the most prominent of the clergy in the 
• 
late 18th century, was taught by his aunt, who was a learned 
woman of the time ... 
Lower class women were often more liberated than the upper 
classes. Hanway, in 1743/1157, remarks on women working in 
shops in the town of Qazvin, while their men were absent. 5 
1. Ebn-Battuta, Travels, Vol.II, p.300. 
2. Muhim Defterleri, a collection of documents relating to the Shic a1s, Der Islam, 
1979, pp.254-5. 
3. O.M.T., p.66 Brydges, Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.432. 
4. Qesas al~Olama, p.150. It is also recorded that he studied with his mother. 
5. Hanway, An historic account of the British trade over the Caspian Sea, London, 
1753, Vol.I, p.234. 
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The usage was, however, unusual in Islamic society and can 
only be the result of mass consciption of the males into the 
army by Nader Shah. As Hanway only saw old women working, 
it could be attributed to the fact that their sons and support-
ers were doingl- military service and they were forced to run 
their shops themselves. However, as mentioned before, women 
had a totally different status among the lower classes and par-
ticipated in economic production on a much larger scale. There 
is, again, no information as to the punishment of women for 
any crime. Hanway states that they used to put women in sacks 
as a form of torture. This practice has survived to the present 
day and is in use in Persia today. 
The rural community, as it formed a great sector of the populat-
ion, deserves particular attention, in that the female played 
a major role in production. They assisted their menfolk in the 
process of cultivating the land. They also engaged in carpet 
and rug weaving during the winter months. These were in addit-
ion to their tending the livestock and making dairy products, 
such as butter, yoghurt and rogan. They shared the miseries 
of their menfolk too. The burden of different imposts and 
demands of the government or local khans was also laid on 
women. Mirza Mohammad Kalantar gives an account of villagers 
being beaten, tor;ured and cauterised by <Ali Mardan Khan Bakh-
tiari, when he was competing for supreme power with Karim 
Khan. 1 The kalantar states that there were no women, who had 
not suffered the calamity. Women were imprisoned along with 
the men,. when they could not meet the demands of the central 
government, their houses burnt and left with no resources. The 
life of the peasant women was a tale of misery and degradat-
ion. Amir Guneh Khan Afshar, the Zand general, in his mission 
to the south of Fars, burnt down the villages, which had not 
provided him with provisions. He transferred the inhabitants 
1. R.M.M., p.43. 
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to other places and left only a mosque and shrine standing. 1 
The houses, which had been burnt had a cellar, which contain-
ed grain. The sardar confiscated it with great satisfaction. 2 
The fate of the villagers in Mazandaran was more horrible. 
Zaki Khan, fn his expedition to that province killed the men 
in Chahardah Kalateh and violated the honour of the women in 
public. 3 It was not uncommon to carry off the women of a vill-
age as captives to another place. The rural female shared the 
same fate as her urban counterpart. Zaki Khan, when he arriv-
ed in the town of Yazdkhast, gave the wife and the daughters 
of a holy Seyed to his soldiers as captives ... 
Another class of the female population of Persia were the pros-
titutes. In Persia, like many of the Middle Eastern countries, 
e.g. Syria and Egypt, prostitution was practised. Although it 
was contrary to the orthodox and traditional laws of Islam, the 
government acknowledged it as a profession and, thus, levied 
taxes on the women engaged in that profession. During the Safa-. 
vid era, there was an official name for the brothel, Baital-
lotf, which provided a lucrative revenue for the government . . 
Their practice was, however, banned at times, due to the relig-
iosity of some monarchs. There is an inscription in the prov-
ince of Mazandaran, in which Shah Tahmasb orders his offic-
• 
ials to prevent its practice. Thus, the taxes were abolished. 
It is not known whether the order was carried out or not, but 
there is another instance of Shah Sol tan Hosein, forbidding the • • 
women to practise prostitution. It appears that it never was 
completely abandoned, as Karim Khan would not have ventured 
to introduce it into the country again. Although he did not pay 
much attention to the clergy, it appears that he only continued 
what was already in existence. 
1. Niebuhr, op. cit., p.47. 
2. Ibid., p.48. 
3. R.T.P., p.365. 
4. O.M.T., p.l29. H.P., Vol.II, p.l60. G.G., p.227. 
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Rostam states that the Vakil brought above 5-6,000 prostitutes 
into the city of Shiraz and allocated a quarter of the city for 
their residence. 1 The mahalleh was named Khail (a quarter for 
public women) .2 Maftun Donboli affirms that these women were 
housed in ~streets and quarters, which were previously the 
abode of the respectable citizens. Waring, also in 1802, implies 
that there was such a quarter in Shiraz. 3 Rostam' s account 
leads one to assume that the Vakil actually started the pract-
ice in Shiraz, so as to keep his turbulent subjects busy and, 
thus, retain the peace in the city. This, however, is unlikely, 
since it would certainly have upset the clergy and antagonised 
them. The moll as, however, turned a blind eye to it and only 
ventured to check the activities of respectable citizens, in 
order to prevent their association with that class. There is a 
letter in existence addressed to the Shaikh al-Eslam of Shiraz, 
Shaikh cAbdol Nabi, which is in reply to a note he had written 
to the notables of Shiraz. In the letter, Mirza Mohammad Ker-
mani denies the accusations made against him, of having in-
vited the Ahl-e-tarab va Alvat to a banquet held in his house. . . . 
c He states that the banquet was given in honour of No man Chal-
abi, the Turkish envoy, by the order of the Vakil, and the 
guests were the usual crowd of notables invitedto all the official 
functions... Incidentally, among the guests were two Akhunds, 
which, if the accusations were well-founded, is of great signif-
icance. There is another point, which is interesting, in the 
letter: that is, the Ahl-e-Tarab va Alvat (plural for Luti) are 
• • • • 
used synonymously, which supports Waring' s account, that the 
prostitutes, dancers, singers and musicians were members of a 
broad group known as the Lutis. 5 
1. R.M.M., pp.339-40. 
2. Dehkhoda, Loghat na1eh, Letter kl. pp.1012-13. 
3. T. s. ' p. 80. 
4. R.M.M., p.114. 
5. T. s. ' p. 55. 
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There is no doubt that the majority of the prostitutes were sing-
ers/dancers. Rostam asserts that almost all of them danced and 
sang with much beauty and skill. Some of these women even 
knew a considerable number of odes from the well-known poets 
and improvised according to the circumstances. 1 Many of them 
them played music and attended the grandees' anderuns and 
the royal harim too. It appears that women singers/dancers per-
• 
formed in pubtic as well. Francklin, in 1786-7, witnessed the 
Cheragun (illumination) 
"in honour of the second son of J a c far Khan under-
going the operation of circumcision." 
On that occasion, women danced in the Bazars and streets of 
Shiraz for several days. 2 This again indicates that the clergy 
did not oppose, at least openly, such unorthodox practices. Res-
tarn relates an amusing anecdote. The Shaikh al-Es lam of Shir-
-az was passing through a street in the city, when he was con-
fronted with a band of Lutis and a prostitute drinking in pub-
• 
lie and, thus, blocking the way. Shaikh cAbdol Nabi, unable to 
make his way, reprimanded the woman to repent of her sinful 
behaviour, but the woman replied to the shaikh with an ode 
from Hafez: 3 _ • • _ / • • . / • / / 
'/ ~ o.)/}_ (5'~({ // fo_) '~ /~ f/L, ((~ 6 }/) 
Incidentally, drinking in public is also mentioned by Franck-
lin, who maintains that almost all the Persians drink, some in 
public, and all in private.... This is another contradiction in 
late 18th century Persian society, with which again, the relig-
ious classes had to contend. 
1. R.T., p.342. 
2. 0. M. T. , p. 50. 
3. R. T., p.344. The ode reads: In the quarter of good repute, we were not admitted. 
If you are not pleased (with the decree) change the destiny. 
4. O.M.T., p.70. 
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In order to understand how the mollas could come to terms with 
these contradictions, one has to discuss the prevailing attitude 
towards prostitution and such practices. As is well known, the 
majority of Persians, being of the Shi c a persuasion, held 
Mot c a (marriage by contract) legal; despite the ban put on it 
by the second Khalif cOmar. 1 The practice did not materially 
differ from prostitution, only in the duration of the contract, 
which could be from an hour to ninety-nine years. This fact 
is attested by contemporary Shic a scholars, who maintain that 
the purpose of it was to protect the institution of the family, 
as some men could not be satisfied with the marital relation-
ship. 2 Ferrieres Sauvebeouf in the 18th century categorizes it, 
as identical with prostitution in his statement: 
"le metier de courtesanne n' est point meprise en 
Per se; 1 'usage est de fa ire marche avec une 
femme; a raison de tant par mois; alors elle se 
pique de fide lite & le menage est tranquille: dans 
1 'a ut re cas, les etrangers se pourvoient a la pass-
ade, comme en Europe & cela ne leur fait point des-
honoeur. "3 
The account, given by Malcolm, of the proceedings of the cont-
ract is exactly consistent with what is given by a contempor-
ary member of the clergy... Malcol~ states that the two parties 
involved have a ceremony in the presence of a molla. The con-
tract can be for any length of time. The man accepts to pay 
the woman a certain amount of money at the expiration of the 
contract. He can declare the contract null and void at his 
pleasure, but he has to pay the money agreed upon. Should a 
man die within the period of the contract, the woman has no 
right to claim inheritance. She is liable, however, to receive 
her money from the deceased heirs to the inheritance. Should 
the woman become pregnant in that period, she has no claim 
1. Tabatabaci, Moham1ad Hosein, Shi~ite Esla1, p.227 • . 
2. Ibid., p.229. 
3. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.60. 
4. Tabataba 1i, Hosein, Reseleh Tolih al-Masa 1el, Tehran, 1332. P386. 
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to alimony (Nafaqa). There is, however, a curious contradict-
ion in that the children born of such contracts, inherit from 
their father's estate. The status of these women was different 
from that of slaves in that, although they were turned out of 
the household at the death of their master, or else he would 
dispose of them at leisure, they were free and could not be 
sold. Slaves had a worse position, as stated by Sir John Mal-
colm, from the "sweeper of his house, and the partner of his 
bed are alike to be sold again if they have been purchased. " 1 
At any rate, it often happened that the Mote as of a notable, 
along with his lawfully married wives, were confiscated by the 
monarch, or that, when a warlord was defeated, all his harim 
was appropriated by the victor. When Hedayat Khan Gilani was 
shot, his wives and daughters were confiscated by Aqa Moham-. 
mad Khan and transferred to Mazandaran. 2 These women were 
often kept by their new owner, if they were young and beauti-
ful. What became of the women, who were not so young and 
beautiful, is not known; most probably, they led a life of ab-
ject poverty. 
The question of the class affiliation of the prostitutes cannot 
be decided with any degree of certainty. It is, however, more 
likely that they were of the lower classes. Rostam states that 
the prostitutes were all of the Indian tribe, which Bahram, the 
Sassanid king, brought to Iran. 3 It seems unlikely that, even 
if such a tribe was brought into the country, they remained in-
tact. Through the centuries they must have intermarried with 
the Persians and become Muslims as well, as Rostam indicates. 
There was a certain woman, by the name of Fatemeh, who was 
• 
very much admired for her beauty and wit... This woman was 
once reprimanded by a molla and told to. leave her sinful path 
1. H.P., Vol.II, p.591. 
2. G.M., p. ~39. 
3. R.T., p.340. He has based his information on Shahnameh. 
4. Funnily enough, she was known as molla Fa~emeh. 
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and lead an honourable life. To this, she replied that she was 
a good Muslim, as she performed all the rituals of the religion 
and, as for her intercourse with men she was barren, through 
taking some kind of herbal dtug. Thus, there was no legal im-
pediment to restrict a woman in that state from having inter-
course with men. 1 
Again, all the names of prostitutes in Shiraz, who are listed 
in Rostam' s book, are Persian rather than Indian, Jewish or 
Armenian. 2 This again proves that the majority of them were 
Muslims. It was not uncommon for a lady of high rank to stoop 
to the state of a prostitute, considering the unsettled state of 
the country and the practices of dishonouring the ladies of the 
royal harim and grandees' anderuns, as a result of political . 
change. 
As can easily be seen, the practice of marriage by contract 
and prostitution, was only for the convenience and the pleasure 
of the upper classes. The ordinary people married one wife and 
had no part in these activities. The only class of lower status, 
who had links with prostitutes, were the Lutis. 3 They acted as 
• 
pimps and agents for the troups of entertainers. 
The close ties of the Lutis with the bands of musicians, danc-
ers/singers are clearly indicated in the letter previously all-
uded, which was written to the Shaikh al-Eslam. These Lu!is 
had a vast network of criminal subculture at their disposal 
and officials of the government turned a blind eye to their act-
ivities, since they were the main clients of these troups of 
entertainers. Waring relates that the Darughe of Shiraz arrest-
ed an Armenian, who visited a brothel and fined him a large 
sum of money: 
1. R. T., p.348. 
2. Ibid., p.341. 
3. Ibid., p. 343. 
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"fifty toomuns (guineas) he thought (the Daroghe) 
he confered a favour on him, at allowing him to 
escape at so easy a rate. " 1 
There arises yet another contradiction, in that, if the govern-
ment levied taxes on prostitutes, why did the Darughe fine 
their clients? As Waring states: 
"The description of people who pay the heaviest tax 
to the government are the female dancers and votar-
ies of pleasure. They exercise their profession 
under the immediate patronage of the governor. 
Their names, ages, etc. are carefully registered 
& if one should die or marry, another instantly 
supplies her place. "2 
The only explanation for fining the client could be, that it 
was to discourage the general public from having any associat-
ion with these women. As is clearly indicated by Waring, 
"The Daroghe of the Bazar likewise superintends the 
morals of the people & if he detects any of them 
drinking wine or in the society of Courtezans he 
compels them to purchase his connivance at no 
small expense. " 3 
According to the above-mentioned traveller, the prostitutes were 
"divided to classes agreeably to their merits and 
estimation they are held in; each class inhabits 
separate street so that you may descend from doo 
(two) toomunees to the pooli seeahs without any 
chance of making mistakes ..... 
This indicates also that the government officials found a source 
of income for themselves, by setting a dual standard, that is 
1. T.S.' p.68. 
2. Ibid., p.BO. 
3. Ibid., p.67. 
4. Ibid., p.BO. 
shak h - e- n a bat 
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as long as one was not caught, one could indulge in the pract-
ice. It is, however, peculiar that the social status of the citi-
zens were taken into account even in such cases. 
Women from religious minorities in Persia: 
Persian society was composed of many ethno-religious groups, 
including Armenians, Jews, Hindus and Zorastrians. During the 
reign of the Vakil, these minorities were encouraged to return 
to Persia and settle there. Carsten Niebuhr was accompanied on 
his trip from Bushehr to Shiraz by a group of Armenians, who 
had returned to Persia. 1 The Jews were also invited to settle 
in the country. The above-mentioned traveller asserts Karim 
Khan had built a caravanserai in the city of Shiraz for the 
Jews, 2 to transact their commercial affairs without harassment. 
After the death of the Vakil, however, the situation greatly alt-
ered. The Armenians and the Jews were constantly harassed and 
oppressed. cAli Morad Khan tortured the patriarch of Julpha, 
along with his fellow priests, until they revealed the hiding 
place of the church's valuable ornaments. Thus, they were 
taken away and melted in order to strike coins. The Armenian 
population had drastically decreased. Joseph Amin informs us 
that: 
"the fine suburb of Julpha once inhabited by 12,000 
rich families, contains at present hardly 500 
houses, and may soon be deserted and left for the 
Muslims of lspahan. "2 
The Jews had also left the country, due to the turbulent state 
of affairs. Buckingham reckoned that there were a few Jews left 
in Shiraz in the early 19th century. 3 
1. Niebuhr, Travels, p.58. 
2. L.A.J.A., p.467. 
3. Buckingham, Travels, Vol.II, pp.42-3. 
I. 
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At all events, the minorities managed to survive and keep their 
identity despite the pressure exerted on them in hostile sur-
roundings. Although the reign of Karim Khan was marked by 
liberality and tolerance towards the religio-social groups, and 
there is no evidence of molestation and oppression exercised on 
the minorities, the minorities had to abide by the prevalent cus-
toms and traditions of a Muslim society. Niebuhr asserts that 
his fellow travellers, Armenian women, had covered their faces 
carefully and, in their appearance, they did not differ from 
the Muslim women. 1 Joseph Amin also remarks on the crowd of 
veiled women, who welcomed him to the city of Tftlis. 2 Still 1v 
more striking, were their religious practices, which had taken 
the form of the Muslim rituals. Niebuhr, on visiting the church 
in Shiraz, remarks that the Armenians, who entered the church, 
fell on the ground and, in exactly the same way as the Mus-
lims, pressed their forehead to the threshold. 3 
The situation of the female portion of the minorities did not dif-
fer greatly from that of the Muslim women. Although they may 
not have been treated as slaves within their own community, 
they were constantly subject to the atrocities of the government 
officials. Joseph Am in relates the miseries of the Armenian com-
munity during the short-lived rule of cAli Naqi Khan in Esfa-
han. 
"In Aly Naky (sic) Khan's miserable reign of forty 
days in Ispahan a dozen of the worst sort of them 
(officials), who are called catkhadas (sic) or 
burgh masters, by express orders from Aly Nacky 
and to their great joy (as they are always glad 
of an opportunity to ruin the poor) were joined to 
Aly Naky Khan's Mahomedan (sic) officers in a com-
mission to search for two young women. They got 
drunk together, and began at night to break open 
almost all the doors in Julpha, in order to discov-
er the concealed females, to gratify their abomin-
1. Niebuhr, C., Travels, p.61. 
2. L.A.J.A., p.205. 
3. Niebuhr, op. cit., p.157. 
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"able covetousness, and at the same time satisfy the 
dia belie officers, in a place where there are no 
more rich merchants left. It was proved that they 
had exacted the sum of 15000 rupees from carpent-
ers, weavers, butchers, shoemakers, coblers and 
even of blind beggars. " 1 
It is significant that the above-mentioned officials were Armen-
ians themselves and had no scuples in ruining their female 
folk. The Armenian community, however, suffered little in com-
parison to the Muslims, as there were about 400 Muslim girls, 
who had been violated against two Armenians. Joseph Amin 
attributes this to the fact that the Armenian women "were not 
so handsome as the Persians. " 2 It is striking to note that one 
of these unfortunate girls was dragged out of a nunnery and 
the other from the house of a secular priest. 3 
Despite all these cruelties, there existed a peculiar tolerance 
of the Armenian ceremonies and rituals. Amin observes that this 
was the reason why many of the rich merchants came to Julpha 
to marry and settle there. Apparently, 
"by the standing law of Shah Abbas the first, the 
Armenians (who are superstitiously fond of eccles-
iastical ceremonies) have been allowed to have 
their weddings and christenings in public, their 
priests singing or rather bawling out hymns, with 
the congregation coming out of the church and go-
ing through the streets, or when the bridegroom 
and the bride enter the house with a pompous pro-
cession ..... 
He further asserts that the Armenians dared not do the same 
in any part of Turkey. 
1. L.A.J.A., p.465. 
2. Ibid., p.459. 
3. Ibid., p.460. It appears that there were two different kinds of priests: one was 
the official order, who could not marry, but the second group were like community 
leaders. 
4. Ibid., p.466. 
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"This stupid formality is an inducement for the for-
eign Armenian merchants who are subject to the 
Turks to come and settle there. They are even 
glad to agree with the inhabitants, according to 
their circumstances to pay a reasonable tax, but 
the destructive system soon disgusts them. No soon-
er are they married, than an officer is sent by 
the Catkhada to demand the tax money, though 
they dare not come near unmarried merchants in 
Isfahan. " 1 
This was probably the reason for the tolerance towards the Arm-
enians, so that they would be induced to settle in Jolfa, thus 
providing the government with a fresh source of revenues. 
The freedom of the minorities to practise their rituals and cere-
monies was extended to the Hindus too. Ferrieres Sauveboeuf wit-
nessed two cremations rituals of the Hindus, in which the 
wives of the deceased were burnt alive with them, and the 
French visitor was relieved to observe that the Hindus were not 
so many as to make rules. 2 There is.oo evidence that similar tol-
erance was shown to the Jewish and Zoroastrian communities. 
Indeed J. Malcolm asserts that they could not perform their rit-
uals in public. We know, however, that they were free to 
choose their spouses. Harford }ones gives an account of a Zoro-
astrian girl, who had been living with an Englishman, Mr. 
Douglas. 3 She had a daughter by that gentleman, who was sent 
to England to be educated. After Mr. Douglas was transferred, 
she was persuaded to turn Muslim and marry a well-to-do mer-
chant in Bushehr. She accordingly became a Muslim and marr-
ied Aqa Kuchak, by whom she had many children. Mohammad 
N a bi Khan, a rich merchant of Bushehr, and later the governor 
of Shiraz, was her son... This is a curious instance of toler-
ance: how a woman could be integrated into the society the 
1. L.A.J.A., p.466. 
2. M.H.P., Vol.!, p.65. 
3. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, p.33. 
4. Ibid. 
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moment she became a Muslim. Her past and previous religion 
did not create any impediment in her marriage and was not con-
sidered a point of dishonour to her offspring. This could, how-
ever, be attributed to the fact that conversion of an infidel 
was universally regarded as an act of benevolence and was 
accorded the respect it merited. 
The Jewish community was probably treated with the same attit-
ude. Karim Khan legally married a Jewish girl and she enjoyed 
the same privileges as his other wives. 1 It was always, how-
ever, regarded as a disadvantage to be born of a Christian or 
Jewish mother in the matter of accession to the throne. Moham-
mad 'Ali Khan, the son of the Vakil by that Jewish woman, 
was, however, accepted as the joint ruler for a brief span of 
time. 2 The Jews were generally despised and disliked much 
more than the Christains and Zoroastrians by the general pop-
ulace. All the foreign travellers assert that they lived in ab-
ject misery and that their number greatly decreased after the 
death of the Vakil. 3 They were confined to their own quarter 
in Shiraz and strictly forbidden from participating in official 
functions, civil or military. They were not admitted to the 
army, whereas the Christians, or at least the Georgians, were 
easily accepted as recruits. cAli Morad Khan had a private body-
guard of fifty Armenians and Georgians ... 
1. G.M., p.220. 
2. R.M.M., p.69. T.Z., p.6. 
3. O.M.T., p.60. Niebuhr, Travels, p.157. M.H.P., Vol.I-, p.64. Buckingham, Travels 
in ~' Vol.II, p.75. 
4. M.H.P., Vol.II, p.293. L.A.J.A., p.461. 
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CHAPTER 12 
A COMMENT ON THE REPORT ON THE COMMERCE OF PERSIA 1792 
This report is a valuable source of information on the economy 
and trade of Persia during the period under consideration, not 
least because such documents are relatively scarce. But the re-
port is also of historical interest in regard to new arguments 
put forward to justify new economic policies of free trade at 
a time, when British industry had developed into the world's 
leading manufacturing power, and also with respect to the weak-
ening economic position of Persia at a particular stage of West-
ern infiltration into her economy. In fact, a proper understand-
ing of the economic scene in Persia, as seen in the report, re-
quires three elements. Firstly, an understanding of the econ-
omic doctrines emerging at the turn of the 19th Century to 
justify free trade and attack mercant i.list views, which were 
influential in the policies of the East India Company. Secondly, 
the links which connected the trade of the European metropolit-
an economies with those of the Orient and various stages of 
this relationship during the 18th and 19th centuries. Only with 
these two aspects of the problem clearly stated can we go on 
to examine the third element, which is putting together differ-
ent issues raised in the text of the report on the subject of 
trade with Persia. 
Mercantilist Economic Theory: 
With the emergence of European imperialist powers in the 16th 
century, we notice the appearance of a set of economic argu-
ments, mainly on trade policies, commonly referred to as mer-
cantilism. Mercantilism was not a well articulated school of 
thought, as was the classical school of Smith and Ricardo, and 
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many of their arguments and emphasis changed with the ad-
vance of international trade and the development of modern in-
dustry in the 17th and 18th centuries. Yet there is a common 
set of assumptions and views on matters of state economic pol-
icy regarding trade, which justifies the term mercantilism. 
Among such views, the most important, particularly in the con-
text of our discussion, was the argument that a nation ac-
quires wealth through external trade, the source being the ex-
cess revenue from exports over expenditure on imports. For 
example, D 'Avenant believed that, in domestic trade, a nation 
became no richer; the only change was in the relative amount 
of individual wealth. However, foreign trade made a net addit-
ion to national wealth. 1 Again, Becher argued that it is al-
ways better to sell goods to others than to buy goods from 
them. 2 
There are, however, some important differences between the 
early and the late mercantilists. The early mercantilists (or 
bullionists as they were called) of the 17th century, thought 
of wealth in terms of money and gold. The late mercantilist 
proper had a broader notion of wealth, which included material 
resources and commodities as well. Nonetheless, both placed a 
high importance on the economic benefits of bullion. The most 
important representative of bullionism was Malynes, who firmly 
believed that expansion of foreign trade depended on the avail-
ability of excess treasures. 3 This led to an attack on usury 
for big financiers and money lenders, who by charging high 
interest rates, reduced the profit margins of the trading mer-
chants and thus discouraged trade. Here we have the apparent 
contradiction of mercantilist thought: the high regard for money 
yet the attack on usury. The main direction of bullionist state 
policy was monetarist: that is, they tried to control internation-
1. Roll, E, History of Economic Thought, London, 1950, p.66. 
2. Ibid. p.70. 
3. Ibid. 
- 422 -
al trade by seeking state prohibition on the export of gold and 
silver. When we come to the mercantilist proper, we see the 
bullionist argument: that expansion of trade depended on sur-
plus of treasure. 
The amount of treasure depended on the expansion of trade, in 
particular on the amount of excess exports over imports. This 
change of emphasis was to some extent reflected by Misselden 
and Thomas Mun, both merchant economists. Misselden, of T.he 
Merchant Adventurers, the E. I.C. 's main rival, favoured the 
confinement of trade to "Christendom", as he called it, because 
in such trade Britain always secured a surplus. He was particu-
larly in favour of trade with Portugal because of her treas-
ures. He blamed the trade depression on the East India Com-
pany's Oriental trade, because it drained Britain's wealth 1 
(the E. I .C. was allowed to take out a certain quantity of bull-
ion on each Oriental voyage according to its 1660 charter, main-
ly because they bought more goods from the Orient than they 
sold to them. 2 ) 
IN response, Thomas Mun, the father of mercantilist thought 
and the director of the East India Company from 1615 to 1641, 
argued that the re-export of Oriental goods enabled the com-
pany to make a net gain of species. 3 In the course of time it 
was the latter's arguments that won and the prohibition on the 
export of gold and silver was abolished in 1663 ... The direction 
of economic policy by the mercantilist proper was in the direct-
ion of trade balance, emphasising state policies for the promot-
ion of manufacturing exports. The surplus in foreign trade de-
pended on domestic industry, which the government was anxious 
to protect. When we come to Child, who was also closely 
1. Roll, op. cit., p.65. 
2. Ibid., p.70. 
3. Ibid., p.77. 
4. Viner, Jacob, "Theories of foreign trade before Adam Smith", Journal of Political 
Econo1y, Vol.XXXVIII, Feb. Dec. 1930, part II, pp.407-8. 
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associated with the E. I. C., we find that he thinks the value 
of the colonies depended on their ability to act as an exclusive 
market for the manufactured products of the mother country and 
to supply the latter with raw materials and cheap labour. 1 In 
political terms, the shift of emphasis reflects the shift of polit-
ical power from big merchant financiers to merchants turned in-
dustrialists, who controlled domestic production by subcontract-
ing work to independent farmers and artisans working at home. 
This shift of emphasis on the role of trade was eventually 
changed by regarding production, not trade, as the main 
source of wealth. This final change was the work of free trade 
supporters, who were opponents of monopoly advantages and ex-
port prohibition on bullion. It was one of the main achieve-
ments of the free trade school, particularly of William Petty, 
to show that money is only a means to trade, not its aim. 
Moreover, trade itself. was seen as a means of expanding domest-
ic industry. Petty argued that, if a country had too much 
money, it should melt it down, export it as a commodity where 
there is a demand for it, or lend it out at a high interest 
rate. 2 In other words, anything in excess of requirements for 
trade was nothing more than an ordinary commodity and should 
be treated as such. As Cantillon, an important free trade advo-
cate, argued, if a country has an export surplus for any con-
siderable time and drawing specie from other countries, circul-
ation will become more considerable. Money will then become 
more plentiful relative to land and labour. The cost of product-
ion and labour will then increase, the export surplus will de-
cline, and trade will balance. 3 Such beliefs led Petty and 
other important free trade predecessors of Adam Smith to reject 
all measures of fixing exchanges by law, as advocated by 
bullionists, and turned them into determined opponents of mer-
1. Roll, op. cit., p.82. 
2. Ibid., p.llO. 
3. Ibid., p.l22. 
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cantilist prohibition of bullion. 
The Commerce of Persia with Britain: 
The above section on mercantilist economic thought helps to 
clarify two fundamental features of the commercial relationship 
between Persia and Britain during the second half of the 18th 
century. The first relates to the economic doctrine of the late 
mercantilist period, which helps us to understand Britain's 
motives in trading with Persia and what she hoped to achieve 
from the relationship. We have seen that the underlying con-
cern was in securing a surplus in the balance of payments. 
There is a new emphasis on ways and means of increasing the 
role of British manufactures abroad as the main source of earn-
ing from foreign trade. This emphasis reflects the growing im-
portance of industry and production as the principle source of 
wealth. Thus Britain was no longer content with a trade deficit 
in her "spice trade" with the Orient to be financed out of her 
trade surplus elsewhere. Britain's industry had then reached 
a stage, where she was seeking to secure a trade surplus with 
the Orient by means of promoting the export of her manufact-
ured goods. 
This brings us to the second feature of the period, that in the 
late 18th century we are only observing the beginning of the 
change of emphasis. This, as we have seen, was due to the 
peculiar position of Asian trade with Europe, which distinguish-
es it from the rest of the non-European world. These peculiar-
ities were continual trade surplus in favour of the Asian coun-
tries and relatively little impact of the trade with Europe on 
their internal economic structure. In addition, the capacity of 
the British manufacturing industry in taking over the world 
export market was still limited. Keeping these two points in 
mind helps to understand the main issues involved in the trade 
between Britain and Persia during the late 18th century. 
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In studying the trade of Persia with foreign countries, we have 
to bear in mind two major aspects. Firstly, the empire of Per-
sia was self-sufficient in its economy. There were only a few 
items of food, which were imported into the country: sugar, 
coffee and spices, and even those were not of crucial necessity 
to the diet of the inhabitants. As is indicated in the report on 
commerce, Persia only imported items of luxury, such as wooll-
en textiles, which only catered for a very limited proportion 
of the population. Thus there arises a question as to how im-
portant was the trade with the European countries for Persia 
and to what degree the country was dependent on this trade. 
Furthermore, internal trade was extensive, as is once more 
asserted by the agents of the E. I. C.: 
"the extension of the Persian empire occasions a 
considerable commerce as the different provinces 
mutually stand in need of the productions of each 
other. " 1 
There are other indi~ations of a prosperous internal commerce. 
Although, as observed by the compilers of the report, the mer-
chants engaged in foreign trade were worse off than those 
under British protection, but, those dealing with internal trade 
appear to have been doing quite well. They paid little tax and 
took less risk in their business transactions. The same appears 
to be true of the muleteers, that is, they carried out a lucra t-
ive transportation business. Sir Harford Jones remarks that 
there were muleteers, who were richer than the merchants who 
employed them. 2 Thus, we may easily conclude that however ex-
tensive the scope of external trade may have been, it had as 
yet made little impact on the internal economic structure of the 
empire at that stage. 
The merchants, who were engaged in foreign trade, did not, 
1. Report. 
2. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.104. 
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however, make profit due to the competition of the Armenian 
and Mohammedan (Indian) merchants, who enjoyed the protect-
ion of the British. 1 But the reality was that they had larger 
capital and the extent of their activities in respect to trade 
enabled them to be more enterprising than the others. All the 
sources agree that these were men of extensive wealth and 
great influence. 2 Their sheer wealth gave them the advantage 
of getting involved in the importation of bullion into Persia, 
a lucrative trade, which must have compensated for their loss 
of trade in other commodities. This reflects the declining posit-
ion of Persia as an exporter of manufactured goods, i.e. car-
pets, silk and cotton textiles, and so on. This must have great-
ly reduced the earning of foreign gold and silver. A good evid-
ence of this decline is the ban put on the export of Kerman 
c -
wool by Ja far Khan, in order to protect the raw material sour-
ces for the shawl industry of Kerman. 3 The silk textiles of 
Yazd and Kashan, which were previously exported, had also lost 
their market, and thus Persia had only become a source of raw 
materials for the E. I .C., whereas she only imported manufact-
ured goods, such as textiles. A glance at the table of goods 
imported into Persia in 1789 shows that many of them were prod-
uced in the country;.. for instance, the eh in t z manufactured in 
Shush tar was, at all times, considered· to be of good texture 
and fast colour. 5 By this time, only very little chintz was ex-
ported to neighbouring countries. The other major item imported 
to Persia was various kinds of metals, e.g. lead, copper and 
iron. These were also abundant within the country, but the im-
portation monolpolized the market had hampered the incentive 
for working the mines of these metals, although the Persians 
had already opened their mines of lead and copper. 
1. I.O.R., Report. 
2. Ibid. 
3. The EIC agents were by no means pleased with the ban, as the export of Kerman 
wool had decreased to only 3000 Mans a year. They feared that the ban might increase 
the price of the wool and thus they were hoping that they could convince the Khan 
that the importation of shawls from India would be more profitable to his treasury, 
since he received custom and toll tax on the foreign imports. I.O.R. G/29/18, pt.3, 
received by the Court of Directors. 1788. 
4. I.O.R. G/29/21, Bushire, 15th Nov. 1789. 
5. I.O.R., Report. 
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However, there are three major points, which help to under-
stand and determine approximately at what stage this transit-
ion occurred between the two stages mentioned above. It is 
clear that the penetration of foreign manufactured goods into 
Persia had not reached an advanced stage. Firstly, because at 
this point the importation was limited to items of luxury and 
Persia was still exporting textiles. In other words, the import 
of manufactured goods was primarily intended to compete with 
Persian industry, but had not yet managed to turn Persia into 
an exporter of raw material and importer of manufactured goods 
which characterises stage II. As a matter of fact, the country 
had succeeded in discouraging the importation of goods, which 
she produced, such as carpets, velvets, embossed clothes, bro-
cade and different kinds of European silk. As the report indi-
cates, during the period of its compilation, the company had 
stopped the importation of these items. Secondly, it is evident 
from the recommendations of the EIC agents, that they are con-
tent with providing luxury manufactured textiles for the con-
sumption of limited upper and middle classes of Persians, as 
the report terms them: "the Persian gentlemen". 1 This clearly 
shows that the scope of this trade could not have been very ex-
- c -ten si ve. Finally, the ban on Kerman wool by J a far Khan shows 
that the competition with foreign trade was confined to the con-
trol of the sources of raw material and had not yet extended 
to textile manufacture, since the prohibition is only on the 
wool and not the importation of textiles. 
Thus Persia, at this point, was in a transitional period be-
tween the two stages, though moving rapidly towards the sec-
ond stage. The country is still self-sufficient; it is losing its 
export market and is faced with the J'port of manufactured / 
goods at an increasing rate, but the tendency is at its initial 
stage. 
1. I.O.R., Report. 
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The chief manifestation of this tendency is reflected in the 
acute shortage of species in Persia, a point of crucial import-
ance in the analysis of the economic situation in that country 
in the report. This we also make a principal issue in our 
study. 
We may start with an apparent contradiction in the report on 
the commerce of Persia. The importation of a limited amount of 
textiles could not have caused a significant drain of gold and 
silver, and make the money shortage a main obstacle in commer-
cial transactions. The explanation for this contradiction may 
be found in a remark in the report: 
"The Persian merchant is obliged to make greatest 
part of his returns to India and of his advances 
sent thither for the purchase of goods in species, 
which confines the exports made from Bushire to 
India to an inconsiderable quantity of old copper, 
drugs, rose water, dried fruits and species export-
ed from Bushire to India consists of Venetian se-
quines and different sorts of Persian silver coins, 
but as the exchange varies very much & often 
proves severely disadvantageous to the exporter he 
frequently prefers to export gold and silver in 
bars, the remaining exports made at Bushire are 
confined, to Muscat and Bussora being made to the 
former in raw silk, cotton, drugs and dried fruits, 
to the latter inconsiderable quantities of grain and 
dried fruits. " 1 
This point is also observed by Waring in 1802, 
"they (merchants) often undertake long journeys, fre-
quently to Cashmire, where they supply themselves 
with shawl, besides the danger of the journey, 
they can seldom hope to receive the returns of 
their money before the expiration of three years, 
from which it is easy to form a notion of their pro-
fit and the present state of trade in Persia. " 2 
1. I.O.R. Report. 
2. T.S., p.77. 
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A possible interpretation for the preference of the merchants for 
exporting gold and silver could be the link between the pass-
age of the decline of manufacturing and the fall in the export 
earning of Persia. A greater volume of export would have 
meant a greater demand for Persian currency by foreign pur-
chasers of Persian goods. It could have exceeded the supply 
available of Persian currency, which would in effect increase 
the value of that currency as against other currencies. Thus, 
the foreign buyer would have to pay the difference in specie. 
This would give the Persian currency a higher exchange rate 
and bring into the country a surplus of bullion. Whether Per-
sia had such a surplus in earlier periods when the trade of 
the kingdom was thriving, is not known. It is, however, poss-
ible to imagine that there was such a surplus in the treasury 
of the government, as it hoarded silver and gold at all times. 
The fact is, however, that the volume of exportation even at 
the time of rapid decline in her traditional industry, indicates 
that it was so in the period under study. In contrast to the 
above-mentioned case, the decline in exportation of manufact-
ured goods as a result of foreign competition would lead to a 
fall in demand for the currency; that is, the limited amount 
of purchase by foreign merchants would require limited quantit-
ies of currency to pay for the goods. The result would necessar-
ily be that the demand for Persian currency would be below its 
supply, leading to the depreciation in the value of Persian 
money, in relation to other currencies, i.e. the exchange rate 
falls in addition to the outflow of bullion. The reference made 
in the report to "the exchange varies very much and is severely 
disadvantageous to the exports~' is the essence of the inclinat-
ion of the merchant to turn to gold and silver for his trade 
due to the relative stability of its value. 1 
It is true that Persia paid for all her importation, especially 
1. I.O.R., Report. 
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to India in cash, as the commodities produced in that country 
did not suit the market in India. The British merchants, there-
fore, were finding it difficult to continue their trade from 
India to Persia and they had stopped their commerce altogether 
for a few years prior to the compilation of the report. The 
drain of specie was due to a fundamental cause: the decline 
in manufacture. The Vakil, apprehensive about the drain of 
gold and silver, had issued a decree: 
"forbidding the exportation of specie in which after 
enumerating the disadvantages which much ever 
arise to the nation, which exports species for the 
purpose of purchasing foreign manufactures, he 
points out the many commercial advantages which 
Persia possesses in consequence of her natural pro-
ductions and enforce the necessity of his subjects 
who may be engaged in foreign commerce availing 
themselves of a circumstance which under proper 
management must prove so beneficial to their coun-
try. This edict although it was carried into exec- ~.~ .. ~"? 
ution to the full extent of the Khan's wishes prov- 1\ 
ed, nevertheless, highly serviceable to the commer-
cial interests <;>f the kingdom & there is good reas-
on to believe that the balance of trade between Per-
sia, India & Turkey was at that period much more 
favourable to the former than ever it has been 
since. " 1 
Incidentally, the Company's agents were quite unhappy about 
the edict issued by Karim Khan, as indicated in a, letter; the 
resident in Basra complains that on the 
"trade of Persia, Carem Caun says he does not want 
it & it only impoverishes his dominions. That no 
species shall be exported but goods shall be taken 
in exchange for goods. " 2 
It is interesting to note the different factors which the report, 
at various points, puts forward as the explanation of the scar-
1. I.O.R. Report. 
2. I.O.R., E/4/458, Bussora 19th May, 1768. 
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city of species in Persia, for it shows the depth of mercantilist 
ideas underlying the report, despite some otherwise free trade 
notions in the offers of solutions to the problem to be examined 
later. All the factors mentioned in the report as responsible for 
the country 1 s shortage of gold and silver derives from the 
bullionist ideas, discussed previously. Shortage of money res-
ults in the decline of the volume of trade: the withdrawal of 
the Dutch factory from Khark deprived the Persian government 
of an important source of revenue, and the death of the Vakil 
also gave rise to a state of uncertainty and anarchy, regard-
ing the government treatment of merchants and the taxation of 
their goods. 1 Elsewhere, another factor is added to the list, 
namely the pilgrimage to the holy shrines in Ottoman Turkey 
such as Karbala, Mecca, by the Persians creating a drain of 
200,000 piasters 2 per annum. 
Despite these factors mentioned in the report, the decline in 
Persia 1 s balance of trade was fundamentally due to the penet-
ration of European manufactures into her internal trade market 
and the resulting fall in export earnings. This was not, how-
ever, particularly a Persian phenomenon, as it would appear 
to be the case according to the report since all the explanat-
ions put forward are specific to Persia. Rather, this was a 
characteristic feature of the stage reached by the world system 
of mercantile capitalism, especially in relation to the oriental 
countries. This is not to deny the depressive effects that the 
state of political instability or the drain of gold by way of pil-
grimage can have on reducing the amount of gold and the state 
revenue. 
But there were factors which aggravated the more fundamental 
underlying trend, a trend which was to be even more pronoun-
ced in subsequent periods, even during the relatively stable 
1. I.O.R. Report. 
2. Ibid. 
reign of the Qajars. Yet, 






cause of the depres-
by anti-mercantilist 
goods destined for 
foreign markets is deemed another obtacle in the way of larger 
ideas. The practice of over-rating British 
sale. As the report informs us, in the year 1788, the consign-
ment made for the Persian market had to be sent back to Eng-
land because the invoice was so high that it was bound to 
bring about a loss. 1 It was one of the practices of the mercan-
tilist doctrine to overrate the export so as to acquire more pro-
fit, but evidently at this stage, it was not practical in the 
Persian market. 
The solutions suggested by the report shows a greater influence 
of anti-mercantilist, more specifically, free trade ideas. By far 
the most important suggestion is that of direct barter of Brit-
ish and Indian goods for Persian products: 
"in the present impoverished state of Persia, it will 
be necessary in order to increase the demand for 
consumption of British manufacture, to advert to 
what advantages may be gained by bartering the 
commodities of Great Britain for those of Persia, 
upon this plan, it is presumed the merchants will 
often be induced to make very considerable pur-
chase at times when they might be even unable 
and unwilling to conclude them for species. " 2 
The idea of bartering rather than cash dealings has thrown 
overboard the most sacred principle of the mercantilist thought, 
that foreign trade enriches the exporting nations only if it 
brings gold and silver. Once the free trade idea of trade sur-
plus as a positive thing in itself is accepted, then it is a 
short step to argue in favour of excess trade, even by means 
of direct barter. The suggestion seems to be influenced by the 
Smithian attack on mercantilism. Smith's classic Wealth of 
1. I.O.R. Report. 
2. Ibid. 
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Nations was published in 1776, 1 some fourteen years prior to the 
date of the compilation of the report ( 1790) . We do not have to 
assume that the compilers of the report were acquainted with 
Smith's doctrine, who together with other free trade writers, 
such as Petty and Child even believed that colonial markets 
were an outlet for British manufactures. Such ideas were preva-
lent at the time of the compilation of the report and clearly 
signalled the rise of industrial ea pi ta lis m in Britain. 
To replace the mercantilist doctrine with free trade ideas would 
have required major changes in the existing practices; indeed 
as the second report suggests, the directors of the EIC should 
have expected competition from other European companies. This 
was another blow to the doctrine hitherto pursued by the com-
pany wherever they established their trading posts, that al-
ways insisted on having monopoly of the market and with this 
aim used all their power to prevent other nations penetration 
into their markets. These changes of policies would have 
brought about a new phase in the trade carried out by the 
EIC. But the time had not yet come for the adoption of the new 
school of economic thought. As the report and the suggestions 
put forward by the EIC agents did not meet with the approbat-
ion of the company directors, they rejected these ideas as tot-
ally impracticable and went as far as suggesting that the fact-
ory at Bushehr should be withdrawn as an unnecessary expense 
to the company. The second report, dated 11th January, 1792, 
reflects the speculations of the members of the committee to the 
effect that the upkeep of the two residencies in Bushehr and 
Basra is an expense which added to the losses sustained does 
not justify their keeping. 2 According to this report, the annual 
sale at Bushehr amounted to £2,608 
the annual loss resulting therefrom was £123 
Besides which the expenses of the factory at Bushehr 
amounts to 
Annual total loss 
1. S1ith, Adam, The origin of the wealth of the nations, London, 1776. 





same story goes for 
expected. They did, 
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Basra, that is a large annual loss 
however, assert that, should they be 
"asked why the company supports establishments at 
such a heavy and certain expense the answer will 
amount to a complete justification of the liberal 
principles of the company and refute the opinion 
the lordships have been pleased to suggest. " 1 
Apparently, the opinion expressed by the court of directors was 
that 
"the company are deprived of the means of establish-
ment on the borders of the Red sea from the want 
of protection and in consequence of expense which 
would arise much beyond the present object, they 
are satisfied with the settlement at Bussora and 
at Bushire, not withstanding the great loss they 
have sustained for many years and which may prob-
ably continue for many more." 2 
To this the company submit on the mere possibility that Arab-
ia, the interior parts of Turkey or Persia, may at length fall 
under a well regulated government. However there are indicat-
ions that the rejection of the proposals of the agent of the com-
pany might only have been marginally related to its unorthodox 
economic context. Indeed, it reflects a mistrust on the part of 
the directors towards their agents, since many of these agents 
were privately involved in trade and many defrauded the com-
pany for their own gains. The fact that the directors rejected 
the plans of extending the establishment of the company in the 
dominion of Persia and granting the right to the agents to trav-
el around the country and stay in Shiraz as he deemed necess-
aryl might have been caused by the very statement made in the 
report that the practice of smuggling merchandise into Ottoman 
Turkey and Persia was prevalent. Furthermore, the accounts of 
1. B.L. Parliamentary papers, Report, 1792. 
2. Ibid. 
3. I.O.R. Report. 
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the customhouse in most of the ports in the Persian Gulf were 
not clear, since these illicit transactions were not recorded and 
made the work of compilation of an accurate account of the mer-
chandise arriving at these ports impossible. As Sutherland 
states as early as 1727, orders had been sent to the agents of 
the company in Madras, forbidding them from taking presents 
or rather bribes from the merchants, with whom the company 
had dealings. The chief problem of the company was the quar-
rels of its own servants among themselves and the instances of 
corruption among them occasionally came to its notice. 1 The 
fact that Manesty and Harford Jones were actively involved in 
the trade of the Gulf and both were making a good profit from 
it, might have induced the directors that their insistence on 
the expansion of the company's activities and maintaining the 
factories of Bushehr and Basra, stemmed from self interest 
rather than the welfare of the company. 
Besides the recommendation on the direct barter, there are 
three other suggestions made in the report, of which two show 
again that the aim was to gain control of the internal market 
of Persia for the British commodities. Firstly, the promotion of 
the sale of British goods, by way of careful selection of the 
consignments destined for a specific market, i.e. Persia. To 
price the goods and the invoices at a reasonable rate so that 
2 they could be met by the merchants. 
Secondly, the expansion of political as well as economic influ-
ence of the company by way of setting up new establishments 
in various parts of the East, i.e. Sind. Giving the residents 
the privilege of travelling to the different parts of the East 
and increasing the number of the company's servants in Bush-
ehr in order to have a free hand in further investigation into 
the demands of those markets within the borders of Persia
3
• 
Thirdly, the Company would increase its revenues by charging 
1. Sutherland, L., The East India Company in 18th century politics, p.47. 
2. I.O.R. Report. 
3. Ibid. 
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a consulage on the ships which travelled under the company's 
protection. This was especially aimed at charging consulage on 
the Armenian and Muslim merchants of India whose property 
was secured under the colour of the Company. We will study 
these suggestions and how they could be beneficial to the EIC. 
In the first instance, the consignments made for the Persian 
markets were made in England and by people who did not have 
a clue about the taste or indeed the type of clothing worn in 
the country. They were often of such colours that no-one would 
think of wearing them, whereas a careful selection of the gar-
ments best suited to the climate and taste of the buyers would 
have greatly improved the sale of textiles. 1 Also, as the report 
asserts, the bulk of merchandise landed in Bushehr were not 
actually destined for that market and the only reason for land-
ing them there was to defraud the Turkish government of their 
duties, this practice could be hardly profitable to the com-
2 pany. 
On the second point, we must bear it in mind that the company 
was still in a phase of non-involvement in politics. Their ambit-
ion was to act as intermediaries in the local disputes and gain 
popular support among the inhabitants. There was, as indic-
ated in the second report a secondary use for the factories est-
ablished in Bushehr and Basra, which were 
"well situated for obtaining information, as well as 
for improving every favourable circumstance which 
eventually may arise." 3 
This marks a new era in the EIC activities and marks the be-
ginning of their political expansions in the Gulf of Persia. 
1. I.O.R. Report. 
2. Ibid. 
3. B.L. Parliamentary papers, Report, 1792. 
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Conclusion: 
In summing up the discussions in this chapter, we may con-
clude that this period was a transitional one, in which the mer-
cantilist and free trade capitalist notions are mixed. This was, 
however, to be expected in a period, in which the company was 
undergoing rapid changes. While the explanation of the bullion 
shortage in the report is bullionist in that the causes ment-
ioned for trade depression are those which had resulted in the 
shortage of money, suggestions for increasing trade with Per-
sia contain significant anti-mercantilist, free trade ideas. The 
shortage of money was mainly due to the reasons we have men-
tioned, rather than those given by the report. The idea of bar-
ter and particularly the sale of gold as a means of increasing 
the sale of products shows the extent of free trade and indus-
trial capitalist influence over foreign trade at this time. As 
for the internal market of Persia, the country was at a trans-
itional .period between the exporting of manufacturing goods 
and being the importer of European commodities, thus losing 
the control over her markets. Persia at this stage was rapidly 
losing ground on her export market and this was the main aim 
of the EIC, that is the control of markets by promoting the 
sale of goods. In achieving this goal they had to penetrate the 
internal market as well as the external, or as the report puts 
it: 
"to erect our flag in the interior parts of Persia. " 2 
1. I. 0. R., Report on the Commerce of Persia. 
2. B.L. Parliamentary papers, Report, 1792. 
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APPENDIX I 
REPORT ON THE COMMERCE OF PERSIA 
Karim Khan though deficient in accomplishment of literature and 
politeness possessed a manly & vigorous understanding alike 
capable of perceiving the most minute circumstances which 
might lend to the advantage of Persia & embracing & compre-
hending the most complicated & extensive schemes for its pros-
perity. ~fter declining the inviduous title of shah he at length 
found himself in some measures under the necessity from the 
general voice of the people of accepting the inferior one of 
Vakeel, to which however, he took care to· annex every useful 
prerogative of royalty. 
The Vakeel early perceived that in the desolate state to which 
Persia had been reduced, by the long period of civil war & by 
the expensive campaigns of Nader Shah the necessary expenses 
of the government wants, far exceeds the revenues collected & 
that the only effectual means of increasing the receipt of the 
royal treasury were to encourage & invite merchants from all 
parts to settle in his dominion to endeavour to revive every 
branch of manufacture to invariably protect the peasantry who 
had a long struggle under misery & oppression. Possessed of 
sentiments like that, it could not long escape the penetration 
of the Vakeel how highly injurious the withdrawing of the diff-
erent European factories formerly established in Persia had 
proved to the government commercial interest, thereof & as the 
country round Gambroon had not yet completely submitted to his 
authority, he urged Shaikh Sadoon the governor of Bush ire to 
make repeated application to the chief at Bussora for the estab-
lishment of an English factory at that port. The applications 
of the Shaikh met with success & the then government of Bom-
bay directed Mr. Price a member of their own board who was 
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proceeding to Bussora with the appointment of chief of factory 
at that place to touch at Bushire & to treat with Shaikh Sadoon 
on that subject. Mr. Price found no difficulty in executing the 
object of his instructions & Mr. Jervis, a servant of the Honble. 
Company was left in charge of their affairs at that place with 
the appointment of resident. 
Notwithstanding the residency at Bushire was so regulated, by 
the orders of the Honble president & council at Bombay ts to 6., 
be subordinate to the chiefship of Bussora, yet the information 
which is to be obtained from the records of the chiefship in re-
gard to the transactions of the subordinate is scanty & incom-
plete, from what little it has been possible to glean from them, 
it appears that Mr. Jervis occasionally made large sales of 
woollens, velvets & on the Honble. Company's account, that the 
commerce carried on by private merchants residing there daily 
increased & that Bushire soon after the establishment of the 
English residency became a port of importance. 
The violence offered by the Turkish governor of Bussora to Bar-
on Kniphausen, the chief of the Dutch factory at that place, 
gave . birth to the establishment of a Dutch factory on the Is-
land of Carrack. Karim Khan was too anxious to see the Euro-
pean's factories again established in Persia to refuse the gover-
nor general of Batavia for an unconditionable grant of the lit-
tle Island of Carrack & Baron Kniphausen to whose care the in-
fant settlement was entrusted, soon erected a fort of no mean 
strength, lodgings for the different servants of the Dutch com-
pany, warehouses for their goods & barracks for the troops stat-
ioned there for the defence of the island. 
The Dutch imports at Carrack consisted mostly of the same com-
modities which they had formerly imported at Bussora but their 
returns were being made partly in pearl, mules, the wine of 
Schyras & the drugs produced in different parts of Persia. To 
this establishment of the Dutch factory at Carrack the little 
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port of Bunderreeg situated on the Persian shore nearly oppos-
ite to the island of Carrack became indebted for many advan-
tages, the port of Bushire & Bunderreeg though situated much 
the same distance by water from the island of Carrack differed 
materially in respect to their situation to Schyras, the market 
for which the greatest parts of the Dutch imports were de-
signed. A Coffle departing from the former of the ports, for 
Schyras, * generally performed the journey in twelve to fourteen 
days, whilst those which proceeded from the latter, required 
no more than seven to eight days on the road. This difference 
in the expence of the journey & the Dutch for the conveyance 
of the goods sent to Schyras either on account of private mer-
chants uniformly preferred to land them at Bunderreeg rather 
than at Bush ire, fortunately, however, for the port of Bush ire 
the governor of Bunderreeg was a character but little entitled 
to the confidence of the merchants, the greatest part of them 
residing at Bushire made frequent commercial trips from thence 
to Carrack & concluded large purchases there of spices & sugar 
which on their return to Bush ire were despatched from thence 
to Schyras. The port of Bunderreeg depending entirely upon the 
settlement at Carrack for its commercial importance relapsed nat-
urally into its former obscurity, on the Dutch withdrawing them-
selves from that island. The Island of Bahreen situated on the 
Arabian shore of the Persian Gulph was at this time annexed 
to the government of Bushire but the court of Schyras did not 
draw so much advantage from the possession thereof as might 
have been expected considering the rich pearl fishery in its 
neighbourhood. The other petty towns of Persia situated on the 
shore of the Gulph were then still less known to Europeans, 
than they are at present but they neither then nor now were 
or are of consequence enough to entitle them even to be mention-
ed in this report. 
The anxiety & solicitude which the Vakeel manifested for the 
* Shiraz is written differently in different parts. 
I 
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extension of the commerce of Persia met with their proper re-
ward & he had the pleasure in the course of a few years to 
find that he had in great measure restored order & regularity 
throughout the extent of his dominion, the vigor or languor of 
commerce in Persia depends entirely upon the degree of confid-
ence which the merchants profess in regard to the government 
& the monthly receipt of the custom house at Schyras arising 
from the moderate duty of two percent is perhaps the best proof 
which can be produced of the confidence which the merchants 
reposed in that of the Vakeel, incredible almost as it may app-
ear there is sufficient authority for advancing, that they 
amounted to the sum of toumauns six thousand, the most skill-
ful workmen in all the different branches of the manufactures 
of Persia were attracted to Schyras, by the liberality of the 
Vakeel, the fine carpets of Khorasaun found their way in abun-
dance to Constantinople & from thence to Europe. The drugs the 
natural produce of some Persian provinces were exported in con-
siderable quantities to Alleppo & India & the duties to be re-
ceived by the government on the silk produce in the province 
of Ghilan alone, were farmed to an American ( Armenian*) mer-
chant for the sum of Tomauns Four thousands. 
It has been before mentioned that the def iciency of the records 
relating to the transactions of the factory does not allow of the 
amount of the sales made annually at that place, during that 
period being mentioned in this report, but there is good reason 
to suppose that they were more various and extensive than they 
have ever been since, amongst the articles which the Honoroble 
Company then imported at Bush ire are to be found beside their 
woollens, carpets, vel vets, metals em bossed clothes, brocades 
& different kind of European silks. 
It must not be deemed foreign to the subject in hand, to men-
tion that upon the records of the Honble company at Bussora 
* It must be an Armenian. 
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there stands a singular instance of the attention which Karim 
Khan paid to & of the insight which he required into the true 
interest of the commerce of Persia. The instance alluded to is 
a fermaun established by the prince forbidding the exportation 
of species in which after enumerating the disadvantages which 
muchever arise to a nation, which exports spicies for the pur-
pose of purchasing foreign manufactures he pointes out the 
many commercial advantages which Persia possesses in conse-
quence of her natural productions & enforces the necessity of 
his subjects who may be engaged in foreign commerce availing 
themselves of a circumstance which under proper management 
must prove so beneficial to their country, this edict although 
it was carried into execution to the full extent of the Khan's 
wishes proved nevertheless highly serviceble to the commercial 
interests of the kingdom & there is good reason to assert that 
the balance of trade between Persia, India and Turky was at 
that period much more favourable to the former than ever it 
has been since. 
As we approach to present period the commerce of Persia will 
be found visibly to have declined & although for want of the 
proper documents, to procure which no pains have been spared 
the exact proportions of its declension can not be assertained, 
yet the true leading circumstances which operated the cause 
thereof, are obviously perceptible for it can not for a moment 
be doubted that the withdrawing of the Dutch settlement from 
the island of Carrack tended materially to its decrease & that 
the death of Vakeel by throwing the empire into confusion, 
gave it still more fatal blow upon this latter event the most 
wealthy merchants who had during the lifetime of the Vakeel 
resided at Schyras & transacted their business in perfect secur-
ity finding themselves suddenly exposed to every species of ex-
tortion & rapine from the different competitors who immediately 
sprang up for the government, embraced in consequence thereof 
the earliest opportunity of abandoning a country in which they 
with reason conceived neither their person nor their property 
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to be any longer secure. 
Although the death of Karim Khan took place early in the year 
1779 yet the confusion ea used there by had not in any degree 
subsided in the southern provinces of the empire until ] aff er 
Khan assumed the government of Schyras & its dependencies in 
the year 1784. Political struggles especially in those countries 
are always unfavourable both to the merchants & the mercantile 
affaires but both perhaps suffered as little as the nature of 
things would admit, during the contest for empire between Jaff-
er Khan and his opponent Akau Mohammed Khan, Since they mut-
ually agreed to permit caflas of merchendise to pass in safety, 
in the districts of the empire of which each was f might be in / tJ< 
possession. 
Had providence designed to ] aff er Khan a longer life, had he 
been fortunate enough to have established himself in the govern-
ment of Persia, there is but little doubt that he would have 
trodden the foot steps of his uncle the Vakeel, at the time of 
his assassination which happened in the month of January 1789. 
The merchants residing in the different cities subject to his 
authority appeared to have considerable confidence in the stab-
ility & equity of his government which appears to be well at-
tested from the amounts of imports from India in the year 1788, 
which wasrnore considerablethan any which have been made from 
the death of the Vakeel to that period, under his government 
the manufactures of the country would have revived & under 
the sanction of his Firmauns, the Honble company might once 
more have erected their flag in the interior parts of Persia 
with security & advantage. It has been judged necessary to 
close at this period the account of the past state of the com-
merce of Persia & in the relation of its present state an opport-
unity will be taken of speaking of the advantages of the manuf-
actures & of the natural productions of the kingdom. 
In entering upon this part of the report a serious difficulty of 
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performing it with accuracy immediately presents itself for al-
though it is possible to assertain with some degree of percision 
the annual imports made in to Persia by way of Bushire or Bus-
sera not in regard to those which are made in to that kingdom 
from Alleppo by way of Bagdad & from Russia by way of 
Rashdt & other places bordering on the Caspian sea, the best 
information which it has been possible to collect appears to be 
imperfect & defective. The degree of commercial intercourse 
which subsists between the north eastern provinces of Persia 
and Usbec Tartary as a branch of Persian commerce, still fur-
ther excluded from the possibility of accurate investigation 
than those already mentioned but as this report would appear 
incomplete without touching in some degree upon these subjects 
what will be hereafter offered thereon is the account offered by 
the most intelligent people of this country & as such it is sub-
mitted with all dffidence to the inspection of the British govern- / 
ment in India. 
The extinction of the commerce formerly carried on at the port 
of Gambroon has been already remarked as well as the conse-
quent rise of the commercial importance of the port of Bush ire, 
so that in regard to the former it is only necessary to observe 
that its present exports are confined to a small quantity of 
dried & wet fruits and tobacco to the port of Muscat from 
whence it imports rice, coffee, coarse Bengal & Surat goods, 
sufficient for the consumption of the town itself & of the inhab-
itants of the country within a few miles of its neighbourhood. 
The road from Gambroon to lspahaun has been for many years 
& continues still to be unsafe for car a vans, that it has fallen 
totally in disuse. The island of Ormus is not now frequented 
by Europeans vessels, it is governed by an Arab Shaikh & con-
siderable quantities of Brimstone & Rock salt are annually ex-
ported from thence in boats to Muscat. 
The port of Bushire is now the only one of importance on the 
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Persian shore of the Persian Gulph, its government partakes 
more of the Arabian than the Persian form & nature. The 
Shaikh governor is induced by motives of self interest to favor 
& respect the persons & property as well the resident mer-
chants as the strangers that frequent this port & this protect-
ion was during the life time of the late Shaikh Nasser & J affa:c 
Khan extended to such a degree as to involve the Shaikh in 
very serious disputes with the government of Schyraus from 
which nothing but the unfortunate assassination of J affar Khan 
could have extricated with impunity. The duties levied at Bush-
ire on importations are very moderate but it is impossible to 
state them with precision since they are frequently varied ac-
cording to the commercia 1 importance of the imports & according 
to the peaceful & confused state of the interior parts of the em-
pire. 
During the Government of the late Shaikh Nasser the freedom of 
the market suffered some degree of restraint, for the Shaikh him-
self being engaged in commerce considered himself entitled on 
the arrival of vessels & foreign merchants to a preference & to 
have the refusal of their importations. This evil was however, 
in some measures alleviated by the Shaikh' s uniformly inviting 
the principal merchants of the place to take share in the pur-
chases which he made & therefore was only felt more severely 
by the British residents & the inferior order of the merchants, 
the present Shaikh Nasser, who succeeded his father in the gov-
ernment of Bushire in the month of April 1789, has not yet en-
gaged in commerce but it is possible that the advice of his con-
fidential servant may early induce him to tread in the foot-
steps of his father. The principal importation from India made 
at Bush ire consists of the chints, manufacture of the coast of 
Coromandel, but this branch of commerce seems to be much upon 
the decline from a cause which will be hereafter mentioned for 
the residual of which it will appear very difficult to suggest 
any adequate means, the greatest part of the Bengal goods im-
ported at Bush ire are suited to & designed for the Bussora, 
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Bagdat, Alleppo and other southern markets & the only possible 
reason which can be assigned for proprietors landing them at 
that place is to wait for a favourable opportunity of defraud-
ing the Bussora government of its import customs. The import at-
ion of several goods made at Bush ire are inconsiderable, but 
it appears that the merchants have in the course of this & last 
year given more attention to the Surat trade than they were for 
merly accustomed to do. 
The commercial intercourse which subsists between Bushire & 
Muscat by boats affords large importation to the latter of sug-
ar, sugar candy, spices of various sorts, coffee, metals of diff-
erent sorts & a variety of different petty articles, the sugar, 
sugar candy, spices & metals are imported at Bush ire by boats 
from the latter in Dutch & French vessels, the merchant vessels 
also which annually leave Bengal for the Persian Gulph gener-
ally dispose of part of their gruff freight consisting of sugar 
candy, iron, speants, laden on board on account of the owners 
at Bush ire; China & glass ware is often imported at Bus hire 
from Bombay on the cruisers of the Honble Company & the de-
mand for Indigo is supplied from Massulipatnam, by the arriv-
al of the annual merchant vessels touching at that port. It is 
necessary to remark for the information of the British govern-
ment in India that the spirit of mercantile adventure in the 
merchants of Bushire will always rise or fall in proportion to 
the stability or instability of the government at Schyrause the 
Persian merchant is obliged to make greatest part of his re-
turns to India & of his advances send thither for the purchase 
of goods in specie which confines the exports made from Bush-
ire to India to an inconsiderable quantity of old copper, 
drugs, rose water, dried fruits & sp~ie exported from Bushire 
to India consisits of Venetian sequines & different sorts Persian 
silver coins, but as the exchange varies very much & often 
proves severely disadvantageous to the exporter he frequently 
prefers to export Gold & Silver in bars, the remaining exports 
made at Bushire are confined to Muscat & Bussora being made 
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to the former in raw silk, Cotton, drugs and dried fruits to 
the latter inconsiderable quantities of grain & dried fruits. 
Bushire holds mutual exchange of the different necessary arti-
cles of life, with a variety of petty towns situated on the Per-
sian shore of the Persian Gulph, but it is conceived that how-
ever, these may lend to the advantage of the merchants resid-
ing at that place, they are too insignificant to merit the at-
tention of the British Government in India, since the capture 
of the Island of Bahreen by the Arabs of the tribe Benuotabba 
but little intercourse has subsisted between the inhabitants of 
the opposite shore of the Persian Gulph. 
The port of Bunderreeg is distant from Bushire about Six 
hourse sail but at present it is not frequented by any of the 
merchant vessels bound up the Gulph. 
The Bandar of Carrack only retaines the ruines of the fort 
erected there by the Dutch & is not at present of the smallest 
commercia 1 importance. 
Shushtar is a city of considerable importance in regard to the 
commercial intercourse which subsists between it & Bussora & 
on account of its manufacture of chintz which as will be here 
after observed has within these last two years met with pecul-
iar encouragement of the government of the city of Shush tar, 
is nominally in the hands of a Khan who secure in his situat-
ion, has for some years past but slightly acknowledged the 
superiority of the government at Schyrause but his independ-
ence retained at home by the authority possessed by the elders 
of the city who are always watchful to prevent his abuse of 
power. 
By the junction of different rivers thjfr remains only two days ~ ? 
journey to be performed by land between Bussora & Sh ushtar 
so the communication is frequent & uninterrupted. 
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Bussora exports to Shushtar coffee, pepper, sugar, cotton, 
iron, Tin, steel, lead, Tumeric, ginger, Muggadooties & Indian 
piece goods & imports from thence coarse chints, coarse cotton 
clothes & a variety of the trifling articles, the duties paid to 
the government at Shushtar are very moderate. 
It will now be necessary to present such information as has 
been collected in regard to the conveyance of the merchandise 
into the interior parts of the Persian Empire, in the perform-
ance of which it is sent into three grand division namely the 
Eastern, Western & Middle parts of the empire. 
To begin therefore from the Eastern part of the empfre which 
is supposed to include the provinces of Mekran, Sigestans & the ~~> ... 
more southern provinces are in such a state of barbarian & - I 
so exposed to the predatory excursions of the Baluchis that no 
merchant is willing to send thither property to any consider-
able amount, the very few foreign articles which the poverty -,f 
the inhabitants permits them to purchase, can only find their 
way thither by occasional consequences from Kerman, the south-
ern parts of Khorasan are su~ with such foreign articles 
as are in demand there from Muscat by means of the In dies & 
the northern parts of this province are sometimes supplied from 
the same place, when impediments occur to its communication 
with Ispahan on the Northern & Eastern parts of Hindostan, 
want of opportunity has prevented any intelligence being ob-
tained in regard to the expense of transporting merchandise 
from Muscat to the Southern parts of the province of Khorasan. 
In speaking of the means by which merchandise is conveyed 
from the port of Bushire to the middle division of the Persian 
Empire, it is to be supposed that such division, contains the 
entire province of Farsistan, Kerman, Iraq Agime & ports of 
the provinces bordering thereon, whenever the road between Bush-
ire and Schyrause is publikly secure scarcely a week passes 
without the arrival to that place of a caravan or caffle from 
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Schyrause which returns hither after a rest of two three days. 
With such goods as the merchants at Bushire judged proper for 
the market of Ispahan & Schyrause in these times, the goods 
designed for Ispahan are transported thither after their arrival 
at Sherause, in small coflas at different periods where the com-
munications between Bushire & Sherause is rendered unsafe by 
the Khans of the districts through which the road lies. Having 
rebelled against the government at Sherause or by any other 
circumstances the merchants send such goods they propose to 
vend at Ispahan, part to Shushtar & part to Yazd from thence 
to be conveyed to the place of their destination in such an ev- I 
~
ent too, specially when this impediment continues for any 
length of time, they keep up an intercourse with Sherause, by 
means of Yazd but as this is expensive, it is never practised 
but in cases of necessity, the communication between Bush ire 
& Yazd is seldom or ever interrupted & the communication be-
tween Shush tar & Ispahan tho' always hazardous is seldom im-
practicable. 
The very large coflas, which in peaceable times go between 
Bush ire & Ispahan sets out laden with wet & dried fruits, with 
an intention of disposing of them at Sherause on its arrival 
there, these articles are chiefly purchased by the muleteers of 
Sherause who immediately proceed with them to Bushire, where 
after disposing of their merchandize, they find ready for them 
a more valuable loading which they return to Sherause. On 
their arrival on that city the caravan belonging to Ispahan 
prepares for the departure & return to Ispahann with such 
goods as the merchants at Schyrause & Bushire may be judgedpro-
per for that market; the space of time which all of these jour-
nies require for their performance seldom exceeds fifty two 
days. 
The merchandizes received at Ispahaun by these caravans are 
conveyed from thence according to the demands they may be in 
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to the different provinces bordering on the Caspian sea where 
they are generally bartered for raw silk, drugs & the product-
ions of the consigned. From Bushire to Sherause, there are two 
different direct roads. The one passing through Kazeroon the 
other thro' Firouzabad. The merchants as well as the Chehrvad-
ars of the caravans give the preference to the former of th~se 
routes as abounding less with difficult passes amongst the moun-
tains & with greater plenty of forage for the cattle of the car-
avan, the expence attending the transportation from Bushire to 
Schrause of bales of merchandize to the weight forty maunds 
Tabreze or the load of a mule varies from Bushire Rupees 22-!-
to BR. 23t & of bales of merchandize to the weight of 60 
maunds Tabreze or the load of a camel varies from Bushire 
Rupees 26t although no correct information has or can be ob-
tained in respect to the expence attending the transportation 
of merchandize from Ispahaun to Tauris, Reshd or any other 
places in the Persian empire yet the framers of the report can 
assert with some degree of confidence that the expence of land 
carriage all over Persia is moderate & reasonable & that tak-
ing the amount charges, as above stated between Bush ire & 
Shera use & supposing to the distance between the two places to 
be 200 Miles it will afford no bad datum, for the calculation 
of the expence of transporting merchandize from one city to an-
other throughout the whole of the Persian dominions. 
The Western provinces of Persia are supplied with such goods 
as they stand in need of, from India by the routes of Shush tar 
& Bagdat, in the preceeding part of this report it has been 
found necessary to speak of the commercial intercourse subsist-
ing between Bussora & Shushtar & to specify the different art-
icles of merchandize exported from the former to the latter. 
The greatest part of which are sent from thence to different cit-
ies in the province of Louristan & the more western part of the 
province or I rake Agime. The parts of the Persian empire which 
receives importations from Bagdat are so situated in respect to 
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climate, as to require but very small supplies of the manufact-
ures of India, although they receive from thence considerable 
ones of English & French woollens, Venice ware, etc. 
Caravans proceed from Bagdat to Ispahaun by the route of Ker-
manshah & Marridas? but they neither frequent nor are they 
ever considered as free from very emminent risque. 
According to the most correct information which it has been pos-
sible to procure, the commercial intercourse between the Persian 
provinces bordering upon the Caspian sea & the city of Astrach-
an is but small & it appears that the importations of woollen in-
to Persia by that route has of late years been but inconsider-
able. The extension of the Persian Empire occasions a consider-
able inland commerce as the different provinces mutually stand 
in need of the productions of each other & since it is not pract-
icable exactly to specify the nature of this commerce, it has 
been judged proper for the information of the British govern-
ment in India to (r\jumerate such of the natural productions & 
manufactures of Persia as have come to the knowledge of the 
framers of this report. The province of Khorasan is generally 
esteemed the richest, in its natural productions which consist 
in a variety of valuable drugs, mines of Iron & copper & abun-
dance of different kinds of fruits, which when dried make a 
considerable branch of commerce. The principal manufacture of 
Khorasan is that of carpets which for the brightness of their 
colors & elegance of their workmanship are deservedly in high 
estimation all over the world. Though this province is intro-
duced into Persia the fine rhubarb which formerly being con-
veyed to Europe by way of the Levant, falsely acquired the 
name of the Turkish Rhubarb. The province of Khorasan as well 
as the adjacent parts of Usbek Tartary & of the province of 
Mazandaran produce great quantities of sheep. The chief advan-
tage of which proceeds from the skin of their lambs, which be-
ing dressed in a particular manner become exceedingly beauti-
ful & are in high estimation both in Persia & Bussora. The pro-
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ductions of the province of Mazandaran are but little varied 
from those already described as belonging to Khorasaun. 
The wealth of the province of Ghilan consists of silk, Irak 
Agime has to boast of a variety of valuable natural product-
ions as Indigo, Tobacco & etc. of the manufactures of steel 
which are carried on at Kerman & of silk & brocade which are 
executed at Cashan. The articles of growth of Farsistan which 
appear most worthy of remark are considerable quantities of 
very fine cotton & the poppy of the val~y of Kazeroon, from ? 
which at present but little opium is extracted for foreign ex-
portation, this opium made at Kazeroon is esteemed by the 
judges of that drug to be superior to every other sort produced 
in Asia & whenever the political affairs of Persia shall resume 
a settled appearance, the manufactures in all probability be 
extended. The manufactures of glass, sword blades, spear 
heads, gun barrels &c carried on at Sherause deserve to be men-
tioned since it is from thence, that the different places in the 
Gulph are supplied with those articles. The city, Yazd situated 
in that part of the province of Farsistan which borders upon 
Kerman is famous for its manufactures of brocades, carpets & 
a fine kind of felt called by the Persians Nummets. The wool of 
a certain breed of sheep peculiar to the province of Kerman, 
has long been an article very much esteemed in Europe. The 
Honble, president & council at Bombay agreeably to their desire 
had in the year 1788 full information given them by the fram-
ers of this report to the possibility of procuring for the Honble 
Company such quantities of this wool, as they might from time 
to time require, from which it appeared that in consequence of 
the thriving state of the shual manufactures & of the prohibit-
ion which was laid on the exportation thereof by Jaffar Khan 
that it was by certain means only practicable annually to pro-
cure the weight of Tabreze Maunds Three thousands, these 
means will be stated in that part of the report which contains 
the ideas of the framers of this report. Upon the subjects of 
the measures be calculated to promote an extension & produce 
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a revival of the British commerce in the Persian Empire. 
The city of Shushtar in the province of Lauristan is remarkable 
for its manufactures of Chintz & coarse cloths. The province of 
Mekran & Sagistan are two provinces of which no exact inform-
ation either of their manufactures or productions has been ob-
tained & the chief wealth of the province of Lauristan consists 
in grain, the variety of wines produced in Persia in the hands 
of an industrious people protected by a well regulated govern-
ment would become a great source of wealth both to the indiv-
idual & to the state & in the hands of such people & under 
such a government she would certainly reap more advantages 
than she does at present from the exportation of Tobacco, dried 
fruits, Rose water & ather of Roses. The mountains of Persia 
abound in Quarries of fine marble freestones & mines both of 
Gold & Silver though not rich enough to defray the expence of 
working them, are to be found in many of the provinces. 
An account of a new branch of commerce which has been open-
ed within these two years past, by several merchants residing 
at Bushire will now be laid before the British Government in 
India & the framers of this report in a subsequent part of it 
will offer to them their ideas in regard to the advantage which 
might accrue to the Honble Company by their engaging therein. 
The merchants before alluded to dispatched factors in charge 
of adventures, to a considerable amount consisting chiefly of 
woollen Bengal piece goods, Mosulipatnam Chintz, European fire 
arms & etc. to Gandahar & Cabool. The factors were directed 
to proceed from Bushire to Muscat to take a favourable opport-
unity of transporting themselves & the merchandize commited to 
their care to Scindy & to take advantage of the stream of the 
Indus, as far as the city of Moultan from whence it was sup-
posed, they would find car a vans frequently departing for Gand-
ahar, some of these factors have lately returned & the informat-
ion which they give in regard to the object of their mission, 
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is highly favourable & flattering they mention that in their 
arrival at c andahar they were treated with every sort of indul-
gence by the government & that in an audience to which they 
were admitted with Timuor Shah. He professed himself highly 
pleased at their arrival in his dominions, enquired much after 
many different sorts of European manufactures & repeatedly de-
clared that he would uniformly & on all occasions shew the ut-
most favour & grant the most liberal protection to all mer-
chants who might be induced to visit his country for the sake 
of commerce, they likewise mention having disposed of the ad ven-
tures in their charge for a considerable profit & it is imag-
ined, that the articles in which they made their returns con-
sisting of shauls, Jewels & drugs must have yielded a still fur-
ther profit to their employers, the purchases of Shauls made at 
Gandahar by the factors aforementioned prove that a communi-
ea tion between the place & the province of Cashmire is open & 
the framers of this report have sufficient reason to believe that 
caravans also frequently pass between that place & the cities 
of Balk & Sumarcand. The climate of Tartary obliges its inhab-
itants to cloth themselves in warm garments, the poor are & 
must be content with their own coarse stuffs & the skins of 
their flocks but the rich seek for the more elegant attire of 
European woollens, according to the best information, the wants 
of these latter in this respect are supplied from Russia & Tar-
tar merchants residing at Astrachan, it is conceived that the 
woollens are different articles so supplied by Russia to the 
kingdom of Karasm* are to be large annual amount, it is pre-
sumed that as the extension of the sale of their woollens has 
always been recommended by the Honble Company any measures 
for the promotion thereof void of imminent risks are not unwor-
thy of their notice, upon these grounds in the subsequent part 
of this report will be insisted such as appear to have at least 
a probability of throwing the supply of woollens required as 
aforementioned into the hands of the Honble Company. 
*Kharaz1. 
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As it appears sufficiently obvious from the proceeding part of 
this report, that the sole cause to which the decline of the com-
merce of Persia can be justly imputed, is the confusion in 
which for some years past the government has been involved, 
it has been therefore judged unnecessary to give a detail of 
this decline, under a separate head or division. The following 
sentiments & ideas are now offered to the inspection of the Brit-
ish Government in India with diffidence & respect, some of 
them upon the information obtained from the most intelligent 
merchants residing at Bus hire & Bussora. 
There appears at present to exist several serious obstacles to 
any very great extension of the sale of British manufactures 
in the kingdoms of Persia & in Bengal, to those country mer-
chants will never fail to import supplies equal to the demands 
of the market but it may be reasonably supposed that the com-
merce which the Honble Company carry on to Persia may be put 
upon a footing more advantageous to them than the one which 
it stands at present & that of the measure hereafter pointed 
out, for that purpose should be carried in to execution, they 
will tend to infuse a more advantageous & active spirit of com-
merce, amongst the private Persian merchants. 
It has been already mentioned how inimical to commerce, the 
different revolutions in the Persian government have always 
proved but as the country possesses great internal sources of 
wealth a few years of a mild & regular administration might 
not only prevent the present decline but even raise its com-
merce to its former importance. The languishing state of the 
Honble Company's commerce, at the port of Bushire has for 
some times past given occasion to the framers of this report to 
form an opinion that the factory there either ought to be 
placed upon a different establishment to the present one, or 
ought to be withdrawn as a useless expence to the Honble Com-
pany. 
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The framers of this report are however more inclined to favour 
the former of these opinions than the latter & humbly conceive 
that the establishment of a factory at the port of Bushire upon 
the plan hereafer mentioned would prove a measure of much pub-
lic utility. In the present impoverished state of Persia, it will 
be necessary in order to increase the demand consumption of 
British manufacture, to advert to what advantages may be gain-
ed by . bartering the commodities of Great Britain for those of 
Persian, upon this plan it is presumed the merchants will often 
be induced to make very considerable purchases at times when 
they might be even unable & unwilling to conclude them for 
species. 
The framers of this report in the year 1788, furnished the gov-
ernment at Bombay with some necessary hints on the subject of 
drugs, the produce of Persia & of the country adjacent thereto 
& they are of opinion that a commerce of the most beneficial 
nature to the Honble Company, might be prosecuted by an ex-
change of different European articles for the article of medicin-
al drugs. It is obvious that the several drugs procurable in 
Persia would reach the British hospitals in India, in a much 
higher state of preservation than ;those which are at present 
received by way of Alleppo, Smyrna & Constantinople. The liber-
al policy observed by the Honble. Company on all occasions 
has ever induced them to pay particular attention to every pos-
sible & probable means for the preservation of the health of 
their troops & of different persons engaged in their employ, it 
is therefore presumed that the possibility of procuring a cons-
tant supply of fresh medicinal drugs in a climate in which 
even the fresh est soon lose some thing of their natural virtue, 
is an object worthy of their attention. It is humbly conceived 
that in case it shall hereafter be found practicable to extend 
a commerce of this nature to a certain extent it will be product-
ive of public utility. 
The Honble Company's hospitals in India will as has been 
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before mentioned reap considerable advantage. The Honble Com-
pany will be enabled to export annually large quantities both 
of the manufactures & natural productions of Great Britain than 
they do at present & it may reasonably be supposed now the 
passage from India to Europe is reduced to a certainty that 
they will be able to send many articles, the produce of Persia 
to the different markets in Europe at a much cheaper rate than 
they can be brought there from any other quarter with a view 
of promoting a scheme apparently so beneficial in its conse-
quence. 
The framers of this report beg leave to submit to the consider-
ation of the British Government in India the means which in 
their opinion seems best calculated to promote the success both 
of it & of the wishes which the Honble Company have expressed 
to receive an annual supply of Carmania wool. It is presumed 
that the first step necessary to be taken for the purpose is for 
the British Government at Bombay, to order one of the civil 
servants upon that establishment to proceed into Persia without 
loss of time & to give him instructions to penetrate into the dif-
ferent provinces of the Empire as far as the situation of af-
fairs will admit to inform himself as minutely as possible of 
the natural productions of each province, of the species of our 
manufactures of which it may stand most in need of, the prob-
able annual amount of the consumption of the same & of the pre-
sent state of its government, by these means, indents which it 
will be necessary to transmit to Europe will be framed with a 
great degree of precision, correspondencies will be formed with 
the different principal merchants at each place, the necessary 
forms will be adjusted with government & the gentlemen to 
whose care the management of the Honble Company's affairs in 
Persia may be entrusted will be furnished with authentic mater-
ials for the conduct & measures which it may be necessary for 
them to pursue, a commission of this nature or of one similar 
to it is performed with fidelity & accurateness will prove a 
task of no small difficulty & it will be indispensibly necessary 
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in case the sentiments thereon above expressed, are meant to 
be carried in to execution that person so sent, to a competent 
knowledge of the Persian language should also join a know-
ledge of the manners & customs of the people with whom in the 
course of this commission he may have to negociate or of whom 
he may be obliged to seek for information with every possible 
advantage on his side it is conceived from experience that he 
must ·& will have greater reason to solicit the indulgent recept-
ions of the fruits of his enquiries than to hope they will prod-
uce him any addition of fame. Another measure which appears 
to the framers of this report to be a necessary one & which 
they accordingly with respect, recommend to be adopted by the 
British Government in India in alteration in the present estab-
lishment of the subordinate of Bushire, the framers of this re-
port conceive that not only in respect to the prosecution of the 
plan before mentioned but in respect to the Honble Company in 
Persia it would be adviseable to give the title of the Honble 
Company's resident in Persia with an authority to reside occas-
ionally as he may judge most proper either at Sherause or Bush-
ire to the gentleman to whom the management of their affairs 
in that country may be entrusted & also to increase the estab-
lishment of covenanted servants in Persia by appointing to the 
assistance of the president a writer always to remain at Bush-
ire & a surgeon well skilled in the qualities of medicinal 
drugs for the purpose of inspecting those which the resident 
may wish to procure on account of the Honble Company on its 
present establishment. The Honble Company in the. opinion of 
the framers of this report, do not derive any or if any, very 
little advantage from the factory at Bushire, on the plan above 
mentioned altho the expenses of establishment must necessarily 
be increased, there is a great probability that the Honble Com-
pany will receive advantages more than adequate thereto. 
The late & present government of Sherause was & is according 
to the Firmauns received by the resident at Bussora very anx-
ious for the extension of British commerce in Persia in the year 
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1787 when Mr. Jones visited Sherauze for the benefit of his 
health, J aafar Khan repeatedly in the several audiences to 
which that gentleman was admitted expressed his desire of see-
ing Europeans settled at Sherauze & if the matters had not 
been misinterpreted, he was at the time of his assassination on 
the point of causing applications to be made to Bombay for an 
alteration of the establishment of the factory at Bushire. A Firm-
aun Jrom Lutf Ully Khan the present ruler at Sherauze to the 
resident at Bussora in the month of June last contains a pass-
age sufficiently striking to justify its insertion in this report: 
"And in as much as our late royal father of happy memory 
whose habitation is now in paradize, formerly made known to 
you his favourable intentions in regard to such of your nation 
as might enter his dominions on a design of commerce, we also 
think it necessary to mention that our good will & regard for 
your nation exceeds that of our late royal father & that we 
earnestly desire to see the curious merchandize of Europe 
brought to Sherause for sale & we faithfully promise to behave 
in all respects to your people according to former usages & cus-
toms & to grant & secure to them every privilege & indulgence 
which they enjoyed at Bussora." 
As the importation to England of raw silk from Persia has long 
since, it is presumed, ceased to be an object of attention to 
Honble Company, the framers of this report will therefore con-
fine what further they have to observe in the subject before 
them to stating the different articles of produce & manufactures 
of Great Britain, which in their opinion may be vended in Per-
sia, & to the expression of such a sentiments as they have 
formed re la ti ve to the prosecution of a commerce with the East-
ern & Northern provinces of Persia with advantage to the Hon-
ble Company. It is necessary, however to premise & to ac-
quaint the British Government in India that Persia at present 
is an exhausted kingdom, that the great influx of wealth which 
it received by the expedition of Nader Shah against Delhi has 
nearly reverted to India & that the following circumstances 
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with more or less always tend to increase the scarcity of spec-
ie in that kingdom. Nine tenth of the imports from India into 
Persia, are at present purchases with specie of which not the 
smallest part ever return into the country, not less than ten 
thousand Persians annually leave the different parts of Persia 
to make pilgrimages to kerbella & Mecca, if it is computed 
therefore that each of these pilgrims at the time of his enter-
ing ·the Turkish dominions is furnished with the moderate sum 
of Piasters twenty for the necessary expenses of his journey, 
it will be found that this single circumstance alone drains the 
kingdom annually of two hundred thousand Piasters. The Prin-
ces of the house of Siffi were sensible how detrimental these pil-
grimages were to the interests of Persia & successively endeav-
oured to, as much as possible, to lessen their repute, if at 
that time they were found to be detrimental, it may be reason-
ably supposed that at the present period they must be much 
more so. The kingdom then enjoyed the blessing of internal 
peace & well established government & the pilgrim often to the 
advantage of the state carried with him instead of specie, such 
of the manufactures or produce of his country as were in de-
mand in the countries through which he had to pass, the arri v-
al in those days at Bagdat of the great caravan of Persian 
pilgrims produced in that city for some days all the hurry & 
business of a fair. The Turkish merchants of Bagdat were 
ready to purchase the raw silk, the drugs, the carpets, the 
Shauls & every other specie of merchandize which the pilgrims 
might have brought with them & the different European firms 
established at Alleppo, Smyrna & etc. on the arrival of these 
articles at those places purchased them for the different mar-
kets of Europe. In the present time from the intestine wars 
which have so long desolated Persia as well as from the chan-
ge which has taken place on the commerce of Levant, the Per-
sian pilgrim has no other mode of defraying the expenses of 
his pilgrimage than that of bringing along with him a suffic-
ient quantity of specie. 
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The framers of this report in speaking of the articles of the 
manufactures & produce of Great Britain, which in their opinion 
are suited to the demands of the markets of Persia flatter them-
selves that such part of their sentiments thereon as are found-
ed on speculation will meet an indulgent & lenient reception, 
since not withstanding, they may have arisen from circum-
stances & information apparently the most undesirable & corr-
ect; many accidents which no humane forsight can preconceive * 
may in a country situated like Persia, in case the British Gov-
ernment in India should be inclined to carry any of them into 
execution tend to a failure of success. It is presumed in re-
gard to promoting the demand for woollens in Persia that two 
points are essentially necessary to be observed, the first of 
which is that, as the assortments for the Gulph markets are 
made up in England, the strictest care be taken that no other 
colors are admitted, therein than those which may be mentioned 
in the indents, framed by the servants of the Honble Company 
residing in Persia & secondly that the present mode of sending 
an assortment of all the different kinds of woollen, be changed 
for that of sending only those best adopted to the markets of 
Persia, the superstitions of the Persian is already generally 
known & it may be easily conceived how detrimental an idea 
of many of the colors of which it is composed being unfortunate 
must prove to the disposal of an assortment of woollen, many 
of the colors of the assortment of woollens sent by the Honble 
Company to Persia are in the opinion of the persians so out-
rageously outre, that no one thinks of wearing them, they be-
ing as little adopted to their taste for their upper garments, 
as a bright yellow would be to that of an Englishman, local 
observation induces Mr. ]ones to suppose that the spotted and 
stripped cloths would be very vendible in Persia. 
The winter dress of a Persian gentleman requires many of the 
manufactures of Europe, his upper garment is of vel vet or fine 
* The text is not at all understandable. 
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cloths his under ones of Sattin, his cap is partly composed of 
vel vet & partly of cloths, his Chuckchoors which he wears in 
the place of stuckings are of cloth & if he is a man of any 
rank the dress is not complete without the addition of Brocade, 
upon these grounds the framers of this report conceive that a 
proper assortment of Velvet, Sattins, Silks & Brocades might be 
annually disposed of in Persia. Notwithstanding the 'pattern of 
Nor.wich & Manchester manufactures, sent to the factories at 
Bussora & Bushire by the Honble the president in Council at 
Bombay in the year 1788 were returned to that residency with 
an opinion from both factions that they would not answer the 
Gulph markets, it is conceived that for want of an opportunity 
of laying them open, to the inspection of the merchants at Sher-
auze such an opinion may hereafter be found to have been a 
very erroneous one, in respect to India. From the information 
given to the framers of this report by Mr.] ones, there were many 
of the patterns, the qualities & colors of such were exceeding-
ly well adapted to the taste of Persians & the only doubt 
which they entertain of their not being vendible in Persia is 
the price at which it could be afforded to invoice them & it is 
therefore, farther conceived that a small consignment of these 
articles might be made to the factory at Bushire. The most san-
guin opinion is entertained in regard to the possibility of dis-
posing of large quantities of hardware & the universal esteem 
which the Persians have for glass of all sorts affords room for 
an opinion that this branch of British manufactures would meet 
with good encouragement in Persia. 
It will probably be found upon experiment that a proper assort-
ment of the different kinds of carpets manufactured in England 
would meet with a favourable reception in Persia provided the 
original price of them was moderate, an idea is also enter-
tained that a careful inquiry after the different dyes made use 
of in the manufacturing carpets in Khorasaun would be product-
ive of much benefit to our own. 
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The Wilton & Axminster carpets are superior to the finest in 
Persia in point of arrangement of pattern & at first & for some 
short times, afterwards, in point of colors lose their bright-
ness, on the other hand, the carpets manufactured in Persia 
from the superior quality, it is imagined of the dye, preserve 
to the very last their briliancy of colour. 
Little doubt can be entertained if the British Government in 
India make the commerce to Persia an object of their attention 
but a very considerable quantity of the different metals annu-
ally exported from England by the Hon ble Company would meet 
an advantageous & ready sale in that kingdom & that several 
other articles of commerce which mentioned separately might 
appear trivial, would be demanded, since the Persians are a 
people much inclined to luxury & shews. 
The framers of this report have not touched upon the imports 
of commerce of India to Persia because they are well convinced 
that the merchants of Persia themselves will always carry it 
on to as great an extent as it will bear & because they can 
not conceive that the British Govt. in India can by any act 
of theirs tend to its encrease, so any thing will advantageous-
ly affect this branch of Persian commerce. The framers of this 
report conceive nothing to be more likely to do so, than the est-
ablishment of a factory in the manner mentioned in the proceed-
ing part of this report. 
In the event of the Brit. Govt. in India coming to determinat-
ion to prove how far it would accord with the interests of the 
Honble Co. to attempt to throw in a supply of woollens to fact-
ory. 
The framers of this report offer them their ideas of the means 
by which it is probable, it may be performed with the least 
risk the hopes of advantage to the Honble Co. The old factory 
at Scindy with some repair will be ready to receive a resident, 
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a writer & a proper consignment of woollens & metals to these 
gentlemen, should be added a third, so he should proceed to 
Moultan with the hopes of being able to meet therewith mer-
chants ready to contract for the goods lying at the factory at 
Scindy but in the event of these hopes being frustrated he 
should have it in his instructions to proceed even to Gandahar, 
it is imagined he could hardly fail of being able to effect the 
purpose of his mission, by these means no risk whatever would 
arise to the Honble Co. since the merchandize of which the ad-
venture might be composed would be paid for & delivered by 
the resident at Scindy, the gentlemen dispatched to Moultan & 
Gandahar would have an opportunity of procuring correct inform-
ation in regard to the extent & advantages of· a commerce of 
this kind & in the event of its not answering such expecta t-
ions, as might be formed of it nothing further would remain 
but to order the servants at Scindy to return to the presidency 
of Bombay. It is supposed that the Govt. at Bombay have a 
better opportunity than the framers of this report of becoming 
acquainted with the actual state of the government of Scindy 
but according to the information they have had an opportunity 
to collect, it appears to be secure as well as favourable to 
mercantile designs. 
Remarks applicable to the trade· of Arabia· & Persia: 
The following remarks are submitted with respect to the consid-
eration of the British Government in India. 
In obedience to the commands of the British Government in 
India, considerable exertions have been made to collect the in-
formation necessary for the formation of exact list of the 
annual importations, made during the last seven years at the 
different parts of the Persian Gulph & the Red Sea & of the ex-
portations made from thence to India in that period. The intell-
igence collected on the subject has proved, however, extremely 
partial, incorrect & unsatisfactory & it has been found imposs-
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ible to obtain the object of pursuit. The difficulty of procuring 
information relative to the commerce of the Red sea, the incorr-
ectness of the custom house account at most of the ports in the 
Persian Gulph, the practice of smuggling prevailing at those 
ports & the in ha bi tants of some of the governors of those ports 
to afford the required communications are causes which have 
operated to prevent the desired success. 
The desire entertained by the British Government in India to 
increase the commercial intercourse between the country & the 
Persian Gulph & the Red Sea will necessarily urge the servants 
of the Honble Company now stationed & those that may in fut-
ure be stationed there to exert themselves strenuously for the 
beneficial accomplishments thereof. It is however, conceived 
that the Honble Company's future consigments to Bussora can 
only consist of the articles already particularized & that the 
residency of Bushire cannot possibly on its present plans prove 
an advantageous establishment. It may not be improper to re-
mark that a very serious obstacle to the increase of the Brit-
ish Government commercial intercourse between India & the Per-
sian Gulph is occasioned by the unwearied attention of the mer-
chants of those countries to their own interest, as loses arise 
on all remittances made from the Persian Gulph to India, the 
commerce between them might even depend on the state of the 
market of the former which are generally overstocked with Ind-
ian commercial articles & as the merchants before mentioned are 
active, industrious, speculative & well informed & have not any 
other mode of employing their fortunes than in commercial dis-
putes, they are careful to profit by every opportunity of con-
veying to the Gulph the merchandize that may be in demand 
there. It has been remarked in this report that a loss has aris-
en on all the remittances latterly made from the Persian Gulph 
to India & it may therefore naturally be concluded that the Hon-
ble Company's remittances to India in the event of the com-
merce being there increased will labour under disadvantage, 
if however, their remittances are made to the residency of Born-
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bay on the vessels belonging to them, which are annually sent 
from thence to Bussora whether they consist of treasures or of 
the gruff articles of merchandize, they will not be liable to 
the charge of freight & in that respect, the Honble Company 
will have the advantage of private traders. 
It is understood that Honble Company suffer a very consider-
able loss in the remittances made by the British Government in 
Bengal, to the presidency of Bombay for the purpose of defray-
ing the expences of the establishment. If the produce of such 
consignments as may be hereafter made to Bussora on the pub-
lic account is ordered to be remitted to Bombay on the vessels 
belonging to the Honble Company, which are annually sent from 
thence to Bussora. The loss in question will be avoided & a 
loss avoided may fairly be considered as gain. 
It is conceived that the Honble Company might with propriety 
derive an advantage from the commercial intercourse carried on 
between India & the Persian Gulph, by means of vessels under 
British coulors, of which they have hitherto generously declined 
to avail themselves. 
From the year 1780 to the present period the British individ-
uals resident in India, a few instances only excepted, have 
ceased to engage in the commerce of the Persian Gulph & the 
trade carried on between those countries by means of vessels 
under British coulors has therefore, been principally cultivated 
by the Armenians & Muslim merchants resident in the British 
settlement in India, under the protection of the government, in 
vessels principally, their property furnished with British pass-
es & navigated by British captains & officers. 
It has long been customary in virtue of the resident at Bussora 
being in possession of a consulary Barik* for the representat-
ives of the Honble Company at the ports of Bussora & Bushire 
*Barque. 
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to collect the consulage of 2 percent on all imports, the proper-
ty of the British individuals made there, which consulage for-
merly amounted to a considerable annual sum. 
Until the year 1784, the consulage collected at each of those 
ports was equally divided between the Honble the president at 
Bombay & the resident there. The consulage since collected 
which in consequence of the trade carried on between India & 
the Persian Gulph, having been principally cultivated by the 
Armenians & Moslim merchants has dwindled to mere trifles, has 
in obedience to the commands of the Honble Company been divid-
ed into equal shares, one of which has been uniformly carried 
to their credits. 
The security which the property of the Armenian & Moslim mer-
chants before mentioned derives from its conveyance in vessels 
of the foregoing description & the dangers to the interests of 
the Honble Company in the Persian Gulph & the difficulties to 
their servants stationed there which generally attend & which 
during the late revolutions in the government of Bussora have 
so very particularly attended, the protection to the vessels are 
considerations of so serious a nature as to establish an opin-
ion that all property imported at Bussora & Bushire in vessels 
under British coulors should in justice be subject to the pay-
ment to the representative of the Honble Company. At those 
ports of the 2 percent consulage in question the British Govern-
ment in India will judge of the prosperity of issuing the necess-
ary orders for that purpose. The value of the imports made in 
the year 1787, at the port of Bussora & Bushire in vessels 
under British coulors amounted to near 20 Lacks of Rupees* & 
it is to be supposed that when peace takes place between the 
Ottoman Empire & his European enemies & the present troubles 
in the government of Persia begin to subside the annual im-
ports at Bussora & Bushire in vessels under British coulor will 
exceed in value the before mentioned sum. The share of the con-
sulage thereon which in the event of orders being issued by 
* 100,000 Tomans 
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the British Government in India for its collections would become 
the property of the Honble Company would amount to the sum 
worthy of their attention & the remaining share thereof if all 
owed by the British Government in India to become the prop-
erty of the residents at Bussora & Bushire would prove to them 
very acceptable emoluments & enable them with more facility to 
support in a becoming stile, the expensive establishment of 
their respective stations & the payment of 3 percent Company's 
duties & 2 percent consulage by British subjects on all their 
importations made at Bussora to the representative at that 
place of the Honble Company has been already mentioned as a 
disadvantage attending the British commerce in that quarter & 
it is conceived that the 83 paragraph of the Honble Company's 
general letter to Bombay of the 6th. April 1763 must mean to 
justify in certain cases the non collection of the customs in 
question at the ports of Bussora & Bushire. 
The following is a paragraph above mentioned. It appears but 
equitable that all goods which have paid duties to us at Tell-
ichery or any other of our factories should be excused paying 
the same over again when imported afterwards to Bombay or 
other of our settlements the property of such goods is not alter-
ed but if the customs of the place to which the goods are ex-
ported exceed the customs first paid them the full duties are 
to be charged to the owner & the only allowed to draw back 
the sum collected from the importer at the factory where they 
were first sold & this we apprehend to have been the general 
practice heretofore, particularly for goods bought at Bombay 
sent to Surat & sold there, the case is quite different when the 
property is changed, for then the customs at the last port must 
be collected in full from the importer without having any re-
gard to what may have been done before he bought or become 
possessed of the same goods & no draw backs must be allowed 
without producing certificates of the customs having been paid 
at the port where they were sold. The navigation of the Per-
sian Gulph is plain & easy & although the strong northerly 
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winds which generally prevail in it in the months of June & 
July render the passage from Muscat to any other of the ports 
both boisterous & tedious & the violence of the southwest Men-
soon prevents during the months of June, July, August & Septem-
ber direct passages being made from the ports of India to Mus-
cat. Yet by perseverence & skill, a passage may be made in 
a well found European vessel, may with propriety sail from 
· Bussora on a vessel to any port in India, in any day in the 
year. In the navigation of the Persian Gulph some danger is 
justified to be apprehended from pirates, in former times some 
English vessels have been taken by them & therefore, although 
the Persian Gulph is now on a tolerably settled & peaceable 
state & the British flag is there treated with great respect, a 
weak unarmed British vessel ought not to be suffered to under-
take a voyage from any of the ports in India to Bussora. 
The Dows & gallivats belonging to the different ports in the 
Persian Gulph are vessels of very considerable force & many 
of the crews particularly those who navigate the Dows belong-
ing to the islands & coast, in the vicinity of Ormus are rapac-
ious & inclined to the commission of unjustifiable acts of viol-
ence on falling in with them a power of self defence is the 
best security that the commander of an English vessel can have 
for their good be ha vi our. 
The framers of the present report have in the course of it res-
pectfully ventured to give it as their opinion that the establish-
ment of British factories at the ports of Mocha & Muscat might 
prove measures beneficial to the commercial interests of the Hon-
ble Company & that a new modification of the residency at 
Bushire might tend materially to the encrease of the British com-
mercial intercourse with the kingdom of Persia. It is a remark 
equally applicable both to Persia & Arabia that the merchants 
of those countries are pleased at the establishment therein of 
European factories conceiving the heads of them to be eligible 
media tors between themselves & the government in the times of 
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difficulty & distress. 
The framers of this report beg leave previous to its conclusion 
to give it as their decided opinion that the success of the 
British general commercial intercourse with Arabia & Persia & 
of the particular plans for its increase which they have point-
ed out must ever principally depend on the propriety of the 
conduct of the gentlemen under whose management they may be 
prosecuted & to express a hope that as the duties of their stat-
ions must necessarily often place them in situations replete by 
delicacy & difficulty their Honble employers will fix their inten-
tions not their success, as the criterion by which to judge of 
their merits in order to facilitate the transactions of commerc-
ial affaires at those places where English factories are or may 
in future be established, the servants of the Honble Company 
must uniformly be steady, temperate & by cautious measures en-
deavour to acquire sufficient influence with the people of the 
government to secure their constant & ieffectual support & fa v- ,-
our by a mild & easy mode of managing business strive to give 
encouragement to such merchants as may wish to have dealings 
with them, who might by contrary conduct be deterred from mak-
ing offers advantageous to the Honble Company & in order to 
secure a peaceable & safe navigation of the Persian Gulph to 
British vessels must uniformly observe a wary & moderate con-
duct, they must be prepared for defence & caution not to offend 
wanton acts of hospitality & negligent security are equally dan-
gerous imprudencies. 
Bussora, 15th. August 1790. 
Signed: S. Manesty & Harford }ones. 
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I Tom an Dinar Mahmudi shahi Gaz 
I 
I 
I Toman 1 1000 100 I Gold 
I 
I shahi 
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I silver coin 
I . I 
I 
Abbasi 2 I 
I 
I 
Gaz 10 I 
I 
I 
Pool-e-siah 2 I I 
I 
Mahmudi 10 
Sources: Waring, E. , A Tour to Sheeraz; Ricks, "Thomas, Trade 
and Politics of South Persia, Appendix E, based on the . F. R. 
Gambroon, IV-XII. The date of this appendix is 1760 but there 
was no source for the particular years under study. Therefore, 
we have compared the information prior and after that period 
of time. 
1. The value of the Toman was greatly depreciated in th~ early 19th century. Harford 
Jones states that one Toman was equal to one Sterling (Mission, Vol.!, p.377). In 
In 1787 it was equal to £2.10s. Malcol1 also states that there were 500 Dinars in 
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I Abbasi I 
I I 
1/-
This table is based on the information provided by Scott Waring 
in his travel book and also from a memorandum from M. Gilliers 
Basra, n. d. in the Archives Nationale, colonies, F2810, Commerce 
avec la Perse, 1686-1786. As there is no material precisely rele-
vant to the period under study. 
1. One rupee is equal to one piaster, Francklin, p.19. 
2. Recorded by W. Francklin, p.19. 
3. Sir Harford Jones gives each £ Sterling equal to 15-16 piasters~ 
4. Sir Harford Jones gives 100 tomans equal to 1000 rupees in his introduction to 
The Dynasty of the Kajars, Persian· translation, p.42. 
5. Francklin states that 30-40 tomans equals 500 rupees. These were apparently Per-
sian rupees not Bombay rupees. (1878, p.133). 
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Mo~~mmad Rafic Eskandar Zaki 1 daughter 
I I I 
Musa I 
I I I 
Mo~ammad 






I I c- - I 
? Nazar Ali Shaikh 
I I CAli 
SabzcAli I · I I 
NaqclcAli FazlcAli I 
I I 
1aher I 
I le l cl c I c I le I I Kalb Ali Ebrahim Ali Abbas Ali ~osein Fat~ Ali 1 daughter 
I c I I _ I c I _ cl I I I 
Zaki Ali Naqi Hasan Nasrollah Mohammad Abdollah Ja far Farz 1 daughter 4 about 30 others 
• • ·Naqi I cAli 
c I I I I l . ! ! 
Abd 1 Ab lf th 3 d ht z M h d cAl" S-l h Lotf All Na af Kh sro o u a aug ers o amma 1 a e • I cAl" 
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Morad/ Qaytas Khoda Morad Allah 
c I _ I 
Ali Morad ~ 
I Seid Morid Vafs Morid Rostam Khin Shah Morid Yiri/yid Jahingir 
I M orad 
~- I I I --~ 
Shaikh Vais Esm~il MohammadcAli Allah Morad Hasan Morteza Qoli Najaf Qoli cAbdollah 2 daughters 3 
I 
Ebrahim 
1. His name is variously given, Mohammad Rahim Khan, G.M., p.220. 
c - -. -- - -2. One of them was married to Ali Aorad Khan, another to his son, Ahmad Morad Khan. G.M., p.220. 
3. Their names are given as Garshaseb and Gohar Taj, G.M., p.416. . --
4. She was married to Shaikh Vais Khan, 'Ali Morad Kh;~son, G.M., p.398. 
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